

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.


The Fourth Part.

Containing the

Cyrenaick
Megarick
Eleack
Eretriack } Sects.



LONDON,
Printed for *Humphrey Moseley*, and *Tho. Dring*.
An. Dom. 1656.





ARISTIPPVS.

THE CYRENAICK SECT.

ARISTIPPVS.

CHAP. I.

Aristippus, his Country and Parents.

THE estimation which Philosophers had daily gain'd among the Grecians about this time caused it exceedingly to multiply, whilst every Professour ambitious to be held wiser then his Master, and teaching somthing new, desired to have the honour to bee Author of a Sect.

The Succession of the *Ionick* Philosophy, which before *Socrates* was single; after him was divided into many Schooles, whereof some were but of short continuance, others had longer succession. Of the lesse durable were the

{ *Cyrenaick,*
 Megarick,
 Eleack,
 Evetriack,

so called from the places where the Professours flourished. Others of longer succession, the

Academick, } out of which came the { *Peripatetick,*
Cynick, { *Stoick.*

We shall first dispatch those which were of shortest continuance, whether that they were founded upon lesse reason, and were in short time broken, as ^a *Cicero* saith, and quite extinct by ^a *De Oratore* lib. 3. the strength and Arguments of the others; or that being instituted and founded in more obscure parts; they were not so lasting as those which were profess'd in the most flourishing City of *Athens*.

Aristippus a Disciple of *Socrates*, after his death, returned home into his Country at *Cyrene* in *Africa*, from whence the Doctrine which his Scholers retained had the name of *Cyrenaick*. ^b He was ^b *Suid.* Son of *Aretades*, ^c of *Cyrene*. ^c *Laert.*

CHAP. II.

How he went to Athens, and heard Socrates.

^a *Plut. de curiosit.* **F**rom Cyrene Aristippus went first to Athens, invited by the fame of ^a Socrates, concerning whom he fell into discourse with Ischomachus, meeting him casually at the Olympick Games, and enquiring what manner of disputes they were wherewith Socrates prevail'd so much upon the young men; hee received from him some little seeds and scatterings thereof, wherewith he was so passionately affected, that he grew pale and lean, untill to assuage his fervent thirst, he took a voyage to Athens, and there drunk at the Fountain, satisfying himself with the Person, his discourse and Philosophy, the end whereof was to know our own evils, and to acquit our selves of them. But as ^b Aristotle said, Philosophy doth harm to those who misinterpret things well said. Aristippus chiefly delighted with the more voluptuous disputes of Socrates, asserted Pleasure to be the ultimate end wherein all happiness doth consist.

^b *Cic. de Nat. Deor.* ^c *Cic. de Orat.* 3.

^d *Athen. deipn.* 12. ^d His life was agreeable to the opinion, which he employed in Luxury, Sweet unguents, rich garments, Wine and Women; maintained by a course as different from the precepts and practise of Socrates as the things themselves were. For, notwithstanding he had a good Estate (and three Country-Seats) ^e he first of the Socratick Disciples, took Money for teaching. Which Socrates observing, asked him how he came to have so much? he replied, how come you to have so little? A further dislike of this course Socrates express'd, when Aristippus sending him twenty minæ, he return'd it, saying, his Demon would not suffer him to take it.

^e *Zaert.*

CHAP. III.

How he went to Ægina.

^a *Athen. deipn.* 12. **L**eaving Socrates, ^a he went to Ægina, where he lived with more freedom and luxury then before: Socrates sent exhortations to reclaim him, frequent but fruitless, and to the same end published that discourse which we find in Xenophon. Here he became acquainted with Laïs the famous Corinthian Curtezian, who came thither yearly at the Feast of Neptune, and was as constantly frequented by Aristippus, for whose sake ^c Hermesianax saith, hee took a voyage to Corinth (mention'd among his Apothegmes)

^b *Athen. deipn.* 12. ^c *Athen. deipn.* 13.

To Corinth Love the Cyrenean lead,
where he enjoy'd Thessalian Laïs bed;

No Art the subtle Aristippus knew
By which the power of Love he might eschew.

^d Whilst he was upon his voyage to *Corinth*, a great Tempest ^d *Laert.*
arose, whereat he was much troubled: one of the Passengers say-
ing unto him, *we ordinary people are not afraid, but you Philosophers*
fear (or as ^e *Ælian*, *are you afraid like other people?*) ^f *Four Souls* answer-
ed he, *are not of equall value, & you hazard a wicked and unhappy life,*
I Felicity and Beatitude. ^e *Var. Hist. 9.*
^f *Agel. 19. 1.*
^g *Ælian. ibid.*

^h To those who blamed him for frequenting *Lais*; *I possess her* saith he, *not she me.* ⁱ *Lais* in emulation of *Phryne* gave admittance to all sorts of people, rich and poor, whereupon *Aristippus* reprehended by his servant for bestowing so much on her, who entertained *Diogenes* the Cynick gratis, *I give her money* saith he, *that I may enjoy her, not that others may not.* ^k *Diogenes* reproached him for frequenting the company of *Lais*, saying, *Aristippus, you and I converse with the same woman, either give over, or be like me a Cynic; Do you think it absurd, saith he, to dwell in a house, wherein others lived before, or to sail in a Ship that hath carried other Passengers? It is no more absurd to affect a woman whom others have enjoyed.*

At *Egina* he continued till the death of *Socrates*, as (besides the testimony of *Plato*) appeareth by this ^m Epistle of his written *In Phaedon.*
upon that occasion. *m Socratic.*

Of the death of Socrates, I and Cleombrotus have received information, and that when he might have escaped from the eleven Officers, he said he would not, unless he was acquitted by Law; for that were as much as in him lay to betray his Country. My opinion is, that being unjustly committed, he might have got his Liberty any way, concerning that all which he could do ill or inconsiderately must be just. From whence again I blame him not, as if he had done ill even in this. You write me word that all the friends and Disciples of Socrates have left Athens, out of fear the like should befall any of you; it is well done; and we being at present at Egina will continue here a while, then come to you, and wherein we are able, serve you.

CHAP. IV.

His Institution of a Sect.

Aristippus returning at length to his own Country, Cyrene, profess'd Philosophy there, and instituted a Sect call'd ^a *Cyrenaick* from the Place, by some ^b *Hedonick*, or voluptuous from the Doctrine. ^c They who followed the institution of *Aristippus*, and were call'd *Cyrenaick*, held thus.

^a Laert.
^b Galen. Hist.
^c Phil.
^d Laert.

C

They

ARISTIPPUS.

They rejected *Physick* and natural disquisitions from the seeming incomprehensibility thereof. *Logick* they handled because of its great usefulness. But *Meleager* and *Clitomachus* affirm they despised both *Physick* and *Dialectick* alike, as unusefull, for that without these, a man who hath learned what things are good, what evil, and able to discourse well, and to shake off superstition and the fear of death.

Sect. 1. Of Judgement und Judicatories.

d Laert.
e Cic. Acad.
Quest. lib. 4.

f Laert.
g Cic.

h advers.
Matthom.

^d They held that the Senses inform not alwaies truly, ^e that nothing extrinsecall can be perceived, those things only can be perceived, which are felt by inward touch, as grief and pleasure, neither know we what colour any thing is, nor what sound it makes, but only that we feele our selves affected after such a manner; that ^f Passions are comprehensiv, that objects not comprehensiv. That ^g nothing judgeth but by interior permutation, and the judgement of true and false consisteth in inward touch.

^h Sextus Empericus more fully. They assert that passions or affections are the Judges and the only things that may comprehend, & not fallacious; but of those things which cause passions, there is nothing which is comprehensible, or that may not deceive us. For, that we are made white or affected with sweet, may be said expressly and firmly, but that the thing which causeth this affection is white or sweet, cannot in like manner be asserted. For it is possible that we be affected with whitenesse from a thing that is not white, and with sweetnesse from a thing that is not sweet; as to him who is dim sighted or hath the yellow jaundies, all things seem yellow to one, dusky to the other, and he who pincheth his eye, thinketh he sees things double, he who is mad fancies two *Thebes's*, two Suns; in all these, they that are so affected, to wit, with yellownesse or duskyhnesse, or duplicity, is true, but that the thing which moveth them is yellow or duskyh, or double, is conceived to be false: So it is most consonant to reason, that wee comprehend nothing more then our own passions. For we must hold that the things seen are either the passions themselves, or the causes of those passions; if we say our passions are the things seen, we must likewise affirm all things seen, to be true and comprehensive; if we say the things seen are the causes of those passions, we must confesse all things seen to be false and incomprehensible. For that passion which happeneth to us, sheweth us its self and nothing more, so that to speak truly, the passion or affection it self is the only thing that is apparent to us, and for that reason, in their proper affections none erre, but in the externall object, all. The first are comprehensive, the second incomprehensiv, the Soul

soul being weak in the discernment thereof, by reason of places, intervalls, motions, mutations, and many other causes.

Hence they assert, that there is not in man any one common thing which judgeth, but they impose common names on the judgments; all commonly name white and sweet, but something common that is white and sweet they have not, for every man apprehends his own affection. Now whether the same affection happeneth to any one, and to him that is next him from white, neither is he able to say, as not receiving the affection of the other, neither can the other that is next him say, as not receiving his affection. There being therefore no common affection in us, it were a rash thing to assert, that whatsoever seemeth such to me, seemeth also such to him that is next me; for perhaps my constitution is such as to be whitened from that which externally incurreth, another hath his sense so ordered, as that he is affected otherwise. That therefore which is seen and appeareth is not common.

That by reason of the differing constitutions of the sense we are not moved alike nor in the same manner, is manifest from those who have the *Jaundies*, and those that are *purblind*, and those that are *affected according to Nature*. For as from the same object, some are so affected as to be *black*, others *red*, others *white*; so is it likewise consonant to reason, that they who are affected according to nature, by reason of the different constitution of senses, are not moved alike by the same things, but one way the white, another way the black, another way he whose eyes are blew, another way he whose eyes are black, whence we impose common names on things, having our selves proper and particular affections.

SECT. 2. Of the End, or chief Good.

TO these assertions (continueth *Sextus Empericus*) concerning the Judicatories, agreeth what they assert concerning Ends.

Of Affections, some are *pleasant*, some *harsh* and troublesome, some *mean*; the harsh and troublesome are *ill*, whose end is *griefe*; the *pleasant*, *good*, whose end, which cannot be deceived, is *pleasure*: The mean are neither good nor ill, whose end is neither good nor ill, which is an affection between pleasure and griefe. Affections therefore are the judges and ends of all things, and we live say they, observing evidence and liking, evidence in the rest of the affections, liking, in pleasure.

Laertius saith, they assert two passions or affections, *Griefe* and *Pleasure*; pleasure, a soft smooth motion; griefe, a harsh motion. One pleasure differeth not from another pleasure, nor is one pleasure sweeter then another pleasure; this pleasure is covered by all living creatures, the other shunned.

They

ARISTIPPUS.

They assert corporeall pleasure to be our ultimate end, as *Panæti*us saith in his book of *Señs*, not catastematick permanent pleasure, which consisteth in privation of griefe, and a quiet void of all disturbance, which *Epicure* held.

The End differeth from *Beatitude*; for the End is some particular pleasure; *Beatitude* is that which consisteth of all particular pleasures, wherein are included both the *past* and *future*. Again, particular pleasure is expetible *in it selfe*, felicity, *not* in it selfe, but for particular pleasures.

That pleasure is our chiefe end is manifest, in that from our first infancy, without any instruction of others, we naturally aime thereat, and having obtain'd it, seek nothing else. Moreover, we avoide not any thing so much as its contrary, griefe.

Pleasure is good, though proceeding from the most sordid dishonest thing, as *Hippobotus* in his Book of *Señs*; for, although the action be dishonest, yet the pleasure thereof is expetible in it selfe, and good.

Indolence, which *Epicure* held, they esteem not pleasure, nor want of pleasure, griefe, for both these consist in motion; but *Indolence* and want of pleasure consists not in motion, for *Indolence* is like the state of a sleeping man.

They hold, that some men may not desire pleasure, through perversity of minde.

All spirituall pleasures and pains arise not from corporeall pleasures and pains; for from the simple prosperity of our Country or our selfe, we are affected with joy.

But neither the remembrance of past goods, nor expectation of future compleat pleasure, as *Epicure* thought; for by time and expectation the motion of the soul is dissolved. ^{i Athen. deipn. 12.} Pleasure, according to *Aristippus*, is *μὲν ὅτι*, consisteth only in one part of time, the present; for the remembrance of past pleasures, or expectation of the future, is vain and frivolous, and nothing appertaineth to beatitude; but that only is good which is present. With those pleasures which he received heretofore, or shall receive hereafter, *Aristippus* said, he was nothing at all moved, the first being gone, the other not yet come, and what it will prove when it is come, is uncertain. Hence ^{k Æl. var. Hist. lib. 14. 6.} he argued, that men ought not to be solicitous either about things past or future, and that not to be troubled at such things is a signe of a constant clear spirit. He also advised to take care only for the present day, and in that day, only of the present part thereof, wherein something was done or thought; for he said, the present only is in our power, not the past or future, the one being gone, the other uncertain whether ever it will come.

Neither do pleasures consist meerly in simple sight or hearing, for we hear with delight those who counterfeit lamentation, and those who lament truely, we hear with displeasure. This privation of pleasure and griefe they called *mean states*. The

The pleasures of the body are much better then those of the soule, and the pains or griefs thereof much worle; for which reason those who offend actually, are most grievously punished.

To grieve, is more unnaturall to us, to delight, more naturall; for which reason, much more care is requisite for the ordering of one then of the other; yet, many times we reject things which effect pleasure, as being grievous; so that the concurrence of pleasures which effecteth beatitude, is very difficult.

Moreover they hold, that every wise man doth not live pleasantly, nor every wicked man unpleasantly, but so for the most part; for it is enough that a man be affected and reduced by incidence of one single pleasure.

They held, that ¹Griefe is the greatest ill; that griefe is not effected by every ill, but by the unexpected and unforeseen; that one man is more grieved then another. ¹ Cic. *Tusc.* ^{quest.} 4.

They assert, that Riches are efficient causes of pleasure; yet, not expetible in themselves.

SECT. 3. Of Vertue.

^m ALL good consisteth in *Pleasure*, Vertue it selfe is only laudable, as being an efficient cause of pleasure. ^m Cic. *de Offic.* 3.

"Nothing is just, honest, or dishonest by *Nature*, but by *Law* and *Custom*; yet a good man will do nothing that is evill, because of the censure or esteem which would fall upon his actions, and ^o that such a one is wise. ⁿ Laert.

Prudence is a good, yet not expetible in it selfe, but for the sake of those things which proceed from it. ^o So Casaubon reads, but doubtlesse there is a defect in the Text.

A friend is to be embraced for the use we may have of him, as the body cherisheth every part thereof as long as it remaineth sound.

Of Vertues, some are in the *unwise*.

Corporeall exercise conduceth to the acquisition of Vertue.

A wise man is not subject to *Envy*, *Love*, or *Superstition*, for all these proceed from the vanity of *Opinion*; but, he is subject to *Griefe* or *Fear*, as being *Naturall* accidents.

CHAP. V.

How he went to Dionysius his Court.

ABOUT this time *Dionysius*, the Sicilian Tyrant, flourished, ^a to whom resorted many Philosophers, amongst the rest *Aristippus*, invited by his sumptuous magnificence. ^b *Dionysius* asked him the reason of his comming, he answer'd, *to give what I have, and to receive what I have not*; or, as others, *when I wanted wisdom, I went to Socrates; now I want money, I come to you*. He soon insinuated into the favour ^a to a *Philosof.* vit. *Apoll.* ^b Laert.

ARISTIPPVS.

favour of *Dionysius*; for he could conform himself to every place time, and person, act any part, construe whatsoever happened to the best: and thus enjoying present pleasure, never troubled himself for the absent, as *Horace*.

*Every condition, habit, and event
With Aristippus suits with all content.*

e Laert.

Of his compliance with *Dionysius's* humour, there are these instances. ^e *Dionysius* at a Feast commanded, that all should put on purple robes: *Plato* refused, saying,

*I will not with a female robe disgrace
My self, who am a man of manly race.*

But *Aristippus* took it, and beginning to dance, said,

*If it come pure, a mirthfull Feast
Never corrupts a modest breast.*

f Laert.

^f Another time suing to *Dionysius* in the behalf of his friend, hee would not hear him; at last he threw himself at his feet, and his petition was granted; for which being reprehended, *Blame not me*, saith he, but *Dionysius*, whose ears are in his feet.

g Laert.

^g *Dionysius* shewed him three Curtezans, bidding him take his choice; he leading them all three away, said, *Paris* was punish'd for preferring one before the other two. But, having brought them to the dore, he dismiss'd them, as ready to condemn as accept: whereupon *Strato* (or as others *Plato*) told him, *You only can wear old garments and raggs*; for which likewise they admired him, that he would wear a thread-bare, and a rich Milesian Cloak with equal decorum, accommodating himself to both.

When *Dionysius* did spit upon him, he took it patiently; for which being reproved, *Fishermen* saith he, *suffer themselves to be wet all over that they may catch* [καβίον] *a Gudgeon, and shall I be troubled at a little spittle, who mean to take* * *βαλόν*?

* Which being pronounced is equivocal: for, *βαλόν* signifieth a fish like a Gudgeon, and *βαλόν* a Tyrant: as I find in a M. S. Lexicon communicated by my learned friend Mr. John Pearson, *βαλόν* ὁ τύραννος, *βαλόν* ὁ ἰχθύς: and again *Βαλόν* ὁ καὶ καβίον (read *βαλόν*) παραπλήσιος καβίον, confirmed by *Atheneus*, deipn. 7. 10.

h Laert.

^h He begged Money of *Dionysius*, who said to him, *You told me, a wife man wanted nothings; Give me, and we will talk of this afterward. When Dionysius had given it him; Now* saith he, *you see I do not want.*

By this complaisance, he gained so much upon *Dionysius*, that he had a greater esteem for him, then all the rest of the Philosophers,

phers, though sometimes he spoke so freely to *Dionysius*, that he incurred his displeasure.

¹ To *Dionysius* asking, why Philosophers haunted the gates of ¹ *Laert.* rich men, but rich men not those of Philosophers: Because, saith he, the one knowes what he wants, the other not.

² To *Dionysius*, urging him to treat of Philosophy: *It is ridiculous*, ² *Laert.* said he, *if you learn of me what it is, to teach me when it should be said.* Whereat *Dionysius* displeased, bad him take the lowest place, which he did quietly, saying, *You have a minde to make this seat more honourable.* ¹ The next day the Tyrant asked him what he thought of that place wherein he then sat, in respect of that wherein he sat the night before: He answered, they were alike to him; to day, saith he, because I left it, it is contemn'd, what yesterday was esteem'd the most honourable; that where I sit to day esteem'd most honourable, which yesterday, without me, was accounted the lowest.

³ Being asked why *Dionysius* fell out with him, he answered, ³ *Laert.* for the same reason he falleth out with others.

⁴ *Dionysius* saying, (out of *Sophocles*, as *Plutarch* affirms, who ⁴ *Laert.* ascribes this to *Zeno*)

*Who ere goes to a Tyrant, he
A servant is, though he came free.*

He immediately answered,
No servant is if he came free.

Dionysius offering *Plato* a great summe of money, which he refused; *Aristippus* being at the same time in the Court of *Dionysius* said, *Dionysius* bestowes his liberality upon sure grounds, to us who ask much, he giveth little; to *Plato*, who requireth nothing, he offereth much.

⁵ Another time *Helicon* of *Cyzicus*, one of *Plato's* friends, having ⁵ *Plut. vit. Dion.* foretold an Eclipse of the Sun, which when it fell out accordingly, he was much honoured for it: *Aristippus* jesting with other Philosophers, said, he could foretell a stranger thing; They demanding what it was: I prognosticate, saith he, that *Plato* and *Dionysius* will ere long be at variance, and so it happened.

CHAP. VI.

His Æmulators.

THis favour which he found with *Dionysius*, was perhaps the occasion, for which he was maligned by the rest of the Philosophers, amongst whom was

Xenophon

ARISTIPPUS:

^a Laert.
^b Memorab. lib.
2.
^c Laert.

^a *Xenophon*, who out of ill will to him, published the ^b discourse between him and *Socrates* about Pleasure.

^d Laert.

^c *Plato* likewise, through the same disaffection tacitely reprehends him, in *Phaedone*; for being in *Agina* at the time of *Socrates*'s death. ^d *Plato* being in *Dionysius*'s Court, when he was there, reproved his sumptuous life: Whereupon *Aristippus* asked him, whether he thought *Dionysius* a good man or not: *Plato* affirmed, he thought him good: Yet he, replied *Aristippus*, liveth much more sumptuously; therefore it is not incompetent with goodness.

^e Laert.

^e *Phaedo* likewise seemed to deride him, demanding who it was that smelt so strong of Unguents: It is I, unhappy man that I am, answered *Aristippus*, and the Persian King, who is more unhappy then I; but, as other things are not the worse for this, neither is a man. ^f A curse on those effeminate persons, who brought a scandal upon so good a thing.

^f Senec. de ben.
fic. Clem. Alex.

^g Laert.

^g *Æschines* also and he were sometimes at difference: Once, after some falling out betwixt them, *Aristippus* said to him, Shall we not be friends, shall we not give over fooling? or, do you expect some body should kick us into kindness? Willingly, answered *Æschines*. Now, saith *Aristippus*, remember, that though I am the elder, yet I yielded first. *Æschines* replied, and justly, for you are better then I; I begun the enmity, you the reconciliation. ^h *Plutarch* relates it thus; Being fallen out with *Æschines*, he met one who asked him, *where is now your old friendship, Aristippus? It is asleep*, saith he; *but I will awake it*: and going straight to *Æschines*, *Am I so unhappy*, saith he, *and so inconsiderable in your esteem, as not to deserve correction*. *Æschines* answered, *It is nothing strange, that exceeding by nature in all things, you should first know what is fit to be done*.

^h De ira Cobit.

Antisthenes is to be numbered also amongst those, who were displeased at his manner of life, as appeareth by an Epistle of his to that effect; extant amongst the Socratick Epistles, to which *Aristippus* returned this answer.

Aristippus to Antisthenes.

ⁱ Socratic. Epist.

9.
^j Ironically answering a former letter of *Antisthenes*.

WE are *Aristippus*, unhappy beyond measure; how can we otherwise, living with a Tyrant, daily eating and drinking deliciously, perfumed with choicest Unguents, attired in rich loose Garments brought from Tarentum: and none will deliver me from the cruelty of *Dionysius*, who detains me, not as a rude person, but one that is versed in Socratick learning; supplying me (as I said) with Meat, Unguents, Garments, and the like; fearing neither the judgments of Gods nor men. And now the misfortune is much encreased; He hath bestowed on me three Sicilian Virgins of extraordinary beauty, and many Urns of silver; and when this man will give over doing such things I know

not,

not; you do well therefore to be concern'd for the miseries of others; in requitall whereof I rejoyce in your happines, and return you thanks; Farewell.

The figs which you have, lay up against Winter, and the Cretan meal; for these things seem to be better then 'riches; wash and drink of the Fountain of Enneacrunus; wear the same garment in Winter as in Summer, and that sordid, as becomes a free person living under the Athenian Democracy: As for me, I knew as soon as I came into a City and Island govern'd by a Monarch, I should suffer those ills of which you write to me; Now the Syracusians, Agrigentines, Geloans, and the rest of the Sicilians ^m compassionately admire me; But ⁿ for my madness in coming inconsiderately to these unseemly things, I wish this curse to fall upon me, that I may never be quit of these evils; ^o because being of years of discretion, and pretending to wisdom, I would not undergo hunger and cold, nor condemn glory, nor wear a long beard; I will send you some great white Lupines to eat, after you have asked Hercules to the boyes; of which things it is reported you esteem it not absurd to discourse and write: but if any man should speak of Lupines to Dionyhus, I think it were against the rules of Tyranny: of the rest go and discourse with Simon the Leather-dresser, then whom you esteem nothing more wise; for I am not allowed familiarity with Artificers, because I live under obedience to others.

Notwithstanding, this jarring betwixt them, *Arifippus* was nothing backward in employing the Interest he had at Court, for some friends of *Antisthenes*, to preserve them from death; as this Letter of his to *Antisthenes* doth manifest.

1 The Locrian young men of whom you write to me, will be set at liberty, neither put to death, nor fined, though they were very near death.
2 Let not Anitthenes know I have saved his friends, for he loves not to converse with Tyrants, but with meal-men; and Victualers, such as sell meat and drink at Athens without fraud; and such as sell thick cloaths in cold weather, and such as serve Simon, these are not Riches.

Diogenes followed the example of his Master *Antisthenes* in deriding *Aristippus*,¹ calling him the Court-Spaniel. As *Aristippus* ^[Laert.] passed by, *Diogenes* busied about washing Herbes, called to him, laying, If you had learned to do thus, you needed not have followed the Courts of Princes; and you, said he, if you had known how to converse with men, needed not to have washed Herbes; thus expressed by ¹Horace.

Diog. On Herbs if Aristippus could have din'd,
The company of Kings he had declin'd.

Arist. *He who derides me, had he wit to use
The company of Kings, would Herbs refuse;*

1 For *Χρημα*
Χρημα read *Χρημα*
 initial of
Χρημα, as
Χρημα the
 last word of
 the following
 Epistle. A *Χρημα*
Χρημα,
 Scapice
 m. Make a point
 at *Χρημα* and
 read *Χρημα*
Χρημα
 Lortice, a ridic-
 ulous and a-
 cute irony; for
Χρημα
Χρημα signifieth to look
 on a thing with
 admiration,
 which is not
 proper to com-
 passion.

n Reau τῆς Δ
 ματίας πάλι,
 ας ἡμᾶν.
 ο τῶν
 οτι Δ
 p Socratic. E-
 piff. II.

q The Letter seems to be written to Ad-
risthenes; and
this meant iron-
ically.
r The Leather-
dresser.

f Laert..
t Epist. 1. 17

*I mine own jeaster ; thou the People's art,
My choice is of the better, nobler part,
I by a King maintain'd, on horseback ride,
Thou by the meanest people art supply'd,
Then those that do maintain thee thou art less ;
Yet to want nothing vainly dost profess.*

Theodorus in his Book of Sects, reproached *Aristippus* ; and
* *Alexis* the Comick Poet, in his *Galatea* bringeth in a servant
speaking thus of one of his Disciples ;

*My Master young on Rhetorick first intent,
Next to Philosophy his study bent :
A Cyrenæan liv'd at Athens then,
Nam'd Aristippus, justly first of men,
Esteem'd for subtlety and Luxury,
A Talent him my Master gave to be
His Scholer, but of Arts he none was taught ;
Save only Cookery ; that away he brought.*

CHAP. VI.

His Apothegms.

OF Apothegms, (in which kinde hee was conceived to
have an acutenesse beyond all the other Philosophers,) these
are remembered.

He once gave fifty drachms for a Partridge, for which being
reproved by another ; *you would have given a penny for it* saith he,
which the other granting ; *so much,* saith he, *are fifty drachmes to*
me.

Being demanded what was the greatest benefit he had re-
ceived by Philosophy ; he answered, *To converse freely with all*
men.

Being reproached for living high ; if *Magnificence were a sinne*
saith he, *it would not be practis'd upon daies of Festiwall to the Gods.*
To one who asked wherein Philosophers excell'd other men ;
Though all Laws were abolished saith he, *we should lead the same*
lives.

Being demanded how the Learned differ from the unlearned,
he answered, *as Horses unback'd from such as are well manag'd.*

Going into the house of a Courtezana, a young man of the Com-
pany blushed, to whom he said, *It is not ill to go in, but not to be a-*
ble to come out.

To one who desired him to resolve a Riddle, Thou fool, saith
he,

he, *why wouldst thou have me resolve that which unresolv'd finds us such entertainment?*

He said, *it is better to be a Beggar then unlearned, for one wants only Riches, the other Humanity.*

Being reviled, he went aloof off; he that reviled, asked why he fled; *Because saith he, to speak ill is in your power, not to hear is not in mine.*

One saying he saw Philosophers at the gates of rich men, and Physicians saith he, *at the gates of the sick; but no man would for that reason choose to be sick rather then a Physitian.*

To one who boasted he learned much; as they saith he, *who eat and exercise much, are not better then those who eat only to satisfy Nature, neither are they learned who make large but profitable collections.*

An Oratour pleading for him, and gaining the Cause, asked him, *what are you the better for Socrates?* so much saith he, *as that I make good those things which you alledged in my defence.*

He instructed his Daughter Arete to condemn all that is too much.

To one who demanded what his Son would be the better for Learning; if in nothing else, in this saith he, *that in the Theater one shal not sit upon another.*

Of one who would have preferr'd his Son to him, he demanded 500. Drachmes, *For so much saith the other I can buy a slave; Do so,* answered he, *and then you will have two (your Son; and him you buy.)*

c Plut. de puer. educ.

He said he took money of his friends, not to make use of it himself, but to let them know the right use of it.

Being reproached for entertaining an Oratour to plead his Cause; and when I would feast, saith he, *I hire a Cook.*

To one who boasted of his swimming, *are you not ashamed* said he, *to glory in the property of a Dolphin.*

Being demanded wherein the learned differed from the unlearned; *send them naked to strangers,* saith he, *and you shall see.*

To one who boasted he could drink much without being drunk; so, saith he, *can a Mule.*

Being blamed that he took money being the Disciple of Socrates; and justly, saith he, *For Socrates when they sent him wheat and wine, took a little for his present use, and sent back the rest, the chief of all the Athenians were his Purveyors, mine Eutichydes, a mercenary Servant.*

Being reproved by Plato for buying a great quantity of fish; *they cost me,* saith he, *but an obolus, would not you have given so much for them?* to which Plato assenting, *It is not that I am profuse then,* saith he, *but that you are covetous.*

Simon Pantler to Dionysius, a Phrygian, a man of ill conditions, brought him to his house paved curiously with marble; Aristippus spits in his face, whereat the other growing angry, *I could not find saith he a fitter place.*

Being

*I mine own jeaster ; thou the People's art,
My choice is of the better, nobler part,
I by a King maintain'd, on horseback ride,
Thou by the meanest people art supply'd,
Then those that do maintain thee thou art less ;
Yet to want nothing vainly dost profess.*

u. Lect.
* Athen. Deipn.
42.

*Theodorus in his Book of Sects, reproached Aristippus ; and
* Alexis the Comick Poet, in his Galatea bringeth in a servant
speaking thus of one of his Disciples ;*

*My Master young on Rhetorick first intent,
Next to Philoſophy his study bent :*

*A Cyrenae
Nam'd Al
Esteem'd f
A Talent
His Schol
Save only*

NOTE

This volume
tight binding and
effort has been
duce the centres
result in

* Suidas

* Laert.

OF Apothege
have an ac
are remembred.

^b He once gave
reproved by ano
which the other
me.

Being deman
ceived by Philoſ
men.

Being reproac

faith he, *it would not be practis'd upon daies of Festival to the Gods*
To one who asked wherein Philosophers excell'd other men
Though all Laws were abolisht faith he, *we should lead the same*
lives.

Being demanded how the Learned differ from the unlearned,
he answered, *as Horses, unback'd from such as are well manag'd.*

Going into the house of a Courtezan, a young man of the Com-
pany blush'd, to whom he said, *It is not ill to go in, but not to be a-*
ble to come out.

To one who desired him to resolve a Riddle, Thou fool, faith
he,

he, why wouldst thou have me resolve that which unresolved finds us such entertainment?

He said, it is better to be a Beggar then unlearned, for one wants only Riches, the other Humanity.

Being reviled, he went aloof off; he that reviled, asked why he fled; Because saith he, to speak ill is in your power, not to hear is not in mine.

One saying he saw Philosophers at the gates of rich men, and Physicians saith he, at the gates of the sick; but no man would for that reason choose to be sick rather then a Physitian.

To one who boasted he learned much; as they saith he, who eat and exercise much, are not better then those who eat only to satisfie Nature. neither are they Learned who make large but profitable collections.

the Cause, asked
ch saith he, as that I
efence.

temn all that is too

ould be the better for
that in the Theater one

to him, he deman-
der I can buy a slave;
(^c your Son; and him

^c Plut, de puer.
educ.

o make use of it him-

ratour to plead his
a Cook.

you not ashamed said

ffered from the un-
and you shall see.

ithout being drunk;

he Disciple of Socra-
sent him wheat and

Wine, took a little for his present use, and sent back the rest, the chief of all the Athenians were his Purveyors, mine Eutichydes, a mercenary Servant.

Being reproved by Plato for buying a great quantity of fish; they cost me, saith he, but an obolus, would not you have given so much for them? to which Plato assenting, It is not that I am profuse then, saith he, but that you are covetous.

Simon Pantler to Dionysius, a Phrygian, a man of ill conditions, brought him to his house paved curiously with marble; Aristippus spits in his face, whereat the other growing angry, I could not find saith he a fitter place.

Being

*I mine own jeaster ; thou the People's art,
My choice is of the better, nobler part,
I by a King maintain'd, on horseback ride,
Thou by the meanest people art supply'd,
Then those that do maintain thee thou art less ;
Yet to want nothing vainly dost profess.*

Theodorus in his Book of Sects, reproached *Aristippus* ; and
* *Athen. Deign.* * *Alexis* the Comick Poet, in his *Galatea* bringeth in a servant
speaking thus of one of his Disciples ;

*My Master young on Rhetorick first intent,
Next to Philosophy his study bent :
A Cyrenæan liv'd at Athens then,
Nam'd Aristippus, justly first of men,
Esteem'd for subtilty and Luxury,
A Talent him my Master gave to be
His Scholer, but of Arts he none was taught,
Save only Cookery ; that away he brought.*

CHAP. VI.

His Apothegms.

OF Apothegms, (in^a which kinde hee was conceived to
have an acutenesse beyond all the other Philosophers,) these
are remembred.

He once gave fifty drachms for a Partridge, for which being
reproved by another ; *you would have given a penny for it* saith he,
which the other granting ; *so much,* saith he, *are fifty drachms to*
me.

Being demanded what was the greatest benefit he had re-
ceived by Philosophy ; he answered, *To converse freely with all*
men.

Being reproached for living high ; if *Magnificence were a sin*
saith he, *it would not be practis'd upon daies of Festiwall to the Gods.*

To one who asked wherein Philosophers excelled other men ;
Though all Laws were abolished saith he, *we should lead the same*
lives.

Being demanded how the Learned differ from the unlearned,
he answered, *as Horses, unback'd from such as are well manag'd.*

Going into the house of a Courtezán, a young man of the Com-
pany blushed, to whom he said, *It is not ill to go in, but not to be a-*
ble to come out.

To one who desired him to resolve a Riddle, Thou fool, saith
he,

he, why wouldst thou have me resolve that which unresolved finds us such entertainment?

He said, it is better to be a Beggar then unlearned, for one wants only Riches, the other Humanity.

Being reviled, he went aloof off; he that reviled, asked why he fled; Because saith he, to speak ill is in your power, not to hear is not in mine.

One saying he saw Philosophers at the gates of rich men, and Physicians saith he, at the gates of the sick; but no man would for that reason choose to be sick rather then a Physician.

To one who boasted he learned much; as they saith he, who eat and exercise much, are not better then those who eat only to satisfy Nature, neither are they learned who make large but profitable collections.

An Oratour pleading for him, and gaining the Cause, asked him, what are you the better for Socrates? so much saith he, as that I make good those things which you alledged in my defence.

He instructed his Daughter Arete to condemn all that is too much.

To one who demanded what his Son would be the better for Learning; if in nothing else, in this saith he, that in the Theater one must sit not sit upon another.

Of one who would have preferr'd his Son to him, he demanded 500. Drachmes, For so much saith the other I can buy a slave; Do so, answered he, and then you will have two (c your Son, and him you buy.)

c Plut. de puer. educ.

He said he took money of his friends, not to make use of it himself, but to let them know the right use of it.

Being reproached for entertaining an Oratour to plead his Cause; and when I would feast, saith he, I hire a Cook.

To one who boasted of his swimming, are you not ashamed said he, to glory in the property of a Dolphin.

Being demanded wherein the learned differed from the unlearned; send them naked to strangers, saith he, and you shall see.

To one who boasted he could drink much without being drunk; so, saith he, can a Mule.

Being blamed that he took money being the Disciple of Socrates; and justly, saith he, For Socrates when they sent him wheat and wine, took a little for his present use, and sent back the rest, the chief of all the Athenians were his Purveyors, mine Eutichydes, a mercenary Servant.

Being reproved by Plato for buying a great quantity of fish; they cost me, saith he, but an obolus, would not you have given so much for them? to which Plato assenting, It is not that I am profuse then, saith he, but that you are covetous.

Simon Pantler to Dionysius, a Phrygian, a man of ill conditions, brought him to his house paved curiously with marble; Aristippus spits in his face, whereat the other growing angry, I could not find saith he a fitter place.

Being

Being demanded how *Socrates* dyed; as *I would wish to doe*, saith he.

Polixenus the Sophist comming to his house, and seeing there women and a great feast, reprov'd him, *Aristippus* gave him way, and after a little pause, *will you dine with me*, saith he? where-to he consenting: *why then*, continues he, *do you reprove me?* 'tis not the feast but the cost which you condemn.

His servant being upon a journey, weary with carrying of mony; throw away, saith he, what is too much, and carry as much as you can.

d *Horat. sat. 2.3.*

*He bad his slaves away his mony throw,
Because ore-charg'd with weight they went too slow.*

e *Laert. Cic. de invent.*

Being at Sea, and understanding the owners of the Vessell were Pirats, he took his Mony and counted it, then let it fall into the Sea, as unwillingly, and sigh'd: some affirm that he said, *it is better these perish for Aristippus, then Aristippus for them.*

He reprov'd men for looking upon goods expos'd to sale, and taking no care to furnish their minds. Others ascribe this to *Diogenes*.

Living in *Asia*, he was seized by *Antaphernes*, the King's Lieutenant, whereupon one saying to him, And where is now your confidence? When, said he, you fool, should I be confident, if not now, when I shall meet with *Antaphernes*.

Those who forsook Philosophy, to apply themselves to Mechanicall Sciences, he compared to the Suitors of *Penelope*; they could get the good wills of *Melantho*, *Polydora*, and others of the servants, but could not obtain the Mistress in Marriage. Not unlike is that of *Aristo*, who said, that *Ulysses*, when he went to Hell, saw all the dead, and spoke to them, but could not come so much as to the sight of the Queen.

Being demanded what Boyes ought to learn? That, saith he, which they ought to practise when they are men.

To one who accused him for going from *Socrates* to *Dionysius*: To *Socrates*, saith he, I went for *mudra*, education; to *Dionysius* for *mudra*, recreation.

To a Curtezan, who told him she was with child by him: You know that no more, said he, then if passing through a bush, you should say, this thorn prick'd you.

To one, who blamed him, that he took Mony of *Dionysius*, Plato a Book; he answered, I want Mony, Plato Books.

f *Plut. de tranq. anim.*

Having lost a great Farm, he said to one, who seem'd excessively to compassionate his losse, You have but one field, I have three left; why should not I rather grieve for you. It is madness (adds *Plutarch*) to lament for what is lost, and not rejoyce for what is left.

g *Stob. Eth. 46.*

When one told him, the land is lost for your sake; Better, saith he,

he, is it, that the land be lost for me, then **I** for the land.

^h Seeing one angry vent his passion in words; *Let us not, saith* ^h St. Eth. 99.
he, *suit words to our anger, but appease our anger with words.*

Seeing a little Woman exceeding fair; *This, faith he, is a little*
evill, but a great beauty. They who invert these words, and read,
 a little fair one, but great evill, mistake the meaning of *Aristippus*,
 who plaies upon that ordinary saying, applying the inversion to
 his own luxurious humour.

^k To one, who demanded his advice whether he should marry or no: he said no, *if you take a fair wife, saith he, she will be common, if foul, a fury.*

¹He used to advise young men to *carry such provision*, as in a ¹ St. Eth. 219.
shipwreck they might swim away withall.

^m As a shoe that is too big is unfit for use, so is a great estate; the bignesse of the shoe troubles the wearer; wealth may be used upon occasions, either wholly or in part. ^m St. Eph. 229.

PLATE VIII.

His writings.

¹Some affirme (of whom is *Soficrates*) that he wrot nothing at *Laert.*
Call: others that he wrot

The *Lybian History*, three Books dedicated to *Dionysius*.

Dialogues twenty five (or rather twenty three; for, the number

seemes corrupt) in one Book; some in the Attick dialect, others

in the Dorick: their Titles these: 1. *Artabazus*. 2. *To the Shbrwrackt*.

3. To Exiles. 4. To a poor man. 5. To Laïs. 6. To Porus. 7. To Laïs

concerning a Looking glass. 8. Hermias. 9. The Dream. 10. To the

Cup-bearer. 11. *Philomelus*. 12. *To servants*. 13. *To those who repro-*

ved him for using old wine and common women. 14. To those who repro-

red him for feasting. 15. *An Epistle to Arete.* 16. *To the Olympick*

exerciser. 17. An Interrogation. 18. Another Interrogation. 19. ^b A

Christ to Dionysius. 20. Another on an image. 21. Another on Dio-

nyhus his Daughter. 22. To one who conceived himselfe dishonoured.

23. To one who endeavoured to give advice.

of the (re-) Discovery of the *MLT* in 1973

of these (viz. to Dionysius his Daughter) Vossius inserts amongst the Greek Histories; if that
it is likely this to Dionysus was of the same Nature

Exercitationes six Bookes.

'Of pleasure, mention'd by Laertius in the life of Epicure.

Of Physiology, out of which Laertius cites, that Pythagoras was so named, because he spake no less truth then Pythius.

Of the luxury of the *Antients*, four Books, containing examples

of those who indulged to love and pleasure; as, the love of ^dEm-

pedocles to *Pausanias*, in the first Book; of *Cratea* to her son *Perian-*

E der :

der: of Aristotle to the Concubine of Hermias, in the fourth, of Socrates to Alcibiades, Xenophon to Clinias, Plato to Aster, Xenocrates to Polemo. But, these latter instances show, that these Books were not writ by this Aristippus.

Epistles, four are extant under his name, in the Socratic collection, put forth by Leo Allatius.

f Laert.

g Socion and Panæius reckon his treatises thus,

Of discipline.

Of vertue, an Exhortation.

Artabazus.

The shipwrackt.

The banish'd.

Exercitations six

Chria three.

To Lais.

To Porus.

To Socrates.

Of Fortune.

CHAP. VIII.

His death.

HAVING lived long with Dionysius, at last his daughter Arete sent to him, to desire him that he would come to Cyrene to her, to order her affairs; for, that she was in danger of oppression by the Magistrates. Aristippus hereupon took leave of Dionysius, and being on his voyage, fell sick by the way, and was forced to put in at Lipara, an Æolian Island, where he dyed, as may be gathered from this Epistle, which he then sent to his Daughter.

a Socy. Epist.

27.

b So supply'd by Leo Allatius.

^a Aristippus to ^b Arete.

I Received your Letter by Teleus, wherein you desire me to make all possible hast to Cyrene, because your businesse with the Prefects giveth not to your minde, and your Husband is unfit to manage your domestick affairs, by reason of his bashfulness, and being accustomed to a retired life, remote from the publick. Wherefore as soon as I got leave of Dionysius, I sailed towards you, and being upon my journey, fell sick by the way at Lipara, where the friends of Sonicus provide carefully for me, with such humanity, as is needfull for one neer death. As for your demand, what respect you should give those whom I manumised, who profess they will never desert Aristippus whilst they have strength; but, ever serve him and you; trust them in all things, they have learned from me not to be false. For your selfe, I advise you to apply your selfe to the Magistrates, which counsell will profit you, if you affect not rather to have

have much: You will live most at ease if you condemn excess; for, they cannot be so unjust as to leave you in want. You have two Orchards left sufficient to maintain you plentifully: and that possession in Bernicia, if alone left you, were sufficient to supply you fully. I do not counsel you to neglect small things; but, not to be troubled for small things, since vexation is not good even for great. If when I am dead, you want my advice for the education of young Aristippus, go to Athens, and above all, esteem Xantippe and Myrto, who have often spoke to me to bring you to the Eleusinian Festivals. Whilst you lead this pleasant life with these, let the Cyrenæan Præfets be as unjust as they please, in your natural * and they cannot prejudice you. Endeavour to live with Xantippe and Myrto, as I did heretofore with Socrates, composing your selfe to their conversations; for, pride is not proper in that place. If Tyrocles, the son of Socrates, who lived with me at Megara, come to Cyrene, it will be well done to supply him; and to respect as your own son. If you will not nurse a daughter, because of the great trouble it gives you, send for the daughter of Eubois, to whom you have heretofore expressed so much kindness, and named after my Mother, and I also have often called her my friend. Above all, take care of little Aristippus, that he may be worthy of us and of Philosophy: For, this I leave him as his true inheritance, the rest of his estate finds the Cyrenæan Magistrates adversaries. But, you writ me not word that any offered to take that away from you. Rejoyce, dear daughter, in the possession of those riches which are in your power, and make your son possess them likewise: I wish he were my son; but, being disappointed of that hope, I depart with this assurance, that you will lead him in the paths trodden by good men. Farewell, and grieve not for us.

Of his Children, besides this Arete his Daughter, whom he educated in Philosophy, is remembered also a Son, whom for his stupidity he disinherit, and turned out of doors; for which, being reproved by his Wife, who alledged, that he came from himselfe; He, spitting, said, This comes from me too, but profiteth me nothing. Or, as Laertius, We cast away all unnecessary things as far as we can from us.

Arete had a Son named from his Grandfather Aristippus, and from his Mothers instructing him in Philosophy, turnamed *μυρτιδιδης*.

Besides these two (Aristippus the Grandfather and the Grandson) Laertius reckons two more of the same name: One writ the History of Arcadia: the Other was of the new Academy.

His Disciples and Successors.

Of the Auditors of *Aristippus*, besides his daughter *Arete*, (whom he taught with much care, and brought up to great perfection in Philology) are remembered *Ethiops* of *Ptolemais*, and *Antipater* of *Cyrene*.

Arete communicated the Philosophy she received from her Father, to her Son *Aristippus the younger*: *Aristippus* transmitted it to *Theodorus the Atheist*, who instituted a Sect, called *Theodorean*.

Antipater communicated the Philosophy of *Aristippus* to *Epitimidus* his Disciple; *Epitimidus* to *Parabates*; *Parabates* to *Hegesias* and *Anniceris*: These two last improving it by some additions of their own, obtained the honour each of them, to have a Sect named after them, *Hegesjack* and *Annicerick*.

HEGES-

HEGESIAS.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

HEGESIAS, Disciple to *Parabates*, was surnamed *Death's Orator*, from a ^a book ^a Cic. *Tusc.* he writ, entituled *Amortis*, upon occasion of ^{qu. 1.} one who had famish'd himself nigh to death, but was called back to life by his friends, in answer to whom, hee in this Book demonstrated that death takes us away from ill things, not from good, and reckon'd up the incommodities of life, and represented the evils thereof with so much Rhetorick, that the ^b Val. *Max. 8. had impression thereof penetrated so far into the breasts of many hearers, that it begot in them a desire of dying voluntarily, and many laid violent hands upon themselves. Whereupon hee was prohibited by *Ptolomy* the King to discourse any more upon this Subject in the Schools.*

CHAP. II.

His Philosophy.

HIS Disciples were from him called *Hegeſians*. They held ^{Laert.} the same chief good and Evill with the *Cyreneans*; further asserting;

That Kindnesse, Friendship, and Benevolence are in themselves nothing; not expetible, but in respect of those benefits which cannot consist without those persons.

That Perfect Felicity is absolutely impossible, because the body is disordered by many troubles, in which the Soul shares, and most of those things which we hope are prevented by chance.

That Life and Death are in our choice.

That nothing is by nature pleasant or unpleasant, but by the rarity and unusuallness of things, or satiety, some are delighted therewith, others not.

F

That

That Poverty and Wealth conferre nothing to Pleasure, neither are the rich poor affected with Pleasure severall waies. Servitude and Liberty, Nobility and Meanness, Glory and ignominy differ nothing in this respect.

That to live is advantageous for a fool, indifferent to a wise man. That a wise man ought to do all things in consideration of himself, and preferre none before himself, for though possibly he may receive benefits from others very great in outward appearance; yet are they nothing in comparison of those which he dispenseth.

That Sense conferrs nothing to certain knowledge, for all act by the rules of their own reason.

That offences ought to be pardon'd, for no man offends willingly, but compelled by some affection.

That we should hate no man, but instruct him better.

That a wise man should not insist so much upon choice of good things, as upon evil, making it his scope and end to live neither in Grief; which they do, who are inclined neither way to the objects of Pleasure.

ANNICE

ANNICERIS.

CHAP. I.

His Life.



ANNICERIS was of Cyrene, Disciple to *Pythagoras*, yet *Suidas* saith he was an Epicurean, and that he lived in the time of *Alexander*.^{a Laert.} He was excellent in Chariot-racing, of which one day he gave a testimony before *Plato*, and drove many courses round the Academy, so exactly, that his wheels never went out of the track, to the admiration of all that were present, except *Plato*, who reprehended his too much industry, saying, it was not possible but that he, who employed so much paines about things of no value, must neglect those of greater concernment, which are truly worth admiration.^{b El. var. hist. 2. 27.}

When *Plato*, by the command of *Dionysius*, was sold as a slave in *Ægina*, *Anniceris* fortun'd to be present, who redeemed him for 20. or according to others 30. minæ, and sent him to *Athens* to his friends, who presently returned the mony to *Anniceris*, but he refused it, saying, they were not the only persons that deserved to take care of *Plato*.^{c Laert. vit. Plat.}

He had a Brother named *Nicoteles*, a Philosopher; hee had likewise the famous *Pedonius* to be his Disciple.^{d Suid.}

CHAP. II.

His Philosophy.

HIS Disciples were called *Annicerians*; They as the rest placed all good in Pleasure, and conceived virtue to be only commendable as far as it produced Pleasure. They agreed in all things with the *Hegeians*, but they abolished not friendship, good will, duty to parents, and actions done for our Country. They held,

That

That although a wise man suffer trouble for those things, yet he will lead a life nothing the lesse happy, though he enjoy but few Pleasures.

That the Felicity of a friend is not expetible in it self; for to agree in judgement with another, or to be raised above and fortified against the generall opinion is not enough to satisfy reason, but we must accustom our selves to the best things because of our intimate vicious inclination.

That a friend is not to be entertained only out of usefull or necessary Ends, nor when such fail, is to be cast off, but out of an intimate goodwill, for which we must also undergo trouble. For though they placed (as the rest) the chief end and good in pleasure, and professed to be grieved at the loss thereof, yet they affirm that we ought to undergo voluntarily labours, out of love to a friend.

THEODO-

THEODORVS.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

THEODORVS heard *Anniceris*, *Dionysius* the ^a *Laertis* Logician, ^b *Zeno* the Cirtican, and *Pyrrho* the ^b *Suid.* Ephestick. He was called the *Atheist*, because he held there was no God, & wrote a treatise ^c *Plut. plac.* (*Suidas* saith many) wherein he endeavoured ^{Phil. 17. Citi-} to refell all arguments to the contrary, out of ^{de nat. deor. 1.} of which *Epicurus* borrow'd much. Afterwards

he was abusively called *Gods*, upon occasion of a dispute with *Stilpo* to this effect. *Do you believe saith Stilpo, you are whatsoever you affirm your self to be? Theodorus* granting; then continues *Stilpo, if you should say you were a God, were you so? To which Theodorus* assenting, *Stilpo* reply'd; *Then impious man you are a Bird, or any thing else by the same reason.*

He was ejected out of *Cyrene* by the Citizens; whereupon hee said pleasantly; *You do not well Cyreneans to thrust me out of Lybia into Greece.* Thence he went to *Athens*, where he should have been cited to the Court of *Areopagus*, and lost his life, but that he was freed by *Demetrius Phalereus*. Being likewise banished thence, he went to *Ptolomy* the Son of *Lagus*, with whom he lived, and was by him sent on Embassy to *Lysimachus*, to whom speaking Atheistically; *Lysimachus* said, *Are not you that Theodorus that was banished Athens,* he answered, *it is true, the Athenians when they could bear me no longer, as Semele Bacchus, cast me out.* *Lysimachus* reply'd, *See that you come no more to me;* No answered he, *unless Ptolomy send me.* *Mythro* Son of *Lysimachus* being present, said, *you seem not only ignorant of the Gods but of Kings.* How saith he, *am I ignorant of the Gods, who believe you an Enemy to them?* *Lysimachus* threatened them with Death; ^d *you* glory saith he in a great matter, a *Cantharides* can do as much. Or as ^d *Sen de* *Stobaeus*, *I knew not that you had not the power of a King but of poison.* ^{trang. anim. 6.} ^{Cic. Tusc. qu. 1.} ^{Plut. an vitios.} ^{ad infel. suff.} Hereat incensed, he commanded he should be crucified; *Threaten* saith he, *those things I pray to your purple Nobles; it is all one to Theodorus whether he rot above or under ground.*

Finally he went to *Cyrene*, and lived with *Marius* in much repute, in that City out of which he was first ejected.

G

Disputing

THEODORVS:

Disputing with *Euryclides* a Priest, he asked, what persons those were who defile mysteries: *Euryclides* answered, Those who communicate them to persons not initiated. Then, replied he, you do impiously, in declaring them to such.

What others ascribe to *Aristippus* and *Diogenes*, some attribute to *Theodorus* and *Marcellus*, a Cynick, who saying, You would not want Disciples if you washed Herbs: *Theodorus* answer'd, Neither would you wash Herbs, if you knew how to converse with Men.

He said of *Hipparchia* the Wife of *Crates*; This is she who hath given over the Shuttle to put on a Cloak.

CHAP. II.

His Philosophy.

^a Said. in So-
crate.

^b Laert.

HE taught all manner of Learning, and instituted a Sect, called *Theodorean*.^a He asserted Indifference, that there is no difference of things.

^b That our end, or chiefe good and greatest ill, are joy and sorrow; one consisting in prudence, the other in imprudence.

That prudence and justice are good things, the contrary habits ill, the mean, pleasure and grief.

He took away Friendship, because it is neither in fooles nor wise-men; those being incapable to make use of it, the thing it selfe vanishes, these not needing it, as being sufficient to themselves.

That it is reasonable that a wise man expose not himselfe to danger for his Country; Wisdome ought not to be lost for the preservation of fooles.

That the world is our Country.

That a man upon occasion may commit theft, adultery, and sacrilege, there being nothing in these naturally evill, if that opinion were taken away which is built upon the agreement of fooles.

That a wise man may publicly without shame *deponere xeros*.

He used such inductions as these: Is not a woman that is skilfull in Grammar, profitable in that respect as a Grammarian? Yea; is not the same of a youth? Yes. Is not a beautifull woman then profitable, as being handsome? Yes: Then she who makes right use of it doth not amisse. In these kinds of Questions he was very subtile.

THEODORVS.

21

CHAP. III.

His death, writings, &c.

^a **A** *Amphicrates* saith that he was condemned by the Law for Atheism, and drunk Hemlock. ^a *Laertius*

He wrot, besides that which appertained to his sect, many other things.

Laertius reckons twenty of this name: The first a Samian, son of *Rhæcus*, who advised to lay the foundation of the Temple at *Ephesus* upon Embers: For, the place being wet, he said, that Coales, when they forsake the nature of Wood, acquire a solidity not to be violated by moisture.

The second of *Cyrene*, a Geometrician, whose Disciple *Pytho* was.

The third this Philosopher.

The fourth writ of exercising the voice, a famous Book.

The fifth writ of Law-givers, beginning with *Trochilus*.

The sixth a Stoick.

The seventh writ the Roman History.

The eighth a *Syracusan*, writ *Tacticks*.

The ninth a *Byzantine*, a Sophist, ^b eminent for civill Pleas. ^b *Strabo*

The tenth of the same Country, mention'd by *Aristotle* in his Epitome of Oratours.

The eleventh of *Thebes*, a Statuary.

The twelfth a painter, mention'd by *Polemon*.

The thirteenth of *Athens*, a Painter, of whom writes *Menodorus*.

The fourteenth of *Ephesus*, a painter, of whom *Theophrastus* in his treatise of painting.

The fifteenth a Poet, who wrote Epigrams.

The sixteenth wrot of Poets.

The seventeenth a Physician, Disciple to *Athenæus*.

The eighteenth of *Chios*, a Stoick.

The nineteenth of *Miletus*, a Stoick.

The twentieth, a Tragick Poet.

BION.

THEODORVS:

Disputing with *Euryclides* a Priest, he asked, what persons those were who defile mysteries: *Euryclides* answered, Those who communicate them to persons not initiated. Then, replied he, you do impiously, in declaring them to such.

What others ascrib'd to *Aristippus* and *Diogenes*, some attribute to *Theodorus* and *Mitrocleus*, a Cynick, who saying, You would not want Disciples if you washed Herbs: *Theodorus* answer'd, Neither would you wash Herbs, if you knew how to converse with Men.

He said of *Hipparchia* the Wife of *Crates*; This is she who hath given over the Shuttle to put on a Cloak.

CHAP. II.

His Philosophy.

a Smid. in So-
crate.

b Laert.

HE taught all manner of Learning, and instituted a Sect, called *Theodorean*. He asserted Indifference, that there is no difference of things.

That our end, or chiefe good and greatest ill, are joy and sorrow, one consisting in prudence, the other in imprudence.

That prudence and justice are good things, the contrary habits ill, the mean, pleasure and grief.

He took away Friendship, because it is neither in fooles nor wise-men; those being incapable to make use of it, the thing it selfe vanissheth; these not needing it, as being sufficient to themselves.

That it is reasonable that a wise man expose not himselfe to danger for his Country; Wisdome ought not to be lost for the preservation of fooles.

That the World is our Country.

That a man upon occasion may commit theft, adultery, and sacrilege, there being nothing in these naturally evill, if that opinion were taken away which is built upon the agreement of fooles.

That a wise man may publicly without shame *Dequiritur Xenodou.*

He used such inductions as these: Is not a woman that is skilfull in Grammar, profitable in that respect as a Grammarian? Yea; is not the same of a youth? Yes. Is not a beautifull woman then profitable, as being handsome? Yes: Then she who makes right use of it doth not amisse. In these kinds of Questions he was very subtile.

THEODORVS.

21

CHAP. III.

His death, writings, &c.

A *Mphicrates* saith, that he was condemned by the Law for Atheism, and drunk Hemlock. a Lart

He wrot, besides that which appertained to his sect, many other things.

Laertius reckons twenty of this name: The first a Samian, son of *Rhæcus*, who advised to lay the foundation of the Temple at *Ephesus* upon Embers: For, the place being wet, he said, that Coales, when they forsake the nature of Wood, acquire a solidity not to be violated by moysture.

The second of *Cyrene*, a Geometrician, whose Disciple *Plato* was.

The third this Philosopher.

The fourth writ of exercising the voice, a famous Book.

The fifth writ of Law-givers, beginning with *Terpander*.

The sixth a Stoick.

The seventh writ the Roman History.

The eighth, a *Syracusan*, writ *Tacticks*.

The ninth a *Byzantine*, a Sophist, ^b eminent for civill Pleas. b Swid

The tenth of the same Country, mention'd by *Aristotle* in his Epitome of Oratours.

The eleventh of *Thebes*, a Statuary.

The twelfth a painter, mention'd by *Polemon*.

The thirteenth of *Athens*, a Painter, of whom writes *Menodotus*.

The fourteenth of *Ephesus*, a painter, of whom *Theophanes* in his treatise of painting.

The fifteenth a Poet, who wrote Epigrams.

The sixteenth wrot of Poets.

The seventeenth a Physician, Disciple to *Athenæus*.

The eighteenth of *Chios*, a Stoick.

The nineteenth of *Miletus*, a Stoick.

The twentieth, a Tragick Poet.

BION.

BION.

CHAP. I.

Bion his life.

^a Laert.



^b Athen. deign.

OF the Theodorean Sect was *BION*, a Beristhenite. What his Parents were, and what his employments, he diverted himselfe to Philosophy, he related to *Antigonus*, King of *Macedonia*, in this manner. *Antigonus* asked whence art thou? Who thy Parents? What thy Town? *Bion* perceiving himselfe to be reproached, answered thus, my Father was a freeman, ^{μυροπώτης} implying, he was a seller of salt-fish, a Beristhenite; he had not a face, but instead thereof a brand-mark, which declared the ill disposition of the owner: My Mother he married out of a common Brothel-house; [^b a *Lacedemonian* *Curtizan*, named *Olympia*,] being such a Woman as such a man could get. My Father, for couzening the State, was sold, and all our Family for slaves. I being a young likely youth, was bought by an Orator, who dyed, and left me all he had. I tore and burnt his Papers, went to *Athens*, and there applyed my selfe to Philosophy.

This is the blood and race I boast to own. Thus much concerning my selfe: Let *Perseus* therefore, and *Philonides* forbear to enquire after these things, and look you upon me, as I am in my selfe. You do not use, O King, when you send for Archers, to enquire of what Parentage they are; but, set them up a mark to shoot at: Even so of friends, you should not examine whence, but what they are.

Bion indeed, setting this aside, was of a versatile wit, a subtle Sophist, and gave many furtherances to the exercisers of Philosophy: in some things he was——

He first heard *Crates* the Academick; but, despising that Sect, took a sordid Cloak and Scrip, and became a Cynick: to which *Laertius* ascribes his constancy, expert of perturbation. Then he followed *Theodorus* the Atheist, who profest all manner of learning; to whose opinions he addicted himselfe, and was called a *Theodorean*: Afterwards he heard *Theophrastus* the Periparetick.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

His Apophthegms.

HE left many memorialls, and profitable Apophthegms; as, Being reprov'd for not endeavouring to Catch a young man; new Cheese saith he, will not stick to the hook.

Being demanded what man is most perplexed, he saith, he who aims at the highest Content.

To one who asked his advice whether he should marry or not, (for this some ascribe to *Bion*, which *Agellius* to *Bias*, the mistake perhaps grounded upon the nearness of their Names) he answered, if you take a fowl Wife, she will be a Torment; if a fair, Common.

He said, that *Age is the Haven to which all ills have recourse*, That *Glory is the Mother of years*; That *beauty is a good which concerns others, not our selves*; That *Riches are the Sinewes of Things*.

To one who had consumed his Patrimony, *Earth*, saith he, *devoured Amphiaraus, but you devour Earth*.

He said, *it is a great ill, not to be able to bear ill*.

He reprov'd those who burn men, as having no Sense, and again burn them as having Sense.

He us'd to say, it is better to yeeld our own youth and Beauty to others, then to attempt anothers; for he that doth so, injures both his body and Soul.

He vilified *Socrates*, saying, if he could enjoy *Alcibiades*, and did not, he was a fool, if he could not, he did no great matter.

He said, the way to the next World is easie, for we find it blind-fold.

He condemn'd *Alcibiades*, saying, when he was a boy, he drew away Husbands from their Wives, when a man, Wives from their Husbands.

At *Rhodes*, whilst the Athenians exercis'd Rhetorick, he taught Philosophy; for which being reprov'd, I bought Wheat saith he, and shall I sell Barley?

He said, they who are punished below would be more tormented if they carried Water in whole Vessells, then in Vessells full of holes.

One that was extremely talkative, desiring his assistance in a business, I will doe what I can for you saith he, if you send a Messenger to me, and come not your self.

Travelling with very ill Company, they fell amongst thieves; we shall be undone saith he, unless we be known.

He said, Arrogance is the obstruction of Virtue.

Of a rich man Covetous, he hath not money saith he; but money him.

He said, Covetous persons keep their Wealth so strictly, that they have no more use of their own than of anothers.

He said, when we are young, wee use Courage, when old, Wisdom. Wisdom excells other Vertues as the Sight the other Senses.

He said no man should be reproached for old age, that being a Condition all pray they may arive at it.

To an envious man said, I know not faith he whether some ill hath befallen you, or some good another.

He said impiety is an ill companion to bold language;

*For though his Speech be free,
To Bondage yield must hee.*

That friends whatsoever they prove ought to be retained: lest we seem to have conversed with wicked persons, or to shunne Good.

Being Demanded if there were any Gods, he said, *Old man, wilt thou not drive this Croud away.*

He conceived that he might make a Field fertile sooner by praising then by manuring it.

He said, they who love to be flattered, are like Pots carried by the ear.

To one who asked him what folly is, he said the Obstruction of Knowledge.

He said good men, though Slaves are free, but wicked men though free are slaves to many Pleasures.

He said Grammarians whilst they enquire after the Errors of *Ulysses*, mind not their own, nor see that they themselves go astray as well as he, in taking pains about uselesse things.

He said Avarice is the Metropolis of all Evill.

* *Athen.*

* Seeing a Statue of *Persæus*, under which was written, ΠΕΡΣΑΙΟΣ ΞΗΝΩΝΟΣ ΟΙΚΙΤΤΙΕΤΣ, *Persæus of Zeno a Citizian*, he said, the writer mistook; for it should be, *Zeno's servant*, as indeed he was.

CHAP. III.

His Death.

Laert.

AT last falling sick (as those of *Chalcis* say; for he died there) he was perswaded to suffer ligatures (by way of charme) hee recanted and profest repentance for all hee had said offensive to the Gods. Hee was reduced to extreame want of such things as are most necessary to sick persons, untill *Antigonus* sent

sent to him two servants ; and himself followed in a litter, as
Pharvorus affirms in his various History, of that sicknesse he dyed;
 on whose death thus *Laertius* ;

Bion the Boristhenite,
By his Birth to Scythia known,
Did religious duties slight,
Gods affirming there were none.

If to what he then profest,
Firm he had continued still,
Then his tongue had spoke his breast,
And been constant though in ill.

But the same who Gods deni'd,
He who sacred fanes despi'd,
He who mortalls did deride,
When to Gods they sacrific'd;

Tortur'd by a long disease,
And of deaths pursuit afraid,
Guists their anger to appease
On their hearths and Altars laid.

Thus with smoak and incense tries
To delight their sacred scent ;
I have sinn'd, not only cries,
And what I profest repent.

But unto an old wives charms
Did his willing neck submit,
And about his feeble armes
Caus'd them leather thongs to knit.

And a youthfull sprig of bayes
Did set up before his gate :
Every means and wayessaies
To divert approaching fate.

Fool to think the Gods might be
Brib'd with gifts, their favours bought,
Or the sacred Deitie
Were, and were not as he thought.

But his wisdoms titles (now
Turn'd to ashes) not avail
With stretch'd arms, I know not how,
Hail be cried, great Pluto hail.

Of this name *Laertius* reckons ten; The first contemporary with *Pherecydes* the Syrian, of *Proconnesus*; who writ two Books extant in his time.

The *second* a Syracusian wrote of the Art of Rhetorick.

The *third* this Philosopher.

The *fourth* an Abderite of the Family of *Democritus* : a Mathematician : he wrote in the Attick and Ionick Dialect : He first said there were some habitable parts of the earth, where it was six months day and six months night.

The *fiſt* of *Soleis*; he wrote the *Æthiopick Hiſtory*.

The *sixth*, an Oratour, who wrote nine Books entitl'd by the names of the Muses.

The seventh a Lyrick Poet.

The *eight* a Milesian Statuary; mention'd by *Polemon*.

The ninth a Tragick Poet, one of those who were called *Tayfici*.

The tenth a Statuary of Clazomene or Chios, mentioned by Hipponax.

THE

THE MEGARICK SECT. E V C L I D.

CHAP. I.

His Country and Masters.



^a **E**UCLID (instituter of the Megarick Sect) ^a *Laert.*
was born at *Megara*, a Town adjacent upon the Isthmus; though others say at *Geta*, a City of *Sicilie*.

He first studied the writings of *Parmenides*, then went to *Athens* to hear *Socrates*: Afterwards the ^b *Athenians* made an order, ^b *Agell. 6. 10.*
that if any Citizen of *Megara* came into the

City of *Athens*, he should be put to death: So great was the hatred the *Athenians* bore to the *Megarenses*. ^c *Thucydides* mentions this ^c *Lib. 1.*
Decree, whereby the *Megarenses* were prohibited to make use of any *Laws* within the *Athenian* jurisdiction, or the *Attick Forum*: Which Order the *Lacedemonians* requiring to be repealed, and not prevailing, the *Peloponnesian War* ensued thereupon, the cruellest and longest that ever was amongst the *Grecians*.

^d *Euclid*, who was of *Megara*, and before that Decree used to ^d *Agell. 6. 10.*
go to *Athens*, and hear *Socrates*, after it was promulgated, came by night in a long womans Gown, and Cloak of severall colours, his head attired in a womans Vail (so *Varro* expounds *Risa*) from his house in *Megara* to *Athens*, to *Socrates*, that he might be in that time partaker of his counsell and instructions, and went back again before that day in the same habit, above twenty thousand paces.

^e Upon the death of *Socrates*, *Plato* and the rest of the Philosophers, fearing the cruelty of the Tyrants, went to *Megara* to him, who entertained them kindly. ^e *Laert.*

CHAP. II.

His institution of a Sect.

HE affected litigious disputes, and ^b was therefore told by *Soc-* ^a *Laert*
rates, that he knew how to contend with *Sophists*, but not with men: ^b *Laert. vit.*
^c *Socr.*

c Laert.

d Laert. vit.

Diog.

c Laert.

Suitable to this contentious humour, he instituted a Sect, ^c first called *Megarick* from the place; afterwards *Eristick*, from the litigious-sophistical nature thereof: Whence ^d *Diogenes* said, it was not ^e a School, but ^e a *anger*: thus reprov'd by *Timon*,

*Of all these trifles, I not value ought,
Which Phædo nor litigious Euclid caught,
Who the Megareans mad contention taught.*

Lastly, it was called *Dialectick*; which name *Dionysius*, a Carthaginian first gave them, because their discourses consisted of question and answer.

He affirmed, that *there is but one good, which is called by severall names; sometimes Prudence, sometimes God, sometimes the Minde, and the like*: He took away all things opposite to good, saying, *there was no such thing*.

He used arguments not by assumption, but by inference.

He took away disputation by similitude, saying, that it consisted either of like or unlike; if of like, it were better to examine the things themselves to which they are like: if of unlike, the comparison is to no purpose.

CHAP. III.

His Apothegmes, Writings.

a De fraterno amore.

b Stob. serm. 82.

c Stob. Eth. 38.

d Stob. Eth. 47

e Laert.

f Laert. vit.

g Eschin.

g In voce Euclides.

HE was famous in the Schooles (saith ^a *Plutarch*) for as much as hearing his Brother in a wild rage, say, *Let me perish, if I be not revenged*: he answered, and *I, unlesse I perswade you to lay aside your anger, and love me as at first*. If ^b *Hierocles* (who relates the same story) for ^c *Zeno* writ not as *Plutarch* ^d *Zeno*, that epithite occasion'd the mistake.

^e He said, that *there is one kinde of sleep, a young pliant Deity, easie to be driven away; the other gray and aged, chiefly frequenting old men; Pertinacious and inexorable, from this God, if he once come, it is hard to get loose; words avail nothing, for he is deafe; nor can you shew him any thing that may move him, for he is blinde*.

^d Being demanded what the Gods are, and wherein they delight: *Of all things else concerning them, saith he, I am ignorant but of this, I know they hate curious persons*.

^e He wrot (besides other things) six Dialogues (^f *Panæti* doubts whether they were genuine or spurious) their Titles these,

Lamprias.

Eschines.

Phænix; or (as *Suidas*) *the Phænixes*.

Crito.

Alcibiades.

The Erotick.

Of the same names are numbered

Euclid the Mathematician, a Megarean also, whence confounded by ^b *Valerius Maximus* with the Philosopher: *Plato* (saith he) sent the undertakers of the sacred Altar (who came to confer with him concerning the manner and form thereof) to *Euclid the Geometrician*, yielding to his skill and profession: That these undertakers came to *Plato*, is evident from the testimony of many others; but, that he remitted them to *Euclid the Geometrician*; or, that *Euclid the Philosopher* own'd that profession, is no where to be proved. On the contrary, ⁱ *Proclus* affirms, that *Euclid the Mathematician* ⁱ *In Euclid lib.* was of the Platonick Sect; and that ^k *Ptolemy King of Egypt* asking if there were any shorter way to Geometry, he answered, ^k *The Text is* Not any Kings-high-way. From the death of *Socrates* to the first of the *Ptolomies* are 95 years. So that *Euclid the Mathematician* was much latter then the Philosopher.

οὐκ εἶναι τὴν σοφιστικὴν ῥητορικὴν ἐκείνην; ὡς δὲ αὖτε φησὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς πρὸς γαρυμψίας βασιλικὴν δόξιν ἔχειν, &c. and so (well nigh) *Varocius*,

Euclid the Archon in the second year of the 88th Olympiad, according to ^l *Diodorus Siculus*; but, ^m *Aristotle* names the Archon for that year *Euclees*, confirmed by his Commentators, and by ⁿ *Suidas*, who only erres a little in the distance of years betwixt him and *Euclid the other Archon*. ^o *Salmasius* not knowing the name *Euclees* to be any where found amongst the Archontes, and expressly affirming the contrary, endeavours to corrupt the Text of *Suidas* reading *Diocles*.

Euclid the Archon, in the second year of the 94th Olympiad.

Euclid the Soothsayer, friend to *Xenophon*, who ^p mentions him.

Euclid the Stone-cutter, named in *Plato's Will*.

^p *Exposit. Cyr. lib. 7.*
^q *Laert. vit. Plat.*

EVBVLIDES.

EVBU LIDES a Milesian succeeded *Euclid*. Some affirm, that ^a *Laert.* *Demosthenes* the Oratour was his Scholler, and that *Demosthenes* not being able to pronounce the Letter R, he taught him by continuall exercise to do it. He was a great enemy to *Aristotle*, and much aspersed him.

In *Dialectick* he invented many kinds of Interrogation or argument, *ἄδελμωον*, the Lying; *διαλαθάνοντα*, the occult; *ἐλέκτρα*, Eleetra; *ὕψιστοι*, the Vailed; *Σοφιστῶν*, Sorites; *Κακοῦντα*, the horrid; *φαλακροί*, the bald: Of which thus *Demosthenes*.

The

you know that I had this Even pair or not? the other confessing he knew not, Then saith he, you know and know not the same thing.

Sorites, By Cicero termed ¹ a Cervalis, who defines it to be ¹ Divin. 2. ² when any thing by degrees is added or taken away: as a Heap (² ~~Sorites~~) ³ m Cic. Lucul. is made by adding grain, or rather as ⁴ Julianus, when from things ⁵ n Digest. lib. 13 Evidently true, by very short Mutations the Dispute is led to such things as are Evidently false; the same, ⁶ Ulpian, The Common example mentioned by ⁷ Cicero, ⁸ Laertius, ⁹ Sextus Empiricus, and others in this: are not two a few? are not three so likewise? Are not ¹⁰ four the same? So on to ten. But two are a few, and therefore ten. ¹¹ o Lib. 48. ad Sabin. in tit. de verbor. & rer. signific. ¹² p In Lucullo. ¹³ q In chrysop. ¹⁴ r Adv. Logic. ¹⁵ s Lib. 5. in Mar.

~~Laertius~~ the horned; Denominated as the rest from the Example, What you lost not you have, you lost not Hornes, therefore you have Horns. Repeated by Seneca, Agellius and others. Of this kind ¹⁶ St. Hierome observes that to see which the Pharisees objected to our Saviour. He came (saith he) from Galilee to Judea, wherefore the sation of Scribes and Pharisees asked him whether it were lawfull for a man to put away his wife for any cause, that they might Entrap him by a Horned Syllogisme, whatsoever he would answer being liable to exception: if he should say a wife might be put away for any cause, and another taken; he being a Professor of modesty should contradict himself; but if he should answer, a wife ought not to be put away for any cause, he should be accounted guilty of Sacrilege, & judged to do contrary to the Doctrine of Moses, and by Moses of God. Our Lord therefore so tempers his answer, that he passeth by their trap, alledging for Testimony the sacred Scripture and Naturall Law, opposing the first Sentence of God to the second, which was granted not from the will of God, but Necessity of Sin. The same Father instanceth another of the same kind proposed to him, ¹⁷ I was assaulted at Rome by a very Eloquent person, with that which they call a Horned Syllogism, so as which way soever I turned I was more entangled. To marry a wife saith he, is it a sin or not? I plainly, not thinking to avoid his ambush, said, it is not a sin; He then propounded another Question, in Baptism are good works remitted or Evil? I with the like simplicity answered, sins are remitted: when I thought my self secure, Hornes began to bud out on each side on me, and the hidden forces to discover themselves: if saith he to marry a wife be not a sin, and that Baptisme remitteth Sinnes, whatsoever is not remitted is reserved. ¹⁸ Epist. 83.

ALEXINUS.

¹⁹ Amongst the many Disciples of Eubulides was Alexinus, an ²⁰ a Laert. Elean; a great lover of Contention, and therefore called ²¹ ~~Mythen~~ from redarguing; He most opposed Zeno.

Hermippus saith, he went to Olympia, and there profest Philosophy; his Disciples questioning why he lived there, he answered, he meant to institute a Sect, and call it Olympick, but his Disciples

EUPHANTVS. &c:

ciples wanting subsistence, and disliking the Air departed, he continued there solitary with one servant only, and swimming in the River *Alpheus*, was hurt with a Reed, whereof he dyed.

He wrote against other Philosophers besides *Zeno*. And against *Ephorus* the Historian.

EUPHANTVS.

^a Laert.

^a From *Alexinus* came *Euphantus* an Olinthian, Master to King *Antigonus*, Father of *Demetrius*, Grandfather of *Antigonus Gonatus*; He died of Age; He writ

The History of that time.

Tragedies many, which upon their publique representations were much applauded.

An Oration upon a Kingdom, to *Antigonus*, very Celebrious.

APOLLONIVS CRONVS.

^a Laert.
^b Lib. 14.

^a Of the Disciples of *Eubulides*, was *Apollonius Cronus*; ^b *Strabo* saith, he was a Cyrenæan by birth, and calls him *Cronus Apollonius*, implying the latter to be a surname from *Apollonia* a Town of *Cyrene*.

DIODORVS.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

^a Laert.

^b Lib. 14. &
17.

^a *Diodorus* was of *Jossus* a City of *Caria*; Son of *Ameinias*; *Laertius* saith, he heard *Eubulides*; ^b *Strabo* that he heard *Apollonius Cronus*, after whom he was called *Cronus*; the name of the Master being transmitted to the Disciple, by reason of the obscurity of the true *Cronus*; ^c of *Diodorus* thus *Callimachus*;

^c Laert.

—ev'n *Momus* ~~was~~
Upon the walls, *Cronus* hath wit.

He lived with *Ptolomeus Soter*, in whose presence being questioned by *Stilpo*, in such things as upon the sudden he could not answer; he was not only punished by the King, but reproached with the name of *Cronus*: whereupon he went from the Feast, and having written an Oration upon that question, died of grief.

CHAP,

CHAP. II.

His Philosophy.

^a *Trabo* and *Laertius* affirm he was a *Dialectick*; The *Dialecticks* ^{a Lib.}
^b (saith ^{b Cicero}) teach in their *Elements* o judge whether a con- ^{b Local.}
nex (a proposition which hath the conjunction *if*) be true or
false; as this, if it be day, it is light, how much is it controverted; *Diodo-*
rus is of one opinion, *Philo* of another, *Chrysippus* of a third; That *Dio-*
dorus laboured much herein, appears from an Epigram of *Callima-*
chus, cited and explained by ^c *Sextus Empiricus*.

^c *Advers.*
Gram.

^d *Pyrrh. Hyp. 2*

Concerning these propositions, the Disagreement of *Diodorus*
from *Philo* and *Chrysippus* (already mentioned by *Cicero*) is thus ex-
plained by ^d *Sextus Empiricus*; But when saith he, or how it followeth
they disagree among themselves, and those things whereby they deter-
mine a consequence to be judged, oppugn one another: as *Philo* said, it is
a true *Connex*, when it beginneth not from true, and endeth in false.
So that according to his opinion, a true *Connex* may be three severall
waies, a false only one way. For when it beginneth from true, and endeth
in true, it is true; as this, if it be day, it is light. Again, when it be-
ginneeth from false, and endeth in false, it is true: as this, if the Earth
flies, the Earth hath wings. Likewise that which beginneth from false,
and endeth in true is true; as this, if the Earth flies it is Earth: that
only is true which beginneth from true, and endeth in false. Such is this,
if it be day it is night. For if it be day, that it is day is true, which is the
Antecedent. But that it is night is false, which was the Consequent. *Di-*
odorus saith, that is a true *Connex* which is not contingent, beginning
from true, and ending in false. This is contrary to the opinion of *Philo*,
for such a *Connex* as this, if it be day I discourse, and if at present it be
day, and I discourse is according to *Philo's* opinion a true *Connex*: for
it begins from true, it is day, and ends in true, I discourse. But accor-
ding to the opinion of *Diodorus* it is false: for it may so happen, that
though it begin from true, to wit, it is day; yet it may end in false, to
wit, that I discourse when I am silent. Thus by Contingencie it may be-
gin in true, and end in false; for before I began to discourse it began
from true; to wit, it is day: but ended in false, to wit, I dis-
course.

And again, ^e for that we examine not many opinions concerning a ^e *Cap. eodem*
Connex, let us say that *Connex* is in it self right, which beginneth not
from true, and endeth in false. This, if there be motion, there is *Vacuity*
according to *Epicures* Opinion, beginning from true, to wit, there is
motion, and ending in true, will be true. According to the *Peripateticks*,
beginning from true, to wit, there is motion, and ending in false, to wit,
there is *Vacuity*, will be false: according to *Diodorus*, beginning from
false,

false; to wit, there is motion, and ending in false, to wit, there is vacuity, will be true, for the assumption, to wit, there is motion, he denies as false.

f Laert.

g. In lib. 1. Prior.

or.

h lib. 2. cap. 19.

ⁱ Some affirme, he invented the tailed and horned arguments (of which already in the life of Eubulides) & Alexander Aphrodisæus, saith he, used *Kuavovta λβov*, the dominative argument: Of whose originall and efficacy thus ^h Epictetus; The Dominative argument seemes to have been interrogated and collected upon such like occasions as these: for, there being a common fight amongst these three propositions to one another: The first, that every thing past is necessarily true. The second, that possibility followes not impossibility. The third, that what is not possible, neither is nor shall be true. This fight Diodorus observing, made use of the two first, to prove, that nothing is possible, which is not, nor shall be. And ⁱ Alexander, For that I be at Corinth is possible, if that I have been, or ever shall be there; but, if neither, it is not possible. It is possible, that a child to be made a Grammarian, if he be made such, in confirmation hereof Diodorus interrogated by the Dominative argument.

k Sext. Empir.

Pyrrhon. hyp.

3. 8.

He held, that nothing is moved, ^k arguing thus: If a thing be moved, it is either moved in the place wherein it is, or in the place wherein it is not: but not in that wherein it is; for it resteth in the place wherein it is: nor in that wherein it is not; for where a thing is not, there it can neither act nor suffer. Therefore nothing is moved: and ^l conse-

l Sext. Empir.

advers. Gram.

m Sext Empir.

Pyrrh. hyp. 3. 4.

n Stob. Ecllog.

phys. 13.

quently nothing is corrupted or perisheth. ^m He asserted, that the principles of things are least indivisible bodies, ⁿ in number infinite, in magnitude finite.

ICHTHYAS.

a Laert.

^a **ICHTHYAS** son of *Metallus*, an eminent person, is remembered amongst these Philosophers that are derived from *Euclid*: To him *Diogenes* the Cynick dedicated a Dialogue.

CLINOMACHVS.

a Laert.

^a Amongst these descended from *Euclid*, was likewise **CLINOMACHVS**, a Thurian: He first wrot concerning *Axiomes*, [Propositions] *Categorems*, [that part of a Proposition which is prædicated of the other] and the like.

STILPO.

STILPO.

CHAP. I.

Stilpo his life.

STILPO was of *Megara* in *Hellas*; he lived in the time of the first *Ptolomy*: Of the Masters which he heard are reckoned ^{a Laert.} *Euclid* the founder of this School: but, this agrees not with his time, as was before observed.

Some followers of *Euclid*, *Thrasymachus* of *Corinth*, friend to *Ichthyas*: So *Heraclides* attesteth.

^b *Diogenes* the Cynick.

Pasicles, a Theban, who heard *Crates* the Cynick, his own ^{b Laert. vit. Diogenis.} Brother:

Diocledes of *Megara*.

Cicero saith, he was very acute; much approved by those times: his friends (saith he) writ, he was much inclined to wine ^{lib. 4.} and women, yet relate not this in his dispraise; but, rather in his commendations, that he by Learning so subdued and repress'd his vicious nature, that none ever saw him drunk, none ever discovered any lasciviousness in him. *Plutarch* magnifies his height of courage, mixed with meekness and temperance.

He was much addicted to civill affairs. Besides his Wife, he kept company with *Nicareta*, a Curtezan: He had a daughter of ill fame, whom *Simmias*, a Syracusian, his intimate friend, married; she living incontinently, one told *Stilpo* she was a dishonour to him: No more, saith he, then I am an honour to her.

Ptolemy Soier much esteemed him; and when he took possession of *Megara* by conquest, gave him money, and invited him along with him to *Egypt*: Of the money he took a little, but absolutely refused the journey: Going to *Agina* stayed there, till *Ptolomies* returne. *Demetrius* son of *Antigonus*, upon the taking of *Megara*, gave order, that his house might be preserved, and whatsoever belong'd to him restored; and bidding him give them an inventory of such things as he had lost, he said, that he had lost nothing that belonged to him, for none had taken away his learnings: his learning and knowledge were both left.

With *Demetrius* he disputed of Humanity so efficaciously, that he became a studious Auditor of him.

Concerning *Minerva's* Statue, carved by *Phidias*, he asked a man, whether *Minerva's* Daughter of *Jove* were a God? He affirmed she was: But this, saith he, is not of *Jove*, but of *Phidias*;

to which the other assented: Then, saith he, she is not a God. Hereupon being cited to the Court of *Areopagus*, he denyed it not, but justified it, averring, she was not a God, but a Goddess: But, the *Areopagites* nothing satisfied with this evasion, ordered that he should depart the City. Hereupon *Theodorus* surnamed *Babe*, said in derision, How came *Stilpo* to know this, did he put aside her vail, and look upon her breast? *Theodorus* was bold of speech; but, *Stilpo* reserved, in so much, as being demanded by *Crates*, whether the Gods delighted in bent knees and prayers: Thou fool, saith he, do not question me in publick, but when we are alone together.

He was sincere and plain, void of all artifice: *Crates* the Cynick not answering him, but *ἀντιλογησας*, I knew, saith he, you would speak any thing rather then that which is decent.

Crates in propounding a question delivered a fig to him, which he took and eat: *Crates* presently cryed out, that he had lost his fig: Yes, saith he, and your question also, of which that was in earnest.

Seeing *Crates* halfe frozen in cold weather, *Crates*, saith he, *me thinks you want ἱματίον αἰῶνα*, (which one way implies a new garment, another way both a garment and wit) *Crates* ashamed, answered thus;

*Stilpo at Megara I saw oppress
Where vast Typhocus lies with weight oppress.
To hear him wrangle, many Schollers came;
Fair truth to chase away was all their aime.*

At *Athens* he wrought so much upon the people, that they would run out of their shops to see him: They wonder at thee *Stilpo* (said one to him) as a monster: No, saith he, but as a true man.

As he was speaking with *Crates*, in the midst of their discourse he went away to buy fish; *Crates* pursued him, crying out, that he gave over the discourse: No, saith he, I carry along the discourse with me; but, I leave you, the discourse will stay, the fish must be bought.

Stob.

Being asked, what is harder then a stone, he answered, a fool.

CHAP. II.

His Philosophy.

a Laert.

^a HE was Master of the *Megarick* School, excellent in *Eristick* Disputes, by his subtle Tenents and Discourses, beautifying himselfe, his Country and friends.

He took away all Species (*Univerfalls*) affirming, that he who

saith

saith, a man, denotes not any man, the Terme being not proper to this or that person, for why to one rather then to another, therefore not to this; and again, that which we see is not an Herbe, for an Herbe was many years ago; Therefore this was not an Herbe.

^b He likewise denyed one thing to be prædicated of another, arguing thus; if running be prædicated of an Horse, the subject is not the same with the prædicate; the definition of man is one thing; that of good another, so an horse is a differing thing from running; for upon Demand, we give severall Definitions of each; for if a man, and good, or a horse, and running were the same, how could good be prædicated of Food or Physick, and running of a horse, which are things so different. Thus he admitted no conjunction with the subject, in things which are in a subject, or prædicated of a subject, but conceived that both these, unlesse they be the very same with the subject, cannot be prædicated of it, even not as an Accident. This, though it were one of those little sayings which Stilpo sportively used to cast out amongst the Sophisters, Colotes the Epicurean opposed so eagerly, that he framed a large discourse against Stilpo, grounded only upon this assertion, (which yet he neither refelled nor resolved) affirming that by holding one thing is not prædicated of another, he takes away good life; But that Stilpo (saith Plutarch) was offended only at some words, and opposed the manner of speaking, but took not away the course of life, or abolished things, is most evident.

^c He asserted the chief good to be a mind not subject to passion. *c Senec. Epist.*

CH A P. III.

His Disciples.

He so far exceeded others in fluent discourse and learning, ^{a Laert.} that he converted almost all Greece to the Megarick Sect, *Philippus* of Megara saith, he drew *Meirodorus* surnamed the Theoretick, and *Timagoras* the Geloan, from *Theophrastus*.

Clitarchus and *Simmias* from *Aristotle* the Cyrenæan.

Of Dialecticks, *Peonius*, from *Aristides*.

Diphilus Son of *Euphantus*, and *Myrmex* Son of *Exenatus* coming to dispute against him, became both followers of him: Thus far *Philippus*: he likewise attracted

Phæsidemus the Peripatetick, excellent in Natural Philosophy.

Alcimus, the most eminent Oratour at that time in Greece.

Zeno the Phænician, an Epicurean Philosopher.

Crates, and others; in a word, whomsoever he would himself.

Heracledes saith, that *Zeno* the Citicæan founder of the Stoicall Sect was his Disciple.

CHAP. IV,

His Death, Writings.

H*ermippus* affirmeth that he died of age; but drank a draught of wine to hasten his end.

Suidas saith, he wrote 20. Dialogues; *Laertius* but nine; and those not very efficacious; their Titles these

Moschus,
Aristippus or *Callias,*
Ptolemæus,
Chærecrates,
Mitrocles,
Anaximenes,
Epigenes,
To his Daughter,
Aristotle,

He had a Son named *Dryso*, a Philosopher also.

THE

THE ELEACK & ERETRIACK SECTS.

P H Æ D O.

THe *Eleack* Sect was instituted by *Phædo*, an Ele-^{a Laert.} an of a noble Family ; It chanced that he was taken by Thieves or Pyrates , and sold to a House of common dishonest resort ; where being forced to sit at the door, he was observed by *Socrates* in passing, who noting the ingenuity of his countenance (which was extraordinary) perswaded (as *Laertius* saith) *Alcibiades* or *Plato*, or (as *Agellius* ,) *Cebes*, to buy him, from which time he addicted himself diligently to Philosophy, and was a constant Disciple of *Socrates* ; so much affected by *Plato*, that he ^d called that most excellent discourse of the immortality of the Soul, after him , *Phædo*.

He instituted a Sect called from him *Eleack* ; The Dialogues ascribed to him were

Zopyrus ,
Medus ,
Simon ,
Antimachus, or the old man ,
Nicias ,
Simmius ,
Alcibiades ,
Critolaus .

^b *Panætius* doubts whether any of these were written by *Phædo* ; ^{b Laert. vit.} *Medus* is by some ascribed to *Æschines* , by others to *Polianus* *Æsch.* as are also *Antimachus* and the Scythian discourses.

M

PHISTHE

PLISTHENES.

^a Laert.

^a The Eleack Sect was continued by *Plisthenes* an *Elean*; successor to *Phædo*; *Plisthenes* was succeeded by *Menedemus* and *Asclepiades*.

MENEDEMVS.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, Teachers.^a Laert.

^a *Menedemus* was one of those Philosophers that continued the School of *Phædo*, which hitherto was called *Eleack*, but from *Menedemus* was termed *Eretrick*: he was an *Eretrian*, Son of *Clisthenes*; *Clisthenes* was of the Family of the *Theopropida*; yet though noble by descent, Mechanick by profession and indigent; some affirm he was a maker of Tents (*Hesychius Illustri* terms him an *Architect*) adding that he taught both Arts to his son *Menedemus*, so that when *Menedemus* wrote a decree, an *Aleximian* Philosopher reproved him, saying, *it becomes not a wise man to frame both Tents and decrees.*

Menedemus being sent by the *Eretrians* with a command of Souldiers, to *Megara*, went from thence to *Athens* to hear *Plato* at the Academy, with whom he was so taken, that he gave over his Military employment.

By *Asclepiades* a *Phlyasian*, his intimate friend, he was carried to *Stilpo* at *Megara*, whom they both heard; Thence taking a journey to *Elis*, they met with *Anchypillus* and *Moschus*, who belonged to the School of *Phædo*.

Some affirm he despised *Plato* and *Xenocrates*, and *Parabates* the *Cyrenæan*; but admired *Stilpo*; concerning whom, being demanded his opinion, he only answered that *he was free.*

CHAP. II.

His School and Philosophy.

Being returned home to Eretria, he set up a School, and brought Philosophy there: the *Elia* & School being thus transferred to Eretria, was from thence forward called *Eretriack*. ^{a Laert.}

In his School there was no order of place, no seats round about it; but, as every man chanced to be sitting, or standing, or walking, in the same postures they heard him.

He held, that *there was but one vertue and good*, reprehending those who asserted more; whence of one who held there were many Gods, he demanded ironically *how many?* and *whether he thought there were more then a hundred?*

He was of a versatile wit, and in composure of his speech a difficult adversary; he turned himselfe every way, and found something to say for every thing: He was very litigious, as *Aristophanes* in his successions affirms, and used this question, *what is not the same, is different from that with which it is not the same?* Yes. *To benefit is not the same with good, therefore good doth not benefit.* He took away *negative propositions*, leaving only the *affirmative*; and of these he admitted the simple only; but rejected those which were *not simple*, calling them *conjoyned and complexe*.

Heraclides saith, he was a *Platonick*, and derided *Dialectick*. *Hexinus* asking, whether he had given over beating his Father? *I neither did beat him*, saith he, *nor have given over*. The other replied, *Either say yes or no, to dissolve the ambiguity.* It is ridiculous, saith he, *to follow your Lawes, when a man may withstand them in the very entrance.*

He writ not, or composd any thing, because (saith *Antigonus Carystius*) he was of no certain opinion: yet, in dispute he was so vehement, that he many times went away with black and blew eyes.

CHAP. III.

His manner of living.

HE contracted a strict friendship with *Asclepiades*, nothing ^{a Laert.} inferiour to that of *Pilades* to *Orestes*: *Asclepiades* was the elder, whence there went a common saying, that he was the Poet, *Menedemus* the Player.

^b When they were yet both young Philosophers, and indi- ^{b Athen. Deipn.} gent, they were cited to the Court of *Areopagus*, to give account
(^c accor-

^aSee life Solon. (^c according to Solon's Law) by what means (spending the whole day amongst Philosophers without any labour, and having no estate) they subsisted, and were in so good a condition: They desired, that one of the Masters of the common Prison might be sent for; who, when he came, attested, that they went down every night into the Prison, where the common malefactours grownde, and did there grinde, and in pay of their labour, received two drachmes: at which the Arcopagites much wondering, bestowed as an honourable reward upon them two hundred drachmes.

They had other Patrons that bestowed gifts upon them; *Archepolides* gave them three thousand pieces of silver; they both contended which should receive last, and in conclusion, neither accepted it. The chief persons that received them were *Hipponicus* a Macedonian, and *Egetor* a Lamiean: *Egetor* gave each of them thirty Minæ. *Hipponicus* gave *Menedemus* two thousand drachmes towards the marriage of his Daughters, which, as *Hæraclides* saith, were three, by his Wife *Oropia*.

For *Asclepiades* and *Menedemus* took each of them a Wife; *Asclepiades* married the daughter, *Menedemus* the Mother: *Asclepiades*, his Wife dying, took the Wife of *Menedemus*: *Menedemus* being made a chiefe Magistrate, married a rich Wife; notwithstanding, he allowed his first Wife an equall interest in the government of the House. *Asclepiades* having lived with *Menedemus* in great plenty; yet, with great temperance, died old at *Eretria*. At that time, one, whom *Asclepiades* much loved, coming late at night, intending to have feasted with him, the servants shut him out of doores: but, *Menedemus* bad them let him in, saying, *Asclepiades* would admit him even under ground.

Menedemus was much given to entertainments, and, because the Country was unwholesome, made many Feasts: what order he observed therein is thus delivered by *Antigonus Caryssi*, and out of him (though not cited) by *Laertius*. He dined but with one or two companions at the most; if any came to him, they were admitted after dinner was ended; if they came sooner then the set time, they walked short turnes before the doore, and demanded of the servants what course was carried in; if they told them fish-broth (with which they begun their dinner) they went away; if any flesh, they went into a room prepared for that purpose. In Summer time, *Menedemus* had the Couches or Beds of his Dining-room covered with flags and rushes, in Winter with sheep-skinns. Every guest brought a Cushion; the Cup they had was no bigger then a large spoon: instead of sweet-meats they had Lupines and Beanes: sometimes such fruit as the season afforded; in Summer, Pomgranats, in Springe, Pulse, in Winter, Figs. This *Lycophron* the Chalcidian confirms in his satyricall Comedy upon *Menedemus*, where *Silenus* speaks thus to the Satires.

*Sons impious of a pious Father, I
(You see) with your delights and sports comply :
But never by the Gods at such a Feast
In Caria, Rhodes, or Lydia was a guest.
How plentiful!*

And not long after,

*A little pot halfe full of water clear,
Rated at farthings five, a boy did bear
To every guest; about vile Lupines went,
With which the beggar's table's scarce content.*

Whilst they drank (after the feast) *Menedemus* proposed questions, and instead of a desert gave them discourse, which excited all to temperance and continence: these continued sometimes till the crowing of the Cock broke them off, much against the will of his guests, who never thought they had enough of them.

CH A P. IV.

His civill employments.

HE was first contemned by his Country-men, and called ^a *Laert.* dog and fool; but at last so much honoured by them, that they committed the government of the Common-wealth to his charge, ^b and paid him yearly two hundred Talents, whereof ^b *Laert.* he sent back fifty.

After he applied himselfe to civill businesse, he was so thoughtfull, that going to put Incense into a Censer, he put it besides. *Crates* reproaching him for undertaking publick employments, he sent him to Prison; whereupon as he chanced to pass by, *Crates* rose up, and saluted him with the title of *Agamemnonian*, leader of the City.

He was sent Ambassadour from the Eretrians to *Ptolomy*, and to *Lyssimachus* (much honoured wheresoever he came) and to *Demetrius*, all three Kings of *Macedonia*, of whom, *Demetrius* first reigned, then *Lyssimachus*, and after him (*Pyrrhus* intervening) *Ptolomy*. ^c *Euseb.*

Some accused him to *Demetrius*, that he would betray his City to *Ptolomy*, of which charge he acquitted himselfe by an Epistle, beginning thus, *Menedemus to king Demetrius, health. I hear that you are informed many things concerning us, &c.* advising him to take heed of one of those that were his enemies, named *Æschylus*. When he was on Embassy to *Demetrius*, he spoke very earnestly and effectually concerning *Oropus*.

Antigonus also, King of *Macedonia*, loved him exceedingly, and profess himself his Disciple: In his behalfe he made a Decree, clear and void of assentation, beginning thus; *Forasmuch as King Antigonus, having overcome the Barbarians in fight, returneth into his own Country, having good successe in all his undertakings: The Senate and people have thought good, &c.*

CHAP. V.

His Vertues and Apothegmes.

MENEDEMUS was of exceeding gravity, for which *Crates* deriding him, said,

Asclepiad the *Phliasian*, and the proud *Eretrian*, and *Timon*.

He supercilious bumbast speech begins. In this severity he was so awfull, that *Eurylochus* being invited by *Antigonus*, together with *Glippides*, a youth of *Cyzicum*, refused to go, fearing *Menedemus* should know it.

In reproof he was bitter and bold, of which *Laertius* instanceth his sayings to a young man over-confident, to *Hierocles*, &c. to an Adulterer boasting, &c. to a young man crying, &c.

Antigonus asking his advice, whether he should go to a luxurious banquet; not speaking whether he should go or not, he bad him send them word, that he was a Kings son.

One who intruded himselfe upon him, and discoursed very absurdly, he asked, if he had a farm; he answered, many: Go then, saith he, and look after them, lest in losing your rusticity you lose them also.

To one asking, whether a good Man may take a Wife, he said, Do you think I am good or not? The other assenting; But, I (saith he) have taken one.

Not able to limit the prodigality of one who invited him to supper, he silently reprov'd him, eating nothing but Olives.

This freedome brought him into danger when he was in *Cyprus* with *Nicocreon*, together with his friend *Asclepiades*; for, the King having invited him with the rest of the Philosophers to a Monthly feast, *Menedemus* said, this convention if it be good, ought to be every day; if otherwise, this day is too much: The Tyrant answered, that he had set apart that day to converse with Philosophers. *Menedemus* persisting in his assertion, demonstrated from what he had said of the sacrifice, that Philosophers ought to be heard at all times. Whereupon if one of the Musicians had not helped them to escape, they had been put to death, whence the Ship being endangered by a storm, *Asclepiades* said, that the humanity of the Musician preserved them, the roughness of *Menedemus* had undone them. He

He was negligent, and (as we said) carelesse in every thing that concerned the order of his School; likewise high-minded, and covetous of glory: insomuch that when he and *Asclepiades* first exercised the trade of building, *Asclepiades* was seen upon the house top carrying clay; but *Menedemus*, if he espied any man passing by, hid himselfe.

He was somewhat enclined to superstition; having eaten in a Cookes shope the flesh of something that had died of it selfe ignorantly with *Asclepiades*, as soon as he knew it, he grew sick, and looked pale, till *Asclepiades* reproved him, saying, *He was not sick of the meat, but of phancy.*

In all other respects he was a person of a great and free soul, in strength even in his old age equall to those who wrestled in exercise, strong made, swarthy of complexion, fat and corpulent; but of indifferent stature, as appears (saith *Luertius*) by his statue in *Eretria*, in the old Stadium; so exactly carved, that it expresseth the naked proportion of his limbs.

He loved *Aratus* and *Lycophron* the Tragick Poet, and *Antagoras* the Rhodian, but above all he was studious of *Homer*; next of the Lyricks; then of *Sophocles*: In *Satyres* he assigned the second place to *Achæus*; the first to *Æschylus*, whence to those in the state who defended the contrary part, he said thus,

*The swift in time outstript are by the slow,
A Tortoise thus an Eagle may outgo.*

These are verses of *Achæus*; they therefore are mistaken, who say he read nothing but the *Medea* of *Euripides*, which is put among the Poems of *Neophron* the Sicyonian.

Of *Bion*, who spoke with much diligence against Prophets, he said, *he murdered the dead.*

To one who said, the greatest good is to enjoy those things which we desire; it is a much greater saith he, to desire those things which are fitting.

He was violent (as we said) in controversie, but most affable in conversation and action: *Alexinus*, whom in dispute he had often circumvented and bitterly derided, hee gratified in deed; taking care for the safe conduct of his Wife from *Delphi* to *Chalcis*, the way being much infested with Theeves.

He was an excellent friend, as is manifest from his affection to *Asclepiades*, of which we have already spoken, only to *Persæus*, he was constantly a profest enemy, for it was known that when *Antigonus* for *Menedemus* his sake would have restored the *Eretrians* to their first liberty, *Persæus* withstood it, whereupon at a Feast *Menedemus* openly enveigh'd against him, using amongst many others this expression; *he is indeed a Philosopher, but of all men that are, were, or ever shall be the most wicked.*

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

His departure from Eretria, and Death.

THe friendship he held with *Antigonus*, made him suspected by his own Countrymen, as if he meant to betray the City to him; of which being accused by *Aristodemus*, he fled, and lived a while at *Oropus* in the Temple of *Amphiaras*: thence some golden Cups chancing to be stoln, he was by a publick decree of the Boeotians forbidden to stay there any longer, whereupon he returned privately into his Country, and taking his Wife and Children along with him, went from thence to *Antigonus*, where he died of grief.

But *Heraclides* on the contrary affirmeth, that whilst he was præfect of *Eretrians*, he often defended his Country against those who would have made *Demeirius* Tyrant thereof; Neither would he therefore have betray'd it to *Antigonus*; but that was falsly laid to his charge; he afterwards went to *Antigonus*, petitioning that he would restore his Country to their liberties; which *Antigonus* denying, he out of grief fasted seven daies, and so died; The same relation is delivered by *Antigonus Carystius*. *Heraclides* saith, he lived 84. years.

FINIS.


THE
HISTORY
OF
PHILOSOPHY.

The Fifth Part.

Containing the *Academick* Philosophers.



LONDON,
Printed for *Humphrey Mofely*, and *Tbo: Dring*.
An. Dom. 1656.



PLATO.



PLATO.

CHAP. I.

The Country, Parents, and Time of P L A T O.

TH E most eminent of all the Sects derived from Socrates was the *Academick*, so called from the *Academy*, a place in *Athens*, where the Professors thereof taught: This Sect was instituted by *Plato*, continued by *Speusippus*, *Xenocrates*, *Polemon*, *Crates*, *Crantor*, thus farre called the first or old *Academy*. *Arcefilaus*, succeeding *Crantor*, instituted the middle *Academy*, continued by *Lacydes*, *Telecles*, *Euander*, and *Hegesinus*. *Carneades* founded the new *Academy*, of which was also *Clitomachus*: Some reckon a fourth *Academy*, instituted by *Philo* and *Charmidas*: a fifth by *Antiochus*.

^a *Plato* was out of doubt an Athenian, nor are they to be credited who relate him ^b a Theban, born at *Cynoccephalus*; ^c *Anaxagoras* affirms his Parents to bee of *Collytus*. ^d Hee was born (according to *Phavorinus*) in the Island *Aegina*, in the house of *Phidiades*, son of *Thales*; his Father sent with others thither at the division of the Land (upon their defection from, and subjection by the Athenians, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War) and returned to Athens, at what time those Athenians were ejected by the Lacedemonians, in aid of the *Aegineta*.

^e He was of an eminent Family; his Father *Aristo* (Son of *Aristoteles*) of the race of *Codrus*, Son of *Melanthus*, who (as *Thrasylus* affirms) derived themselves from *Neptune*. *Melanthus* flying *Messena*, came to *Athens*, where afterwards by a Stratagem killing *Xanthus*, he was made King after *Thymocles*, the last of the *Theseide*. His Mother *Perictione*, by some called *Potone*, whose Kindred with *Solon* is thus described by *Laertius* and *Proclus*. *Execestides* had two Sons, *Solon* and *Dropides*: *Dropides* had *Critias*, mentioned by *Solon* in his Poems.



PLATO.



PLATO.

CHAP. I.

The Country, Parents, and Time of PLATO.

THE most eminent of all the Sects derived from Socrates was the *Academick*, so called from the *Academy*, a place in *Athens*, where the Professors thereof taught: This Sect was instituted by *Plato*, continued by *Speusippus*, *Xenocrates*, *Polemon*, *Crates*, *Crantor*, thus farre called the *first or old Academy*. *Arcefilaus*, succeeding *Crantor*, instituted the *middle Academy*, continued by *Lacydes*, *Telecles*, *Euander*, and *Hegesinus*. *Carneades* founded the *new Academy*, of which was also *Clitomachus*: Some reckon a *fourth Academy*, instituted by *Philo* and *Charmidas*: a *fifth* by *Antiochus*.

^a *Plato* was out of doubt an *Athenian*, nor are they to be credited who relate him ^b a *Theban*, born at *Cyncephalus*; ^c *Anaxileon* affirms his Parents to bee of *Collytus*. ^d Hee was born (according to *Phavorinus*) in the *Island Aegina*, in the house of *Phidiades*, son of *Thales*; his Father sent with others thither at the division of the *Land* (upon their defection from, and subjection by the *Athenians*, at the beginning of the *Peloponnesian War*) and returned to *Athens*, at what time those *Athenians* were ejected by the *Lacedemonians*, in aid of the *Aeginetæ*.

^e He was of an eminent Family; his Father *Aristo* (Son of ^f *Aristoteles*) of the race of *Codrus*, Son of *Melanthus*, who (as *Thrasylus* affirms) derived themselves from *Neptune*. *Melanthus* flying *Messena*, came to *Athens*, where afterwards by a *Stratagem* killing *Xanbus*, he was made King after *Thymocles*, the last of the *Theſeide*. His Mother *Perictione*, by some called *Potone*, whose Kindred with *Solon* is thus described by *Laertius* and ^g *Proclus*. *Execeſtides* had two Sons, *Solon* and *Dropides*: *Dropides* had *Critias*, mentioned by *Solon* in his Poems.

*Bid fair-haired Critias his Sire observe;
A wandering minde will from his leader swerve.*

Critias had Calleschrus, Calleschrus had Critias, one of the thirty Tyrants, and Glaucō (whom Apuleius calls Glaucus) Glaucō had Charmides and Perictione; Perictione by Aristō had Plato, the sixt from Solon; Solon was descended from Neptune and Neleus, [Father of Nestor.] Thus Laertius, from whom Proclus dissent only in that, that he makes Glaucō Son of the first Critias, Brother to Calleschrus, which Critias manifestly (saith he) in Plat. Charmides confirms, calling Glaucō (Father of Charmides) his Uncle. Thus was Plato descended both waies from Neptune.

g Dogm. Plat.

h Laert. ἐν τῷ
ἐπιγραφόμενῳ
Πλάτωνι
ὡς εἰρη-
perhaps it should
be Πλάτων,
ὃν περὶ δέειπνον.
amongst the writ-
tings of Speusippus
is mentioned
Πλάτων
ὡς γὰρ
i Sympos. 8. 1.
k Apul. dogm.
Plat.

There are (saith ^h Apuleius) who assert Plato of a more sublime race: Aristander, followed by many Platonists, thinks, he was begotten on his Mother by some Spectrum in the shape of Apollo: ^h Speusippus in his Treatise, entitl'd Plato, or περὶ δέειπνον, Clearchus in his Eulogie of Plato; Anaxilides in his second Book of Philosophers; ⁱ Plutarch, Suidas, and others, affirm it to have been commonly reported at Athens, that he was the Son of Apollo, who appearing in vision to her (being a woman of extraordinary Beautie) ^k Perictione se miscuit, she thereupon conceived: Aristō (her Husband) having often attempted to enjoy her, but in vaine; at last Apollo appearing to him in a vision or dream, and a voice commanding him to refrain the company of his Wife for ten Months, untill her delivery were past, he forbore; whence Tyndarus

*He did not issue from a mortal bed;
A God his Sire; a God-like life he led.*

l Aduers. Jul.
m Laert.

Some thereupon (as ^l Saint Hierom saith) affirmed, he was born of a Virgin, and ^m it was a common speech among the Athenians, that Phœbus begat Æsculapius and Plato, on to cure Bodies, the other Soules.


n Laert. Suid.

ⁿ Aristō had afterwards by Perictione, two Sons, Adimantus and Glaucō, and a Daughter Potone, Mother to Speusippus: These relations of Plato will be more conspicuous in this Genealogicall Table.

Neptun

PLATO.

3



For the Year of his Birth, (to omit the mistakes of Eusebius, who placeth it in the fourth year of the eightie eight Olympiad, in the Archonship of Stratocles, and of the *Chronicon Alexandrinum*, that placeth it the year following) Laertius saith, He was born, according to the *Chronologie* of Apollodorus, in the eightie eight Olympiad, which seemes to be towards the beginning of the first year, whilst Aminias was yet Archon. For Laertius elsewhere saith, that he was six years younger then Isocrates; for Isocrates (saith he) was born, when Lyfimachus, Plato, when Aminias

was Archon, under whom Pericles dyed: in the third year of the Peloponnesian War. This *Aminias* is by the^r Scholiast of Euripides called *Ameinon*, by^r *Athenaeus*, *Epameinon*, by^r *Diodorus Siculus*, *Epaminondas*. The various reading, occasion'd either by addition or detraction of the Preposition *in*, but by which of these two cannot easily be evinc'd. ^u *Salmasius* endeavouring to prove the name to be *Ausinon*, positively affirms, that the Greeks never name an Archon without the Preposition *in*, but that error ^{*} *Petavius* confutes, whose opinion is confirmed by the ancient Marble at Arundell-house, which addeth not the Preposition to the names of the Archons.

Neither is the opinion of ^{*} *Athenaeus* much different, who affirms, *Plato* was born (the Year before) *Apollodorus* being Archon, who succeeded *Euthydemus*, who was Archon the third Year of the eightie seventh Olympiad, and that under *Euphemus*, in the fourth year of the nintieth Olympiad, he was fourteen years old. For both *Laertius* and *Athenaeus* agree in the Year of his death, viz. the first of the hundred and eight Olympiad, when *Theophilus*, the successor of *Callimachus*, was Archon; *Athenaeus* only differeth in this, that, computing eightie two Archons, he attributes so many years to *Plato's* life, whereas it is certain, that he lived but exactly eightie one.

The day of his birth, ^y according to *Apollodorus*, was the seventh of Thargelion, at which time the Delians did celebrate the Feast of *Apollo*. So likewise *Florus*, cited by ^z *Plutarch*, who addes, that the Priests and Prophets call *Apollo* *isodouaximus*, as being born upon this seventh day; whence perhaps was occasion'd the fiction, that he was Son of *Apollo*, which *Plutarch* esteemes no disparagement to his Deity. In the first year of the eighty eight Olympiad, the Neomenia of Hecatombæon fell upon the second of *August*, and (upon those Hypotheses which we laid down formerly in the ^a life of *Socrates*) the Dominicall Letter for that Year being *E*. the seventh of Thargelion will (according to the Julian accompt taken proleptically) fall upon *Friday*, the thirtieth of *May*; according to the Gregorian, upon *Friday* the ninth of *June*, in the year of the Julian period, 4286.

This is according to the faith of the Historians, with whom the Astrologers do not agree; for ^b *Julius Firmicus* hath erected the Scheme of his Nativity after this manner.

x Argum. Hip.
pol.

f Deipn. 5.

t Lib.

u Plin. Exercit.

p. 157.

* Doctr. temp.


x Deipn. 5.

y Laert.

z Sympos. 8. 1.

a Cap. 1.

b Astron.



If the Ascendent saith he shall be ♄, ♀ and ♁ therein posited; and if ♀ then be placed in the seventh, having ♁ for his signe, and in the second the ☉ in ♄ and the ☽ in ♁ in the fifth house beholding the Ascendent with a ♄ aspect, and ♄ in the ninth from the Ascendent in ♄. This Geniture renders a man Interpreter of Divine and heavenly Institutions, who endued with instructive speech, and the power of divine wit, and formed in a manner by a celestial Institution, by the true license of disputations shall arrive at all the secrets of Divinity. Thus Firmicus, whose Scheme agreeth not with the other Calculation, as being betwixt the midit of February and of March, during which time the ☉ is in ♄.

Hence will appear the great Anachronisme of those, who affirm, that Plato went to Egypt in the time of the Prophet Hieremie (whom Eusebius placeth in the thirtie sixt Olympiad) and heard him there. Hieremie at the captivity of the Jewes into Babylon, was carried by Johanan son of Carce into Egypt: The Jewes were carried away by Nebuchadnezzar, at what time Tarquinius Priscus reign'd at Rome, Vaphres in Egypt, to whom the rest of the Jewes fled, which was in the fortie seventh Olympiade, 160 years before Plato was born. This opinion ^c once held, ^{c De Doctr.} was afterwards retracted by Saint Augustine, in his Book of ^{Christ. 2. 28.} Retractions, and confuted, *de Civit. Dei. 8. 11.*

CHAP. II.

His first Education, Exercises, and Studies.

^a *W* ^{Elia. var. hist. 10. 21.} *Hilst* Plato was yet an Infant carried in the armes of his Mother *Perictione*, *Aristo*, his Father went to *Hymettus* (a mountaine in *Attica*, eminent for abundance of Bees and Honey) to sacrifice to the Muses or Nymphs, taking his Wife and child along with him; as they were busied in the divine rights, she laid the Child in a thicket of Mirtles hard by; to whom, as he slept (^b *in cunis dormienti*) came a swarm of Bees, artists of *Hymettian* Honey, flying and buzzing about him, and (as it is reported) made a honey-combe in his mouth. This was taken for a presage of the singular sweetnesse of his discourse; his future eloquence foreseen in his Infancy.

^b *Cic. divinat. lib. 1.*

^c *Laert.*
^f *Apul. dogm. Plat.*

^g *Laert.*

His Parents (saith ^e *Alexander*) named him after his Grandfather, *Aristocles*: ^f *Speusippus* (instituted in his domestick documents) extolleth his sharpnesse of apprehension, whilst yet a Child, and the admirable modesty of his disposition (^g which was such, that he was never, even all those years, seen to laugh immoderately) affirming, that the beginnings of his youth were season'd with labour and love of Study; which Vertues encreased and met with all the rest when he came to manesstate.

^h *Laert.*

^h Of *Dionysius* the Grammarian (mentioned in his *improvisal*) he received the first rudiments of Learning. Of *Aristo*, an Argive, he learned the Art of Wrestling (at that time much in esteem, as being one of the Olympick Exercises) wherein he became so great a Proficient, that some affirm, he wrestled at the Isthmus, in the Pythian Games.

ⁱ *Laert.*

ⁱ As in years and vertue, so likewise he encreased extraordinarily in outward proportion and shape, insomuch, that *Aristo* named him *Plato* (which implyeth Latitude) in allusion to the largenesse of his person; others say, to the widenesse of his shoulders; *Neantes* of his forehead: some, to his large Eloquence. Whatsoever the occasion were, this name wore out and displaced the other. That he was called also *Sarapis*, is affirmed by *Hesychius*. There was not any imperfection throughout his person, except a gibbosity in the hinder part of his head, and (as *Timotheus* affirms) a kind of ^l Hesitation in his speech.

^k *In verbo Esca.*

^l *Laert. 1976*

^m *Laert. 1976*

ⁿ *Laert. 1976*

^o *Laert. 1976*

^p *Laert. 1976*

^q *Laert. 1976*

^r *Laert. 1976*

^s *Laert. 1976*

^t *Laert. 1976*

^u *Laert. 1976*

^v *Laert. 1976*

^w *Laert. 1976*

^x *Laert. 1976*

^y *Laert. 1976*

^z *Laert. 1976*

^{aa} *Laert. 1976*

^{ab} *Laert. 1976*

^{ac} *Laert. 1976*

^{ad} *Laert. 1976*

^{ae} *Laert. 1976*

^{af} *Laert. 1976*

^{ag} *Laert. 1976*

^{ah} *Laert. 1976*

^{ai} *Laert. 1976*

^{aj} *Laert. 1976*

^{ak} *Laert. 1976*

^{al} *Laert. 1976*

^{am} *Laert. 1976*

træd, the fourth Satyricall) and gave it to the Players to be acted, intending to contest for the Palm upon the Olympick Theater: but the day before it should have been presented, chancing to hear *Socrates* discourse at the Olympick Theater (ⁿ before the Bacchanals) he was so taken with that Syren, that he not only forbore to contest at that time, but wholly gave over all Tragic Poesy, and burned all his Poems, saying that of *Homer*,

n *Ælian*. *var.*
Hist. 2. 20.

Vulcan come hither, Plato needs thy aid.

From that time (the twentieth year of his age, which falls about the 4th of the 92 Olympiad) he became a follower of *Socrates*, and studied Philosophy.

Some affirm (of the truth of which report, ⁿ *Ælian* justly doubts) *he was driven by poverty to betake himselfe to the warres, but intercepted by Socrates, and instructed in that which concerns Mankind, he sold his armes, and through his perswasion, addicted himselfe to Philosophy.*

That he fought for his Country is certain, express'd in his answer to ^p *Crobylus* the Sycophant: ^q *Aristoxenus* and *Ælian* affirm, he was engaged thrice: First, at Tanagra; the second time at Corinth; and lastly at Delium, where he fought best of all the Souldiers. Thus *Aristoxenus*. But that this is false, may be easily evinced by computation of times. The first fight of the Athenians at Tanagra, was in the 4th year of the 80th Olympiad, 17 years before Plato was born: The second, in the first of the 89th when he was but six years old. The fight at Delium, was in the first of the 89th, at what time he was but foure years old; from the last words of *Aristoxenus*, *ὅθι καὶ ἀετιώμενος* (implying, that at Delium he had the prize for fighting best) may be conjectured, that this was meant of *Socrates*, who was thrice personally engag'd, and at Delium should have had the prize for fighting best, but that his modesty procured it to be conferr'd upon *Alcibiades*.

^p Afterwards,
^{cap.} 11.
^q *Laert.*
^r *Var. Hist.*

^r See *Socrates*
life, cap.

CHAP III.

His Masters in Philosophy, and his Travells to that end.

Socrates, the night before Plato was recommended to him, dreamed, that a young Swan fled from *Cupid's* Altar in the Academy, and sat in his lap, thence flying up to Heaven, it delighted both Gods and Men with its Musick. As *Socrates* [the next day] was relating this to some of his Auditors, *Aristo* came at the same time, and presented his Son *Plato* to him, to be his Disciple. As soon as *Socrates* saw him, reading in his looks his ingenuity; Friends, saith he, this is the Swan of *Cupid's* Academy.

Eight years he lived with *Socrates*, in which time, he committed

C c

ted

ted (as others of his Disciples) the effect of his Masters discourse to writing: hereof he compos'd Dialogues, but with so great additions of his own, that ^b*Socrates* hearing him recite his *Lyfis*, cry'd out, Oh! *Hercules*, how many things doth this young man feigne of me? For not a few things (addes *Laertius*) of those which he writ, *Socrates* never spoke.

At the time of *Socrates*'s arraignment, the first year of the 95th Olympiad, he was one of the Senate, the youngest of that Convention. That he was a Senator, implies he was full thirty years old at that time, according to *Solon*'s Law. This argues ^c*Hermodorus* of a mistake, who saith, he was twenty eight years old when he fled to *Megara*, upon the death of *Socrates*; and subverts the accounts of those who under-reckon his birth. ^dThe Judges

being much displeas'd at *Socrates*, *Plato* went up into the Orator's Chair, intending to plead in his defence, and began thus; *Though I (Athenians) am the youngest of those who come up into this place.* But all the Senate crying out of *those who go down*, he was thereupon constrained to do so. *Socrates* being condemned, *Plato* offer'd him to procure so much money as might purchase his liberty, but *Socrates* refused the offer. ^eAbout that time, *Socrates* his friends being met together to condole his death, *Plato* encourag'd them, and bid them not despair, for that himself was capable to govern the School: and in so saying, drunk to *Apollodorus*, who answer'd, he would sooner take up the cup of poyson from the hand of *Socrates*, then pledge him upon that condition. Upon the death of *Socrates*, *Plato* (whose excessive grief upon that occasion is observed by ^f*Platarch*) with others of his Disciples, fearing the Tyranny of those persons, who put their Master to death, ^gfled to *Euclid* at *Megara*, who friendly entertained them, till the storm was blown over.

^h*Apuleius* saith, that before he came to *Socrates*, he was initiated in the *Seft* of *Heraclitus*. But more likely is that which is affirmed by *Laertius*, that after *Socrates*'s death, he applyed himselfe to *Craylus*, a follower of *Heraclitus*, and to *He. mogenis*. He conceived, saith ⁱ*Saint Augustine*, that his own invention, and *Socrates*'s instructions came short of the true aime of Philosophy: He considered with himselfe what course he should take to benefit himselfe most, for this purpose he determin'd to travell to any place, where report told him he might drink of the spring of Learning, even to the farthest parts of the Earth, saith ^k*Cicero*: ^lFirst, to Italy, where he addicted himselfe to the discipline of *Pythagoras*, which, though he saw replenish'd with curious and high reason, yet, he chiefly affected to imitate the continence and chastity thereof; though the ^m*Pythagoreans* themselves affirme he had all his naturall Philosophy from thence.

ⁿPerceiving the knowledge of the *Pythagoreans* to be assisted with other disciplines, he went to *Cyrene*, to learn Geometry of *Theodorus* the Mathematician: thence to *Egypt* (which was then under

^b *Laert.*

^c *Laert.*

^d *Laert. vit. Socr.*

^e *Athen. deipn. lib.*

^f *De virtut. moral. g Laert.*

^h *Dogm. Plat.*

ⁱ *De Civ. dei. lib. 8. cap.*

^k *De finib. 5. l Apul. dogm. Plat.*

^m *Porphyr. vit. Pythag.*

ⁿ *Apul.*

under the Empire of *Ariaxerxes Mnemon*) ^o under pretence of selling Oyle, but the scope of his journey was to fetch Astrology from thence: To learn *Arithmetick and Celestiall Speculations of the Barbarians*, (saith ^p *Cicero*) ^q and to be instructed in the rites of the Prophets. ^r He travelled over the Country, informing himselfe all the way by their Priests, of the multiplicitious proportions of Geometry, and the observation of Celestiall motions. At what time the young Students at Athens were enquiring for Plato to instruct them, he was busied in surveying the inexplicable banks of Nilus, the vast extent of a barbarous Country, and the winding compasse of their trenches, a Disciple to the Egyptian old men. Having taken a full survey of all the Country, he at last settled himselfe in the Province of Sais, Learning of the wise men there, what they held concerning the Universe, whether it had a beginning, and whether it is moved at present, wholly, or in part, according to Reason. From these, ^r *Pausanias* affirms, he learn'd the Immortality of the Soul, which that they held, as likewise the transmigration thereof into severall bodies, is affirmed by ^u *Herodorus*. * Some say, that *Euripides* followed him to Egypt, and falling sick, was cured by the Priests with Sea-water, whereupon he said,

^p De finib. 5.
^q Apul.
^r Val. Max.
8. 7.

^r Epist. Socratic.
26.

^u Lib. 2.
* Laert.

The Sea doth wash away all ills of Man:

But this agrees not with the time of his death, which was before that of *Socrates*, viz. in the 93^d Olympiad.

From Egypt Plato returned to *Tarentum* in Italy, at what time *L. Camillus* and *P. Claudius* were Consuls at Rome, as ^x *Cicero* affirmeth. What Fasti he used, I know not, for in those which are now with us received as authentick, there are no such Consuls during the whole life of Plato. And indeed, in those times, Rome was, for the most part, govern'd by Tribunes. ^y Here he conversed with *Eurytus* of *Tarentum*, the Elder; *Archytas* the Elder (at whose discourse concerning Pleasure he was present) and with the rest of the Pythagoreans, *Echecrates*, *Timæus*, *Acivio* (corruptly in ^z *Valerius Maximus*, *Ario*) and *Coetus Locrians*. Thus to the learning of *Socrates* he added that of *Pythagoras*, and informed himselfe in those things which *Socrates* neglected: He would have gone also to the Indians, and to the Magi, but that the Warres which at that time were in Asia hindred him.

^x Cat. Major.

^y Cic. Apul.

^z 8. 7.

CHAP. IV.

What Authors he follow'd.

^a Peren. Philos.
1. 27. & 5. 2.

^a **E**ugubinus affirms, that *Plato* borrow'd the mystick part of his Philosophy from *Hermes Trismegistus*; particularly, that concerning the Divine Goodness: which, I suppose, he rather asserts from his own conjecture, in regard *Plato* had been long in *Egypt*, then from any good Authority. He was induced thereunto by those Books, which are now commonly, but falsely, vended under the name of *Hermes Trismegistus*; whereas, the learned *Casaubon*, in his ^b Exercitations upon *Baronius*, hath sufficiently taught us the forgery of those Books, which seem by some Impostor, to have been compiled out of the works of *Plato*, and the Divine Scripture.

^b Exercit. 1.
num. 18.

That *Plato* received some light from *Moses*, is affirmed with much greater Authorities of severall Nations and Religions:

^c Euseb. prap.
Evang.

Of *Jewes* by ^c *Aristobulus*, *Plato* (saith he) followed our Law in many things, his various allegations evince him a curious observer thereof: for the Volumes of *Moses* were translated before *Alexander's* time.

^d Contra. Apion.
lib. 2.

And ^d *Josephus*, *Plato* chiefly followed our Law-giver. Of Philosophers, by ^e *Numerius*, what is *Plato*, (saith he) but *Moses* speaking Greek?

^e Clem. Alex.
Strom. 1. Suid.

Of Fathers, by ^f *Justine Martyr*, ^g *Clement Alexandrinus*, ^h *Eusebius*, ⁱ *Theodoret*, ^j *Saint Augustine*, &c.

^f Paran.
^g Strom. 1.

^k When *Plato* went to *Sicily*, he bought the Books of *Philolaus*, a Pythagorean, which were three, of *Naturall Philosophy*, the first

^h Prap. Evang.
lib. 11.

that ever were published out of that School: Some say, he had them of *Dionysius's* friends, for four Alexandrian Minæ: Others,

ⁱ Civ. Dei. 8. 11.
^k Laert. and a-
gain in Philolaus

that *Dionysius* had them of a young Man, one of *Philolaus's* Disciples, and gave them to *Plato*. Others, that he sent to *Dion* at *Syracuse* to buy them for him, which he did for 100 Minæ: ^l *Agellius* saith, ten thousand Denaries: For, having received of *Dionysius* above eighty Talents, he was very full of mony. Out of these, he is said (as *Agellius* and *Laertius* affirm) to have taken a great part of his *Timæus*; for which derided by *Timon*, (in *Sil-lis*) thus:

13. 17.

*You (Plato) with the same affections caught,
with a great Summ a little Treatise bought,
where all the knowledge, which you own, was taught.*

^m Laert.

^m *Alcimus* in his four Books to *Amintas*, affirms, that *Plato* borrow'd much from the writings of *Epicharmus*, the Comick Poet, in the first Book he hath these words: *In Sensibles* (saith *Plato*) neither magnitude nor quality is permanent, but in continuall fluxion and mutation; as if we should substract number from them, which

which are neither equall, nor certain, nor quantitative, nor qualitative; these are they where generation is alwaies, their essence never. To Insensibles nothing can be added, nothing taken away. This is the nature of Eternall Beings, the like and same ever. Thus Plato cited by Alcimus. Indeed, he teacheth this in many places, particularly in *Timæo*, where he at large explaineth what is that which never is, and never had beginning, and that which hath beginning, but no being. He concludes the first comprehensible, by the Intellect with Reason, the other by sense and opinion. But the citation of Alcimus seems to refer to Plato's *Theætetus*, the subject of which Dialogue is Science: there he examines some Definitions of Science by the Antients, amongst the rest, the assertion of Protagoras, that Science is Sense; against which he disputes largely, the summe this: That the Soul apprehends some things by mediation of the Body, others without; of the first kind are things warm, light, dry, sweet, &c. of the other, Essence and not being, similitude and dissimilitude, identitie and diversity, unie and number: Hence it followes, that Sense apprehends not Essences, and consequently not Truths, for Essence and Truth are convertible. This assertion of Plato Alcimus deduceth from Epicharmus, whoⁿ Laert. (saith he) hath plainly spoken of things subject to Sense and Reason, in these words:

Gods alwaies were, to be, desisted never,
Like them Eternall, still the same persever.
Chaos the first begotten Deitie
Is still d: of something how can nothing be?
Thence nor the first nor second nothings are,
How we steem of those we thus declare:
If we an even or uneven summe
Alter, by adding or subtracting one,
Seems it to you the same? to me not so;
If a continu'd measure shrink or grow,
It is not the same measure: such the lives
Of Men are, one decays, another thrives;
That Nature, which new being ever takes
Is different from the being it forsakes,
Nor yesterday the same were I and you,
Nor shall to morrow be what we are now.

* Again, Alcimus, The wise say, that the soul apprehends some things by mediation of the body, as when she hears or sees; others, she conceiveth within her selfe, without using the body, whence of beings, some are subject to sense, others, comprehensible by the Intellect. Therefore Plato saith, that they who desire to know the principles of the Universe, must first distinguish the Ideas in themselves, as similitude, unity, multitude, magnitude, restoration. Secondly, add in it selfe, honest, good,

good, just, and the like; thirdly, examines what Idea's cohere mutually with one another, as Science, Magnitude, Power: and withall, to think that those who are amongst us, because they participate of them, should be called by the same name, as for instance, just things are those which participate of Just, Honest, which of honest: one of every Species is eternall, perceptible by the mind. and consequently free from perturbation. Wherefore, he asserts Idea's in nature as Exemplars, after whose likeness other things are made. Thus Alcimus; the first part whereof seems to be taken out of Plato's Theatetus, the latter out of his Parmenides. The words of Epicharmus concerning Gods and Idea's, to which Alcimus refers this of Plato, are these:

*Is Musick then a thing? It is; the man
Musick? no: what then? a Musician
A man or not? he is the same of good,
Good from the thing apart is understood:
Whoever learns good by that art is made,
Who Musick a Musitian: of each trade
As dancing, weaving, and the like the same,
The Art and Artist have a different name.*

p Latr.

q In Arist. de
animal.

p Again, Alcimus: Plato in his opinion of Idea's saith thus; if there is memory, there must be also Idea's, for memory is of a quiet permanent thing, but nothing is permanent except Idea's, for how, saith he, could living creatures be preserved unlesse by their Idea and receiving a naturall mind; Now they remember Similitude and their nourishment: showing that all Creatures have an innate understanding of their own similitude, and therefore perceive things belonging to their kind. Thus Alcimus: What place of Plato he means I know not, ^q Scaliger reads, Πλάτων ἐστὶ τῆ μετ' ἰδέων ἀναμνηστικῆς ἰσχύος ἔστι, τὰς ἰδέας, &c. omitting μνηστικῆς; as if he made a doubt whether that both of the opinions of Idea's were Plato's; but I rather think Alcimus meant not the title of any Book, having named none in the rest of his citations, but what himself abstracts out of Plato's opinion concerning Idea's. Plato in Phileto, teacheth this concerning memory, that sense is a motion common to the Soul and Body; this suffering from externall Senses, the other acting and dijudicating; that memory is a conservatory or repository of the Senses. For the Soul, as oft as she in her self, or by assistance of the Body, calls to mind what she hath suffer'd, she is said to remember. To Plato's assertion, Alcimus applyeth this of Epicharmus:

*Eumæus wisdom's not to one confin'd;
Various in every living knowing mind.
The Hen first doth not living things beget,
But sits and hatcheth with enlivening heat:*

*This Wisdom only Nature's friend discerns,
Of whom (her Mistressse) she this lesson learns.*

And again,

*This is not strange for every thing we find
Is to its proper species most inclin'd;
To Dogs a Bitch seems fairest, and to kine
A Bull, an Asse to Asses, swine to swine.*

These things Laertius cites out of *Alcimus*, adding that there are more of the same kind in those four Books, whereby he intimates the help that Plato receiv'd by the writings of *Epicharmus*; neither was *Epicharmus* himself ignorant of his own wisdom, as may be collected from these Verses, predicting that he should have a follower:

*This I assert, and what I now maintain,
Shall Monuments to future times remain,
Some one hereafter will my verse review,
And cloathing it in language rich and new
Invincible himself, others subdue.*

Moreover *Phavorinus* alledgeth the whole form of *Plato's* ^{Laert.} Common-wealth in *Protagoras's* Antilogicks, others say, he borrowed his Politicks from *Socrates*.

Lastly, it is related, that much of *Plato's* morality was in the ^{Laert.} Books of *Sophron* the Mimographe, which having been long neglected, were by him first brought to *Athens*, and were found lying under his head, when he was dead.

CHAP. V.

His School.

Being return'd to *Athens* from his Journey to *Egypt*, he settled himself in the Academy, a Gymnasium or place of Exercise in the Suburbs of that City, beset with woods, taking name from *Ecademus* one of the Hero's, as *Eupolis*,

In sacred Hecademus shady walks.

And *Timon*,

*The fluent sweet-tongu'd Sage first led the way,
who writes as smoothly as from some green spray
Of Hecademe, Grasshoppers chirp their lay.*

Hence it was first called *Ecademy*, the occasion of his living here, was, that he was poor and had nothing but one Orchard in
or

or adjoyning to the Academy, which was the least part of his Successours. This Orchard at first yeelded but three *aurei nummi* of yearly rent to the Owners, afterwards the whole Revenue amounted to a thousand or more. It was in proceſſe of time much enlarged by well-willers, and ſtudioſus perſons, who dying, bequeathed by will ſomething to the Profeſſours of Philoſophy, their riches to maintain the quiet and tranquillity of a Philoſophicall life. *Plato* (the Academy being ſaid to be a ſickly place, and Phyſicians adviſing him to tranſfer his School to the *Lyceum*, would not be perſwaded, but answered, I would not live on the top of *Athos* to linger my life. The unwholſomneſſe of the place brought him to a Quartan ague, which laſted eighteen months, but at length by ſobriety and care he maſter'd it, and recover'd his ſtrength more perfect then before.

Fiſt, he taught Philoſophy in the Academy, and after in the Gardens of *Colonus*. At the entrance of his School in the Academy was written, LET NONE IGNORANT OF GEOMETRY ENTER HERE, meant, not only of the meaſure and proportion of lines, but alſo of the inward Affections.

CHAP. VI.

How he inſtituted a Sect.

a Laert.

b Civit. dei. lib. 8.

c Laert.

HAVING thus ſetled himſelf in the Academy, he began out of the Collection he had made from others, and his own invention to inſtitute a Sect, called from the place where he taught Academick. ^a He mixed the Heraclitian diſcourſes, with the Socratick and Pythagorick, following in ſenſibles *Heraclitus*, in Inteligibles *Pythagoras*, in Politicks *Socrates*. whereas Philoſophy, ſaith, ^b St. Auguſtine, concerns either action or contemplation (thence aſſuming two names, Contemplative and Active) the Active conſiſting in praſiſe of morall Actions, the contemplative, in penetration of abſtruſe Phyſicall cauſes, and the nature of the Divinity, *Socrates* excelled in the Active, *Pythagoras* in the Contemplative. But *Plato* join'd them into one perfect kind, which he ſubdivided into three ſeverall parts; Morall, conſiſting chiefly in Action, Naturall in Contemplation, Rationall in Diſtinction of true and falſe, which though uſeſull in both the other, yet belongeth more particularly to Contemplation. So that this Trichotomy contradicts not the other Dichotomy, which includeth all within Action and Contemplation. ^c And as of old in a Tragedy, the *Chorus* acted alone, then *Theſpis* making ſome intermiſſions of the *Chorus* introduc'd one Actor, *Eſchylus* a ſecond, *ſophocles* a Third, in like manner Philoſophy was at fiſt but of one kind, Phyſick, then *Socrates* added Ethick, thirdly, *Plato* inventing Dialectick, made it perfect.

Of theſe three parts as they were held by *Plato*, and the reſt of

of the old Academy, we cannot have a generall better accompt
then this of^d Cicero.

d Acad. quæst. 1.

Sect. 1. Ethick.

The first, concerning well living they sought in Nature, affirming that
she ought to be obeyed: and that in nothing else but Nature was to be
had that chief good whereto all things should be referr'd, that the ulti-
mate being of desirable things, and end of all good in the mind, body and
life were acquir'd by Nature. Those of the body they placed in the whole,
and in the parts: Health, Strength, Beauty in the whole, in the parts,
sound Sense, and a certain Excellⁿce of particular parts, as in the
feet swiftnesse, strength in the hands, clearenesse in the voice, in the
Tongue, plainnesse of expression. Of the mind were those which are pro-
per to comprehend the power of wit, which they divided into Nature and
Manners. To Nature they ascribed quickness of apprehension, and memo-
ry both proper to the mind and wit; To manners belonged study and a
kind of wisdom formed partly by continuall exercise, partly by reason, in
which consisted Philosophy it self, wherein that is begun and not perfected,
is called progression to Vertue, what is perfected, Vertue; perfection of
Nature of all things in the mind, the most excellent. Thus of Minas: The
Adjuncts of life, that was the third, they asserted such things as conduced
to the practise of Vertue.

Sect. 2. Physick.

Of Nature (for that was next) they so treated as to divide it into two
things: One the efficient, the other giving it self to this, that, thereof
might be made something. In that they conceived to be a power, in this a
certain matter to be effected: in both, matter could not cohere, unlesse
contained by some power, nor the power without some matter, for there is
nothing which is not enforced to be some where: that which consists of both,
they called Body and Qualitie: Of Qualities, some are primary, others
arising from these: the primary are uniform and simples those which arise
from these are various, and as it were multiform. Air, Fire, Water,
and Earth are Primary, of these arise formes of living Creatures, and of
those, things which are made of the Earth. These principles are called
Elements, of which, Air and Fire have a faculty to move and effect; the
other parts, Water and Earth to suffer. To all these there is subjected a
certain matter without form, destitute of quality, out of which all things
are expressed and formed: It is capable of admitting all; and of changing
all manner of waies, in the whole, and in every part: This resolves nothing
to nothing, but into its own parts, which are divisible into infinite, there
being in nature no least which cannot be divided. Those which are moved,
are all moved by intervalls, which intervalls likewise may be divided in-
finitely, and that power which we call quality, being moved and agitated
every way, they conceive the whole matter to be thoroughly changed, and by

E c

that

that means those things, which they call *qualitative*, to be produced, of which, in all coherent nature continued with all its parts, was effected the world; beyond which there is not any part of matter or body: The parts of the world are all things therein, kept together by a *Sensitive* nature, wherein is likewise perfect reason; It is also sempiternall, for there is nothing more strong whereby it may be dissolved: This power they call the Soul of the world, God, a certain providence over all things subjected to him, regarding in the first place heavenly things, next on the Earth those thing which appertain to man. The same they sometimes call *Necessity*, because nothing can be otherwise then is by him ordained; a fittall immutable continuation of eternall order; sometimes *Fortune*, as producing many things not foreseen or expected by us, by reason of the obscurity and our ignorance of the Causes.

Sect. 3. *Dialectick*.

Of the third part of Philosophy, consisting in reason and dissertation, they treated thus. Though Judgment arise from the Sense, yet the Judgment of truth is not in the Senses. The mind they affirmed to be Judge of things, conceiving her only fit to be credited, because she alone seeth that which is simple, and uniform, and certain: This they called *Idea*. All sense they conceived to be obtuse and slow, and no way able to perceive those things which seem subject to sense, which are so little, as that they cannot fall under sense, so moveable and various, that nothing is one, constant, nor the same, because all things are in continuall alteration and fluxion. All this part of things they called *Opimative*; Science they affirmed to be in where but in the Reasons and Notions of mind, whence they approved definitions of things, and applyed them to all whereon they discoursed. They approved likewise explications of words by *Erymologies*: They used Arguments and marks for things, to prove and conclude what they meant to explain; In this consisted all the discipline of *Dialectick*, that is, of Speech concluded by Reason.

This accompt in generall *Cicero* gives of the old Academy; *Plutarch*, *Laertius*, *Apuleius*, and others have made collections more particular: we shall make choice of that of *Alcinous*, as most full and perfect, which by reason of the length is referred as an Appendix to *Plato's* life.

CHAP. VII.

His Inventions.

HE added much to learning and language by many inventions, as well of things as of words. To omit Dialectick, of which we treated last, ^a *Phavorinus* attributes to his invention, ^a *Laert.* discoursing by way of *Question*; but *Aristotle* ascribes it to *Alexamennus*, a Stryrian or Teian, and it appears by the Dialogues of *Plato*, that *Socrates* also used that form of arguing. *Laertius* informes us, that *Zeno Eleates* was the first composer of Dialogues; yet in my opinion, saith he, *Plato* hath so much refined the form thereof, that he deserves to be preferr'd before all others, as well for invention as reformation.

More properly may be attributed to him the invention of ^b *Analytica I Method*, which reduceth the thing sought unto its principle, the best of Methods. He taught it to *Leodamas*, and by it found out many things in Geometry: *Analysis*, as defined by the ^c *Scholast* upon *Euclid*, is a supposition of the thing sought, by the consequents, (as if it were already known) to find out the truth. Examples thereof we find in the five first propositions of the 13th Book of *Euclid*, besides severall others, that occur in *Apollonius Pergæus*, and *Pappus Alexandrinus*. ^b *Laert. Procl. in Euclid. lib. 3.* ^c *Lib. 13.*

Amongst his Geometricall Inventions also must be remembred the duplication of a Cube, the occasion and manner whereof is related by ^a *Plutarch* and ^c *Philoponus*. The Delians afflicted with the Pestilence, consulted the Oracle of *Apollo*; he answer'd, the Plague would cease if they doubled their Altar, which was of a Cubick figure. *Plutarch* saith, that hereupon the Overseers of the Altar made all the four sides double to what they were before, & so instead of doubling the Altar, they made it octuple to what it was. *Philoponus* saith, they caused another Cube of the same bignesse with the former to be set upon it, whereby they changed the figure of the Altar, which was no longer a Cube, but ^d *Δύοις. a quadrilaterall Pillar*. The first way, it was Cubick, but not double, the second way double, but not Cubick. The Plague not ceasing, they consulted the Oracle again. *Apollo* answer'd, they had not fulfilled his Command, which was to build a Cubick Altar as big again as the former. Hereupon they went to *Plato*, as most skilfull in Geometry, to learn of him the Oracle's meaning, and how they should find out the way of doubling a Cube, retaining the Cubick figure. *Plato* answered, that the God mocked the Grecians for their neglect of Philosophy and Learning, insulting over their ignorance, that he commanded them seriously, to addict themselves to Geometry, that this could not be done any other way, then by finding out two mean proportionals between two right lines in a Duple proportion (*Plato's particular* ^e *de ei delph. In Anal. post. lib. 1. cap. 7.*

particular method herein is delivered, *Eutocius* in his comment upon the first proposition of the second Book of *Archimedes de Sphæra & Cylindro*.) He added that *Eudoxus* the Gnidian, or *Helico* the Cizycene would do it for them, That the God needed not this duplication of his Altar, but commanded all the Grecians, that avoyding war and the miseries wherewith it is attended, they should apply themselves to the Muses; and having settled the turbulent commotions of their minds, converse harmletsly and beneficially with one another. *Philoponus* addes, that *Plato* expounded this Problem to his Disciples, who writ much upon this subject, though nothing thereof be extant. Of the Antients, labour'd in this Problem besides *Plato*, *Archytas* the Tarentine, *Menæchmus*, *Eratoſthenes*, *Philo* of *Byzantium*, *Hero*, *Apollonius Pergæus*; *Nicomedes*, *Diocles* and *Sporus*: ^{f 8. 13.} *Valerius Maximus* saith, that *Plato* remitted the Overseers of the sacred Altar to *Euclid* the Geometrician, as submitting to his Science and Profession; but this is an Errour, because *Euclid* the Geometrician was much later then *Plato*, and the other *Euclid*, *Plato's* contemporary, nothing eminent in Mathematicks, as hath been before me observed by ^g *Sir Henry Savile*.

^g *Præla. 1.*

That *Plato* invented many other things in the Mathematicks, (more then appears from those writings of his that are extant) and was most eminent therein, may be argued from the three Books of *Theon Smyrnaus*, the first *Arithmetick*, the second *Harmonicks*, the last, (not yet publish'd) *Astronomy*. Those Books contained many things, singular and choice, not to be met elsewhere. The design is acknowledg'd by the Author, to be as an introduction necessary to the understanding of *Plato's* writings.

^h *Laert.*

There are also divers words of which he is citeem'd to be the first Author, as ^h *Antipodes*, a word by him first introduced into Philosophy, to signifie those people whose feet are diametrically opposite.

ⁱ *Laert.*

ⁱ *Ἐτορειος*, *Element*, untill his time was confounded with *ἀρχή*, *Principle*, by all Philosophers from *Thales*. *Plato* distinguish'd them thus, *ἀρχή*, *principle* is that which hath nothing before it whereof it might be generated; *στοιχεῖα*, *Elements* are compounded.

^k *Laert.*

^k The word *Poem* also, though since very triviall, was not used by any before him.

^l *Laert.*

^l He first used this term, τὸ ἀέχμα τὸν ἀσπυκτὸν, oblong number, [in *Theæteto*] thereby signifying the product of a greater number multiplied by a lesser.

^m *Laert.*

^m He also first introduced the word *ἐπιφανεία*, *Superficies*, for which before was used *ἐπιφάνεια* a *Plane*. Thus *Laertius*, though ⁿ *Proclus* implies, that neither *Plato* nor *Aristotle* use the word, but for it *ἐπιφάνεια*. Divine *Plato*, saith he, calls *Geometry* the *Contemplatrix* of *Planes*, opposing it to *Stereometry*, as if *Plane* and *Superficies* were the same. So likewise doth *Aristotle*. But *Euclid* and those who

ⁿ *In Euclid.*
lib. 2.

(succeed

succeed him, make Superficies the genus, plane a species thereof.

^o *Θεὸς ἡγεμὼν*, Divine Providence, a word since much used by ^o Laert. Christians, was first the expression of Plato.

^p He first of Philosophers wrote against *Lysias*, Son of *Cephalus*, ^p Laert. in *Phædro*.

^q He first considered the force and efficacy of Grammar.

^r He first wrote against all that were before him, whence it is ^q Laert. ^r Laert. wondred at that he never mentions *Democritus*.

CHAP. VIII.

His Distinctions.

OF His Distinctions *Aristotle* made this Collection in some piece not extant, cited by *Laertius*.

Good is threefold, { *in the Soul*, as Justice, Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, and the like.
In the Body, as Beauty, good habit, strength.
Externall, as friends; prosperity of our Country; Wealth.

Friendship is threefold. { *Naturall*, which Parents bear to their Children, and kindred to one another; which kind is also amongst beasts.
Sociable, begotten by conversation, without any relation of kindred; such was that betwixt *Pylades* and *Orestes*.
Hospitable, towards Guests, or wherewith we affect strangers even upon letters of recommendation.
 Some adde a fourth kind, *amatory*.

Democraticall; a Democracy is that wherein the people rules and hath power to make Magistrates and Laws.

Aristocraticall; an Aristocracy is that wherein neither rich nor poor nor Nobles govern, but the best persons of the whole City.

Oligarchicall; an Oligarchy is when Governours are elected by the votes of Magistrates, for they are fewer then the poore.

Elektive by Law; as that of the Carthaginians; for it is civill.

Regall: { *Successive* in a Family; as that of the Lacedæmonians and Macedonians, who confine themselves to a certain race.

Tyrannicall; Tyranny is that wherein men are brought to subjection either by fraud or force.

P L A T O .

Justice is threefold { *Towards the Gods*; they who sacrifice as the Law requires, and perform the Divine rites, are just towards the Gods.
Towards men: They who restore what was lent or committed to their trust, are just towards men.
Towards the dead: They who take care of Sepulchers are just towards the dead.

Science is threefold { *Practick*, as playing on the flute, lute, and the like; which effect nothing visible.
Mechanick, as architecture of Houses, Ships, or the like, which produceth a visible effect.
Theoretick, as Geometry, Harmonick, Astronomy, which act not, neither produce any thing. The Geometrician considers the proportion of lines to one another; Harmonick sounds: Astronomy stars and the World.

Medicine is of five kinds. { *Pharmaceutick*, cureth diseases by application of Medicine.
Chirurgick by incision, or cauterising.
Dietetick, by diet.
Nosognomonick discernes diseases.
Boethetick removeth diseases.

Law is twofold. { *Written*; such are those by which states are governed.
Not written, grounded upon custom; as that no man shall go naked into the forum, or habited like a woman, is not forbidden by any written law, but forborn because of the unwritten.

Speech is of five kinds. { *Politicall*, used in Orations by such as govern States.
Rhetoricall, used by Lawyers in pleading either to confirm, praise, dispraise or accuse.
Vulgar, used by people in common discourse.
Dialethick, used by such as discourse in short questions and answers.
Artificiall, used by Tradesmen in their severall professions.

Musick is threefold. { Of the Voice onely.
Of the Voice and hands, as singing to the Lute.
Of the Hand only, as the Harp.

Nobility is of four kinds. { If the Predecessors were upright, just, and honest.
If the Predecessors were rulers of Princes.
If the Predecessors acquired honours, as the command of an Army, or were crown'd in publick games: those who are descended from such we call Noble.
If a man be endued with a generous mind; this is the best kind of Nobility.

Beauty is threefold. { Commendable, as a fair form.
Usefull, as an instrument, house, or the like.
Beneficiall, as all that belongs to institution of Laws.

The Soule hath three parts, the { Rationall, the principle whereby we judge, discourse, and the like.
Concupiscible, whereby we desire meat, coition, and the like.
Irafcible, whereby we are emboldned, joyned, grieved, enraged.

Perfect Virtue hath four kinds. { Wisdom, the principle of doing things aright.
Justice, the principle of doing things equally in private conversation and publick affairs.
Fortitude, the principle of not flying danger through fear, but meeting it.
Temperance, the principle of subduing desires, and yielding to no pleasures, but living moderately.

Government is of five kinds. { By Law: Those who are chosen Magistrates in a City govern by Law.
By Nature: the males not only of mankind, but of most other creatures are predominant over the Females by nature.
By Custome, as that which Masters have over their Disciples.
By Descent, as the Lacedæmonian Kings, who succeed out of one Family: and in Macedonia they use the same custome.
By force, as those who rule a Kingdom against the will of the people.

Of Rhetorick are six kinds. { Adhortation, as when we perswade to war against any.
Dehortation, as when we dissuade from War.
Accusation, when we declare that we have been injured by one whom we prove cause of our misfortune.

Defence

P L A T O.

Defence, when a man proves he did not an injury or offence.

Encomium, when we speak well of another.

Vituperation, when we declare a man to be wicked.

Of Right
speaking
are four
kinds ;
when wee
speak

what is requisite ; those things which will benefit both the hearer and speaker.

As much as is requisite, if we speak neither more nor lesse then concerns the businesse.

To those to whom it is requisite; as when we speak to old men that have done amisse in such terms as are fit for old men, or to young as becomes young.

When it is requisite, neither too soon nor too late; for if that be not observed, nothing can be spoken aright.

Benificence
is of four
kinds.

In Wealth, when we relieve the wants of any according to our means.

In Body, when we succour those who are beaten.

In Knowledge, when we instruct, cure, teach any good.

In Speech, he, who pleadeth in defence of another, helpeth him in words.

The end of
things is of
four kinds

Legall, imposing an end to things by decree.

Naturall, such as dayes, years, and noures have.

Artificiall, as the building of a house.

Accidentiall, by chance unexpected.

Of powers
are four
kinds

One in the minde, to think and conjecture.

Another of the body, to walk, give, receive, and the like.

A third, consisting in a multitude of Souldiers, and store of wealth, in which respect, Princes are called Powerfull.

The fourth, as to suffer good or evil to be done to us; as to be capable of Sicknesse, Learning, health, or the like.

Of Huma-
nity are
three
kinds.

In calling, as those who call all they meet, and salute them, taking them by the hand.

In relieving, in relieving the misfortunes of another willingly.

In feasting and conversation.

Felicity is divided into five parts.

- Prudent Counsell*, acquired by learning and experience.
- Soundnesse of senses*, consisting in the parts of the body, as to see with the eyes, to hear with the ears, to smell and tast.
- Prosperity of affairs*, when those things which a man intendeth, he performeth fully.
- Good reputation* amongst men, when a man is well spoken of.
- Plenty* of riches, and things necessary to life, so as to be able to supply friends, and perform works of publick magnificence: He who hath all these five kinds is perfectly happy.

Arts are of three kinds.

- The first diggeth out mettalls, and fells wood.
- The second gives varietie of shape to things, as Wood-work and Iron-work.
- The third maketh use of these, as horsemanship of bridles, Soldiery, of arms, musick of instruments.

Good is of four kinds.

- One, as wen wee call a man good from his proper goodnesse.
- A second, as we call Virtue and Justice it self good.
- A third, as we say, food, exercise and medicines are beneficiall.
- The fourth good we call the act of playing on musick, or acting in a play.

Of things some are

- Ill*, alwaies capable to do hurt, as ignorance; imprudence, injustice, and the like.
- Good*, the contrary to the former;
- Indifferent*, which sometimes may benefit, sometimes hurt, as walking, sitting, eating, or cannot do hurt at all, being neither good nor bad.

Good Government is threefold.

- If the Laws be good.
- If the Laws be well kept.
- If without Laws the people live orderly by custome.

Ill Government is threefold.

- If the Laws be bad for Natives and Forainers.
- If the Laws in being are not observed.
- If there are no laws at all.

Contraries are of three kinds.

- Good to ill*, as justice to injustice, wisdom to imprudence, and the like.
- Ill to ill*, as prodigality to avarice, unjust torments to just.
- Neither to neither*, as heavy to light, swift to slow, black to white.

Good is of three kinds. { Some we *have*, as Justice and Health.
 { Of some we *participate*, as good it self cannot be had, but may be participated.
 { Some are *fixt*, which we can neither have, nor participate as to be virtuous and just.

Consultation is three-fold. { *From the Past*, by example; as what befell the Lacedæmonians through overmuch confidence.
 { *From the present*, as considering the timorousness of men, weakness of walls, scarcity of provision, and the like.
 { *From the Future*, as that Ambassadors should not be injured upon suspicion, least it cast infamy upon all Greece.

Voice is { *Animate*, of living creatures. { *Articulate* of men.
 { *Inanimate*, sounds and noise. { *Inarticulate* of Beasts.

Things are { *Divisible*, compounded as Syllables, Symphonies, living creatures, water, Gold. { *Homogeneous*, consist of similar parts, differing from the whole only in number, as water, gold, and all liquid things.
 { *Indivisible*, compounded of nothing, as a point, found. { *Heterogeneous*, consist of dissimilar parts.

Things are { *Absolute*, requiring nothing else to express them, as a man, a horse and other creatures.
 { *Relatives*, which imply another thing, as greater (then others) swifter, fairer, and the like, for what is greater relates to something lesser, and the like.

These according to Aristotle were Plato's divisions of first things.

CHAP. IX.

His three voyages to Sicily.

Plato made three voyages to Sicily; the first to see the fiery ^{a Laert. Apul.} ebullitions of *Aetna* ^{b Plat. Epist.} and to improve the knowledge of ^{c Laert.} States, and Philosophy, which he got by his other travells; This was about the 40th year of his age, ^{d In Dioge.} at what time *Dionysius* the ^{e Plat. Epist. 3. & 7.} elder, Son of *Hermocrates*, reigned in *Syracuse*; ^{f Plat. in Dioge.} *Plutarch* saith, hee was led thither by providence, not fortune, and that some good Genius, designing a far off the liberty of the people of *Syracuse*, brought him acquainted with *Dion* then very young, who entertained him as his ^g guest: He much disliked the luxury of that place, feasting, nocturnal lucubrations and the like; Converted frequently with *Dion*, discoursed with him of those things which were best in man, and with his best arguments exhorted him thereto; by which he seemed to lay grounds for the subversion of that Tyranny, which afterwards hapned; ^h *Dion* though young, was the most ingenious of all *Plato's* followers, and most eager in pursuit of Virtue, as appears as well by the testimony of *Plato*, as his own actions. Though he had been brought up by the King in an effeminate luxurious kind of life; yet as soon as he tasted of Philosophy the guide to Virtue, his soul was enflamed with love thereof, and from his own candour and ingenuity was perswaded that *Dionysius* would be no lesse affected therewith: And therefore desired him when hee was at leasure to admit and hear *Plato*: Hereupon the Tyrant sent for him; at that meeting all their discourse was concerning fortitude; *Plato* affirmed none was further from that Virtue then a Tyrant, and, proceeding to speak of Justice, asserted the life of the Just to be happy, of the unjust miserable. *Dionysius* was displeased at this discourse (as reflecting upon himself) and with the standers by for approving it, at last much exasperated, he asked *Plato* why he came into Sicily? *Plato* answered, to seek a good man: it seems, replied *Dionysius*, you have not yet found him. *Laertius* saith, *Plato* disputed with him concerning Tyranny, affirming, that is not best which benefits our selves, unlesse it be excellent also in Virtue; whereat *Dionysius* incensed, said to him, your discourse favours of old age; and yours, answered *Plato*, of Tyranny. *Dionysius*, enraged, commanded him to be put to death; I will have, saith he, your head taken off; at which words *Xenocrates* being present, answered, He that doth it must begin with mine: but *Dion* and *Aristomenes* wrought with him to revoke that sentence. *Dion* thinking his anger would have proceeded no further, sent *Plato* away at his own request in a Ship which carried *Pollis* (whom *Laertius* calls *Polis*, *Ælian* *Pölis*,) a Lacedæmonian Captain (who at that time had been sent Embassadour to *Dionysius*) back to Greece: *Dionysius* secretly

Who slew Hip-
parchus, bro-
ther of Hippo-
crates the Tyrant
of Athens, & up-
on which the
Pisistratida
were expelled.

secretly desired *Pollis* to kill him whilst he was on Shipboard; or if not, by all means to sell him, alledging, it would be no injury to *Plato*, for he would be as happy in bondage as at liberty, as being a just man. Some affirm the occasion of *Dionysius* his anger was, because, that when he asked what was the best brasse, *Plato* answered, that whereof the Statues of *Aristogiton* and *Harmodius* were made. Others, that it was because he was over-mastered in learning. But *Tzetzes* rejecting these, as idle fictions of Philosophers, & falsifiers, affirms the true reason to have been, that he perceived, he advised *Dion* to possesse himselfe of the Kingdome: *Pollis* transported him to *Agina*; there *Charmander*, son of *Charmandrides*, accused him, as meriting death by a Law they had made, that the first Athenian that should come to that Island, should, without being suffered to speak for himselfe, be put to death: Which Law, as *Phavorinus* affirms, he himselfe made. One that was present, saying in sport, he is a Philosopher, they set him at liberty: Some say, they brought him to the publick assembly, to plead for himselfe, where he would not speak a word, but underwent all with a great courage. Then they altered their intent of putting him to death, and agreed to sell him for a slave. *Plutarch* saith, that upon a decree of the *Eginetae*, that all Athenians taken in that Island, should be sold for Slaves; *Pollis* sold him there: *Anniceris*, a Cyrenaick Philosopher, being accidentally present, redeemed him for twenty, or as others thirty Minæ, and sent him to *Athens* to his friends; they immediately returned the money to *Anniceris*, but he refused it, saying, they were not the only persons concerned in *Plato*'s welfare: Some say, *Dion* sent the money, which he would not accept, but bought therewith a little Orchard in the Academy. *Pollis* was defeated by *Chabrias*, and afterwards drowned in *Elice*. The report goes, that an apparition told him, he suffered those things for the Philosophers sake. *Dionysius* understanding what had happened, writ to *Plato*, to desire him not to speak ill of him; *Plato* returned answer, that he had not so much time vacant from Philosophy, as to remember *Dionysius*. To some detractours who upbraided him, saying, *Dionysius* hath cast off *Plato*; no, saith he, but *Plato* *Dionysius*.

Dion continued to live, not according to the ordinary luxury of the Sicilians and Italians, but in vertue, untill *Dionysius* died, for which maligned by those who lived after Tyrannicall institutions. Then considering, that these documents were not practised by himselfe alone, but by some others, though few, he entertained a hope, that *Dionysius* the younger, who succeeded his Father in the Government, might become one of those, to the extraordinary happinesse of himselfe, and the rest of the Sicilians: To this end, he used many exhortations to invite him to vertue, intermixed with some sentences of *Plato*, with whom *Dionysius*, upon this occasion, became extreemly desirous to be acquainted.

acquainted: To that effect, many Letters were sent to *Athens* to him, some from *Dionysius*, others from Pythagoreans in *Italy*, desiring *Plato* to go to *Syracuse*, who, by prudent Counsell, might govern the young man, transported by his own power to luxury. *Plato*, as himselfe affirmeth, fearing to be thought a Person only of words, and not willing to engage in action, and withall hoping, by purging one principall part, to cure the disease of all *Sicily*, yielded; *Lacritus* saith, upon a promise made to him by *Dionysius*, of a Place and People that should live according to the rules of his Common-wealth; which he made not good. Hence *Athenaus* accuseth *Plato* of Ambition. In the mean time, the enemies of *Dion*, fearing a change in *Dionysius*, perswaded him to call home from banishment *Philistus* (a person very rationally, but educated in Tyrannicall principles) as an Antidore against *Plato's* Philosophy; but *Dion* hoped, the comming of *Plato* would regulate the licentious Tyranny of *Dionysius*.

Plato at his arrivall in *Sicily* (placed by *Agellius*, betwixt the beginning of *Philips* raigne, foure hundred years from the building of *Rome*, and the Chæronean fight) was received by *Dionysius* with much respect: One of the Kings magnificent Chariots stood ready to receive him as soon as he landed, and carried him to the Court. The King offered Sacrifice to the Gods for his comming, as a great blessing upon his government. The temperance of their Feasts, alteration of the Court, meeknesse of the King, gave the *Siracusians* great hopes of reformation: The Courtiers addicted themselves to Philosophy so much, that the Palace was full of Sand (wherein they drew Geometricall figures.) Not long after *Plato's* comming, at a Sacrifice in the Castle, the Herald, according to the usuall manner, made a solemn Prayer, that the Gods would long preserve the Kingly Government: *Dion* standing by, said, *will you never give over praying against me?* This troubled *Philistus* and his friends, who feared *Plato* would insinuate into the favour of *Dionysius* so much, as that they should not be able to oppose him, since in so short time, he had effected so great an alteration in him: Hereupon they all joyntly accused *Dion*, that he wrought upon *Dionysius*, by the eloquence of *Plato*, to resigne his Government, that it might be transferred to the Children of his Sister, to quit his command for the Academy, where he should be made happy by Geometry, resigning his present happinesse to *Dion* and his Nephews. With these and the like insinuations, *Dionysius* was so incensed, that he caused *Dion* to be unexpectedly carried on Ship-board in a little bark, giving the marriners order to land him in *Italy*. This happened four months after *Plato's* comming. ^h *Plato*, and the rest of *Dion's* ^h *Plat. Epist.* friends, feared to be put to some punishment, as partakers of his offence. A report was raised, that *Plato* was put to death by *Dionysius*, as author of all that happened: but, on the contrary, *Dionysius*,

i Plutarch.
k Plat. Epist. 7.

l Plat. Epist.

Dionysius doubting, lest something worse might happen from their fear, treated them all kindly, comforted *Plato*, bid him be of good cheer, and intreated him to stay with him: ⁱ He caused him to be lodged in his Castle, ^k in the Orchards adjoyning to his Palace, where not the Porter himselfe could go out without *Dionysius* his leave; thus cunningly, under pretence of kindnesse, he watched him, that he might not return into *Greece*, to give *Dion* notice of the wrong done to him. *Dionysius* by frequent conversation with *Plato* (as wild Beasts are tamed by use) fell into so great liking of his discourse, that he became in love with him; but, it was a Tyrannicall affection, for, he would not that *Plato* should love any but him, offering to put the power of the Kingdome into his hands, if he would value him above *Dion*. With this passion, troublesome to *Plato*, *Dionysius* was sometimes so farre transported, as men jealous of their Mistresses, that he would upon the suddain fall out with him, and as suddainly be reconciled, and ask him pardon. He had indeed a great desire of *Plato's* Philosophy, but a great respect likewise on the other side for those who dissuaded him from it, telling him, that it would ruine him to be too far ingaged therein. ^l In the mean time, there happening a War, he sent *Plato* home, promising, that the next spring (as soon as there was peace) he would send back for him and *Dion* to *Syracuse*: but he kept not his promise, for which he desired *Plato* to excuse him, protesting the War to be the occasion thereof, and that assoon as it were ended, he would send for *Dion*, whom he desired in the mean time to rest satisfied, and not attempt any thing against him, nor to speak ill of him to the Grecians. This *Plato* endeavoured to effect; he instructed *Dion* in Philosophy, in the Academy: *Dion* lay in the City at the house of *Calippus*, with whom he had been long acquainted. He purchased a Country house for pleasure, whither he sometimes went; this he bestowed afterward, at his return to *Sicily*, upon *Speusippus*, with whom he conversed most intimately, as being so advised by *Plato*, who knew the cheerfull humour of *Speusippus* to be a fit divertisement for the reserved disposition of *Dion*. *Plato* had undertaken the expence of some Playes and Dances by some youths; *Dion* took the pains to teach them, and paid the whole charge: By this liberality which *Plato* suffered him to confer upon the Athenians, he gained more love then *Plato* honour.

In the mean time, *Dionysius*, to acquit himselfe of the disesteem he had gained amongst Philosophers in *Plato's* cause, invited many learned men, and in a vain ostentation of Wisdome, applyed improperly the sentences he had learned of *Plato*: Hereupon he began to wish for *Plato* again, and to blame himselfe, for not knowing how to use him well when he had him, and that he had not learned so much of him as he might: and being like a Tyrant

transpor-

transported with uncertain passions and changes, a sudden vehement desire came upon him of seeing *Plato* again. ^m The peace ^m *Plat. Epist. 3.* being now concluded, he sent to *Plato* to come to him (but not (as he had promised) to *Dion*) writing to him, that he would have him to come immediately, and that afterwards he would send for *Dion*. Hereupon *Plato* refused to go, notwithstanding the intreaties of *Dion*; alledging for excuse his old age, and that nothing was done according to their agreement. In the mean time, *Archytas*, whom, with others of *Tarentum*, *Plato*, before his departure, had brought into the acquaintance of *Dionysius*, came to *Dionysius*; there were also others there, Auditors of *Dion*. *Dionysius* being refused upon a second invitation, thought his honour deeply concerned, and thereupon sent the third time a Galley of three banks of Oars (ⁿ trimmed with Fillets) and other Ships, and with ⁿ *Plat.* them *Archidemus*, whom he conceived *Plato* most affected of all his friends in *Sicily*, and some Sicilian Noblemen: ^o He had by all ^o *Plat.* means obliged *Archytas* the Pythagorean, to let *Plato* know, he might come without danger, and that he would engage his word on it. ^p As soon as they came to *Plato*, they all protested, that ^p *Plat. Epist. 7.* *Dionysius* was much inclined to Philosophy, and delivered an Epistle from him to this effect.

Dionysius to Plato.

(After the accustomed way of Preface) *nothing* (saith he) *Should you do sooner, then come to Sicily at my request. First, as concerning Dion, all shall be done as you will; for, I think you will only moderate things, and I will condescend: But, unlesse you come, you shall not obtain any thing which you desire for Dion, nor in any thing else, nor in those which chiefly concern your own particular.*

^q Other Epistles were sent from *Archytas*, and other Italians ^q *Plat. Epist.* and *Tarentines*, praising *Dionysius* for his love of learning; adding, that if *Plato* came not, it would reflect upon his friends, as well as on himselfe. ^{*} Many Letters and intreaties were sent to *Dion*, ^{*} *Platarch.* from his Wife and Sister: ^r to these were joyed the importuni- ^r *Plat. Epist.* ties of some friends of *Plato's* at *Athens*, ⁱ insomuch that *Dion* ⁱ *Plat.* brought it to passe, that *Plato* (^t lest he should desert him and the *Tarentines*) yielded to *Dionysius*, without any excuse; and, as he writeth himselfe, was driven the third time to the Sicilian straits. ^t *Plat.*

Once more Charybdis dangers to essay.

At his arrivall in *Sicily*, *Dionysius* met him with a Chariot, drawn by four white horses, ^u whereinto he took him, and made ^u *Ælian. var.* him sit, whilst himselfe plaid the Coachman: whereupon a facere ^{Hist. 4. 18.} Syra-

Syracusan, well vers'd in *Homer*, pleas'd with the sight, spoke these verses out of the *Iliads*, with a little alteration:

*The Chariot groan'd beneath its waight,
Proud that the best of men there sat.*

And as *Dionysius* was much joy'd at his coming, so were the Sicilians put in great hopes, being all desirous, and endeavouring, that *Plato* might supplant *Phisistus*, and subvert Tyranny by Philosophy: The Ladies of the Court entertained *Plato* with all civility; but above all, *Dionysius* seem'd to repose more confidence in him, then in any of his friends; for, whereas he was jealous of all others, he had so great respect for *Plato*, that he suffer'd him only to come to him unsearched (*though he knew him to be *Dions* intimate friend) and offer'd him great summs of money, but *Plato* would not accept any: (yet **Onetor* saith, he receiv'd eighty Talents of him, wherewith enriched, he purchas'd the Books of *Philolaus*) whence *Aristippus* the Cyrenæan, who was at the same time in the Court, said, *Dionysius bestoweth his bounty on sure grounds; he gives little to us who require much, and much to Plato who requireth nothing.* And being blamed, that he receiv'd money of *Dionysius*, *Plato* books, *I want money*, saith he, *Plato* books. So untrue it is, as *Xenophon* asperseth him, that he went thither to share in the Sicilian luxury: or as *Tzetzes*, that he studied the art of Cookery, and liv'd with *Dionysius* as his pensioner and parasite. So far was he from any sordid compliance, that at a Feast, *Dionysius* commanding every one to put on a purple Gown, and dance, he refus'd, saying,

*I will not with a female robe disgrace
My selfe, who am a man of manly race.*

Some likewise ascribe this to him, which others to *Aristippus*, that *Dionysius* saying,

*Who ere comes to a Tyrant, he
A servant is, though he came free.*

He answer'd immediately,

No servant is, if he came free.

^b *Plat. Epist.*
Plut.

^b *Plato*, after a while, began to put *Dionysius* in minde of the City he had promised him to be governed by his rules; but *Dionysius* retracted his promise: He mov'd him also in the behalfe of *Dion*; *Dionysius* at the first delay'd him, afterwards fell out with him, but so secretly, that none saw it, for he continued to confer as much honour on him, as he could possibly, thereby to make him

* *Ælian. var.*
Hist. 4. 18.

x *Laert.*

y *Epist. ad*
Æschin.
z *Chiliad.*

a *Laert. vit.*
Aristip.

him forsake his friendship to *Dion*? *Plato* from the beginning perceived there was no trust to be reposed in what he said or did, but that all was deceit; yet concealed that thought, and patiently suffered all; pretending to believe him. Thus they disssembled with each other, thinking they deceived the eyes of all men besides; *Helicon* of *Cyzicum*, a friend of *Plato*, foretold an Eclipse of the Sun, which falling out according to his prediction, the Tyrant much honoured him, and gave him a Talent of Silver: then *Aristippus* jesting with other Philosophers, said, he could tell them of a stranger thing that would happen; they desiring to know what that was, I foretel, saith he, *Plato* and *Dionysius* will be at difference ere long; and it came to passe. ^c *Dionysius* detain'd ^c *Plat. Epist.* *Dion's* Rent which he used to send yearly to him to *Peloponnesus*; pretending he kept it for his Nephew, *Dion's* Son. *Plato* discontented hereat, desired he might go home, saying; he could not stay, *Dion* being used so ignominiously: *Dionysius* spoke kindly to him, desiring him to stay: He thought it not convenient to let *Plato* go so soon to divulge his actions: but being not able to prevail with him, hee told him he would provide a means for his Passage; *Plato* had designed to go with the Passage-boates; *Dionysius* seeing him bent upon his voyage, the next spoke thus kindly to him; that the differences betwixt *Dion* and me may be composed, I will for your sake condescend thus far, *Dion* shall receive his revenues living in *Peloponnesus* not as a banished person, but as one that may come hither when he and I, and you his friends shall think convenient. The Trustees for this business shall be yourself, and your and his friends who live here; *Dion* shall receive his Rents, but through your hands, otherwise I shall not dare to trust him; in you and yours I have more confidence; stay for this reason a year here, and then you shall carry along with you his money, wherein you will do *Dion* a great courtesie. To this *Plato* after a daies deliberation consented; and writ to that effect to *Dion*; but as soon as the Shippes were gone, that *Dionysius* saw he had no means to away, forgetting his promise, he made sale of *Dions* Estate.

^d At this time hapned a mutiny amongst the Souldiers of *Dionysius*, of which *Heraclides* a friend of *Plato's* was reported the Author: *Dionysius* laid out to take him, but could not light on him: Walking in his Garden he called *Theodotus* to him; *Plato* being accidentally walking there at the same time; after some private discourse with *Dionysius*, *Theodotes*, turning to *Plato*, *Plato* saith he, I perswade *Dionysius* that I may bring *Heraclides* to him to answer the crimes wherewith he is charged, and then if *Dionysius* will not suffer him to live in *Sicily*, that he at least permit him to take his wife and Children along with him to *Peloponnesus*, and live there, and; whilst he shall not plot any thing against *Dionysius*, that he may there enjoy his Revenues. With this assurance I have sent to *Heraclides*, and will send again to him to come hither; but if he come either upon the first or second notice, I have made an agreement with *Dionysius*, and
I i obtained

obtained a promise from him that he shall receive no harm, either in or without the City; but, if he be so resolved, that he send him away beyond the confines of this Country, untill he shall be better satisfied with him: Do not you Dionysius consent hereto saith he, I do, answered Dionysius, neither if he be in your house shall he receive any prejudice; The next day (about 20. daies before Plato left Sicily) came Eurybius and Theodotes to Plato in much hast and trouble; Plato, said Theodotes, you were yesterday present at the agreement betwixt Dionysius and me, concerning Heraclides. I was so, answered Plato, but since continues Theodotes, he hath sent out Officers to apprehend him, and I fear he is somewhere very nigh; therefore go along with us to Dionysius, and let us use our utmost endeavour with him: They went, when they came before him, Plato (the rest standing silent by, and weeping) began thus, These men, Dionysius, are afraid lest you should do something against Heraclides contrary to the agreement you made yesterday, for I suppose he is come near here abouts, Dionysius at this grew angry, his colour often changed with rage; Theodotes fell at his feet, and taking him by the hand, besought him not to do any such thing: Plato continuing his speech; Be of good cheer, saith he, Theodotes, for Dionysius will not do any thing contrary to the promise he made yesterday. Dionysius looking severely upon Plato, to you, saith he, I made no promise; yes by the Gods answered Plato, you promised not to do those things which Theodotes now beseecheth you not to do. Archedemus and Aristocritus being present; he told Plato (as hee had done once before, when he interceded for Heraclides,) That he cared for Heraclides and others more then for him: and asked him before them, whether he remembered that when he came first to Syracuse, he counselled him to restore the Græcian Cities: Plato answered, he did remember it, and that he still thought it his best course, and withall asked Dionysius whether that were the only counsell he had given him. Dionysius returned an angry contumelious reply, and asked him, laughing scornfully, whether he taught him those things as a School boy; to which Plato answered, you well remember, what replies he, as a Master in Geometry, or how? Plato forbore to reply, fearing it might occasion a stop of his Voyage; But immediately went away; Dionysius resolved to lay wait for Heraclides; but hee escaped to the Carthaginian Territories.

From this displeasure against Plato, Dionysius took occasion to forbear to send to Dion his money; and first sent Plato out of his Castle, where, til then, he had lain next the Palace, pretending that the women were to Celebrate a Feast ten daies in the Gardens where he dwelt; For that time he commanded Plato to live without the Castle with Archedemus; during which time Theodotes sent for him, and complained to him of Dionysius his proceedings. Dionysius, receiving information that Plato had gone to Theodotes, took a new occasion of displeasure against him, and sent one

one to him, who asked him whether he had gone to *Theodotes*. *Plato* acknowledged that he had, then saith the Messenger, *Dionysius* bad me tell you, you do not well to preferre *Dion* and his friends before him. Never from that time did he send for *Plato* to the Court, looking upon him as a profest friend to *Theodotes* and *Heracledes* and his profest enemy: *Plato* lived without the Castle amongst the Souldiers of the Guard: who, as *Dionysius* well knew, had born him ill will long, and sought to murder him, because he counsel'd *Dionysius* to give over the Tyranny, and live without a Guard. Some, who came to visit him, gave him notice that calumnies were spread against him amongst the Souldiers, as if he excited *Dion* and *Theondas* to restore the Island to liberty, and that some of them threatned, when they could light upon him to kill him. Hereupon *Plato* began to think of some means of Escape, which he effected in this manner; He sent to *Archytas* at *Tarentum*, and to other friends advertising them of the danger wherein he was; They, under pretence of an Embassy in the name of the Country, sent *Lamiscus* (whom *Laertius* calls *Lamiscus*) one of their party with a Galley of three banks of Oares to redemand *Plato*, declaring that his coming to *Syracuse* upon the engagement of *Archytas*: His letter was to this effect,

Architas to Dionysius, health.

WE all *Plato's* friends have sent *Lamiscus* and *Photides* to redemand the man according to your agreement with us: You will do well to consider with what importunity you prevail'd with us to invite *Plato* to you, promising to yeeld to all things, and to give him liberty to go and come at his pleasure; remember how much you prized his coming, and preferred him before all others: if there hath hapned any difference betwixt you, it will besit you to treat him courteously, and restore him safe to us. This if you do, you will do justly, and oblige us.

Dionysius to excuse himselfe, and to shew he was not angry with *Plato*, feasted him magnificently, and then sent him home with great testimonies of affection: One day amongst the rest he said to him, I am afraid *Plato* you will speak ill of me when you are amongst your friends. The Gods forbid, answered, *Plato*, smiling, they should have such scarcity of matter in the Academy, as to be constrained to discourse of you. *Dionysius* at his departure, desired him to find out whether *Dion* would be much displeased if he should dispose of his Wife to another, there being at that time a report that he did not like his match, and could not live quietly with his Wife. *Plato* in his return, came to *Peloponnesus* at what time the Olympic games were celebrated; where the eyes of all the Grecians were taken off from the sports and fixed upon him as the more worthy object: Here he found *Dion* beholding the exercises, To whom

whom hee related what had happened, *Dion* protested to revenge the discourtesie of *Dionysius* towards *Plato*, from which *Plato* earnestly dissuaded him: Being come home to *Athens*, hee wrote to *Dionysius*, and gave him a plain accompt of every thing, but that concerning *Dion's* Wife, he set it down so darkly, that hee alone to whom the letter was directed could understand him; letting him know that he had spoken with *Dion* about the businesse which he knew, and that he would be very much displeased if *Dionysius* did it: so that at that time, because there was great hopes of reconciliation between them, the Tyrant forbore a while to dispose of his Sister *Arete*, *Dion's* Wife, as, soon after, when he saw the breach irreconcilable, he did, marrying her against her will to one of his friends named *Timocrates*. *Dion* thence forward prepared for War against *Plato's* advice, who endeavoured to dissuade him from it, as well for respect of *Dionysius* his good reception of him, as for that *Dion* was well in years; though *Ælian* saith, he put *Dion* upon that war; which *Plutarch* imputes to the instigations of *Speusippus*.

CHAP. X.

His Authority in Civill Affairs.

^a *Laert.*

AT home he lived quietly in the Academy, ^a not engaging himself in publick Affairs; (though he were a person very knowing therein as his writings manifest,) because the Athenians were accustomed to Laws different from his sense.

^b *Ælian. var. hist. 2.41.*

^b His fame spreading to the Arcadians, and Thebans, they sent Embassadors earnestly to request him to come over to them, not noly to instruct their young men in Philosophy, but, which was of higher concernment, to ordain Laws for *Megalopolis* a City then newly built by the Arcadians, upon occasion of the great defeat given them by the Lacedæmonians, in the first year of the 103. Olympiad. *Plato* was not a little pleased at this invitation, but asking the Ambassadors how they stood affected to a parity of Estates, and finding them so averse from it, as not to be by any means induced thereto, he refused to go: but sent *Arifonimus* his familiar friend.

Plutarch. ad princip. inerrudit.

The *Cyrenæans* likewise sent to him, desiring him to send them Laws for their City, but he refused, saying, it was difficult to prescribe Laws to men in prosperity.

Yet to severall people upon their importunities he condescended.

To the *Syracusians* he gave Laws upon the ejection of their King.

To

To the *Cretans*, upon their building of *Magnesia*, he sent Laws digested into twelve Books.

To the *Ilians* he sent *Phormio*; to the *Pyrreans*, *Mededimus* (his familiar friends) upon the same designe.

This is enough to justifie him against those who *accuse him, * *Athenians* of having written a form of Government, which he could not perswade any to practise, because it was so severe: and that the *Athenians*, who accepted the Laws of *Draco* and *Solon*, derided his.

CHAP. XI.

His Vertues and Morall Sentences.

^a HE lived single, yet soberly and ^b chastly, insomuch as in his ^a *Laert.* ^b *Suid.* hold age (in compliance with the vulgar opinion) he sacrificed to Nature, to expiate the crime of his continence. So constant in his composure and gravity, that a Youth brought up under him, returning to his Parents, and hearing his Father speak aloud, said, *I never found this in Plato.* He ate but once a day, or, if the second time, very sparingly; he slept alone, and much discommended the contrary manner of living. Of his Prudence, Patience, Magnanimity, and other Vertues, there are these instances.

^c *Antimachus* a Colophonian, and *Niceratus* a Heracleot, contending in a Poetick Panegyrick of *Lysander*, the prize was bestowed upon *Niceratus*: *Antimachus* in anger tore his Poem; *Plato*, who at that time was young, and much esteemed *Antimachus* for his poetry, comforted him, saying, *Ignorance is a disease proper to the ignorant, as blindness to the blind.* ^c *Plut.*

^d His servant having offended him, he bad him put off his coat, and expose his shoulders to be beaten, intending to have corrected him with his own hand; but perceiving himselfe to be angry, he stopt his hand, and stood fixt in that posture; a friend comming in, asked him what he was doing, *Punishing an angry man*, saith he. ^d *Senec. de ira.* ^e *3. 12.*

^f Another time, being displeased at his servant for some offence, *do you* (saith he to *Speusippus* (or as *Laertius* to *Xenocrates*) accidentally comming in) *beat this fellow, for I am angry.* And another time to his servant he said, *I would beat thee, if I were not angry.* ^f *Senec. de ira.* ^g *3. 12.* Fearing to exceed the limits of correction, and thinking it unfit the Master and servant should be alike faulty. ^g *Val. Max.*

^h *Chabrias* the generall being arraigned for his life, he alone shewed himselfe on his side, not one of the Citizens else appearing for him. *Crobulus* the Sycophant met him, accompanying *Chabrias* to the Tower, and said unto him, *Do you come to help others,*

whom hee related what had happened. *Dion* protested to revenge the discourtesie of *Dionysius* towards *Plato*, from which *Plato* earnestly dissuaded him: Being come home to *Athens*, hee wrote to *Dionysius*, and gave him a plain accompt of every thing, but that concerning *Dion's* Wife, he set it down so darkly, that hee alone to whom the letter was directed could understand him; letting him know that he had spoken with *Dion* about the businesse which he knew, and that he would be very much displeased if *Dionysius* did it: so that at that time, because there was great hopes of reconciliation between them, the Tyrant forbore a while to dispose of his Sister *Arete*, *Dion's* Wife, as, soon after, when he saw the breach irreconcilable, he did, marrying her against her will to one of his friends named *Timocrates*. *Dion* thence forward p
endeavoured to d
onysius his good re
years; though *El*
tarch imputes to d

His.

PAGINATION ERROR

a Laert.

AT home he li
himself in p
knowing therein
ans were accustor
His fame spre
Embassadours ear
noly to instruct th
of higher concern
then newly built
feat given them
103. Olympiad. P

b *Ælian*. var.
hist. 2. 41.

but asking the Ambassadours how they stood affected to a parity of Estates, and finding them so averse from it, as not to be by any means induced thereto, he refused to go: but sent *Aristonimus* his familiar friend.

Plutarch. ad
princip. in erudit.

The *Cyreneans* likewise sent to him, desiring him to send them Laws for their City, but he refused, saying, it was difficult to prescribe Laws to men in prosperity.

Yet to severall people upon their importunities he condescended.

To the *Syracusians* he gave Laws upon the ejection of their King.

To

To the *Cretans*, upon their building of *Magnesia*, he sent Laws digested into twelve Books.

To the *Ilians* he sent *Phormio*; to the *Pyrreans*, *Mededimus* (his familiar friends) upon the same designe.

This is enough to justifie him against those who * accuse him, * *Athenians* of having written a form of Government, which he could not perswade any to practise, because it was so severe: and that the Athenians, who accepted the Laws of *Draco* and *Solon*, derided his.

CHAP. XI.

all Sentences.

^b chastly, insomuch as in his ^a *Laert.*
the vulgar opinion) he sacri- ^b *Suid.*
ne of his continence. So con-
that a Youth brought up un-
nd hearing his Father speak
o. He ate but once a day, or,
he slept alone, and much dis-
living. Of his Prudence, Pa-
ertues, there are these in-

| *Niceratus* a *Heracleot*, con- ^c *Plu.*
Lyfander, the prize was be-
n anger tore his Poem; *Plato*,
ch esteemed *Antimachus* for
Ignorance is a disease proper to

im, he bad him put off his ^d *Senec. de ira.*
beaten, intending to have ^{3. 12.}
but perceiving himselfe to

friend comming in, asked him what he was doing, *Punishing an*
angry man, saith he.

* Another time, being displeased at his servant for some of- ^e *Senec. de ira.*
fence, *do you* (saith he to *Speusippus* (or as *Laertius* to *Xenocrates*) ^{3. 12.}
accidentally comming in) *beat this fellow*, for *I am angry*. And ano-
ther time to his servant he said, *I would beat thee, if I were not angry*.
Fearing to exceed the limits of correction, and thinking it unfit ^f *Val. Max.*
the Matter and servant should be alike faulty.

* *Chabrias* the generall being arraigned for his life, he alone ^g *Laert.*
shewed himselfe on his side, not one of the Citizens else appea-
ring for him. *Crobulus* the Sycophant met him, accompanying
Chabrias to the Tower, and said unto him, *Do you come to help o-*

whom hee related what had happened. *Dion* protested to revenge the discourtesie of *Dionysius* towards *Plato*, from which *Plato* earnestly dissuaded him: Being come home to *Athens*, hee wrote to *Dionysius*, and gave him a plain accompt of every thing, but that concerning *Dion's* Wife, he set it down so darkly, that hee alone to whom the letter was directed could understand him; letting him know that he had spoken with *Dion* about the businesse which he knew, and that he would be very much displeased if *Dionysius* did it: so that at that time, because there was great hopes of reconciliation between them, the Tyrant forbore a while to dispose of his Sister *Arete*, *Dion's* Wife, as, soon after, when he saw the breach irreconcilable, he did, marrying her against her will to one of his friends named *Timocrates*. *Dion* thence forward prepared for War against *Plato's* advice, who endeavoured to dissuade him from it, as well for respect of *Dionysius* his good reception of him, as for that *Dion* was well in years; though *Ælian* saith, he put *Dion* upon that war; which *Plutarch* imputes to the instigations of *Speusippus*.

CHAP. X.

His Authority in Civill Affairs.

^a *Laert.*

AT home he lived quietly in the Academy, ^a not engaging himself in publick Affairs; (though he were a person very knowing therein as his writings manifest,) because the Athenians were accustomed to Laws different from his sense.

^b *Ælian. var. hist. 2.41.*

^b His fame spreading to the Arcadians, and Thebans, they sent Embassadors earnestly to request him to come over to them, not only to instruct their young men in Philosophy, but, which was of higher concernment, to ordain Laws for *Megalopolis* a City then newly built by the Arcadians, upon occasion of the great defeat given them by the Lacedæmonians, in the first year of the 103. Olympiad. *Plato* was not a little pleased at this invitation, but asking the Ambassadors how they stood affected to a parity of Estates, and finding them so averse from it, as not to be by any means induced thereto, he refused to go: but sent *Arifonimus* his familiar friend.

Plutarch. ad princip. inerudit.

The *Cyreneans* likewise sent to him, desiring him to send them Laws for their City, but he refused, saying, it was difficult to prescribe Laws to men in prosperity.

Yet to severall people upon their importunities he condescended.

To the *Syracusians* he gave Laws upon the ejection of their King.

To

To the *Cretans*, upon their building of *Magnesia*, he sent Laws digested into twelve Books.

To the *Ilians* he sent *Phormio*; to the *Pyrreans*, *Mededimus* (his familiar friends) upon the same designe.

This is enough to justifie him against those who *accuse him, * *Athenians* of having written a form of Government, which he could not perswade any to practise, because it was so severe: and that the *Athenians*, who accepted the Laws of *Draco* and *Solon*, derided his.

CHAP. XI.

His Vertues and Morall Sentences.

HE lived single, yet soberly and ^b chastly, insomuch as in his ^a *Laert.* ^b *Suid.* hold age (in compliance with the vulgar opinion) he sacrificed to Nature, to expiate the crime of his continence. So constant in his composure and gravity, that a Youth brought up under him, returning to his Parents, and hearing his Father speak aloud, said, *I never found this in Plato.* He ate but once a day, or, if the second time, very sparingly; he slept alone, and much discommended the contrary manner of living. Of his Prudence, Patience, Magnanimity, and other Vertues, there are these instances.

^c *Antimachus* a Colophonian, and *Niceratus* a Heracleot, con- ^c *Plut.* tending in a Poetick Panegyrick of *Lyfander*, the prize was bestowed upon *Niceratus*: *Antimachus* in anger tore his Poem; *Plato*, who at that time was young, and much esteemed *Antimachus* for his poetry, comforted him, saying, *Ignorance is a disease proper to the ignorant, as blindness to the blind.*

^d His servant having offended him, he bad him put off his ^d *Senec. de ira.* coat, and expose his shoulders to be beaten, intending to have ^{3. 12.} corrected him with his own hand; but perceiving himselfe to be angry, he stopt his hand, and stood fixt in that posture; a friend comming in, asked him what he was doing, *Punishing an angry man*, saith he.

^e Another time, being displeased at his servant for some of- ^e *Senec. de ira.* fence, *do you* (saith he to *Speusippus* (or as *Laertius* to *Xenocrates*) ^{3. 12.} accidentally comming in) *beat this fellow, for I am angry.* And another time to his servant he said, *I would beat thee, if I were not angry.*

^f Fearing to exceed the limits of correction, and thinking it unfit ^f *Val. Max.* the Master and servant should be alike faulty.

^g *Chabrias* the generall being arraigned for his life, he alone ^g *Laert.* shewed himselfe on his side, not one of the Citizens else appearing for him. *Crobulus* the Sycophant met him, accompanying *Chabrias* to the Tower, and said unto him, *Do you come to help o-*

thers; you know not that the poison of Socrates is reserved for you? Plato answered, When I fought for my Country I hazarded my life, and will now in duty to my friend.

^h At the Olympick Games, he fell into company with some strangers, who knew him not, upon whose affections he gained much by his affable conversation, Dining and spending the whole day with them, not mentioning either the Academy or Socrates, only saying, his Name was Plato. When they came to Athens, he entertained them curteously. Come Plato, said the strangers; shew us your namesake, Socrates his Disciple; bring us to the Academy; recommend us to him, that we may know him. He smiling a little, as he used, said, I am the man: Whereat they were much amazed, having conversed so familiarly with a person of that eminence, who used no boasting or ostentation; and shewed, that beside his Philosophicall discourse; his ordinary conversation was extremely winning.

When he went out of the School, he alwaies said, See (Youths) that you employ your idle houres usefully.

At a Feast he blamed those that brought in Musicians to hinder discourse.

Seeing a young man play at Dice, reproved him, he answered, *what, for so small a matter? Custome* (replies Plato) *is no small thing.*

Being demanded, whether there should be any record to posterity of his actions or sayings, as of others before him: First, saith he, *we must get a Name, then many things will follow.*

Getting on Horse-back, he immediately lighted again, saying, He feared lest he should be carried away *in raion* by a high willfull conceit, a metaphor taken from a Horse.

He advised drunken and angry men to look in a Glasse, and it would make them refrain from those vices.

He affirmed, that to drink to the *excesse* of drunkenness was not allowable at any time, unless upon the festivall of that God who gives Wine.

Sleep also much displeased him, whence he saith in his Lawes, *No man sleeping is worth any thing.*

That truth is more pleasing to all, then any feign'd story, so of truth he saith, *de legibus: Truth, O guist is an excellent thing, and durable, but to this we are not easily perswaded.*

^{Val. Max. 4.1.} Being told, that Xenocrates had spoken many unjust things against him; he presently rejected the accusation; the informer persisted, asked, why he would not believe him? He added, it was not probable, that he whom he loved so much, should not love him again. Finally, the other swearing it was thus; he, not to argue him of perjury, affirmed, that Xenocrates would never have said so, but that there was reason for it.

^{Senec. de ira. 1. 16.} He said, *No wise man punisheth in respect of the fault past, but in prevention of the future.*

Seeing

Seeing the Agrigentines magnificent in Building, luxurious in Feasting, *These people* (saith he) *Build, as if they were to live for ever, and Eat, as if they were to die instantly.* Elian.

Hearing a wicked person speak in the defence of another, *This man*, saith he, *carries his heart in his tongue.* Stob.

Being told, that some spoke ill of him, he answer'd, *'Tis no Stob. matter, I will live so that none shall believe them.*

Seeing a young man of a good family, who had wasted all his means, sitting at the door of an Inn, feeding upon bread and water, he told him, *If you had dined so temperately, you would never have needed to sup so.* Stob.

To Antisthenes, making a long oration, *You know not*, saith he, *Stob. that discourse is to be measured by the hearer, not the speaker.*

Seeing a youth over-bold with his Father, *Young man*, saith he, *will you under-value him, who is the cause you over-value your selfe?* Stob.

To one of his Disciples, who took too much care of his body, he said, *Why do you labour so much in building your own prison?*

Of a prisoner fettered, he said, *That man is dead in his own body, he lives in another.*

He said, that *whosoever neglected himselfe for another, was the most happy of all persons, for he enjoyed neither.*

One Leo, an eminent Citizen, being blamed for loud and immoderate clamour in the Senate, *That is*, saith he, *to be a Lyon indeed.*

His Disciples wondring, that *Xenocrates*, severe all his life time, had said something that was pleasant, *Do you wonder* (saith he) *that Roses and Lillies grow among Thorns?*

Xenocrates by reason of his severe conversation, he advised to sacrifice to the Graces. Laert. vit. Xen.

He used to say, Prefer labour before idlenesse, unlesse you esteem rust above brightnesse.

He exhorted the young men to good life, thus; Observe the different nature of vertue and pleasure; the momentary sweetnesse of the world is immediately followed by eternall sorrow and repentance, the short pain of the other by eternall pleasure.

He said, that it was a great matter in the education of youth, to accustome them to take delight in good things; otherwaies, he affirmed pleasure to be the bait of evill.

He affirmeth Philosophy to be the true help of the Soul, the rest ornaments; that nothing is more pleasing to a sound minde, then to speak and hear truth, then which nothing is better or more lasting.

To some, who demanded what kinde of possessions were best to be provided for Children: Those (saith he) which fear neither stormes, nor violence of men, nor *Jove* himselfe.

To *Demonicus*, asking his advice concerning the education of his Son: The same care (saith he) that we have of Plants, we must

must take of our Children ; The one is Labour, the other Pleasure. But we must take heed that in this we be not too secure, in that too vigilant.

To *Philedonius*, who blamed him that he was as Studious to learn as to teach, and asked him *how long he meant to be a Disciple* ; as long saith he, *as I am not ashamed of growing better and wiser.*

Being demanded what difference there is between a learned Man and an unlearned, the same saith he, *as Betwixt a Physitian and a Patient.*

He said, *Princes had no better Possessions then the familiarities of such men who could not flatter, that Wisdom is as necessary to a Prince, as the Soul to the Body. That Kingdoms would be most happy, if either Philosophers Rule, or the Rulers were inspired with Philosophy, for nothing is more pernicious then power and arrogance accompanied with ignorance. That Subjects ought to be such as Princes seem to be. That a Magistrate is to be esteemed a Publick not a private good. That not a part of the Common-wealth, but the whole ought to be principally regarded.*

*Plut. Sympos. 6.
prefat.
Ælian. var. hist.*

Being desirous to take off *Timotheus* Son of *Conon*, Generall of the Athenians, from sumptuous Military Feasts ; he invited him into the Academy to a plaine moderate Supper, such as quiet pleasing sleeps succeed with a good temper of body. The next day *Timotheus* observing the difference, said, They who feasted with *Plato* were the better for it the next day ; and meeting *Plato*, said unto him ; *Your Supper, Plato, is as pleasant the next morning as overnight*, alluding to the excellent discourse, that had past at that time.

Hence appears the truth of that Poet's saying, who being derided for acting a Tragedy, none being present but *Plato*, answered, *but this one person is more then all the Athenians besides.*

CHAP. XII.

His Will and Death.

Thus continuing a single life to his end, not having any Heirs of his own, he bequeathed his Estate to young *Adimantus*, (probably the Son of *Adimantus*, his second Brother) by his will ; thus recited by *Laertius*.

These things Plato hath Bequeathed and disposed, The Eniphistidean grounds bordering North, on the high way from the Cephisian Temple, South on the Heracleum of the Eniphistiades, East on Archestratus the Phrearian, west Philip the Cholidian, this let it not be lawfull for any man to sell or alienate, but let young Adimantus be possessor thereof in

as full and ample manner as is possible. And likewise the *Enerisadean Farm* which I bought of Callimachus, adjoining on the North to Eurymedon the *Myrrinusian*, on the South to Demotratrus Xypeteron, on the East to Eurymedon the *Myrrinusian*, on the West to Cephiſſus; Three mine of Silver; a Golden Cup weighing 160. a ring of Gold, and an earring of Gold, both together weighing four drachmes and three oboli; Euclid the Stone-Cutter oweth me three Minae, Diana I remit freely, I leave Servanus, Ticho, Bictas Apolloniades, Dionysius Goods, whereof Denictrius keepeth an Inventory. I ow no man any thing, Executors, Sothenes, Speusippus, Demetrius, Hegias, Eurymedon, Callimachus, Thrasippus.

If this Will be not forged, that of *Apuleius* is false, who a- Dogm. Plat. vers the Patrimony he left was a little Orchard adjoining to the Academy, two servants, and a Cup wherein he supplicated to the Gods; Gold no more then he wore in his ear when he was a boy, an Emblem of his Nobility.

He died in the 13th year of the Reign of Philip King of Macedon, Laert. in the first of the 108. Olympiad; the 81. (according to *Hermippus*, *Cicero*, *Seneca*, and others) of his age (not as *Athenæus* the 82.) which number he compleated exactly, dying that very day whereon he was born; For which reason the Magi at Athens sacrificed to him, as conceiving him more than man, who fulfilled the most perfect number, nine multiplied into it self.

He died only of age, which *Seneca* ascribes to his temperance Epist. 1. 58. and diligence; *Hermippus* saith, at a Nuptiall Feast; *Cicero* saith, as he was writing; they therefore who affirm he dyed (as *Pherecydes*) of lice, do him much injury; upon his Tomb these Laert. Epitaphs.

The first.

whose Temperance and Justice all-envies,
The fam'd Aristocles here buried lies;
If Wisdom any with renown indued,
Here was it lost, by envy not pursued.

The second.

Earth in her bosom Plato's body hides,
His Soul amongst the deathlesse Gods resides
Aristo's Son; whose fame to strangers spread,
Made them admire the sacred life he lead.

Another later.

Eagle, why art thou pearcht upon this stone,
And gaz'st thence on some Gods Starry throne?
I Plato's Soul to Heaven flown represent,
His body buried in this Monument.

L I

Phavorinus

Phavorinus saith, that *Mithridates* the Persian set up *Plato's* statue in the Academy with this Inscription;

MITHRIDATES SON OF RHODOBATES,
THE PERSIAN, DEDICATED THIS I-
MAGE OF PLATO, MADE BY SILANION TO
THE MUSES.

CHAP. XIII.

His Disciples and Friends.

THE Fame of this Schoole attracted Disciples from all parts of whom were

Speusippus an Athenian, *Plato's* Sifters Son, whom he said he reformed by the example of his own life.

Xenocrates a Chalcedonian, *Plato's* beloved Disciple, an imitator of his gravity and magnanimity: *Athenaus* saith, hee was first the onely Disciple of *Æschines*, and relief of his poverty, seduced from him by *Plato*.

Aristotle a Stagiritic, whom *Plato* used to call a Colt, foreseeing that he would ungratefully oppose him, as a Colt having suckt, kicks at his Dam: *Xenocrates* was slow, *Aristotle* quick in extremity, whence *Plato* said of them, what an Asse have I, and what a horse to yoke together.

Philippus an Opuntian, who transcribed *Plato's* Laws in wax; to him some ascribe *Epinomis*.

Hestæus a Perinthian.

Dion a Syracusan; whom *Plato* exceedingly affected, as is evident from his Epigrams; seeing him in the height of honour, all mens eyes fixt upon his noble actions, hee advised him to take heed of that vice, which makes men care onely to please themselves; a consequent of solitude.

Amyclus (or as *Ælian*, *Amyclas*) a Heracleote.

* *Erastus* and *Coriscus* Scepsians.

Temolaus a Cyzicene.

Euamon a Lampfacene.

Pithon, whom *Aristotle* calls *Paron*, and *Heraclides* Ænians.

Hippothales and *Callippus*, Athenians.

Demetrius of *Amphipolis*.

Heraclides of *Pontus*.

Two women, *Lasthenia* a Mantinean, and *Axiotia* a Phliasi-an, who went habited like a man.

Theophrastus, as some affirm.

Oratours, *Hyperides*, *Lycurgus*, *Demosthenes*. *Lycurgus* (saith *Philistus*

* See also *Stob.*
lib. 13.

Philiſtus) was a perſon of great parts, and did many remarkable things, which none could perform, who had not been *Plato's* auditor. *Demofthenes*, when he fled from *Antipater*, ſaid to *Archias*, who counſell'd him to put himſelfe into his hands, upon promiſe to ſave his life; Far be it from me to chooſe rather to live ill, than to die well, having heard *Xenocrates* and *Plato's* diſpute of the Soules immortality.

Mneſiſtratus a Thafian.

To theſe reckoned by *Laertius*, add *Ariſtides* a Locrian.

Eudoxus a Gnidian, who at a great Feaſt made by *Plato*, firſt found out the manner of fitting in a circular form.

Hermodorus, of whom the Proverb, *Hermodorus traffiques in Zenob. words.*

Heracleodorus, to whom *Demofthenes* writing, reprehends him, that having heard *Plato*, he neglected good arts, and lived diſorderly.

* *Euphratus*, who lived with *Perdiccas* King of *Macedonia*, in ſo great favour; that he in a manner ſhared command with him. * *Athen. deipn. lib. 11.*

Euagon of *Lampsacum*.

Athen. Ibid.

Timæus of *Cyzicum*.

Athen. Ibid.

Charon of *Pellene*.

Athen. Ibid.

* *Iſocrates* the Oratour, with whom *Plato* was very intimate: * *Laert.* *Praxiphanes* published a diſcourſe they had together, in a field of *Plato's*, who at that time entertained *Iſocrates* as a Gueſt.

After, *Phædrus*, *Alexis*, *Agatho*, young men, whom *Plato* particularly affected, as appears by his Epigrams.

* *Ariſtonymus*, *Phormio*, *Mededimus*, his familiar friends, already * *chap. 10.* mentioned.

CHAP. XIV.

His Emulatours and Detractions.

AS *Plato's* eminent learning gained on one ſide many Diſciples and admirers, ſo on the other ſide, it procured him many emulators, eſpecially amongſt his fellow Diſciples, the followers of *Socrates*; amongſt theſe,

Xenophon was exceedingly diſaffected towards him; they emulated each other, and writ both upon one ſubject; a *Symposium*, *Socrates* his *Apologie*, morall commentaries: One writ of a *Commonwealth*, the other, the *Inſtitution of Cyrus*: which book * *Plato* notes as commentitious, affirming *Cyrus* not to have been * *In Legib.* ſuch a perſon as is there expreſt. Though both writ much concerning *Socrates*, yet neither makes mention of the other, except *Xenophon* once of *Plato*, in the third of his Commentaries.

Aniſthenes being about to recite ſomething that he had writ-

ten

ted; desired *Plato* to be present; *Plato* demanding what he meant to recite, he answered, that to contradict is not lawfull. How come you, saith *Plato*, to write upon that subject? And thereupon demonstrating that he contradicted himselfe, *Anisthenes* writ a Dialogue against him, intituled *Saibo*.

Aristippus was at difference with him, for which reason (in *Phadone*) he covertly reproves *Aristippus*, that being near at *Ægina* when *Socrates* died, he came not to him. He writ a book of the luxury of the antients; some ascribe the amatory Epigrams to his invention, his designe in that treatise being to detract from eminent persons, amongst the rest from *Socrates* his Master, and *Plato* and *Xenophon* his fellow Disciples.

Æschines and *Plato* also disagreed: some affirme, that when *Plato* was in favour with *Diomysius*, *Æschines* came thither very poor, and was despised by *Plato*, but kindly entertained by *Aristippus*: But the Epistle of *Æschines* put forth by *Allatius*, expresth the contrary. The discourse which *Plato* relates, betwixt *Crito* and *Socrates* in Prison, *Idomeneus* saith, was betwixt *Socrates* and *Æschines*; by *Plato*, out of ill will to *Æschines*, attributed to *Crito*. But of *Æschines* he makes not any mention in all his works, except twice slightly; once in *Phadone*, where he names him amongst the persons present at *Socrates* his death; and again in his Apology speaking of *Lysanias* his Father.

Phado, if we credit the detractions of *Atheneus*, was so much maligned by *Plato*, as that he was about to frame an indictment against him, to reduce him to that condition of servitude, out of which, by the procurement of *Socrates*, he had been redeemed; but his designe being discovered, he gave it over. Besides his condisciples

Diogenes the Cynick derided his Laws, and assertion of Ideas; concerning the first, he asked if he were writing Lawes? *Plato* assented. Have you not written already a Commonwealth, saith *Diogenes*? Yes, answered *Plato*. Had that Commonwealth Lawes, saith *Diogenes*? *Plato* affirmed it had. Then, replied *Diogenes*, what need you write new? ^a Another time, *Diogenes* saying, he could see the things of the world, but not Ideas: *Plato* answered, that is no wonder, for you have, and use those eyes, which behold such things: but the minde, which only can see the other, you use not.

^b *Molon*, in detraction from him, said, *It was not strange Diomysius should be at Corinth, but that Plato should be at Sicily*.

From these private differences, arose many scandalous imputations, forged and spread abroad by such as envied or maligned him: as, ^c That he profest one thing, and practised another: ^d that he loved inordinately *Aster*, *Dion*, *Phadrus*, *Alexis*, *Agatho*, and *Archeanassa*, a Curtisan of *Colopho*: ^e That he was a calumniator, envious, proud, a gluttonous lover of Figs: ^f that he was the

^a Laert. vit.
Diog.

^b Laert.

^c Seneca.
^d Laert.

^e Athen.
^f Tzetx. Chiliad.

the worst of Philosophers a parasite to Tyrants, and many other accusations alike improbable; from these the Comick Poets and others took liberty to abuse him; ⁶ Theopompus in *Autochare.* ^g Laert.

— for one is now,
 And two (as Plato holds) is hardly one.
 Anaxandrides in *Theæo*;
 When *Olivæ* he (like Plato) doth devour;
 Timon,
 As Plato feignes, in framing ^h wonders skill'd;
 Alexis in *Meropide*,
 Aptly thou comest, I walking round could meet
 (Like Plato) nothing wise; but tir'd my feet.
 And in *Anchilione*,
 Thou speak'st of things thou understands not, go
 To Plato, thence Nile and onions know:
 Amph in *Amp hirate*,
 What good from hence you may expect to rise,
 I can no more then Plato's good comprise;
 And in *Dexidemide*,
 Plato thou nothing knowst, but how
 To look severe and knit the brow.
 Cratylus in *Pseudobolymæo*,
 A man thou art, and hast a soul, but this
 With Plato not sure, but opinion is.
 Alexis in *Olympiodoro*.
 My body mortall is grown dry,
 My soul turn'd air that cannot dy;
 Taught Plato this Philosophy?
 And in *Parasito*.
 Or thou with Plato rav'st alone.

^h Sw.

ⁱ *Ephippus* in *Naufrago*, objects to Plato and some friends of his, that corrupted with money they detracted from many persons; that they went proudly habited, and they took more care of their outward beauty, then the most luxurious: See *Athenæus*, lib. 11.

CHAP. XV.

His Writings.

THE writings of Plato are by way of Dialogue; of the Invention of Dialogue we have ^a already spoken; now of the ^a Chap. Nature thereof.

A Dialogue is composed of questions and answers Philosophical

M m

or

or Politicall, aptly expressing the Characters of those persons that are the speakers in an elegant stile; Dialectick is the art of discourse, whereby we confirm or confute any thing by questions and answers of the disputants.

Of Platonick discourse there are two kinds, *Hyphegetick* and *Exegetick*, subscribed thus,

<i>Hyphegetick</i>	{	<i>Theoretick.</i>	{	<i>Logick.</i>
				<i>Physick.</i>
		<i>Practick.</i>	{	<i>Ethick:</i>
				<i>Politick.</i>

<i>Exegetick</i>	{	<i>Gymnastick,</i>	{	<i>Majeutick.</i>
				<i>Physick.</i>
		<i>Agonistick,</i>	{	<i>Endeistick.</i>
				<i>Anatreptick.</i>

we know where there are other divisions of Dialogues; as into dramattick Narrative mixt: but that division is more proper to Tragedy then to Philosophy.

Of *Plato's* Dialogues are

Physick, { *Timæus.*

Logick, { *The Politick.*
 { *Cratylus.*
 { *Parmenides.*
 { *The Sophist.*

Ethick, { *Apology of Socrates.*
 { *Crito.*
 { *Phædo.*
 { *Phædrus.*
 { *Symposium:*
 { *Menexemus.*
 { *Clitophon.*
 { *Epistles.*
 { *Philebus.*
 { *Hipparchus.*
 { *The Rivalls.*

Politick,	{	The Common-wealth.
		The Lawes.
		Minos.
		Epinomis.
		The Atlantick.
Maieutick,	{	Alcibiades.
		Theages.
		Lyfis.
		Laches.
Pirastick,	{	Euthyphron.
		Menon.
		Ion.
		Charmides.
		Theætetus.
Endeictick,	{	Protagoras.
Anatreptick,	{	Euthydemus.
		Hippias 1.
		Hippias 2.
		Gorgias 1.
		Gorgias 2.

It being much controverted (continueth *Laertius*) whether *Plato* doth dogmatize, some affirming, others denying it, it will be necessary to say something thereupon. *Δογματίζειν* to dogmatize is to impose a Doctrine, as *νομίζειν* to impose a Law; A Doctrine is taken two waies, either for that which is Decreed, or the Decree it self; That which is Decreed is a proposition, the Decree it self an imposition. *Plato* expounds those things which he conceiveth true: Confutes those which are false, suspends his opinion in those which are doubtfull. He asserts what he conceiveth true under one of these four persons, *Socrates*, *Timæus* an Athenian Guest, an *Ælian* Guest; The Guests are not, as some conceive, *Plato* and *Parmenides*, but imagined namelesse persons, as what *Socrates*, *Timæus* speak, are the Decrees of *Plato*. Those whom he argueth of falsehood are *Thrasymachus*, *Callicles*, *Polus*, *Gorgias*, *Protagoras*, *Hippias*, *Euthydemus*, and the like.

In Argument he often used induction of both Sorts. Induction is a discourse, which from certain truths Collects, and inferreth a truth like to those: Of Induction there are two kinds, one from Contraries, another from Consequents: From Contraries, as when he who is questioned, answereth in all things contrary to himself, as thus; My Father is either the same with yours, or
not

not the same, if therefore thy Father be not the same with mine, he is not my Father: and again, if a man be not a living creature, he is stone, wood, or the like, but he is neither stone nor wood, for he hath a soul, and moveth himselfe, therefore he is a living creature; if a living creature, a dog and an Ox. This kind of induction by contraries, serves not for assertion, but confutation: Induction by consequents is two-fold; one, when a singular being sought, is concluded from a singular, the first proper to Oratours, the second to Logicians; as in the first, the question is, Whether such an one were a murthurer, it is proved from his being bloody at the same time. This induction is Rhetoricall, for Rhetorick is conversant in Singulars, not in universalls; it inquireth not after justice, but after the severall parts thereof: the other is Dialectick, whereby Universalls are concluded from Singulars, as in this question; Whether the Soule be immortall, and whether the living are of the dead, which is demonstrated in his Book of the Soul, by a generall Maxime, that contraries proceed from contraries, this being generall, is proved by singulars, as, waking succeeds sleeping, the greater the lesser, and so on the contrary. Thus he useth to confirm what he asserts.

Thrasyllus saith, he published his Dialogues according to the tragick Tetralogie: His genuine Dialogues are fiftie six, his Common-wealth divided into ten, they make nine Tetralogies, reckoning his Commonwealth one Book, his Lawes another. The first Tetralogie hath a common subject, declaring what is the proper life of a Philosopher: every Book hath a two-fold title; one from the principall person, the other from the subject.

The first. { *Euthyphron*; or of Piety: Pirastick.
 { *Socrates* his Apologie: Ethick.
 { *Crito*; or of that which is to be done: Ethick.
 { *Phædo*; or of the soul: Ethick.

The second. { *Cratylus*; or, of right naming: Logick.
 { *Theætetus*; or, of Science: Pirastick.
 { *The Sophist*; or, of Ens: Logick.
 { *The Politick*; or, of a Kingdome: Logick.

The third. { *Parmenides*; or, of Idæa's: Logick.
 { *Philebus*; or, of Pleasure: Ethick.
 { *The Symposium*; or, of Good: Ethick.
 { *Phædrus*; or of Love: Ethick.

The fourth. { *Alcibiades* 1. or, of human Nature: Majeutick.
 { *Alcibiades* 2. or, of Prayer: Majeutick.
 { *Hipparchus*; or, the Covetous: Ethick.
 { *The Rivalls*; or, of Philosophy: Ethick.

- The fifth { *Theages*; or of Philosophy : Majeutick.
Charmides; or, of Temperance: Pirastick.
Laches; or, of Fortitude : Majeutick.
Lyfis; or, of Friendship: Majeutick.
- The sixth { *Euthydemus* ; or, the Litigious : Anatreptick.
Protagoras; or, the Sophist : Endeistick.
Gorgias ; or, of Rhetorick : Anatreptick.
Menon; or, of Vertue: Pirastick.
- The seventh { *Hippias* first; or, of Honest : Anatreptick.
Hippias second ; or, of False : Anatreptick.
Jo ; or of Ilias: Pirastick.
Menexenus; or, the funerall Oration : Ethick.
- The eighth { *Clitophon*; or the Exhortation : Morall.
The Commonwealth; or, of Just: Politick.
Timæus; or, of Nature : Physick.
Critias; or, the Atlantick: Ethick.
- The ninth { *Minos* ; or, of Law : Politick.
Laws; or, of Legislation : Politick.
Epinomis ; or, the Nocturnall convention ; or, the
Philosophers Politick.
Epistles thirteen, Ethick, in the inscriptions whereof
he useth *de diazon*. *Cleon xalson*. to *Aristodemus* one;
to *Architas* two ; to *Dionysius* foure; to *Hermias*, *Eras-*
tus, and *Coriscus* one ; to *Leodamas* one ; to *Dion* one ;
to *Dions* friends two. Thus *Thrasilaus*.

Others, of whom is *Aristophanes* the Grammarian, reduce his Dialogues to Trilogies, placing in

The first { *The Common-wealth*.
Timæus.
Critias.

The second { *The Sophister*.
The Politick.
Cratylus.

The third { *Laws*.
Minos.
Epinomis.

The fourth { *Theætetus*.
Euthyphron.
Apology.

The fifth.

{ *Crito.*
Phædo.
Epistles. The rest single without order.

Some, as we said, begin with *Alcibiades major*, others from *Theages*, others from *Euthyphron*, others from *Clitophon*, others from *Timæus*, others from *Phædrus* (which they say was the first Dialogue he wrote, as the subject it selfe seemeth to confirme, which favours of youth; and therefore *Dicæarchus* condemnes it as too light: to which censure *Cicero* agreeth, as conceiving, he ascribeth too great a power to Love.) others begin with *Theætetus*, many with his Apologie.

He mentions not himselfe in all his writings, except once in his *Phædo*, and another time in his Apologie for *Socrates*. At the recitall of his *Phædo*, all, but *Aristotle* rose, and went away. The efficacy of that Dialogue (which treats of the immortality of the Soule) is evident from *Cleombrotus* of *Ambracia*, who, as soon as he had read it, was so disaffected to life, that he threw himselfe from a high wall into the Sea; upon whom thus *Callimachus*,

b *Cicero. Tuscul.*
quæst. 2.
c *Epigr.*

*Cleombrotus cries out, farewell this light,
 And headlong throwes himselfe into endlesse night:
 Not that he ought had done, deserving death,
 But Plato read, and weary grew of breath.*

The Dialogues generally noted as spurious (not to say any thing of his *Epinomis*, though some ascribe it to *Philippus* the Opuntian) are these,

Midon, or the Horse-courser.
Erixias, or *Erasistratus*.
Alcyon.
Acephali, or the *Sisyphi*.
Axiochus.
Phæaces.
Demodochus.
Chelidon.
The seventh,
Epimenides.

Of these *Alcyon* is ascribed by *Phavorinus* to *Leon*.

His stile, *Aristotle* saith, is betwixt Prose and Verse. He useth variety of names, that his work may not easily be understood by the unlearned. He conceiveth wisdom properly to be of intellectuall things, Knowledge of reall Beings conversant about God,
 and

and the soul separate from the body. Properly, he calleth *Philosophy* *Wisdom*, being the appetition of divine *Knowledge*; but, commonly he calleth all skill knowledge, as an Artificer, a wise man. He likewise used the same names in divers significations; *παῖς*, which properly signifies Evill, he useth for Simple, as *Euripides* in his *Lycimnius* of *Hercules*,

παῖς ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ ἀγαθόν.

The same word *Plato* sometimes takes for *honest*, sometimes for *little*. He likewise useth divers names to signify the same thing: *Idea* he useth both for species and genus; Exemplar, both principle and cause. Sometimes he useth contrary expressions to signify the same thing; Sensible he calleth a being and no being; a being, as having been produced; no being, in respect of its continuall mutation. *Idea*, neither moveable nor permanent, the same both one and many. The like he useth often in other things.

The method of his discourse is three-fold: first, to declare what that is which is taught; then for what reason it is asserted, whether as a principall cause, or as a comparifon, and whether to defend the Tenent, or oppugne the contrary. Thirdly, whether it be rightly said.

The marks, which he usually affixed to his writings, are these.

- X denotes Platonick words and figures.
- XX διπλῶ, Doctrines and opinions proper to *Plato*;
- XX μειστεῖναι, Choice expressions.
- διπλῶ μειστεῖναι, Corrections.
- ↑ βελῶ μειστεῖναι, Things superfluous.
- ↕ αἰτιολογία μειστεῖναι, Double signification or use.
- ↓ κατέστην, Philosophicall institution.
- * αἰεὶσιν, agreement of opinions.
- ↗ βελῶ, Improbation. Hitherto *Laertius*.

There are two Epistles under *Plato's* name, besides those in his works, already mentioned, one in *Laertius* his life of *Architas*.

Plato to Architas, ἀπεστὶν.

THE Commentaries which came from you, we received with extraordinary content, infinitely admiring the writer, who appears to us a person worthy of those ancient predecessors; for those men are said to be *Myraans* of those *Trojans*, which were banished in the time of *Laomedon*, good men, as *Tradition* speaks them. Those Commentaries of mine, concerning which you write, are not yet polished; however as they are, I have sent them to you, in the keeping of them we agree both, so as I need not give you any directions. Farewell.

Another published by *Leo Allatius* amongst the Socratick Epistles.

I had not any of those things to send to Syracuse which Archytas desired to receive by you ; as soon as possible I will send to you. Philosophy hath wrought in me I know not whether good or bad , a hatred of conversing with many persons, justly, I think, since they erre in all kind of folly as well in private as publick affairs ; but if unjustly, yet know I can hardly live and breath otherwise. For this reason I have fled out of the City, as out of a Den of wild Beasts, living not far from the Ephestides, and the places thereabouts. I now see, that Timon hated not men, he could not affect Beasts, therefore lived he alone by himself, perhaps not without danger. Take this as you please ; my resolution is to live far from the City, now and for ever hereafter, as long as God shall grant me life.

In Poefy he writ,

Dithyrambs.

An Epick Poem,

Four Tragedies, all which (as we said) he burned.

The Atlantick Story, of which thus Plutarch; Solon began the Atlantick story (which he had learnt of the Priests of Sais , very proper for the Athenians) but gave it over by reason of his old age, and the largeness of the work. Plato took the same argument, as a vast piece of fertile ground fallen to him by hereditary right ; He manured it, refined it, enclosed it with large Walls, Porches and Galleries, such as never any Fable, or Poem had before ; but because he undertook it late, he was prevented by Death. The more things written delight, the more their not being perfected is

For as the Athenian City left the Temple of Jupiter; so Plato's Wisdom, amongst many excellent writings, left the Atlantick argument alone imperfect.

Epigrams, of which these are extant in Laertius, and the Anthologic.

Upon one named *Aster*.

^d Laert. Anthol. 3. 6. 27.

*The Stars, my Star, thou view'st; Heav'n I would be,
That I with thousand eyes might gaze on Thee.*

Upon his *Death*.

^c Laert.

*A Phosphor 'mongst the living late wert thou,
But shin'st among the dead a Hesper now.*

Epitaph on *Dion*, engrav'd on his Tomb at *Syracuse*.

^f Laert. Anthol. 4. 33. 26.

*Old Hecuba the Trojan Matron's years
were interwoven by the Fates with Tears ;
But thee with blooming hopes my Dion decks ,
Gods did a Trophy of their pow'r erect.
Thy honour'd reliques in their Country rest ,
Ah Dion ! whose love rages in my breast.*

On Alexis.

^g Fair is Alexis, I no sooner said,
When every one his eyes that way convey'd:
My soul (as when some dog a bone we show,
Who snatcheth it) lost we not Phædrus so?

^g Laert. An-
thol. 3. 33. 44.

On Archæanassa.

^h To Archæanassa, on whose frown'd brow
Love sits in triumph, I my service vow;
If her declining Graces shine so bright,
What flames felt you, who saw her noon of light?

^h Laert.

On Agathon.

My Soul, when I kiss'd Agathon, did start
Up to my lip, just ready to depart.

To Xantippe.

ⁱ An Apple I (Love's emblem) at the throw,
Thou in exchange thy Virgin-zone bestow.
If thou refuse my suite, yet read in this,
How short thy years, how frail thy Beauty is.
I cast the apple, loving those love thee,
^k Xantippe yeeld, for soon both old will be.

ⁱ Laert.

^k Anthol.

^l On the Eretrians vanquish'd by the Persians.
^m We in Eubæa born Eretrians are
Buried in Susa from our Country far:

^l Herod. lib. 6.

^m Laert.

Venus and the Muses.

ⁿ Virgins (said Venus to the Muses) pay
Homage to us, or, Love shall wound your Hearts:
The Muses answer'd, take these toys away,
Our Breasts are proof against his childish darts.

ⁿ Laert.

Fortune exchange'd.

^o One finding Gold, in change, the halter quits,
Missing his Gold, tother the halter knits.

^o Laert. Anthol.
84. 1.

On Sappho.

^p He, who believes the Muses Nine, mistakes,
For Lesbian Sappho ten their number makes.

^p Anthol. 67.
19.

Time.

^q Time all things bring to passe, a change creates
In Names, in Formes, in Nations and in States.

^q Anthol. 12.

Death.

r Anthol. 3.22.
3.

*That is a Plough-man's grave, a Sailor's this ;
To Sea and Land alike Death common is.*

On one Shipwrack'd.

f Anth. 3.22.6.

*The cruel Sea, which took my life away,
Forbore to strip me of my last array :
From this a covetous man did not refrain,
Acting a crime so great for so small gain ;
But let him wear it to the shades, and there
Before great Pluto in my cloaths appear.*

Another.

t Anth. 3.22.7.

*Safely (O Saylor) presse the Land, and wave,
Yet know, ye passe a Shipwrack'd persons grave.*

On the Statue of Venus.

u Anth. 4.12.8.

*Paphian Cythera, swimming crosse the Main,
To Guidas came her Statue there to see,
And from on high, surveying round the plain
Where could Praxiteles me spy? (saith shee)
He saw not what's forbidden mortall Eyes,
'Twas Mars's Steel that Venus did incize.*

Another.

* Anth. 4.12.9

*Not carv'd by Steel, or Praxitele's fam'd hand:
Thus nak'd before the Judges didst thou stand.*

Love sleeping.

x Anth. 4.12.19

*Within the Covert of a shady Grove,
We saw the little red-check'd God of Love.
He had nor Bow nor Quiver, those among
The neighb'ring Trees upon a bough were hung :
Upon a Bank of tender Rose-buds laid
He, (smiling) slept ; Bees with their noise invade
His rest, and on his lips their honey made.*

Pan Piping.

y Anth. 4.12.
74.

*Dwell awfull Silence on the shady Hills
Among the bleating flocks, and purling rills,
When Pan the Reed doth to his lip apply,
Inspiring it with sacred Harmony,
Hydriads, and Hamadryads at that sound
In a well order'd measure beat the ground.*

On the Image of a Satyre in a Fountain and
Love sleeping.

^a A skilfull hand this Satyre made so near
To life, that only Breath is wanting here:
I am attendant to the Nymphs; before
I fill'd out purple wine, now water powre;
Who ere thou art com'st nigh, tread softly, lest
You waken Love out of his pleasing rest.

^a Anth. 4. 12.
96.

Another.

^a On horn'd Lyæus I attend,
And powre the streams these Nymphs lend,
Whose noise Lou's slumber doth befriend.

^a Anth. 4. 13.
97.

Another.

^b This Satyre Diodorus did not make,
But charme asleep; if prick'd he will awake.

Anth. 4. 11.
102.

On a Seal.

^c Five Oxen grazing in a flow'ry Mead,
A Jasper seal done to the life doth hold,
The little herd away long since bad fled,
We're not inclos'd within a pale of Gold.

^c Anth. 4. 18. 6.

ALCINOUS.

THE
DOCTRINE OF PLATO
delivered by
ALCINOVS.

CHAP. I.

Of PHITOSOPHT, and how a Philosopher must be qualified.

Such a Summary as this may be given of the Doctrine of *Plato*. *Philosophy* is the desire of Wisdom, or solution of the soul from the body, and a conversion to those things, which are true and perceptible by Intellect. *Wisdom*, *sophia*, is the Science of things Divine and Humane. A *Philosopher* is he who takes denomination from Philosophy, as a Musician from Musick. He who is to be a Philosopher, must be thus qualified; First, he must have a naturall capacity of all such Learning as is able to fit and bring him to the knowledge of that essence which is perceptible by Intellect, not of that which is in continual fluxion or mutation. Then he must have a naturall affection to Truth, and an aversion from receiving falshood, and besides this, temperate in a manner by Nature; for those parts which use to be transported with passions, he must have reduced to obedience by Nature. For whosoever hath once embraced those disciplines which are conversant in consideration of such things as truly exist, and hath addicted all his study thereunto, little valueth corporeall pleasure. Moreover a Philosopher must have a liberall mind, for the estimation of mean things is contrary to a man who intended to contemplate the truth of things. Likewise he must naturally love Justice, for he must be studious of Truth, Temperance and Liberality. He must also have an acute apprehension, and a good memory, for these inform a Philosopher, those gifts of Nature, if improved by Discipline and Education, make a man perfect in Vertue, but neglected are the cause of the worst ills. These *Plato* useth to call by the same names with the Vertues, *Temperance*, *Fortitude* and *Justice*.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

That Contemplation is to be preferred before Action.

WHereas *Life* is twofold, *Contemplative* and *Active*, the chief Office of the *Contemplative* consisteth in the knowledge of truth, as of the *Active*, in the practice of those things which are dictated by Reason. Hence the *Contemplative* life is first, after which as necessary followeth the *Active*. That it is so, may easily be proved thus. *Contemplation* is an Office of the intellect in the understanding of *Intelligibles*: *Action* is an operation of the ratiōall Soul, performed by meditation and service of the body. For the Soul, when it contemplateth the Divinity and the notions thereof, is said to be best affected. This affection is called *epistēmē, wisdom*, which is nothing else but an assimilation to the Deity. This therefore ought to be esteemed the first and principall, as being most expetible and proper to man; for there are no impediments that can hinder it from being within our power, and it is cause of our proposed end. But *Active* life, and the practise thereof, chiefly making use of the mediation of the body, are many times obstructed; Wherefore those things which the *Contemplative* life considers in order to the reformation of the manners of men, a Philosopher, as often as necessity requireth, shall transferr to *Action*. Then shall a good man apply himselfe to the administration of Civill Affairs, when he seeth them ill managed by others. He must look upon the leading of an Army, administration of Justice and Embassies, as things necessary. The institution of Laws, ordering the Common-wealth, the compresure of Seditions, education of youth in Discipline, are the chiefest, and, among those things which relate to *Action*, of greatest consequence. Hence is it manifest, that a Philosopher must not onely be perseverant in *Contemplation*, but also cherish and increase it, sometimes giving himself to *Action* as an attendant upon *Contemplation*.

CHAP. III.

The three parts of Philosophy.

THe study of a Philosopher seemeth according to *Plato* to be conversant chiefly in three things, in the *Contemplation* and knowledge of things, in the *Practise* of Vertue, and in *Disputation*. The Science of things that are, is called *Theoretick*, of

those which pertain to Action, *Prædictick*; the disputative part, *Dialectick*.

Dialectick is divided into *Division*, *Definition*, *Induction* and *Syllogisme*; *Syllogisme* into the *Apodeictick*, which concerneth necessary ratiocination; and *Rhetoricall*, which concerneth Enthymeme, called an imperfect ratiocination; and lastly into *Sophismes*. This the Philosopher must look upon, not as the chiefest but a necessary part.

Of *Prædictick* Philosophy, one part is conversant about *Manners*, another orders *Families*, the last takes care of a *Commonwealth*. The first called *Ethick*, the second, *Oeconomick*, the third, *Politick*.

Of *Theoretick* Philosophy, one part enquires into things immutable and divine, and the first causes of things; this is called *Theologie*; another the motion of the stars, the revolution and restitution of Celestial Bodies, and the constitution of the world. This is called *Physick*. That whereby we enquire Geometrically, and those other disciplines which are called *μαθηματικά*, is termed *Mathematick*.

Philosophy being thus divided, wee must first according to *Plato* speak of the *Dialectick* part, and in that, first of the *Judiciary*.

CHAP. IV.

DIALECTICK.

Of the Judiciary part.

Whereas there is something that judgeth, something which is judged, it is necessary also that there be something which is made of both these, properly called *Judgement*. This Judgement may not unfitly be termed Judiciary, but more commonly that which judgeth. This is twofold; one, *from which*; another *by which* judgement is made. That is intellect; this the naturall Organ accommodated for judgement; primarily of *true* things; secondarily of *false*; neither is it any thing but naturall reason. To explain this more fully, of things which are, a Philosopher who judgeth the things themselves, may be called a *Judge*; reason likewise is a *Judge*, by which truth is judged, which even now we called an Organ.

Reason is twofold, one *incomprehensible* and true; the other is *never deceived* in the knowledge of those things which are. The first is in the power of God, not of man, the second in that of man also. This likewise is twofold, the first *Science*, and scientifick reason; the second *Opinion*. The first hath *certainitude*, and

and *Stability*, as being conversant in things certain and stable. The second, *similitude of truth and opinion*, as being conversant in things subject to mutation. Of science in Intelligibles, and opinion in sensibles, the principles are *Intellection* and *Sense*.

Sense is a passion of the soul by the mediation of the body, first, declaring a passive faculty; When through the Organs of sense, the species of things are impress'd in the soul, so, as they are not defac'd by time, but remain firm and lasting, the conservation thereof is called *Memory*.

Opinion is the conjunction of memory and sense; for, when some object occurreth, which can first move the sense, thereby sense is effected in us, and by sense memory. Then again is the same thing objected to our sense, we joyne the precedent with the consequent sense, and now say within our selves, *Socrates*, a Horse, Fire, and the like: This is termed opinion, when we joyne the precedent memory with the late sense; when these agree within themselves, it is a *true opinion*, if they disagree, a *false*; for, if a man, having the species of *Socrates* in his memory, meet with *Plato*, and think, by reason of some likenesse betwixt them, he hath met *Socrates* again, and afterwards joyne the sense of *Plato*, which he took, as it were, from *Socrates*, with the memory which he preserved of *Socrates*, there will arise a false opinion.

That wherein sense and memory are formed, *Plato* compareth to a *tablet of wax*, but when the soul by cogitation reforming these things, which are conceived in opinion by memory and sense, looketh upon these as things from which the other are derived: *Plato* sometimes calleth this a *picture and phantasmie*. Cogitation he calleth the soules discourse within her selfe: *Speech*, that which floweth from the Cogitation through the mouth by voice. *Intellection* is an operation of the Intellect, contemplating first Intelligibles. It is two-fold, one of the soul, beholding Intelligibles before she cometh into the body; the other of the same, after she is immers'd in the body: The first is properly called *Intellection*; the other, whilst she is in the body, is termed *naturall knowledge*, which is nothing but an intellection of the soul confined to the body. When we say, Intellection is the principle of Science, we mean not this latter, but the other, which is competent to the soul in her separate state, and, as we said, is then called Intellection, now naturall Knowledge. The same *Plato* termeth *simple Knowledge*, the *wing of the soul*; sometimes *Reminiscence*.

Of these simple Sciences consisteth *Reason*, which is born with us, the efficient of naturall Science; and as reason is two-fold, Scientifick, and opinionative, so Intellection and Sense. It is likewise necessary that they have their objects, which are *Intelligibles* and *Sensibles*: And for asmuch as of *Intelligibles*, some are *Primary*, as *Ideas*, others *Secondary*, as the Species, that are in matter, and cannot be separated from it. *Intellection* likewise, must be two-fold,

fold, one of *Primaries*, the other of *Secondaries*. Again, forasmuch as in *Sensibles*, some are *Primary*, as qualities, colour, whitenesse, others by *accident*, as white coloured, and that which is concrete, as fire: in the same manner is *Sense*, first, of *Primaries*, second, of *Secondaries*. Intellection judgeth primary Intelligibles, not without Scientifick knowledge; by a certain comprehension without discourse. Secondaries the same scientifick reason judgeth, but not without Intellection. Sensibles, as well Primary as Secondary sense, judgeth, but not without opinionative reason. That which is concrete, the same reason judgeth, but not without sense. And since the Intelligible world is the Primary Intelligible, the sensible something concrete, the first Intellection judgeth with reason, that is, not without reason: The other opinionative reason not without sense, whereas there is both contemplation and action; right reason discerneth not in the same manner those which are subject to contemplation, and those which are subject to action: In contemplation it considereth what is true, what false; in things that belong to action, what is proper, what improper, what that is which is done. For, having an innate knowledge of that which is good and honest, by using reason, and applying it to those naturall notions, as to certain rules, we judge whether every thing be good or bad.

CHAP. V.

The Elements and Office of Dialectick.

OF Dialectick, the first and chiefeft Element according to Plato, is, first, to consider the *essence* of every thing; next, the *accidents* thereof. *What a thing* is, it considers, either from its superiors, by *division* and *definition*, or contrariwise by *Analysis*. *Accidents* which adhere to substances, are considered, either from those things which are contained by *induction*, or from those which do contain by *Syllogisme*.

Hence the parts of *Dialectick* are these, *Division*, *Definition*, *Analysis*, *Induction*, *Syllogisme*.

Of *Divisions*, *one* is a distribution of the Genus into Species, and of the whole into parts; as when we divide the Soule into the rationall part, and the irrationall; and the latter, into the concupiscible and the irascible. *Another* is of a word into divers significations, when the same may be taken severall waies. *A third* of accidents, according to their subjects; as when we say of good, some belong to the soul, some to the body, some are externall. *The fourth* of subjects, according to their accidents; as of men, some are good, some ill, some indifferent. Division of the Genus into its Species, is first to be used, when we examine the essence

of a thing, this cannot be done but by definitions.

Definition is made by Division in this manner, we must take the Genus of the thing to be defined, as that of man, living creature; that we must divide by the next differences, descending to its species, as rationally, and irrationall, mortall, and immortall. Thus by adding the first difference to the Genus, is made the definition of man.

Of *Analysis* there are three kinds, *one* by which we ascend from Sensibles to primary Intelligibles, *another* whereby we ascend by demonstrates and subdemonstrates, to indemonstrable immediate propositions. The *last*, which from supposition proceedeth to those principles which are taken without supposition.

The first kind is thus, as if from that Beauty which is in the body, we should proceed to that of the minde, from that to another conversant in the offices of life, thence to that of Lawes, and so at last to the vast ocean of Beauty, that by these steps, as it were, we may arrive at the sight of the supream Beauty.

The second kind of Analysis is thus; We must suppose that which we seek, and consider those which are precedent, demonstrating them by progression, from inferiours to superiours, untill we arrive at that which is first and generally granted: From which, beginning anew, we return synthetically to that which was sought. As for example, I enquire whether the Soul be immortall, and supposing it to be so, I enquire whether it be alwaies moved. This being demonstrated, I again enquire, whether that which is alwaies moved, is moved by its selfe, which being again demonstrated, we examine, whether that which is moved by its selfe, be the principall of motion. Lastly, whether a principall is ingenerate; this, as most certain, is admitted by all. That which is ingenerate, is also incorruptible; whence, as from a thing most certain, we collect this demonstration. If a Principle be ingenerate and incorruptible, that which is moved by its selfe is the principle of motion; but the soul is moved by its selfe, therefore the soul is incorruptible, ingenerate, and immortall.

The third kind of Analysis upon supposition is this; He who enquireth after a thing, first, supposeth that thing, then observes what will follow upon that supposition. If a reason for the supposition be required, assuming another supposition, he enquireth, whether that which was first supposed, follow again upon another supposition: This he alwaies observeth, untill he come at last to that principle, which is not taken upon supposition.

Induction is every method by reason, which proceedeth either from like to like, or from Singulars to Universalls: It is of great efficacy to excite naturall notions.

CHAP. VI.

Of Propositions and Argumentations.

OF that speech which we call a *Proposition*, there are two kinds, *Affirmation* and *Negation*; *Affirmation*, as *Socrates* walketh; *Negation*, as *Socrates* walketh not.

Of *Affirmative* and *Negative Propositions*, some are *Universall*, others *Particular*: A *particular affirmative* is thus, Some pleasure is good; a *particular negative* is, some pleasure is not good. An *universall affirmative*, all dishonest things are ill; an *universall negative*, no dishonest thing is good.

Of *Propositions*, some are *Categoricall*, some *Hypotheticall*: the *Categoricall* are simple, as every just thing is good: *Hypotheticall* import consequence or repugnance.

Syllogismes are used by *Plato*, either to confute or demonstrate; to confute, what is false by interrogation, to demonstrate, what is true by declaration. *Syllogism* is a speech, wherein somethings being laid down, another thing besides those which are laid down, is necessarily inferred from them.

Of *Syllogismes* some are *Categoricall*, some *Hypotheticall*, some *Mixt*: *Categoricall* are those whose sumptions and conclusions are simple propositions. *Hypotheticall* are those which consist of *Hypotheticall Propositions*: *Mixt*, which conclude both.

Plato useth *demonstrative* arguments in those Dialogues, wherein he explaineth his own doctrine; *Probable* against *Sophists* and young men; *Litigious* against those who are properly called *Eristicks*, as *Euthydemus* and *Hippias*.

Of *Categoricall Syllogismes* there are three figures; the first is, that wherein the common extremum is first the prædicate, then the subject. The second, when the common extremum is prædicate in both: the third, wherein the common extremum is subject in both. *Extremums* are the parts of a Proposition, as in this, *A man is a living creature*, *man* and *living creature* are the extremums. *Plato* often argueth in the first, second, and third figures; in the first, as in *Alcibiades*;

Just things are honest,
Honest things are good,
Therefore just things are good.

In the second, as in *Parmenides*; as,

That which hath no parts is neither straight nor crooked,
But whatsoever hath figure is either straight or crooked,
Therefore, whatsoever hath not parts, hath not figure.

In the *third* thus, in the same book,

*Whatsoever hath figure is qualitative,
Whatsoever hath figure is finite,
Therefore whatsoever is qualitative is finite.*

Like wise by *Hypotheticall* Syllogisme *Plato* often disputeth,
chiefly in *Parmenide* thus,

*If one hath not parts, it hath neither beginning, end, nor middle,
But if it have neither beginning, end, nor middle, it hath no bound,
and if no bound, no figure,
Therefore if one hath no parts, it hath no figure.*

In the *Second* Hypotheticall figure, ordinarily called the third,
wherein the common extreame is subject in both, he argueth thus,

*If one hath not parts, it is neither straight nor crooked,
If it hath a figure, it is either straight or crooked,
Therefore if it hath no parts, it hath no figure.*

In the *Third* figure by some called the second, wherein the
common extreame twice precedes the other two, he thus argues,
in *Phaedone*,

*If having the Knowledge of Equality we forget it not, we know, but
if we forget it, we have recourse to Reminiscence, &c.*

Mixt Syllogismes which conclude by consequence, he useth
thus;

*If one is whole and finite, that is, having beginning, middle and
end, it hath figure also;
But the Antecedent is true,
Therefore the Consequent.*

Of those also which overthrow by consequence, the differences
may be gathered out of *Plato*.

Thus when a man hath diligently understood the faculties of
the mind, the various differences of men, the severall kinds of
reasoning which may be accommodated to this or that, and to
what persons such and such reasons are to be used, he, meeting
with an opportunity suiting with his purpose, will become a per-
fect Orator.

The reasons of *Sophismes* and captious arguments are, if we ob-
serve narrowly, expressed by *Plato* in *Euthydemo*, for there is de-
clared which are in words, which in things, and how they are to
be solved.

The ten *Pradicaments* are touched by *Plato* in *Parmenide*, and
in

in his other Dialogues; the place of Etymologies is fully set down in *Cratylus*. To conclude, hee was singularly admirable for division and definition, wherein the greatest force of Dialectick consisteth.

The Summe of that which he saith in *Cratylus*, is this; Hee enquireth whether *Names* are by the power and reason of *Nature*, or by *imposition*. He concludeth that the rectitude of names is by a certain imposition, not temerarious or casuall, but seeming to follow the nature of the things themselves; for rectitude of names is nothing but an imposition consonant to the nature of the thing: Hence every imposition of names is not sufficient for rectitude, neither the nature nor first sound of the voice, but that which is composed of both; so as every name is conveniently and properly applyed to the thing. For any name applyed to any thing will not signifie rightly, as if wee should impose the name of horse upon man. To speak is a kind of Action; Not he that speaketh any way speaketh rightly, but he who speaketh so as the nature of the thing requireth. And for as much as expression of names is a part of speaking, as Noun is a part of Speech, to name rightly, or not rightly, cannot be done by any imposition of names, but by a naturall affinity of the name with the thing it self. So that he is a right imposer of names, who can expresse the Nature of the things in their names; for a name is an Instrument of the thing, not every inconsiderate name, but that which agreeth with its nature. By this benefit we communicate things to one another, whence it followeth, that it is nothing else but an instrument accommodated to the teaching and discerning of a thing, as a weavers shuttle to his Webbe. It belongeth therefore to a Dialectick to use names aright; for as a Weaver useth a shuttle rightly, knowing the proper use thereof after it hath been made by the Carpenter; so the Dialectick rightly useth that name which another hath made. And as to make a Helm, is the office of a Shipwright, but to use it rightly of a Pilot; so he who frameth names, shall impose them rightly, if he do it as if a Dialectick were present, who understandeth the nature of those things which are signified by the names. Thus much for Dialectick.

CAAP. VII.

Of THEORETICK Philosophy.

WE come next to *Theoretick* Philosophy, whereof one part is *Theologicke*, another *Physick*, a third *Metaphysick*. The end of *Theologie* is the knowledge of primary Causes: Of *Physick*, to understand the nature of the Universe, what kinde of creature man is, what place he holdeth in the world, whether there be a divine

divine Providence over all things, to which there are other Gods subordinate, how men are in respect of them. The end of *Mathematick* is, to know the nature of a superficies and a solid, and to consider the motion and revolution of celestiall bodies, the contemplation whereof must first be proposed in brieve. Thus *Plato* useth to confirm the acutenesse of the minde, for it sharpeneth the understanding, and rendreth it more ready towards the contemplation of divine things. That which considereth *Numbers*, being likewise a part of *Mathematicks*, conferreth not a little to the understanding of things that are; It frees us from the error and ignorance which attend sensible things, and conduceth to the right knowledge of the essence of things: It likewise renders a man expert in military affairs, especially towards the ordering of an Army by the science of *Tacticks*. *Geometry* also conferreth much towards the understanding of good it selfe, if a man pursue it not only for mechanickall dimention, but that he may by the helps thereof ascend to things which are not, busying himselfe about those which are in continuall generation and motion. *Streometry* likewise is exceeding usefull, for after the second accretion followeth this contemplation, which holdeth the third room. *Astronomy* also is usefull as a fourth discipline, whereby we consider the motions of Heaven and the Starres, and the author of night and day, months and years. Thus by a familiar kinde of way, finding out him who made all these, and by these disciplines, as from certain rudiments or elements proceeding to things more sublime. Likewise *Musick* is to be learnt, which relateth to hearing; for, as the eyes are created for *Astronomy*, so are the ears for *Harmony*: and as when we apply our selves to *Astronomy*, we are led from visible things, to the divine invisible essence; so when we receive the *Harmony* of voice in at our ears, from audible things, we ascend by degrees to those which are perceived by Intellect, unlesse we pursue *Mathematicall* disciplines to this end, the contemplation thereof will be imperfect, unprofitable, and of no value. We must therefore presently proceed from those things which are perceived by the eyes and ears, to those which reason only discerneth; for, *Mathematick* is only a preface to divine things. They who addict themselves to *Arithmetick* and *Geometry*, desire to arrive at the knowledge of that which is, which knowledge they obtain no otherwise then as by a dream, but really they cannot attain it, because they know not the principles themselves, nor those things which are compounded of the principles: neverthelss, they conduce to those things which we mentioned; wherefore *Plato* will not have such disciplines to be called Sciences. *Dialectick* method proceeds in such manner, that by *Geometricall* Hypotheses, it ascendeth to first principles, which are not taken upon Hypotheses. For this reason he calleth *Dialectick* a Science;

but, Mathematick, neither opinion, because it is more perspicuous then sensible things; nor a Science, because it is more obscure then first Intelligibles: But, the opinion of Bodies, the science of Primaries, the contemplation of Mathematicks.

He likewise asserteth *Faith* and *Imagination*: *Faith*, of things subject to sense; *Imagination* of Images and Species.

Because Dialectick is more efficacious then Mathematick, as being conversant about divine eternall things, therefore it is put before all Mathematicks, as a wall and fortification of the rest.

CHAP. VIII.

Of first matter.

VWE must next give a brief account of *Principles*, and those things which belong to *Theologie*, beginning at the first, and from thence descending to the creation of the world, and contemplation thereof, whereby at last we come to the creation and nature of man.

To begin with *matter*; this he calleth the *receptacle*, *nurse*, *mother*, *place*, and *subject of all Images*, affirming that it is *touch'd without sense, and comprehended by an adulterate kinde of reason*. The property thereof is to undergo the generation of all things, and to cherish them like a Nurse, and to admit all formes, being of her own nature expert of all form, quality, and species: These things are imprinted and formed in her as in a Table, and she admitteth their figures, not having of her selfe any figure or qualitie. For, she could not be fit to receive the impressions of severall formes, unlesse she were wholly void of all quality; and of those formes which she is about to receive. They who make sweet Unguents of Oyle, make choice of that oyle which hath the least sent; they who would imprint any figures in wax, first smooth and polish the matter, defacing all former figures. It is requisite that matter capable of all things, if it must receive all formes, must not have the nature of any one of them, but must be subjected to all formes, without any qualitie or figure; and being such, it is neither a body nor incorporeall, but a body potentially, as Brasse is potentially a Statue, because then it becomes a Statue, when it puts on the form thereof.

CHAP. IX.

Of Ideas.

Whereas matter is a Principle, *Plato* likewise introduceth other principles besides matter. One as an *exemplar*, *Ideas*; another *Paternal*, God, the Father and Author of all things. *Idea*, as to God, is the notion of God, as to us, the *primary Intelligible*, as to matter, a *manner*, as to this sensible world an *Exemplar*, as to it selfe, *Essence*. For whatsoever is made with understanding, must necessarily be referred to something, as if something be made from another, as my picture from me, the exemplar thereof must be presupposed, and if there be nothing eternall, every Artist conceiveth it first within himselfe, then transferreth the formes thereof into matter.

They define *Idea* an eternall exemplar of things which are according to Nature; for, the greater part of Platonists will not allow an *Idea* to be of things that are made by Art, as of a Shield, or Lute, nor of things which are praternaturall, as of a Feavour, or unnaturall Choler; nor of singulars, as of *Socrates* or *Plato*; nor of vile abject things, as of filth or straws; nor of relatives, as of greater and longer: For *Ideas* are the eternall notions of God, perfect in themselves.

That there are *Ideas*, they prove thus: Whether God be Intellect or something Intelligent, he must have his Intelligibles, and those eternall and immovable; if so, there are *Ideas*. For, if matter it selfe be in it selfe void of measure, it is necessary that it receive measure from some superiour, that is wholly remote from matter: But the Antecedent is true, therefore the consequent; and if so, there are *Ideas*, certain measures void of matter. Again; if the world were not made by chance, it must only be made of something, but by something, and not only so, but after the likenesse of something; but, that after whose likenesse it was made, what is it but an *Idea*? whence it followeth, that there are *Ideas*. Again, if intellect differ from true opinion, that which is intelligible differeth from that which is opinionable; and if so, there are intelligibles distinct from opinionables, wherefore there are first Intelligibles, as well as first Sensibles, whence we conclude there are *Ideas*.

CHAP. X.

Of God.

WE come next to speak of the third principle, which *Plato*, though he think it almost ineffable, conceiveth may be express'd in this manner. If there are intelligibles, and those neither sensibles, nor coherent with sensibles; but adherent to first Intelligibles, then are there first simple Intelligibles, as there are first sensibles; the Antecedent is true, therefore the consequent. But men subject to perturbation of sense, when they would contemplate something intelligible, presently fall upon the thought of something sensible, whereby at the same time they imagine magnitude, or figure, or colour, and therefore cannot understand this sincerely: But the Gods being void of corporeall mixtion understand purely and sincerely. Now because the Intellect is better then the Soul, and that Intellect which is alwaies in act, and at once understandeth all things, is better then that Intellect which is in power, and of these, that is most excellent which is the cause of the other, and superiour to all; This can be nothing else but God, whom we call the first, as being the Cause that the Intellect of the Word alwaies acteth. He, being himself immovable, acteth upon the Intellect of the World, as the Sun upon the Eye, when it turneth towards him. And as that which is desired moveth the Appetite it self remaining immovable; so doth this Intellect move the Intellect of all Heaven. Now this first Intellect being most fair, must have the most fair Intelligible; but nothing is fairer then it self, therefore it alwaies understandeth it self, and its own notions, which Act is called Operation.

Moreover, God is *first*, *eternall ineffable*, *perfect in himself*; that is, needing none, and *ever perfect*, that is, absolute in all times, and *every way perfect*, that is, absolute in every part, *Divinity*, *Essence*, *Truth*, *Harmony*, *good*. Neither do we so name these, to distinguish one from the other, but rather by them all to understand one. He is said to be *Good*, because he bestoweth his benefits upon all according to their severall capacities, and so is the cause of all goods. *Fair*, because he is in his essence both more and equall. *Truth* because, he is the principle of all truth, as the Sun of all light. And *Father*, as being cause of all things, and adorning the mind of Heaven and Soule of the World after his own exemplar and notions. For according to his own will hee filled all things with himself, exciting the Soul of the World, and converting it to himself, for hee is cause of that Intellect, which being adorned by the Father, adorneth also the Nature of all this World. He is likewise *ineffable*, and as we said, can only be perceived by the mind, for he is neither genus nor species, nor difference, neither can any accident

dent be applyed to him. He is *not ill*, for that it were impiety to affirm; *nor good*, for so he should be termed if he were meanly or highly participant of goodnesse. Nor *difference*, for that cannot be made according to the notion of him, nor qualited, for he is not made that which he is by quality, nor perfected thereby. Nor *void of quality*, for he is not deprived of any quality that appertaineth to him. Nor *part* of any thing, *nor as a whole* constituted of parts; *nor as the same or divers*, for nothing can happen to him whereby he may be distinguished from others; Neither doth he *move*, or is he *moved*.

Hence the first apprehension of him is by *abstraction* from these things, as wee understand a point by abstraction from sensibles, considering first a superficies: then a line, then a point. The second is by *Analogie* in this manner. As the Sun is to sight and visible things, himself not being sight, yet affording the one to see the other to be seen, so is the first Intellect to that Intellect, which is in our Soule, and to those things which it understandeth. For, it self is not the Intellect, yet it perfecteth in these the Act of Intellection, to those it affordeth that they are understood, enlightning that truth which is in them. The third way to understand him is thus: when a man beholdeth that Beauty which is in Bodies, hee proceedeth to that which is in the Soule, then to that which is in Offices and Lawes: Lastly, to the vast Ocean of Beauty, after which, he considereth that which is good it self, amiable it self, expetible it self, which shineth like a light, and meeteth the Soule, that which ascends unto it by these degrees. By this he comprehendeth God himself through reason of that excellence, which consisteth in adoration of him. He considereth God void of parts, for nothing was before him a part, and that of which something consisteth is precedent to that whereof it is a part, for a superficies is before a body, and a line before a superficies. Moreover God not having many parts, can neither be locally moved, nor altered by qualities. For if hee be altered, it must be done by himself, or some other; if by some other, that other must be of greater power then he; if by himself, it must be either to better or to worse, both which are absurd.

From all these it followeth that *God is incorporeal*, which may likewise be proved thus. If God were a body, he should consist of matter and form; for every body consisteth of matter, and its form joynes to that matter, which is made like unto the Idæa's, and in an ineffable manner participant of them; But that should consist of matter and form is absurd; for then he could not be either simple or a Principle; therefore he is incorporeall. Again, if he be a body, he consisteth of matter, and consequently is either fire or air, or earth, or water, or something made out of these; but none of these is principle by it self; besides, he must then be later then matter, as consisting of it, which being absurd, it is necessary

cessary that God be incorporeall. Moreover, if he were a body, it would follow that he must be generable, corruptible, mutable, which to affirm of God were intollerable.

CHAP. XI.

Of Qualities.

THAT *Qualities* are *incorporeall*, may be proved thus · every body is a Subject, quality is not a Subject but an accident, therefore quality is not a body. Again, no body is in a subject ; every quality is in a Subject , therefore quality is not a body. Again, quality is contrary to quality, but no body as no body is contrary to a body ; therefore qualities are not bodies. To omit , that it is most agreeable to reason, that as matter is void of quality, so quality should be void of matter, and if quality be void of matter, it must likewise be void of corporeity, for if qualities were bodies, two or three bodies might be together in the same place, which is absurd.

Qualities being incorporeal, the maker of them must be incorporeall also ; moreover there can be no efficient, but in corporeals , for bodies naturally suffer and are in mutation , not continuing alwaies in manner nor persevering in the same state. For whensoever they seem to effect any thing, we shall find that they suffer it long before. Whence as there is something which wholly suffereth , so must there bee something which wholly acteth ; but such only is incorporeall.

Thus much concerning principles as far they relate to Theology ; we proceed next to Physicall contemplations.

CHAP XII.

Of the Causes, Generation, Elements , and Order of the World.

FOrasmuch as of sensible and singular things there must of necessity be some exemplars, *viz.* Idea's, of which are Sciences and Definitions (for besides all particular men , we conceive a man in our mind , and besides all particular horses a horse, and likewise besides all living creatures a living creature immortall and unbegotten : as from one seale are made many prints, and of one man there may be many Pictures, of all which, the Idea it self is cause that they are such as it self is) it is necessary

cessary that this Universe, the fairest Fabrick of Gods making, be so made by God, that in the making thereof, he look'd upon an *Idea* as its exemplar, whilst by a wonderfull providence and most excellent design God applyed himselfe to the building of this frame, because he was good.

God therefore made it of all matter, which being before the generation of Heaven, disorderly scattered; he from a deformed confusion reduced to beautifull order, and adorned every way the parts thereof with fit numbers and figures, untill at last he so distinguish'd them as now they are, Fire and Earth to Air and Water, of which there were then only the footsteps, and a certain aptitude to admit the power of Elements, and so without any reason or order, they juttled matter, and were juttled again by matter.

Thus God framed the World of four entire Elements, of whole Fire and Earth, Water and Air, omitting no power or part of any of them. For he saith, it must be corporeall and generated, and subject to touch and sight; but without Fire and Earth nothing can be touched or seen; Wherefore justly he framed it of *Fire* and *Earth*, and because it was requisite, there should be some chain to unite these, there is a Divine chain, which according to the proportion of reason maketh one of it self, and those things which are united to it, and the World could not be plain (for then one medium would have served) but sphaericall, therefore there was need of two mediums to the constitution thereof. Betwixt Fire and Earth by the prescription of this reason is interposed *Air* and *water*, that as Fire is to Air, so is Air to Water, and as Air is to Water, so is Water to Earth; and again, as Earth is to Water, so is Water to Air, and as Water is to Air, so is Air to Fire.

There being nothing remaining beyond the World, God made the World *one*, conformable to this *Idea*, which is one. He likewise made it such, as that is *uncapable of sicknesse or age*. For, besides that nothing can befall it whereby it may be corrupted, it is so sufficient to it self, that it hath not need of any exterior thing. He bestowed upon it a *Sphaericall* figure, as being the fairest, the most capacious and aptest to motion, and because it needeth not hearing or sight, or the rest of the senses, he gave it not any Organs of sense. He denied all kinds of motion to be competent to it, except the circular, which is proper to the mind and to Wisdom.

Of the convenience of figures with the Elements and World.

THe world thus consisteth of two parts, a *Soul* and a *Body*; this visible and corruptible, that neither subject to sight nor touch: The power and constitution of each is different, the body consisteth of Fire, Earth, Water, and Aire; which foure, the maker of the Universe (there being untill then nothing more confused then the Elements) formed in a *Pyramid*, a *Cube*, an *Octaedron*, and an *Icosaedron*; but chiefly in a *Dodecaedron*. Matter, as far as it put on the figure of a *Pyramid*, became *Fire*, and mounted upward: For, that figure is the most apt to cut and to divide, as consisting of fewest triangles, and therefore is the rarest of all figures. As far as it is an *Octaedron*, it took the qualitie of *Aire*: Where it took that of an *Icosaedron*, it became *Water*; The figure of a *Cube* *Earth*, as being the most solid and staple of all the Elements. The figure of a *Dodecaedron*, he used in the fabrick of the Universe. *Superficies* come nigher the nature of Principles then all these, for they are before solids. Of its nature, the two Parents (as it were) are two *Triangles*, most fair and rectangular; one a *Scalenum*, the other an *Isofceles*; a *Scalenum* is a triangle having one right angle, the other of two thirds, the last of one third. A *Scalenum* therefore is the element of a *Pyramid*, and an *Octaedron*, and an *Icosaedron*. A *Pyramid* consisteth of foure triangles, having all sides equall to one another, each whereof is divided as we said, into six scalenous triangles. The *Octaedrons* consist of eight like sides, whereof each is divided into six *Scalenums*. The *Icosaedrons* of twenty in the same manner; but the element of a *Cube* is an *Isofceles* triangle, for foure such triangles concurring make a square, and six squares a *Cube*. God made use of a *Dodecaedron* in the construction of the Universe, whence there are twelve figures of living creatures in the *Zodiack*, whereof each is divided into thirty parts. Likewise in a *Dodecaedron*, which consisteth of twelve *Pentagones*, if each be divided into five triangles, there are in every one six triangles, so that in the whole *Dodecaedron*, there will be 360 triangles, as many as there are degrees in the *Zodiack*.

When matter was put into those figures by God, first it was moved rudely without order, untill at last he reduced it to order, each being conjoynd to one another, and composed in due proportion: Neither are these distinct in place, but are in perpetuall motion, which they give likewise into matter. For, being strained by the compasse of the world, and agitated by nature

all justlings, they are driven, the rare alwaies into the region of the solid, whence nothing is left vacuous, nothing void of body. The inequality which remaineth amongst them causeth convulsion, for matter is agitated amongst them, and they reciprocally by matter.

CHAP. XIV.

Of the Soul of the World, the Sphears and Stars.

FROM Bodies hee alloweth that we collect the powers of the Soul, for seeing that we discern all things by the Soul, hee justly placed the principles of all things therein, that whatsoever should occur, we might contemplate it by that which is of kin and neighbour unto it, and attribute an essence thereunto consonant to the functions. Then therefore he called one substance intelligible and indivisible; he placed another divisible amongst bodies, to signifie that the knowledge as well of the one as of the other may be had by Intellect. And knowing that in things intelligible and sensible, there is identity and diversity, he fitly composed the Soul out of all these. For, either the like is known by the like, as the *Pythagoreans* hold, or, as *Heraclitus the Naturalist*, unlike alwaies by unlike.

That he would that the World should be *generate*, we must not so understand, as if there shall be any time wherein the world is not, but in as much as it alwaies perisheth in generation, and declareth, that there is some more excellent and principall cause of its essence.

The soul of the world which was from all eternity, was not made by God, but only adorned by him, in which respect he is sometimes said to have made it, for that he exciteth it, and converteth the mind thereof, as out of a profound sleep unto himself, that beholding his intelligibles and affecting his notions, it should from thence receive Species and form; whence it is manifest, that the World was endued by God, both with a Soul and mind. For, intending it to be the best, he must have made it animate and intelligent, since an animate thing is more excellent then an inanimate, and an intelligent then an unintelligent; perhaps the mind also could not subsist without a Soul.

This Soul, being diffused from the Centre of the world to the extreame, *comprehendeth* the whole body of the World, so as it is extended throughout the Universe, and in that manner joyneth and conserveth the whole. The externall preside over the internall, for they are not divided, but these are divided into seven Circles; from the first distributed according to duple and

T t

triple

triple Intervalls. That which is comprehended by the indivisible sphear, is correspondent to it, that which is divided to the other. For the motion of Heaven which comprehendeth all things, being not uncertain, is one and ordinate, but that of the things within it, is changeable, varied by rising and setting, whence called Planetary. The outermost sphear moveth to the right hand from *East* to *West*, the innermost contrariwise, to the left hand from *West* to *East*, meeting the World.

God framed also the Stars and constellations; some *fixed* for the Ornament of Heaven and might, very many in number. The *Erratick* are seven, serving for number and time, and the illumination of all things; for time is an intervall of the motion of the World as an image of eternity, which is the measure of the state of the eternall World. The Planets are not of equall power, the *Sun* is the leader of all, who illuminateth and sheweth all things to the eye. Next the *Moon*, which in respect of her power hath the second place. The rest of the Planets, each according to their severall proportions. The Moon maketh the measure of a *Month*, in that space compleating its circle, and overtaking the Sun. The Sun measureth the *Year*, for running through the circle of the Zodiack, he compleateth the seasons of the year. Of the other starrs each hath its proper revolution, with which all men are not acquainted but only the Learned. By all those revolutions the *absolute number of time* is compleated, when coming all to the same point, they are in such order, as if we should imagine a right line to be drawn from the sphear of fixed stars to the Earth; the Centers of them all would be seen in that line.

There being seven Orbes in the Planetary sphear, the maker of the World, framed in them seven conspicuous bodies of matter for the most part fiery, and inserted them into the sphears belonging to the other Erratick Circle. The *Moon* he placed in that Circle which is next the Earth, the *Sun* in the second, the *Morning-star*, and the sacred Star of *Mercury*, in that Orbe which is equall in swiftnesse with the Sun. The rest higher, each in his proper sphear. That of *Saturn* the slowest of all, he placed in that Orbe which is next to the fixed stars. Second to this is that which they call the sphear of *Jupiter*, next that of *Mars*; the eighth which is the *Supream power* includeth all. These are all living intelligent Creatures, and Gods endued with a sphericall figure.

C A A P. XV.

Of Dæmons and Elements.

THere are other *Dæmons* also which we may call Intelligent Gods, in each of the Elements partly visible, partly invisible, in the æther, fire, air and water, that there be not any part of the World void of Soul, or of an animate creature more excellent then humane nature. Below these are all earthly sublunary things; God is maker of the World, of all Gods and Dæmons. This Universe by his Divine Will shall not be dissolved. Over the rest his *Sons* preside, who by his command and example order whatsoever they do. By these *lo.s*, *nocturnall visions*, *dreams*, *Oracles*, and *whatsoever men referre to divination* is artificially wrought.

The *Earth* is fixed in the midst of all, round about the *Axle-tree* which passeth through the midst of the World. It is the observer of night and day, the most ancient of all Gods in Heaven. Next the Soul of the World it affordeth us most nutriment; about it the Heavens move, and it self is a kind of *Starre*: It remaineth in its proper place, which by reason of its even weight is the Centre; the æther exterior is divided into the sphere of fixed Stars, and that of Planets. Next to these is the Air; in the midst the Earth with its humidity.

C H A P. XVI.

Of the younger Gods makers of men.

After that all these were framed, there remained three kinds of living Creatures which were to be mortall, *Volatile*, *Aquatile*, and *Terrestrial*; the generation whereof he committed to his *Son*, lest if he himself had begotten them, they should have been immortall as well as the rest. They borrowing some little parts from first matter for a certain time, formed mortall living Creatures, and because of Mankind, as being next to the Gods, both the Father of all things, and his Sons likewise have a particular care, the Maker of all things sent down himself their Soules into the earth equall in number to the Stars, & having imposed each one his proper Star as a *vehiculum*, like a Law-giver, he pronounced decrees unto them, that he himself might be inculpable, which

was that there should arise mortall affections from the body, first senses, next pleasure, then grief, and fear, and anger, which those soules that should overcome, and not suffer themselves to be transported by them, should justly be accounted Victors, and at the last return to their proper Star, though they which should be transported by injustice, should in the second generation undergoe the lives of women, wherein if they ceased not from their wickednesse, they should at last transmigrate into the Nature of brute Beasts, the end of these Labours shall then be, when they have overcome the innate affections of the body, and then return to their proper habit.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the Body, and parts of man, and Powers of the Soul.

THE Gods first formed man of Earth, Fire, Air, and Water, borrowing some parts from matter, (to be restored in their due time) which they so connected to one another by secret ties, as that of all these they framed one body. The most excellent part of the soul that was sent down from Heaven, they placed in the *Head*, for which as a manured Field they prepared the *Brain*. About the face they disposed Organs proper for sense; *Marrow* they made of smooth straight triangles, of which the Elements were formed, that it should be the Origine of prolifick feed. *Bones* they formed of Marrow and Earth, the Earth moistened, and often dipt in Water and Fire. *Flesh* is compounded of salt and sharpe, as of a kind of ferment. Marrow they enclosed with *bones*, bones with *sinewes* instead of chaines, that by these inflexions the knitting of the joints might be plyant. Over these as a cover is extended the *Skin*, partly white, partly black, for beauty and use. Of these likewise consist the internall *bowells*, and the belly, and the intestines, every where rolled about it. And from the mouth above the *aspera arteria*, and the *œsophagus*, of which one commeth down to the stomach, the other to the Lungs. Meat is digested in the belly by spirit and heat, and thence distributed to the whole body according to their severall constitutions. The two veines passing along the spine of the Back, meet and crosse at the head, where they spread into many parts.

Thus when the Gods had made man, and given him a soul as the Mistresse of his body, they placed the principall part of that soul to which Reason appertaineth, in the head. Whence is derived marrow and sinewes, and by the different affection of this, the

the minde likewise is altered. Moreover they gave him senses, as the attendants of Reason, and the power of judging and contemplating with Reason. Those parts of the soul, which are moved by meaner affections, they seated in lower places; the irascible part in the heart, the concupiscible about the belly, and the parts next to the Navell, of which hereafter.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of sight.

After that the Gods had placed the eyes (conduits of light) in the face, they included in them a fiery light, which being smooth and in some manner thick, they conceived of kin to diurnall light. This breaketh forth every where at the Eyes, but chiefly through the Eye-balls, as being there most pure and clear. This agreeing with the externall light, as like with like affordeth the sense of sight, whence in the night, when the light vanisheth and is obscured, this ray of ours no longer mingleth with the immediate air; but, on the contrary, withdrawing it self inwards, smooths and diffuses the motions that are in us, and so bringeth on sleep, whereby the eyelids are shut. If it bring much rest, the sleep is little disturb'd with dreams, but if there remain any motions behind, we are troubled with many illusions. In this manner phantasies, whether true or false, arise. Of the same Nature are images, which we see in glasses, or other smooth pellucid bodies, which exist only by reflection. For, as the glass is concave or convex, or oblong, the object is differently represented to the beholder. The light being reflected to other parts, those which are dispersed in convex meet in the concave, for in some, the right and left sides seem quite inverted, in others alike; in others, those which are upwards seem downwards, and on the contrary, those which are downwards, upwards.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the rest of the Senses.

Hearing is given for the perception of voice, it ariseth from a motion made about the head, and setteth in the liver. Voice is that which passeth through the ears, brain, and blood to the

V u

Soul

Soul. A sharp voice is that which is moved swiftly, deep which slowly, great which much, small which little.

Next followeth the sense proper to the Nostrills, perceptible of odour. Odour is an affection which passeth from the veines of the Nostrills to the parts of the Navell. The Species thereof have no name, except the two that are most common, pleasant, and unpleasant, commonly called sweet and stinking. All Odour is more thick then Air, more thin then Water; for Odour is properly said to be of those things which have not yet received perfect mutation, but consist of a commixtion of Air and Water, as smoke and mists. For, by the resolution of these into one another, the sense of smelling is made.

Tast was made by the Gods to be the judge of different favours. Hence are veines extended to the Heart, by which several favours are examined. These Veins by dilating or contracting themselves severally according to the Saptors presented to them, discern their differences. The differences of Saptors are seven; sweet, sharp, sowre, picqueant, salt, acid, bitter; the Nature of sweet Saptor is contrary to all the rest, for by its power it sootheth and pleaseth the moisture of the tongue, whereas of the rest some disturb and dispell it, as acute Saptors, some heat, and fly upwards, as the hot; others being absterfive, dissolve it, as the bitter; others are by degrees purgative and absterfive, as the salt. Of these some contract the passages; they which do it more roughly, are called acid, they which more gently, austere.

The sense of touching was formed by the Gods to discern hot and cold, soft and hard, light and heavy, smooth and rough, and to judge the differences of each of these; *Yielding* bodies, we call those which yield to the touch, *resisting* those which yield not; this proceedeth from the bases of bodies, those which have large bases are firm and solid, these which have narrow bases are yielding, soft, and easily changed. Rough is that which is uneven and hard, smooth that which is plain and thick: As warm and cold qualities are most opposite, so they proceed from the most different causes. That which cutteth by the acutenesse and roughnesse of its parts, begetteth a hot affection, that which is more thick, in penetration, a cold, whilst the more rare are expelled, and the more dense compelled to penetrate into their room. Thence ariseth a concussion and trepidation, and (an affection which is from hence begotten in bodies,) rigor.

CHAP. XX.

Of Heavy and Light.

HHeavy and light ought not to be defined by higher or lower place, nothing is high or low; for Heaven being absolutely round, and its convexe extremity even; we cannot term any thing higher or lower; yet may we call that heavy, which is hardly drawn to a place different from its Nature, light which easily; or, heavy is that which consisteth of most parts, light of fewest.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Respiration.

WE breath after this manner. The externall Air compasseth us round about, and passeth in at our mouth, nostrills, and invisable Pores of the body, where being warmed, it floweth back again to the externall Air, by that part out of which it flowed, it again thrusteth the externall Air to the interiour. Thus there is an unintermitted succession of inspiration and expiration.

CHAP. XXII.

Of the Causes of Diseases.

OF Diseases Plato alledgeth many causes. The first is defect or excesse of the Elements, and a change into places which agree not with their Nature. The second a preposterous generation of homogeneall parts, as when of flesh is made blood, or choler, or flegme; for all these are nothing but colliquation, or putrefaction. Flegm is a new colliquation of flesh; sweat and tears, are a kind of Serum of flegm. Flegm intercepted in the outward parts, begetteth Scurfe and Leprosie, in the inward being mingled with Melancholy, it causeth the falling-sickness. Sharp, and salt flegme engender those affections which consist in rigour, for all bodies that are inflamed with choler must suffer that. A world of various diseases are engendred by choler and Flegm

flegm. As concerning feavours; *Plato* conceiveth that a continuall feavour proceedeth from excesse of fire, a quotidian from excesse of air, a tertian from excesse of water, a quartan from excesse of Earth. It remaineth that we here begin to speak of the Soul, though not without some danger, of repeating the same things.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of the three principall powers of the Soul.

THE Gods, the makers of mortall Creatures, having received from the first God the Soul of Man immortall, added unto it two mortall parts; yet lest the immortall divine part might be infected with mortall extravagances, they seated as Prince of all in the tower, as it were of the body, the Head, in figure resembling the Universe. The rest of the body they appointed as a vehiculum to serve this. To each mortall part they assigned its proper habitation, placing the irascible in the heart, the concupiscible in the midst betwixt the Navell and the Diapnragme, binding it there as a furious savage Beast. They framed the Lungs in respect of the heart, soft, bloodlesse, hollow, and spungy, that the heart being something heated with anger, might thereby be refrigerated and asswaged; the Liver to excite and allay the concupiscible part, having both sweetnesse and bitternesse, as likewise for the clearing of divinations which are given by dreams: for as much as in it by reason of its smoothnesse, shining and brightnesse, the power which proceedeth from the mind doth shine forth. The Spleen was made for the benefit of the Liver, to purge and cleanie it; so that those corruptions, which by some diseases, are contracted about the Liver, retire thither.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of the distinction of the parts of the Soul.

THat the Soul and parts thereof according to their proper faculties are threefold; every part appointed by reason their severall places, is manifest from hence. Those things which are separated by Nature, are divers; passionate and reasonable are separate by nature; this being conversant in Intelligibles, that
in

in things sad or joyfull, to omit the passive part which is common likewise to brut Beasts. Now these two being distinct by Nature, must likewise be distinguished by place, because for the most part they disagree, and are repugnant to one another; but nothing can be repugnant to it self, neither can those things which are contrary to one another consist together in the same. In Medea anger seemeth to contest thus with reason;

*I know what I intend is ill,
But anger over-rules my will.*

In *Laius*, when he ravished *Chrysippus*, concupiscence contested with Reason; for so he saith;

*Men to this crime the Gods confine,
To know the ill that they decline.*

That the rationall power is different from the Passive, is evident from this, that they ordered by severall means, one by discipline, the other by habituall practice.

CHAP. XXV.

Of the Immortality of the Soul.

THAT the Soul is immortall *Plato* proveth by these Arguments. The Soul to every thing, wherein it is, conferreth life, as being naturally innate in her self, but that which conferreth life to others never admitteth death, but what is such is immortall.

The Soul being immortall, is likewise incorruptible, for it is an incorporeall essence which cannot be changed substantially, and is only perceptible by the Intellect, not by the eyes, and is uniform. Hence it must be simple, neither can be at any time dissolved or corrupted. The body is contrary, for it is subject to sight and other senses, and as it is compounded, so shall it again be dissolved, and it is multiform. When the Soul adhereth to those things which are perceptible by Intellect, it acquiesceth; Now to that by whose presence she is disturbed, she cannot possibly be like, wherefore she is more like to those things which are perceptible by Intellect; but what is such is by nature incorruptible and perishable.

Again, the Soul naturally doth preside over the body, not the body over the Soul, but that which by nature ruleth and commandeth is of kin to Divinity, wherefore the Soul being next unto God, must be immortall, not subject to corruption.

Again, Contraries which have no *medium*, nor by themselves, but by some accident are so ordered by Nature, that they may be mutually made of one another. But that which men call life is contrary to that which they call death; as therefore Death is a separation of the Soul from the body; so is life a conjunction of the Soul with the body, præexistent to the Body. But if she be præexistent, and shall subsist after the body, it followeth that she be sempiternall, for there cannot any thing be imagined whereby she may be corrupted.

Again, if learning be Reminiscence, the Soul must be immortal, but that it is reminiscence we prove thus: Learning cannot otherwise consist then by remembrance of those things we formerly know. For, if from *Singulars* we understand *Universalls*, how could we discourse by singulars which are infinite? or how from a few perceive *Universalls*? we should therefore necessarily be deceived, as if we judged that only to be a living Creature which breatheth; or how could the notions themselves have the reason of principles. By reminiscence therefore, from some few which we have conceived in our mind, we understand the rest, and from some occurrent particulars we remember those which we knew long before, but were then given over to oblivion, when the Soul first descended into the Body.

Again, if the Soul be not corrupted by its own proper ill, neither can it be destroy'd by that or any other, nor simply by any ill, and being such, shall remain uncorrupted.

Again, that which is moved in it self, as being the principle of motion in those things which are moved, is alwaies moved; that which is such is immortal; but the Soul is moved of it self, that which is moved of it self is the principle of all motion and generation; and a principle is expert of generation and corruption, wherefore the Soules of men and of the Universe it self are such, for both partake of the same mission. He affirmeth the Soul to be moveable in her self, because it hath an innate life, alwaies operating by its power.

That rationall Soules are immortal, may clearly be asserted out of *Plato*; but whether the irrational be such seemeth doubtful; yet is it probable that being guided only by Phantasie, not endued with reason or judgement, neither do they contemplate any thing, or discern, or collect from it, nor can they discern ills, but generally understand nothing, nor are of the same nature with those Soules which have Intellect and Reason, but are capable of dying and being corrupted. For as much as they are immortal, it followeth that they are put into bodies, being planted into the formed Nature of Embrio's, and transmigrate into severall bodies as well humane as others, either according to some certain numbers which they expect, or by the wil of the Gods, or for intemperance of life, or for love of the Body. For the

the Body and Soul have a kind of affinity, as Fire and Brimstone.

Moreover the Souls of the Gods have a disjudicative faculty, called Gnostick, and impulsive to some action, called Parastatick, which faculties being likewise in humane Soules, become changed as soon as they come into the bodie, the assistent into the concupiscible, the impulsive into the Irascible.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Fate and Free-will.

Concerning *Fate* Plato held thus. All things are in fate, yet all things are not decreed by Fate. For Fate, though it be like a Law, yet it useth not to speak in this manner, that this man shall do thus, and to that man, that shall befall (which were to proceed into infinite, there being an infinite generation of men, and infinite accidents happening daily to them; besides that, this would take away our free-will, our praise or dispraise, and whatsoever is of that kind) but rather thus; Whatsoever Soul chooseth such a life, and doth such things, these shall follow, the Soul therefore is free, and it is left within its power to do or not to do, without any compulsion or necessity. But that which followeth the action is performed by Fate. As from *Paris's* ravishing of *Helena*, (which it is within his power to do or not to do) shall follow that the Grecians contend with the Trojans about *Helena*. Thus *Apollo* foretold *Laius*;

If thou beget a Son, that Son shall kill thee.

In the Oracle are comprehended both *Laius* and the begetting of a Son, that which shall follow upon the begetting of the Son depends on *Plato*.

That which may be done is of a middle kind betwixt true and false, and being so indefinite by Nature: that which is in our power, is carried on as it were unto it. That which is done by our election, is presently either true or false; that which is in power, is different from that which is said to be in habit and act. That which is in power declareth an aptitude in that thing, wherein the habit is not yet perfect. So a boy may be said to be a Grammarian, a Musician, a Carpenter in power. He is in habit of one or more of these when he hath acquired that habit. He is said to be in act, when he operateth according to that acquired habit. That which we call possible to be done is none of these. Indeterminate is that which is in our power, and to which part soever it inclineth, will be true or false.

WE must next give a short account of *Plato's Ethicks*. That which is worthy of all honour, and is the Supream good, he conceived not easie to be found, and if found, not safe to be declared. For this reason, he communicated the contemplation of the chief good to very few, and those of his most intimate acquaintance, of whom his judgement made choice for this purpose. But our good, if we examine his books dilligently, we shall find he placed in the knowledge of the first good, which may rightly be called God, and the first mind. For all things which men call good, he conceiveth to be called good in this respect, for as much as they derive something from that good, as all sweet and hot things are termed such from some participation of the first sweet, and first hot. Of those things which are in us, only the mind and reason have a similitude of the first good. Wherefore he calleth our good, Fair, Venerable, Amiable, Proportionate, and lastly Beatitude. Of those which are commonly called good, as health, beauty, strength, there is none good, unless it be employed towards the practise of Vertue. For being separated from Vertue, they are like matter only; and to those who make ill use of them only ill. Yet these *Plato* sometimes calleth mortal goods. Beatitude he reckoneth not amongst humane goods, but amongst the divine and immortall. Whence he asserteth that the souls of true Philosophers are replenish'd with vast admirable goods, and after the dissolution of their mortall body, are admitted to the table of the Gods, and with them walk over and survey the field of Truth, because they did see they used the utmost endeavours of their Soules to know it, and esteemed it the most precious of all things, by the benefit whereof they illustrated and excited their mind as a lost or blinded sight, preferring the conservation thereof before many corporall eyes. Foolish men are like those who lead all their life in some Cave underground, where they never saw the light of the Sun, but only some empty thin shadows of such bodies as are with us upon the Earth, which seeing, they think they see true bodies. As these, if ever they should be brought out of darknesse into the clear light, would questionlesse despise all things which they saw before, and themselves much more, as having been absolutely deceived; So they who rise up out of the darknesse of this life to those things which are divine and fair, in all likelihood will condemn what before they most esteemed, and love more vehemently this contemplation.

plation. Thus it appeareth, that only what is good is honest, and that Vertue sufficeth to Felicity,

Moreover, that good and fair consist in knowledge of the first good, he declareth in whole volumes. As concerning those which are good by participation, he speaketh thus in his first Book of Laws. Good is twofold, Humane and Divine, &c. If any thing be disjoyned from the first good, and void of the essence thereof, that is called good by the foolish, which in *Euthydemo*, he affirmeth to be a greater ill to the Possessor.

That he conceiveth the Vertues to be eligible in themselves, is manifest, in as much as he affirmeth that only to be good which is honest, which he demonstrateth in many Dialogues, particularly in those of the Common-wealth.

Hence he conceiveth that man to be most happy and blessed, who hath attained the Science we mentioned; yet not in respect of the honours which attend such a person, nor of any other reward; for though he be unknown to all men, and such things, as are commonly accounted Ills, as, dishonour, banishment and death happen unto him; he is notwithstanding happy. On the contrary, a man who wants this knowledge, though he possesse all things commonly esteemed good, riches, power, health, strength, and Beauty, he is nothing the more happy.

He asserteth an ultimate end, conformable to all these which is to be made like unto God, as far as Humanity is capable of being such. This he expounds variously, sometimes as in *Theæto* he affirms our resemblance to God to consist in being prudent, just, and holy; wherefore we must endeavour to fly with all possible celerity from hence to those. This flight is the resemblance to God, as much as is possible: The similitude consisteth in Prudence, Justice, and Sanctity; sometimes in Justice only, as in his last Book of the Common-wealth. For a man is never deserted by God, whilst he endeavoureth to be just, and by the very act of Vertue, as much as man is capable of, he is rendred like unto God. In *Phædo* he asserteth, that this resemblance to God is acquired by Temperance and Justice, thus. *Are not they blessed and happy, and from hence shall go into the best place, who have practised the popular civill Vertue which they call Temperance and Justice?* Again, sometimes he affirmed, that the end of life is to be like unto God, sometimes to follow God, as when hee saith, God indeed according to the old saying, *containing the beginning, midale and end of all things*, &c. Sometimes he joyneth both together, as when he saith, *The Soul following God, and being rendred like unto him*, &c. The principle of Utility is good it self, but this is said of God, therefore the end conformable to the principle, is to become like unto God, to the Celestiall, or rather supercelestiall God, who hath not Vertue, but is more excellent then all Vertue. Wherefore it is rightly said, that *κακὸς αἰσχροῖα*, misery, is a per-

verfity of the Genius, ~~and~~ *Beatitude* is a good habit of the Genius.

This fimilitude to God we fhall obtain, if we enjoy convenient nature; in our manner, education and fenfe, according to Law, and chiefly by reafon, and difcipline, and inftitution of wifdom, withdrawing our felves as much as poffible from humane affairs, and being converfant in thofe things only which are underftood by contemplation: the way to prepare, and, as it were, to cleanse the Demon that is in us, is to initiate our felves into higher difciplines, which is done by Mufick, Arithmetick, Astronomy and Geometry, not without fome refpect of the body by Gymnastick, whereby it is made more ready for the actions both of Warre and Peace.

CHAP. XXVIII.

The definition and kinds of Virtue.

Vertue being divine, is the perfect and beft affection of the Soul, which adorneth a man, and rendreth him more excellent and ready, as well for fpeech as action, whether he do it alone or with others.

Of the Vertues, fome are placed in the rationall part, fome in the irrationall. For whereas the Nature of the rationall part is one, that of the irafcible another, that of the concupifcible another, the perfection of thefe muft likewife be different. That of the rationall is *Prudence*, of the irafcible, *Fortitude*, of the concupifcible, *Temperance*.

Prudence is the Science of things, Good, Bad, and betwixt both.

Temperance is an apt moderation of defires and appetites; when we call Temperance a moderation and obedience, we mean only this, that it is a faculty caufing all appetites to be fubjected unto it, in decent order, and fubmiffe obedience to be commanded by nature. This is the rationall part.

Fortitude is a lawfull obfervation of a command difficult, or not difficult, that is, it is a faculty which keepeth a lawfull precept.

Justice is an agreement amongst all thefe, which caufeth that the three parts of the Soul agree with one another, and that each be worthily converfant in thofe things which are proper, and belong unto it.

Thus it is a common intire perfection of thefe three Vertues, *Prudence*, *Fortitude* and *Temperance*, in fuch manner that reafon commandeth, and the reft of the parts, each according to its feveral

verall property, are restrained by Reason, and obey it.

Hence it followeth, that the Vertues are mutually consequent to one another; Fortitude being the conservation of a lawfull precept, is likewise conservative of right reason. Right reason proceedeth from Prudence; Prudence cohereth with Fortitude, for it is the knowledge of good things, but no man can discern that which is good, if he be distracted by fear, or involved in the like troubles. In like manner, neither can any man be wise, and intemperate, for then he is overcome by affections. If a man do something contrary to reason, *Plato* affirmeth he doth through ignorance and imprudence, so that can be prudent that is intemperate or fearfull. Whence it followeth, that the perfect Vertues cohere to one another, and are inseparable.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of Virtues, Vices, and their differences.

THe gifts of Nature and progress in them are called Vertues also, by reason of their similitude with the perfect Vertues, assuming the same name. In this sense we call all souldiers stout, and sometimes call imprudent and rash persons stout, when we speak not of the perfect Vertues, for the perfect neither increase nor decrease; but Vices are intended and remitted. One man is more imprudent and more unjust than another, neither do all the vices follow one another, for they are certain contraries which are not competent to the same. Such is fury to Cowardice, and prodigality to covetousnesse, nor can there be any man at once possessed of all Vices, no more than a body tormented by all diseases.

Moreover, there is a mean affection which inclineth not plainly either to Vice or Vertue; for it is not necessary that all men must be good or bad; they are such, who have arrived at the height of these; for it is not easie to passe suddenly from Vertue to Vice, because betwixt extremes there is a great intervall and distance.

Of Vertues some are principall, others concomitant; principall are those which are in the rationall part of the Soul, and by which the other Vertues are perfected. Concomitant are those which are in the other part which are subject to Affections. These act honest things according to Reason, not that which is in them, for they have none, but that which they receive from Prudence, which is confirmed in them by custom and exercise.

Now for as much as neither science nor art consisteth in any part

part of the soul, but in the rationally, those virtues which are in the other part, that is subject to affections, cannot be taught, because they are neither Arts nor Sciences, neither have they a peculiar Doctrine. Prudence is a Science, which prescribeth unto every one what is proper to him, as a Pilot, or Master of a Ship, to inferior ignorant Sailors. The like in a common Soldier and a General.

For as much as Ills are intended and remitted, offences cannot be equal, but some must be greater, others lesser, for which reason, they, who make Lawes, punish some more gently, other more severely. And though Virtues are certain Heights, as being perfect, and like unto that which is right, yet in another respect they are called mediocrities, because all or the most of them are placed betwixt two Vices, whereof one sinneth in excess, the other in defect; as on the one side of *Liberality* is *Covetousness*, on the other *Prodigality*. For in affections we recede from the mean, when we relinquish that which is placed in Virtue, either by excess or defect. But neither he, who beholding his Parents wronged is nothing moved thereat, nor he who is incens'd at the smallest matters void of passion or moderate, but the quite contrary. He who at the death of his Parents grieveth not, is void of passion; He who destroyeth himself with grieving, is overpassionate and immoderate; he who grieveth moderately, is moderately passionate. In like manner, he, who feareth upon all occasions, and more then needs, is timorous; he who feareth nothing is rash; He only is stout that can keep a mean betwixt fear and rashness; the like in all the rest. And for as much as that which is mean in affections is likewise best, and mediocrity is nothing but a mean betwixt excess and defect, there are these Virtues termed Mediocrities, because in humane perturbations and passions they affect us a middle kind of way.

CHAP. XXX.

That Vertue is voluntary, Vice involuntary.

Virtue being chiefly of those things which are in our power, not compulsive (for it could not deserve praise, if it came either by nature or divine decree) it followeth; that Virtue is voluntary, begotten by a fervent, generous, and firm impulsion.

From this, that Virtue is voluntary, it followeth that Vice is involuntary: For, who, in the most excellent part of himself, would ever voluntarily choose that which is the greatest of all Ills? When a man is carried on to Vice, he first inclineth to it, not as if it were ill, but good, and if he fall into ill, doubtless, he

is deceived with thinking, that this way by a lesser ill, he may arrive at a greater good, and goeth in this manner unwillingly to it. For, it is not possible, a man should pursue ill as it is ill, without any hope of good, or, fear of a greater ill. All ill things therefore, which an ill man doth, are involuntary; for, injustice being involuntary, to act unjustly is so much more involuntary, as the action of Vice is beyond the idle habit thereof. Yet, though wicked actions are involuntary, the wicked nevertheless ought to be punished, and that not after one manner; but, according to the variety of hurt which they do to those they wrong. That which is involuntary consisteth in ignorance of perturbations, all which may be diverted, either by reason, or civill custome, or diligence.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Love and Friendship.

F*riendship*, properly so termed, is made by a mutuall reciprocal benevolence. This is, when either is as much concerned for the happinesse of the other, as of his own, which equality is preserved only by similitude of manners: For, the like is friend to its like, if they be both moderate; but, the intemperate cannot agree, either with themselves, or the moderate.

There are other things which are thought friendships, but are are not such, in which there appeareth some shew of vertue. Of these, is the naturall goodwill of Parents to their Children, and of Kindred one to another, as also that which is called civill and sociable: These are not alwaies accompanied with mutual benevolence. Likewise, the amatory art is a kind of friendship. That which is honest is proper to a generous soul, dishonest, to a perverse; mean, to one meanly affected. For, as the habit of the rationall soul is three-fold, right, dishonest, and mean; so many different kinds are there of love, which appeareth most clearly in the difference of the ends they propose unto themselves. The dishonest aimeth only at corporeall pleasure, and therefore is absolutely brutish. The honest considereth the minde only, as far as vertue appeareth in it. The mean desireth both the beauty of the soul and of the body; of which love, he who is worthy, is mean likewise; that is, neither absolutely honest nor dishonest. Hence that love which aimeth only at the body, ought to be tearmed a Demon (rather then a Deity, which never descendeth to an human bodie) transmitting divine things to men, and human to God.

Of the three kinds of love, that which is proper to a good man,

being remote from vicious affections, is artificiall, whence it is placed in the rationall part of the soul. The contemplations thereof are these, to discern who is worthy of love, and to contract friendship with him, and enjoy it: This discernment is made from his aimes or desires, whether they are generous, and directed to a good end, or violent and fervent. The contraction, or acquisition of friendship, is made, not by wanton excessive praise, but rather by reprehension, shewing him, that it is not convenient he should live in that manner he doth; when he enjoyeth the love of him whom he affects, he must alwaies exhort him to those things, by exercise whereof, he may arrive at perfect habit. Their end is that of lover and beloved, they may at last become friends.

CHA P. XXXII.

Of Passions.

Injustice is so great an ill, that it is better to suffer wrong then to do wrong; for one belongeth to a wicked man, the other to a weak man: both are dishonest, but to do wrong is worse, by how much it is more dishonest. It is as expedient that a wicked man be punished, as that a sick man should be cured by a Physician; for all chastisement is a kind of medicine for an offending Soul.

Since the greater part of Vertues are conversant about passions, it is necessary that we define passion. Passion is an irrationall motion of the Soul, arising out of some good or ill; it is called an irrationall motion, because neither judgments nor opinions are passions; but motions of the irrationall parts of the Soul. For in the irrationall part of the Soul, there are motions, which though they are done by us, are yet nothing the more in our power. They are often done therefore contrary to our inclination and will; for sometimes it falleth out, that though we know things to be neither pleasing nor unpleasing, expetible nor avoidable, yet we are drawn by them, which could never be if such passions were the same with Judgement. For we reject judgement when we disapprove it whether it ought to be so or otherwise. In the definition is added, arising from some good or some ill, because of that which is mean or indifferent betwixt these, no passion is ever excited in us. All passions arise from that which seemeth good or ill. If we see good present, we rejoyce, if future, we desire. On the contrary, if ill be present, we grieve, if imminent, we fear.

The simple affections, and, as it were, elements of the rest are two;

two; *Pleasure* and *Grief*; the rest consist of these. Neither are fear and desire to be numbred among the principall passions, for he who feareth, is not wholly deprived of pleasure, nor can a man live the least moment, who despaireth to be freed or eased of some ill. But it is more conversant in grief and sorrow, and therefore he, who feareth, sorroweth. But he who desireth, like all those who desire or expect something, is delighted; insomuch as he is not absolutely confident; and hath not a firm hope he is grieved. And if desire and fear are not principall passions, it will doubtlesse follow, that none of the other affections are simple; as anger, love, emulation and the like; for in these, *Pleasure* and *Grief* are manifest, as consisting of them.

Moreover of Passions, some are rough, others mild, the mild are those, which are naturally in men, and if kept within their bounds, are necessary and proper to man, if they exceed, vitious. Such are *Pleasure*, *Grief*, *Anger*, *Pitty*, *Modesty*; for it is proper to man to *delight* in those things which are according to Nature, and to be grieved at their contraries. *Anger* is necessary to repell and punish an injury. *Mercy* agreeth with Humanity. *Modesty* teacheth us to decline sordid things. Other passions are rough, and praternaturall, arising from some depraved or perverse custom. Such are excessive laughter, joy in the misfortunes of others, hatred of Mankind. These, whether intense or remisse, after what manner soever they are, are alwaies erroneous, and admit not any laudable mediocrity.

As concerning *Pleasure* and *Grief*, *Plato* writeth thus. These passions are excited in us by Nature. *Grief* and sorrow happen to those who are moved contrary to Nature; *Pleasure* to those who are restored to the proper constitution of their Nature. For he conceiveth the naturall state of man to consist in a mean betwixt *Pleasure* and *Grief*, not moved by either, in which state we live longest. He asserteth severall kinds of *Pleasure*, whereof some relate to the *Body*, others to the *Soul*. Again, of *Pleasures* some are mix'd with grief, some are pure. Again, some proceed from the remembrance of things past, others from hope of things to come. Again, some are dishonest, as being intemperate and unjust; others moderate, and joyned with good, as joy for good things, and the *Pleasure* that followeth Vertue. Now because most *Pleasures* are naturally dishonest, he thinks it not to be disputed whether *Pleasure* can be simply and absolutely a good, that being to be accounted poor and of no value, which is raised out of another, and hath not a principall primary essence. For *Pleasure* cohereth even with its contrary *Grief*, and is joyned with it, which could not be, if one were simply good, the other simply ill.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of the formes of Common-wealths.

OF the formes of Common-wealth, some are supposed only, and conceived by abstract from the rest. These he delivers in his book of a Commonwealth, wherein he describeth the first concordant, the second discordant, enquiring which of these is the most excellent, and how they may be constituted. He also divideth a Commonwealth like the Soul into three parts, *Keepers, Defenders, and Artificers*. The office of the first is to Counsel, to advise, to command; of the second, to defend the Commonwealth, upon occasion, by armes, which answereth to the irascible power; To the last belong Arts and other services. He will have Princes to be Philosophers, and to contemplate the first good, affirming that so only they shall govern rightly. For Mankind can never be freed from ill, unlesse either Philosophers govern, or they who govern be inspired with Philosophy after a divine manner. A Commonwealth is then governed best, and according to Justice, when each part of the City performeth its proper Office. So that the Princes give Laws to the People; the Defenders obey them, and fight for them, the rest willingly submit to their Superiours.

Of a Commonwealth he asserteth five kinds, the first, *Aristocracy*, when the best rule; the second, *Timocracy*, when the ambitious; the third *Democracy*, when the people; the fourth, *Oligarchy*, when a few; the last, *Tyranny*, which is the worst of all.

He describeth likewise other supposed formes of Commonwealth, as that in his Book of Laws; and, that which reformeth others, in his Epistles, which he useth for those Cities that in his Books of Laws he saith are sick. These have a distinct place, and select men out of every age, as according to the diversity of their nature and place, they require different institution, education and armes. The Maritime people are to study Navigation and Seafight; the Iland fighting on foot; those in mountainous Countries to use light armour, those on the shore heavy. Some of these to exercise fighting on horseback. In this City he alloweth not a Community of women. Thus is Politick a Verue conversant both in Action and Contemplation; the end wherof is to constitute a City, good, happy, and convenient to it self. It considers a great many things, amongst the rest, whether War be to be waged or not.

CHA P. XXXIV.

Of a Sophist.

Hitherto we have spoken of a *Philosopher*, from whom a *Sophist* differeth; In *Manners*, because he teacheth young men for gain, and desireth rather to *seem* then to *be* good. In *matter*, for a *Philosopher* is conversant in those things which alwaies are, and continually remain in the same manner; but a *Sophist* in that which is not, for which reason he seeketh darknesse, that he may not be known to be what he is. To things that are, that which is not, is not opposed as contrary, for it neither existeth, nor is participant of any essence, nor can be understood. So that if any man endeavour to expresse it in words, or comprehend it by thought; he is deceived, because he putteth together things contrary and repugnant. Yet that which is not, as far as it is spoken, is not a pure negation of that which is, but implyeth a relation to another, which in some manner is joined to *Ens*. So that unlesse we assume something from that which is to that which is not, it cannot be distinguished from other things, but thus, as many kinds as they are of *Ens*, so many are there of *Non-Ens*, because that which is not an *Ens* is a *Non-Ens*.

Thus much may serve for an introduction into *Plato's* Philosophy: Some things perhaps are said orderly, others disorderly, or confusedly, yet is all so laid down, that by those which we have delivered, the rest of his Assertions may be found out and contemplated.

*After so serious a Discourse, it will not be amisse
to give the Reader a Poeticall entertainment upon
the same Subject, being*

A PLATONICK DISCOURSE,

Written in Italian by

JOHN PICUS Earl of **MIRANDULA**,

In explication of a Sonnet by

HIERONIMO BENIVIENTI.

The first P A R T.

Señ. I.

IT is a principle of the Platonists, That every created thing hath a threefold being; Causal, Formal, Participated. In the Sun there is no heat, that being but an elementary quality, not of Celestiall nature: yet is the Sun the cause and Fountain of all heat. Fire is hot by nature, and its proper form: Wood is not hot of its self, yet is capable of receiving that quality by Fire. Thus hath heat its Causal being in the Sun, its Formall in the Fire, its Participated in the Fuel. The most noble and perfect of these is the Causal: and therefore Platonists assert, That all excellencies are in God after this manner of being; That in God is nothing, but from him all things; That Intellect is not in him, but that he is the original spring of every Intellect. Such is Plotinus's meaning, when he affirms, * *God neither understands nor knows*; that is to say, after a formall way, As Dionysius Areopagita, *God is neither an Intellectual nor Intelligent nature, but unspeakably exalted above all Intellect and Knowledge.*

* Ennead. 6.
lib. 7. 37.

Señ. II.

Platonists distinguish Creatures into three degrees. The first comprehends the corporeall and visible; as Heaven, Elements, and all compounded of them: The last the invisible, incorporeal, absolutely free from bodies, which properly are called Intellectual (by Divines, Angelicall) Natures. Betwixt these is a middle nature, which though incorporeal, invisible, immortal, yet moveth bodies, as being obliged to that Office; called, the rational

rationall Soul; inferiour to Angells, superiour to Bodies; subject to those, regent of these: Above which is God himselfe, author and principle of every Creature, in whom Divinity hath a casual being; from whom, proceeding to Angells, it hath a formal being, and thence is derived into the rationall Soul by participation of their lustre: below which, no nature can assume the Title of Divine.

Sect. III.

THat the first of these three Natures cannot be multiplied, who is but one, the principle and cause of all other Divinity, is evidently proved by Platonists, Peripateticks, and our Divines. About the second (*viz.*) The Angelick and Intellectuall, Platonists disagree. Some (as *Proclus*, *Hermias*, *Syrianus*, and many others) betwixt God and the rationall Soul place a great number of creatures; part of these they call *Nétes, véses*, Intelligible, part intellectuall; which termes, *Plato* sometimes confoundeth, as in his *Phædo*. *Plotinus*, *Porphyrius*, and generally the most refined Platonists, betwixt God and the Soul of the World, assigne only one Creature, which they call the Son of God, because immediately produced by him. The first opinion complies most with *Dionysius Areopagita*, and Christian Divines, who asserf the number of Angells to be in a manner infinite. The second is the more Philosophick, best suiting with *Aristotle* and *Plato*, whose sense we only purpose to expresse; and therefore will decline the first path (though that only be the right) to pursue the latter.

Sect. IV.

VVE therefore, according to the opinion of *Plotinus*, confirmed not only by the best Platonists, but, even by *Aristotle*, and all the Arabians, especially *Avicenna*, affirm, That God from eternity produced a creature of incorporeall and intellectuall nature, as perfect as is possible for a created being, beyond which, he produced nothing; for, of the most perfect cause, the effect must be most perfect, and the most perfect can be but one; for, of two or more, it is not possible but one should be more or lesse perfect than the rest, otherwise they would not be two; but the same. This reason for our opinion I rather choose, then that which *Avicen* alledges, founded upon this principle, That from one cause, as one, can proceed but one effect. We conclude therefore, that no creature but this first minde proceeds immediately from God: for, of all other effects issuing from this minde, and all other second causes, God is only the mediate efficient. This by *Plato*, *Hermes*, and *Zoroaster*, is called the Daughter of God, the Minde, Wisdome, Divine Reason, by some interpreted the Word; not meaning (with our Divines) the Son of God,

God, he not being a creature, but one essence coequall with the Creator.

Sect. V.

ALL understanding agents have in themselves the form of that which they design to effect: as an Architect hath in his minde a figure of the building he undertakes, which as his pattern he exactly strives to imitate: This Platonists call the Idea or Exemplar, believing it more perfect, then that which is made after it: and this manner of Being, Ideal, or Intelligible, the other Materiall and Sensible: So that when a Man builds a house, they affirm there are two, one Intellectuall in the Workmans mind; the other sensible, which he makes in Stone, Wood, or the like; expressing in that matter the form he hath conceiv'd: to this *Dante* alludes.

— None any work can frame,
unless himself become the same.

Hereupon they say, though God produced only one creature, yet he produced all, because in it he produced the Ideas and forms of all, and that in their most perfect being, that is the Ideal, for which reason they call this Mind, the Intelligible World.

Sect. VI.

After the pattern of that Mind they affirm this sensible World was made, and the exemplar being the most perfect of all created things, it must follow that this Image thereof be as perfect as its nature will bear. And since animate things are more perfect then the inanimate; and of those the rational then the irrational, we must grant, this World hath a Soul perfect above all others. This is the first rationall Soul, which, though incorporeall, and immateriall, is destin'd to the function of governing and moving corporeall Nature: not free from the body as that mind whence from Eternity it was deriv'd, as was the mind from God. Hence Platonists argue the World is eternall; its soul being such, and not capable of being without a body, that also must be from eternity; as likewise the motion of the Heavens, because the Soul cannot be without moving.

Sect. VII.

THe antient Ethnick Theologians, who cast Poeticall veils over the face of their mysteries, expresse these three natures by other names. *Cælum* they call God himself; he produc'd the first Mind, *Saturn*: *Saturn* the Soul of the World, *Jupiter*. *Cælum* implies Priority, and excellence, as in the Firmament, the first Heaven. *Saturn* signifies Intellectuall nature, wholly imploy'd in

con-

contemplation; *Jupiter* active life, consisting in moving and governing all subordinate to it. The properties of the two latter agree with their Planets: *Saturn* makes Men Contemplative, *Jupiter* Imperious. The Speculative busied about things above them; the Practick beneath them.

SECT. VIII.

WHich three names are promiscuously used upon these grounds: In God we understand first his Excellence, which as Cause, he hath above all his effects; for this he is called *Cælus*. Secondly, the production of those effects, which denotes conversion towards inferiours; in this respect he is sometimes called *Jupiter*, but with an addition, *Optimus, Maximus*. The first Angelick nature hath more names, as more diversity. Every creature consists of Power and Act: the first, *Plato* in *Philebo*, calls Infinite: the second, Finite: all imperfections in the Mind are by reason of the first; all perfections, from the latter. Her operations are threefold. About Superiours, the contemplation of God; about the knowledge of her self; about inferiours, the production and care of this sensible World: these three proceed from Act. By Power she descends to make inferiour things; but in either respect is firm within her self. In the two first, because contemplative, she is called *Saturn*: in the third, *Jupiter*, a name principally applied to her power, as that part from whence is derived the act of Production of things. For the same reason is the soul of the World, as she contemplates her self or superiours, termed *Saturn*; as she is employed in ordering worldly things, *Jupiter*: and since the government of the World belongs properly to her; the contemplation to the Mind; therefore is the one absolutely called *Jupiter*, the other *Saturn*.

SECT. IX.

THIS World therefore (as all other creatures) consisteth of a Soul and Body: the Body is all that we behold, compounded of the four Elements. These have their casuall being in the Heavens, (which consist not of them, as sublunary things; for then it would follow that these inferiour parts were made before the Celestiall, the Elements in themselves being simple, by course causing such things as are compounded of them:) Their formal being from the Moon down to the Earth: Their participate and imperfect under the Earth, evident in the Fire, Air, and Water, experience daily finds there; evinc'd by naturall Philosophers: to which the ancient Theologians ænigmatically allude by their four infernall Rivers, *Acheron*, *Cocytus*, *Styx*, and *Phlegeton*.

We may divide the body of the World into three parts: Celestiall, Mundane, Infernall: The ground why the Poets feign

the Kingdom of *Saturn* to be shar'd betwixt his three Sons, *Jupiter*, *Neptune*, and *Pluto* : implying only the three-fold variation of this corporeall World ; which as long as it remains under *Saturn*, that is, in its Ideal Intellectual being, is one and undivided ; and so more firm and potent : but falling into the hands of his Sons, that is, chang'd to this material Being, and by them divided into three parts , according to the triple existence of bodies, is more infirm and lesse potent , degenerating from a spiritual to a corporeal estate. The first part, the heavenly , they attribute to *Jupiter* ; the last and lowest to *Pluto* ; the middle to *Neptune*. And because in this principality is all generation and corruption, the Theologians expresse it by the Ocean, ebbing or flowing continually: by *Neptune* understanding the Power or deity that presides over Generation. Yet we must not imagine these to be different souls, distinctly informing these three parts : the World her self being one, can have but one Soul ; which as it animates the subterranean parts, is called *Pluto* ; the sublunary *Neptune* ; the celestiall, *Jupiter*. Thus *Plato* in *Philebo* averss by *Jove* is understood a regall soul, meaning the principall part of the World which governs the other. This opinion, though only my own, I suppose is more true then the expositions of the Grecians.

Sect. X.

NEXT that of the World, Platonists assign many other rational souls. The eight principall are those of the heavenly Spheres ; which according to their opinion exceeded not that number ; consisting of the seven Planets, and the starry Orb. These are the nine Muses of the Poets : *Calliope* (the universall soul of the World) is first, the other eight are distributed to their severall Spheres.

Sect. XI.

* In *Timæo*.

Plato asserts, * That the Author of the world made the mundane, and all other rationall souls, in one Cup, and of the same Elements ; the universall soul being most perfect, ours least : whose parts we may observe by this division : Man, the chain that ties the World together, is placed in the midst : and as all mediums participate of their extreame, his parts correspond with the whole World ; thence called *Microcosmus*. In the World is first Corporeall Nature, eternall in the Heavens ; corruptible in the Elements, and their compounds, as Stones, Metals, &c. Then Plants. The third degree is of Beasts. The fourth rationall souls. The fifth Angelicall minds. Above these is God, their origine. In man are likewise two bodies ; one eternall, the Platonists *Vehiculum celeste*, immediately inform'd by the rational soul : The other corruptible, subject to sight, consisting of the Elements : Then the vegetative faculty, by which generated and nourished. The third part is Sensitive and motive. The fourth Rational ; by the

Latine

Latine Peripateticks believ'd the last and most noble part of the Soul : yet, above that is the Intellectuall and Angelick; the most excellent part whereof, we call the Souls Union, immediately joynning it to God, in a manner resembling him; as in the other Angels, Beasts, and Plants. About these Platonists differ, *Proclus* and *Porphyrus* only allow the rationall part to be Immortall; *Zenocrates* and *Speusippus* the sensitive also; *Numenius* and *Plotinus* the whole Soul.

Set. XII.

I Deas have their casuall being in God, their formall in the first Minde, their participated in the rationall Soul. In God they are not, but produced by him in the Angelick nature; through this communicated to the Soul, by whom illuminated, when she reflects on her intellectuall parts, she receives the true formes of things, Ideas. Thus differ the Souls of Men from the Celestiall: these in their bodily functions recede not from the Intellectuall, at once contemplating and governing. Bodies ascend to them, they descend not. Those employ'd in corporeall office are depriv'd of contemplation, borrowing science from sense, to this wholly enclin'd, full of errors: Their only means of release from this bondage, is, the amatory life; which by sensible beauties, exciting in the soul a remembrance of the Intellectuall, raiseth her from this terrene life, to the eternall; by the flame of love refined into an Angell.

The Second PART.

Set. I.

THE apprehensive faculties of the Soul are employ'd about truth and falshood; assenting to one, dissenting from the other. The first is affirmation, the second negation. The desiderative converse in good and ill, inclining to this, declining to that. The first is Love, the second Hate. Love is distinguish'd by its objects; if of riches, termed covetousnesse; of honour, ambition; of heavenly things, piety; of equalls, friendship: these we exclude, and admit no other signification, but, *the desire to possesse what is in it selfe, or, at least in our esteems, is fair*: of a different nature from the love of God to his Creatures, who comprehending all, cannot desire or want the beauty and perfections of another: and from that of friends which must be reciprocall. We therefore with *Plato* define it, *ὁρᾷς τὸ καλόν * *The desire of beauty*. Desire is an inclination

tion to reall or apparent good. As there are divers kinds of good, so of desire. Love is a species of desire, Beauty of good. Desire is Naturall or Knowing. All creatures have a particular perfection by participation of the divine goodnesse. This is their end, including that degree of felicity whereof they are capable, to which center they tend. This desire we call Naturall; a great testimony of Divine Providence, by which they are unwittingly (as an Arrow by the Archer) directed to their mark. With this, all Creatures desire God, as being the Originall good imprinted and participated in every particular. This is in every Nature, as more or lesse capable; addressed to ends more or lesse noble; yet, is the ultimate end of all the same, to enjoy God, as far as they may: Thus as the Psalmist, *Every thing worships and praiseth God; like suppliants, turning and offering themselves up to him*, saith Theodoret.

Sect. II.

THE other Species of Desire is employed only about things known, given by Nature, that to every apprehensive faculty, there might be a desiderative; to embrace what it judgeth good, to refuse what it esteemeth evill; in its own nature inclin'd to good: None ever desires to be miserable; but, the apprehensive Vertue many times mistaking Evill for Good, it oft falls out that the desiderative (in its selfe blind) desires evill. This in some sence may be said voluntary, for none can force it; in another sence, not voluntary, deceived by the judgment of its Companion. This is Plato's meaning, when he saith, ** No man sins willingly.*

* In *Timæo*
Καὶ τὸ πᾶν
ἐκ τῆς φύσεως.

Sect. III.

IT is the Property of every desiderative Vertue, that He who desires, possesseth in part the thing he desires, in part not: for, if he were wholly deprived of its Possession, he would never desire it: this is verified two waies. First, nothing is desired unlesse it be known; and to know a thing is in some part to possess it. So Aristotle, ** The Soul is all, because it knowes all.* And in the Psalmist God saith, *All things are mine, I know them.* Secondly, there is alwaies some convenience and resemblance betwixt the desirer and desired: Every thing delights and preserves it selfe by that, which by naturall affinity is most conformable to it; by its contrary is grieved and consum'd. Love is not betwixt things unlike; Repugnance of two opposite natures is naturall hate. Hate is a repugnance with knowledge. Hence it followeth, that the nature of the desired, is in some manner in the desirer; otherwise, there would be no similitude betwixt them: yet imperfectly; else it were vain for it to seek what it entirely possesseth.

* De Anima,
3. 9.

Señ. IV.

AS desire generally followes knowledge, so severall knowing are annexed to severall desiring Powers: We distinguish the knowing into three degrees; Sense, Reason, Intellect; attended by three desiderative Vertues, Appetite, Election, Will. Appetite is in Brutes, Election in Men, Will in Angels. The sense knowes only corporeall things, the Appetite only desires such; the Angelick Intellect is wholly intent on Contemplation of spirituall Conceptions, not inclining to Materiall Things, but when divested of matter, and spiritualiz'd, their Will is only fed with intemporall spirituall Good. Rationall Nature is the Mean betwixt these Extreames; sometimes descending to Sense, sometimes elevated to Intellect; by its own Election complying with the desires of which she pleaseth. Thus it appears, that corporeall Objects are desired, either by Sensuall Appetite, or Election of Reason inclining to Sense: Incorporeall by Angelick Will, or, the Election of Reason, elevated to Intellectual Height.

Señ. V.

Beauty in generall, is a *Harmony resulting from severall things, proportionably concurring to constitute a third*: In respect of which temperament, and mixture of various Natures, agreeing in the composition of one, every Creature is Fair; and in this sense no simple being is Beautifull, not God himselve; this Beauty begins after him, arising from contrariety, without which is no composition; it being the union of contraries, a friendly enmity, a disagreeing concord; whence *Empedocles* makes discord and concord the principles of all things; by the first, understanding the varietie of the Natures compounding; by the second, their Union: adding, that in God only there is no Discord, He not being the Union of severall Natures; but, a pure uncompounded Unity. In these compositions the Union necessarily predominates over the contrariety, otherwise the Fabrick would be dissolved. Thus in the fictions of Poets, *Venus* loves *Mars*: this Beauty cannot subsist without contrariety; she curbs and moderates him, this temperament allais the strife betwixt these contraries. And in Astrologie, *Venus* is plac'd next *Mars*, to check his destructive influence; as *Jupiter* next *Saturn*, to abate his malignancy. If *Mars* were alwaies subject to *Venus* (the contrariety of principles to their due temper) nothing would ever be dissolved.

Señ. VI.

This is Beauty in the largest sense, the same with Harmony; whence God is said to have framed the World with muscicall harmonious temperament. But Harmony properly implies a

melodious agreement of Voices; and Beauty in a restrict accep-
tion relates to a proportionable concord in visible things, as Har-
mony in audible. The desire of this Beauty is Love; arising only
from one knowing faculty, the Sight: and that gave *Plotinus*,
(*Ennead. 3. lib. 5. 3.*) occasion to deprive ~~us~~ Love, from ~~Sight~~
Sight. Here the Platonist may object; If Love be only of visible
things, how can it be applyed to Ideas, invisable natures? We
answer, Sight is twofold, corporeal and spirituall; the first is that
of Sense, the other the intellectuall faculty, by which we agree
with Angels; this Platonists call Sight, the corporeall being only
an Image of this. So *Aristotle*, *Intellect is that to the Soul which sight*
is to the Body: Hence is *Minerva* (Wisdom) by *Homer* call'd
φαιδριμος, *Bright-ey'd*. With this sight *Moses*, *Saint Paul*, and other
Saints, beheld the face of God: this Divines call intellectuall,
intuitive cognition, the Beatificall vision, the Reward of the
Righteous.

Sect. VII.

AS Sight, so Beauty (its object) is twofold (the two *Venus's*
celebrated by *Plato*, [*Sympos.*] and our Poet) Sensible, called
Vulgar *Venus*. intellectuall in Ideas (which are the object of the
Intellect, as colour of sight) nam'd Celestiall *Venus*. Love also is
twofold, Vulgar, and Celestiall; for as *Plato* saith * *There must ne-*
cessarily be as many Loves as Venus's.

* *Sympos.*

Sect. VIII.

Venus then is Beauty, whereof Love is generated: properly
his Mother, because Beauty is the cause of Love, not as pro-
ductive principle of this act, to Love, but as its object: the Soul
being the efficient cause of it as of all his acts; Beauty the mate-
riall: For in Philosophy the efficient is assimilated to the Father,
the material to the Mother.

Sect. IX.

CElestiall Love is an intellectuall desire of Ideall Beauty: I-
deas, (as we said before) are the Patterns of things in God,
as in their Fountain; in the Angelick Mind, Essentiall; in the
Soul by Participation, which with the Substance partakes of the
Ideas and Beauty of the first Mind: Hence it follows, that Love
of Celestial Beauty in the Soul, is not Celestiall Love perfectly,
but the nearest Image of it. Its truest being is with the desire of
Ideal Beauty in the first Mind, which God immediately adorns
with Ideas.

Sect.

SECT. X.

LOve (saith Plato) was begot on *Penia*, by *Porus* (the Son of *Metis*) in *Jupiters* Orchard, being drunk with Nectar, when the Gods met to celebrate *Venus* Birth. Nature in it self inform, when it receives form from God is the Angelick Mind; this form is Ideas, the first Beauty; which in this descent from their divine Fountain, mixing with a different nature, become imperfect. The first mind, by its opacousness eclipsing their lustre, desires, that Beauty which they have lost; this desire is love; begot when *Porus* the affluence of Ideas mixeth with *Penia* the indigence of that informe nature we termed *Jupiter* (1. 8.) in whose Garden the Ideas are planted, with those the first Mind adorned, was by the Antients named Paradise; to which contemplative life and eternall felicity *Zoroastres* inviting us, saith, Seek, seek Paradise: our Divines transfer it to the *Cælum Empyræum*, the seat of the happy Souls, whose blessedness consists in contemplation and perfection of the Intellect, according to Plato. This Love begot on *Venus* birth-day, that is, when the Ideal Beauty, though imperfectly, is infused into the Angelick Mind; *Venus* yet as a Child, not grown to perfection. All the Gods assembled at this Feast, that is their Ideas, (as by *Saturn* we understand both the Planet and his Idea) an expression borrowed from *Parmenides*. These Gods then are those Ideas that precede *Venus* (She is the beauty and Grace resulting from their variety.) Invited to a Banquet of Nectar and Ambrosia: those whom God feasts with Nectar and Ambrosia are eternall beings, the rest not; These Ideas of the Angelick Mind are the first eternals; *Porus* was drunk with Nectar, this Ideal affluence fill'd with Eternity; other Ideas were not admitted to the Feast, nor induc'd with Immortality.

Orpheus upon the same grounds saith, Love was born before all other Gods, in the bosom of Chaos: Because Nature full of indistinct imperfect forms (the Mind replenish'd with confused Ideas) desires their perfection.


SECT. XI.

THe Angelick Mind desires to make these Ideas perfect; which can onely be done by means opposite to the causes of their imperfection, these are Recession from their Principle, and mixtion with a contrary Nature: Their Remedy, separation from the unlike Nature, and return and conjunction (as far as possible) with God. Love, the desire of this Beauty, excites the Mind to conversion and re-union with him. Every thing is more perfect as nearer its Principle; This is the first Circle. The Angelick Mind, proceeding from the Union of God, by revolution of intrinsecall knowledge returneth to him. Which with the Antients is *Venus adulta*, grown to perfection. Every Nature that may have this conversion

conversion, is a Circle; such alone are the Intellectual and Rational, and therefore only capable of felicity, the obtaining their first Principle, their ultimate end and highest good. This is peculiar to Immortall Substances, for the Materiall (as both Platonists and Peripateticks grant) have not this reflection upon themselves, or their Principle. These, (the Angelick Mind and Rational Soul) are the two intelligible Circles; answerable to which in the corporeall World are two more; the tenth Heaven immoveable, image of the first Circle; the Celestiall Bodies, that are moveable, image of the second: The first *Plato* mentions not, as wholly different and irrepresentable by corporeall Nature: of the second in *Timæo* he saith, That all the Circles of this visible Heaven (by him distinguished into the fixed sphere and seven Planets) represent as many Circles in the Rational Soul.

Some attribute the name of Circle to God; by the ancient Theologists called *Cælus*; being a Sphear which comprehends all; as the outmost Heaven includes the World.

In one respect this agrees with God, in another not; the property of beginning from a point and returning to it, is repugnant to him; who hath no beginning, but is himself that indivisible point from which all Circles begin, and to which they return: And in this sence it is likewise inconsistent with materiall things, they have a beginning, but cannot return to it.

In many other Properties it agrees with God; He is the most perfect of beings; this of figures; neither admit addition: The last Sphear is the place of all bodies, God of all Spirits: the Soul (say Platonists) is not in the Body, but the body is in the Soul, the Soul in the Mind, the Mind in God, the outmost Place; who is therefore named by the Cabalists .

SECT. XII.

THE three Graces are Handmaids to *Venus*, *Thalia*, *Euphrosyne*, *Aglaia*; Viridity, Gladnesse, Splendour; properties attending Ideal Beauty. *Thalia*, is the permanence of every thing in its entire being; thus is Youth called green, Man being then in his perfect state; which decaies as his years encrease, into his last dissolution. *Venus*, is proportion, uniting all things. Viridity, the duration of it; In the Ideall World, where is the first *Venus*, is also the first Viridity; for no Intelligible Nature recedes from its being by growing old. It communicates this property to sensible things as far as they are capable of this *Venus*, that is, as long as their due proportion continues. The two other properties of Ideal Beauty are Illustration of the Intellect, *Aglaia*, Repletion of the wil with desire and joy, *Euphrosyne*.

Of the Graces one is painted looking toward us; The continuation of our being is no reflex act. The other two with their faces

faces from us, seeming to return; the operations of the Intellect and Will are reflexive; *what comes from God to us, returns from us to God.*

SECT. XIII.

Venus is said to be born of the Sea; Matter, the Inform Nature whereof every Creature is compounded, is represented by Water, continually flowing, easily receivable of any form. This being first in the Angelick Minde, Angels are many times expressed by Water, as in the Psalms, *The Waters above the Heavens praise God continually*, so interpreted by Origen; and some Platonists expound the Ocean (stil'd by Homer Father of Gods and Men) this Angelick Minde, Principle and Fountain of all other Creatures; *Gemistius, Neptune*; as Commander of all Waters, of all Mindes Angelicall and Humane. This is that living Fountain, whereof he that drinketh shall never thirst: These are the Waters whereon (*David* saith) God hath founded the World.

SECT. XIV.

Porus (the Affluence of Ideas proceeding from God) is stiled by Plato the Son of *Metis* (Counsell,) in Imitation of the Scripture: whence our Saviour by *Dionysius Areop.* is termed the Angel of Counsell, that is, the Messenger of God the Father; so *Ascen* calls the first Cause conciliative, the Minde not having Ideas from it selfe but from God, by whose Counsell she receiveth Knowledge and Art to frame this visible World.

SECT. XV.

Love, * according to Plato, is *Youngest and Oldest of the Gods*; * *Sympos.* They, as all other things, have a two-fold Being, Ideal and Naturall. The first God in his Naturall Being was Love, who dispenc'd theirs to all the rest, the last in his Ideal. Love was born in the Descent of the Ideas into the Angelick Minde, which could not be perfect till they, its Essence, were made so; by loves conversion to God. The Angelick Minde owing its naturall being to Love, the other Gods who succeeded this Minde, necessarily are younger then He in their naturall Being, though they precede him in their Ideal, as not born till these Ideas, though imperfectly, were joyn'd to the inform'd Nature.

SECT. XVI.

The Kingdome of Necessity is said to be before that of Love. Every *Plat. Sympos.* Creature consists of two Natures, Materiall, the imperfect, (which we here understand by Necessity) and Formall, the occasion of perfection. That whereof it most partakes is said to be predominant, and the Creature to be subject to it. Hence is Necessity (matter) suppos'd to raigne when the Ideas were imperfect,

fect, and all imperfections to happen during that time; all perfections after Love began his reign; for, when the Minde was by him converted to God; that which before was imperfect in her, was perfected.

Señ. XVII.

* *Plat. Sympos.* * **V**enus is said to commend Fate. The order and concatenation of causes and effects in this sensible World, called Fate, depends on the order of the Intelligible World, Providence. Hence Platonists place Providence (the ordering of Ideas) in the first Minde, depending upon God, its ultimate end, to which it leads all other things. Thus *Venus*, being the order of those Ideas, whereon Fate, the Worlds order, depends, commands it.

Fate is divided into three parts, *Clotho*, *Lachesis*, and *Atropos*: That which is one in Providence, indivisible in Eternity, when it comes into Time and Fate is divisible, into Past, Present, and Future. Others apply *Atropos* to the fixed Sphear, *Clotho* to the seven Planets, *Lachesis* to sublunary things.

Temporall corporeall things only are subjected to Fate; the Rationall Soul being incorporeall, predominates over it; but, is subjected to Providence, to serve which is true liberty. By whom the Will (obeying its Lawes) is led to the Acquisition of her desired end. And as often as she endeavours to loose her selfe from this Servitude, of Free she becomes a Servant and Slave to Fate, of whom before she was the Mistressse. To deviate from the Laws of Providence, is, to forsake Reason, to follow Sense and Irrationall Appetite, which being corporeall, are under Fate; he that serves these, is much more a servant then those he serves.

Señ. XVIII.

AS from God Ideas descend into the Angelick Mind, by which the Love of intellectuall Beauty is begot in her, called *Divine Love*; so the same Ideas descend from the Angelick Minde into the Rationall Soul, so much the more imperfect in her, as she wants of Angelicall Perfection: From these springs *Human Love*. *Plato* discourseth of the first, *Plotinus* of the latter; who by the same Argument, whereby he proves Ideas not accidentall, but substantiall in the Angelick Minde, evinceth likewise the specificall Reasons, the Ideas in the Soul, to be substantiall, terming the Soul *Venus*, as having a specious splendid Love, in respect of these specificall Reasons.

Señ. XIX.

Vulgar Love is the Appetite of sensible Beauty, through corporeall sight. The cause of this Beauty is the visible Heaven by its moving power. As our motive faculty consists in Muscles and Nerves (the Instruments of its Operation,) so the motive

motive faculty of Heaven is fitted with a Body proper for circular sempiternall motion: Through which Body the Soul (as a Painter with his Pencill changeth this inferiour matter into various Forms. Thus vulgar *Venus*, (the beauty of materiall forms) hath her casuall being from the moving power of the Heavens, her formall from colour, enlighthned by the visible Sun as Ideas by the invisible; her participate in the Figure and just order of parts communicated to sight by mediation of light and colour, by whose Interest only it procures love.

Sett. XX.

AS when the Ideas descend into the Minde, there ariseth a desire of enjoying that, from whence this Ideall Beauty comes; so when the species of sensible Beauty flow into the Eye, there springs a two-fold Appetite of Union with that, whence this Beauty is derived; one Sensuall, the other Rationall; the principles of Bestiall and Human Love. If We follow Sense, We Judge the Body wherein We behold this Beauty, to be its Fountain; whence proceeds a desire of Coition, the most intimate union with it: This is the Love of irrationall Creatures. But Reason knowes, that the Body is so far from being its Originall, that it is destructive to it, and the more it is sever'd from the Body, the more it enjoyes its own Nature and Dignity: We must not fix with the species of Sense in the Body, but refine that species from all reliques of corporeall infection.

And because Man may be understood by the Rationall Soul, either considered apart, or, in its union to the Body; in the first sense, human Love is the Image of the Celestiall; in the second, Desire of sensible Beauty; this being by the Soul abstracted from matter, and (as much as its nature will allow) made Intellectual. The greater part of men reach no higher than this; others more perfect, remembring that more perfect Beauty which the Soul (before immers'd in the Body) beheld, are inflam'd with an incredible desire of reviewing it, in pursuit whereof, they separate themselves as much as possible from the Body, of which the Soul (returning to its first dignity) becomes absolute Mistresse. This is the Image of Celestiall Love, by which man ariseth from one perfection to another, till his Soul (wholly united to the Intellect) is made an Angell. Purged from materiall drosse, and transformed into spirituall flame by this Divine Power, he mounts up to the Intelligible Heaven, and happily rests in his Fathers bosome.

Sett. XXI.

Vulgar Love is only in Souls immerst in Matter, and overcome by it, or at least hindred by perturbations and passions. Angelick Love is in the Intellect, eternall as it. Yet but
infern'd,

infern'd, the greater part turning from the Intellect to sensible things, and corporeall cares. But so perfect are these Celestiall Souls, that they can discharge both Functions, rule the Body; yet not be taken off from Contemplation of Superiours: These the Poets signifie by *Janus* with two faces, one looking forward upon Sensible things, the other on intelligible: lesse perfect Souls have but one face, and when they turn that to the Body, cannot see the Intellect, being depriv'd of their contemplation; when to the Intellect, cannot see the Body, neglecting the Care thereof. Hence those Souls that must forsake the Intellect, to apply themselves to Corporeall Government, are by Divine Providence confin'd to caduque, corruptible Bodies, loosed from which, they may in a short time, if they fail not themselves, return to their Intellectuall felicity. Other Soules not hindred from Speculation, are tyed to eternall incorruptible Bodies.

Celestiall Souls then (design'd by *Janus*, as the Principles of Time, motion intervening) behold the Ideal Beauty in the Intellect, to love it perpetually; and inferiour sensible things, not to desire their Beauty; but, to communicate this other to them. Our Souls before united to the Body, are in like manner double-fac'd; but, are then as it were, cleft asunder, retaining but one; which as they turn to either object, Sensuall or Intellectuall, is deprived of the other.

Thus is vulgar love inconsistent with the Celestiall; and many ravish'd at the sight of Intellectuall Beauty, become blinde to sensible; imply'd by *Callimachus*, *Hymn*. 5. in the Fable of *Tyresias*, who viewng *Pallas* naked, lost his sight; yet by her was made a Prophet, closing the eyes of his Body, the open'd those of his Minde, by which he beheld both the Present and Future. The Ghost of *Achilles* which inspir'd *Homer* with all Intellectuall Contemplations in Poetry, deprived him of corporeal sight.

Though Celestiall Love liveth eternally in the Intellect of every Soul; yet, only those few make use of it, who declining the Care of the Body, can with Saint *Paul* say, *whether in the Body, or out of the Body they know not*. To which state a Man sometimes arrives; but, continues there but a while, as we see in Extracies.

SECT. XXII.

Thus in our Soul (naturally indifferent to sensible or intelligible Beauty) there may be three Loves; one in the Intellect, Angelicall; the second Human; the third Sensuall: the two latter are conversant about the same object, Corporeall Beauty; the sensuall fixeth its Intention wholly in it; the human separates it from matter. The greater part of mankind go no further then these two; but they whose understandings are purified by Philosophy, knowing sensible Beauty to be but the Image of another more perfect, leave it, and desire to see the Celestiall

lestial, of which they have already a Taste in their Remembrance ;
if they persevere in this Mental Elevation, they finally obtain it ;
and recover that, which though in them from the beginning, yet
they were not sensible of, being diverted by other Objects.

The Sonnet.

I.

Love, (whose hand guides my Hearts strict Reins
Nor, though he govern it, disdains
To feed the fire with pious care
which first himself enkindled there)
Commands my backward Soul to tell
what Flames within her Bosom dwell ;
Fear would persuade her to decline
The charge of such a high design ;
But all her weak reluctance fails,
'Gainst greater Force no Force avails.
Love to advance her flight will lend
Those wings by which he did descend
Into my Heart, where he to rest
For ever, long since built his Nest :
I what from thence he dictates write,
And draw him thus by his own Light.

II.

Love, flowing from the sacred spring
Of uncreated Good, I sing :
When born ; how Heaven he moves ; the soul
Informs ; and doth the World controul ;
How closely lurking in the heart,
With his sharp weapons subtle art
From heavy earth he Man unites,
Enforcing him to reach the skies.
How kindled, how he flames, how burns ;
By what laws guided now he turns
To Heaven, now to the Earth descends,
Now rests 'twixt both, to neither bends.
Apollo, Thee I invoke,
Bowing beneath so great a weight.
Love, guide me through this dark design,
And imp my shorter wings with thine.

III.

When from true Heav'n the sacred Sun
 Into th' Angelick Mind did run,
 And with enliv'ned Leaves adorn,
 Bestowing form on his first-born;
 Enflamed by innate Desires,
 She to her chiefest good aspires;
 By which reversion her rich Brest
 With various Figures is imprest;
 And by this love exalted, turns
 Into the Sun for whom she burns.
 This flame, rais'd by the Light that shin'd
 From Heav'n into th' Angelick Mind,
 Is eldest Loves religious Ray,
 By Wealth and Want begot that Day,
 When Heav'n brought forth the Queen, whose Hand
 The Cyprian Scepter doth Command.

IV.

This born in amorous Cypris arms,
 The Sun of her bright Beauty warms.
 From this our first desire accrues,
 Which in new fetters caught, pursues
 The honourable path that guides
 Where our eternall good resides.
 By this the fire, through whose fair beams
 Life from above to Mankind streams,
 Is kindled in our hearts, which glow
 Dying, yet dying greater grow;
 By this th' immortal Fountain flows,
 Which all Heaven forms below, bestows;
 By this descends that shower of light
 Which upwards doth our minds invite;
 By this th' Eternall Sun inspires
 And souls with sacred lustre fires.

V.

As God doth to the Mind dispence
 Its Being, Life, Intelligence,
 So doth the Mind the soul acquaint
 How't understand, to move, to paint;
 She thus prepar'd, the Sun that shines
 In the Eternal Breast designs,
 And here what she includes diffuses,
 Exciting every thing that uses

PLATO.

118

*Motion and sense (beneath her state)
To live, to know, to operate.
Inferiour Venus hence took Birth;
Who shines in heav'n but lives on earth,
And o're the world her shadow spreads:
The elder in the Suns Glas reads
Her Faces, through the confused skreen
Of a dark shade obscurely seen;
She Lustre from the Sun receives,
And to the Other Lustre gives;
Celestiall Love on this depends,
The younger, vulgar Love attends.*

VI.

Form'd by th' eternal Look of God,
From the Suns most sublime abode,
The Soul descends into Mans Heart,
Imprinting there with wondrous Art
What worth she borrowed of her star,
And brought in her Celestiall Carre;
As well as humane Matter yields,
She thus her curious Mansion builds;
Yet all those fumes from the divine
Impression differently decline:
The Sun, who's figur'd here, his Beams
Into anothers Bosom streams;
In whose agreeing soul he states,
And guilds it with its virtuous Raies,
The heart in which Affection's bred,
Is thus by pleasing Errour fed.

VII.

The heart where pleasing Errour reigns,
This object, as her Child maintains,
By the fair light that in her shines
(A rare Celestiall Gift,) refines;
And by degrees at last doth bring
To her first splendours sacred spring;
From this divine Look, one Sun passes
Through three refulgent Burning-glasses,
Kindling all Beauty, which the Spirit,
The Body, and the Mind inherit.
These rich spoiles, by th' eye first caught,
Are to the Souls next Handmaid brought,
Who there resides: She to the brest
Sends them; reform'd, but not exprest:
The heart, from Matter Beauty takes,

of

*Of many one Conception makes ;
And what were meant by Natures Laws,
Distinct, She in one Picture draws:*

VIII.

THe heart by Love allur'd to see
Within her self her Progeny ;
This, like the Suns reflecting Rayes
Upon the Waters face, survaies ;
Yet some divine, though clouded light
Seems here to twinkle, and invite
The pious Soul, a Beauty more
Sublime, and perfect to adore.
Who sees no longer his dim shade
Upon the earths vast Globe display'd,
But certain Lustre, of the true
Suns truest Image, now in view.
The Soul thus entring in the Mind,
There such uncertainty doth find,
That she to clearer Light applies
Her aimes, and near the first Sun flies :
She by his splendour beautilous grows,
By loving whom all Beauty flows
Upon the Mind, Soul, World, and All
Included in this spacious Ball.

IX.

But hold ! Love stops the forward Course
That me beyond my scope would force.
Great Power ! if any Soul appears
Who not alone the blossoms wears,
But of the rich Fruit is possesst,
Lend him thy Light, deny the rest.

The Third PART.



Treat of both Loves belongs to different Sciences; Vulgar Love to Naturall or Morall Philosophy; Divine, to Theology or Metaphysics. *Solomon* discourseth excellently of the first in *Ecclesiastes*, as a Naturall Philosopher, in his *Proverbs* as a Morall: Of the second in his *Canticles*, esteemed the most Divine of all the Songs in Scripture.

Stanza I.

The chief order established by Divine Wisdom in created things, is, that every inferiour Nature be immediately governed by the superiour; whom whilst it obeys, it is guarded from all ill, and lead without any obstruction to its determinate felicity; but, if through too much affection to its own liberty, and desire to prefer the licentious life before the profitable, it rebell from the superiour Nature, it falls into a double inconvenience. First, like a Ship given over by the Pilot, it lights sometimes on one Rock, sometimes on another, without hope of reaching the Port. Secondly, it loseth the command it had over the Natures subjected to it, as it hath deprived its superiour of his. Irrationall Nature is ruled by another, unfit for its Imperfection to rule any. God by his ineffable Excellence provides for every thing; himselfe needs not the providence of any other. Betwixt the two extreams, God and Bruits, are Angells and Rationall Souls, governing others, and governed by others. The first Hierarchy of Angels immediately illuminated by God, enlighten the next under them; the last (by Platonists termed *Dæmons*, by the Hebrewes *מלאכים*, as Guardians of *Men*) are set over us as We over Irrationalls. So *Psalm* 8. Whilest the Angells continued subject to the Divine Power, they retained their Authority over other Creatures; but when *Lucifer* and his Companions, through inordinate love of their own Excellence, aspir'd to be equall with God, and to be conserved, as He, by their own strength, they fell from Glory to extream Misery; and when they lost the Priviledge they had over others, seeing us freed from their Empire, enviously every hour insidiate our good. The same order is in the lesser World, our Soul: the inferiour faculties are directed by the superiour, whom following they erre not. The imaginative corrects the mistakes of outward sense; Reason is illuminated by the Intellect, nor do we at any time miscarry, but when the Imaginative will not give credit to Reason, or Reason confident of it selfe, resists the Intellect. In the desiderative the Ap-

Fff

petite

petite is govern'd by the Rationall, the Rationall by the Intelle-
ctuell, which our Poet implies, saying,

[*Love whose hand guides my heart's strict reins.*]

The cognoscitive powers are seated in the *Head*, the desiderative in the *Heart*: In every well order'd Soul, the Appetite is govern'd by Intellectuall Love; implied by the Metaphor of *Reins*, borrowed from *Plato* in his *Phædrus*.

[*Love to advance my flight, will lend
The wings by which he did ascend
Into my heart—*]

When any superiour vertue is said to *descend*, we imply not, that it leaves its own height to come down to us, but drawes us up to it selfe; its descending to us, is our ascending to it; otherwise such conjunction would be the imperfection of the vertue, not the perfection of him who receives it.

II.

[*Love flowing from the sacred Spring
Of uncreated good—*]

From the Fountain of divine goodnesse into our Souls, in which that influx is terminated.

[*When born, &c.*]

The order, participation, conversion of Ideas, see *Part 2.* Sect.

[*— how Heaven he moves, the Soul
Informs, and doth the world controul.*]

Of these three properties, Love is not the efficient: God produceth the Ideas in the Angelick Minde, the Minde illustrates the Soul with Ideal Beauty; Heaven is moved by its proper Soul: But, without Love, these principles do not operate: He is cause of the Mindes conversion to God, and of the Souls to the Minde; without which, the Ideas would not descend into the one, nor the Specifick reasons into the other: the Soul not illuminated by these, could not elicit this sensible form out of matter, by the motion of Heaven.

III.

WHEN the first emanation from God (the plenty of Ideas) descended into the Angelick Minde, she, desiring their perfection, reverts to God, obtaining of him what she covets; which the more fully she possesseth, the more fervently she loves. This desire, (Celestiall Love,) born of the obscure Minde and Ideas, is explain'd in this *Stanza*:

[*--true Heaven--*]

God who includes all created beings, as Heaven all sensible,

lib. 2. Sect. Only Spirituall things, according to Platonists, are true and reall, the rest but shadowes and images of these.

[---the sacred Sun]

The light of Ideas streaming from God.

[---enlivened leaves---

The Metaphore of *Leaves* relates to the Orchard of *Jupiter*, where these Ideas were planted 2. 10. *Enlivened*, as having in themselves the principle of their operation, Intellection, the noblest life, as the Psalmist, *Give me understanding, and I shall live.* So the Cabalist to the second *Sephirah*, which is *Wisdom*, attributes the name of *Life*.

[--adorn bestowing form--]

To *adorn* denotes no more then accidentall perfection, but Ideas are the Substance of the Minde, and therefore he adds, *bestowing form*; which though they come to her from without, she receives not as accidents, but as her first intrinsecall act: which our Author implies, terming her *desires innate*.

[And by this love exalted, turns

Into the Sun, for whom she burns.]

Love transformes the Lover into the thing loved.

[---Wealth and Want--]

Porus and *Penia*, 2. 10.

IV.

The properties of Celestiall Love are in this *Stanza* discovered.

[---in new fetters caught---

The Soul being oppress'd by the Body, her desire of Intellectuall Beauty sleeps; but, awakened by Love, is by the sensible Beauty of the body, led at last to their Fountain, God.

[--which glow

Dying, yet glowing greater grow.]

Motion and Operation are the signes of life, their privation of death: in him who applies himselfe to the Intellectuall part, the rationall and the sensitive faile by the Rationall he is Man, by the Intellectuall communicates with Angels: As Man he dies, reviv'd an Angell. Thus the Heart *dies* in the flames of Intellectuall Love; yet, consumes not, but by this death *grows greater*, receives a new and more sublime life. See in *Plato* the Fables of *Alcestes* and *Orpheus*.

V.

This *Stanza* is a description of sensible Beauty.

[The elder in the Suns glasse reads

Her face, through the confused skreen

Of a dark shade obscurely seen.]

Sen-

Sensible light is the act and efficacy of Corporeall, spirituall light of Intelligible Beauty. Ideas in their descent into the inform Angelick Minde, were as colours and figures in the Night: As he who by Moon-light seeth some fair object, desires to view and enjoy it more fully in the day; so the Minde, weakly beholding in her selfe the Ideal Beauty dim and opacous (which our Author calls *the skreen of a dark shade*) by reason of the Night of her imperfection, turns like the Moon to the eternall Sun, to perfect her Beauty by him; to whom addressing her selfe, she becomes Intelligible light; clearing the Beauty of Celestiall *Venus*, and rendring it visible to the eye of the first Minde.

In sensible Beauty we consider first the object in it selfe, the same at Midnight as at Moon: Secondly, the light, in a manner the Soul thereof: the Author supposeth, that as the first part of sensible Beauty (corporeall forms) proceeds from the first part of Intellectual Beauty (Ideal forms) so sensible light flowes from the intelligible, descending upon Ideas.

VI. VII. VIII.

Corporeall Beauty implies, first, the materiall disposition of the Body, consisting of quantity in the proportion and distance of parts, of quality in figure and colour: Secondly, a certain quality which cannot be exprest by any term better then Gracefulness, shining in all that is fair: This is properly *Venus*, Beauty, which kindles the fire of Love in Mankind: They who affirm it results from the disposition of the Body, the sight, figure, and colour of features, are easily confuted by experience. We see many persons exact, and unaccustomable in every part, destitute of this grace and comlineffe; others lesse perfect in those particular conditions, excellently gracefull and comely; Thus *Catullus*,

Many think Quintia beauious, fair, and tall,

And streight she is, apart I grant her all:

But altogether beauious I deny;

For, not one grace doth that large shape supply.

He grants her perfection of quality, figure, and quantity; yet not allowes her handsome, as wanting this Grace. This then must by consequence be ascribed to the Soul, which when perfect and lucid, transfuseth even into the Body some Beams of its Splendour. When *Moses* came from the divine Vision in the Mount, his face did shine so exceedingly, that the people could not behold it unlesse vail'd. *Porphyrus* relates, that when *Plotinus* his soul was elevated by divine Contemplation, an extraordinary brightness appeared in his looks; *Plotinus* himselfe avers, that there was never any beautifull Person wicked, that this Gracefulness in the Body, is a certain sign of perfection in the Soul, *Proverbs* 17. 24. *Wisdom shinieth in the countenance of the wise.*

From

From materiall beauty wee ascend to the first Fountain by six Degrees : the Soule through the sight represents to her self the Beauty of some particular person, inclines to it, is pleased with it, and while she rests herē, is in the first, the most imperfect material degree. 2. She reforms by her imagination the Image she hath received, making it more perfect as more spirituall; and separating it from Matter, brings it a little nearer Ideal Beauty. 3. By the light of the agent Intellect abstracting this Form from all singularity, she considers the universall Nature of Corporeal Beauty by it self : This is the highest degree the Soul can reach whilst she goes no further then Sense. 4. Reflecting upon her own Operation, the knowledge of universall Beauty, and considering that every thing founded in matter is particular, shee concludes this universality proceeds not from the outward Object, but her Intrinsic Power: and reasons thus : If in the dimme Glasse of Materiall Phantasmes this Beauty is represented by vertue of my Light, it follows, that beholding it in the clear Mirrour of my substance divested of those Clouds, it will appear more perspicuous: thus turning into her self, shee findes the Image of Ideal Beauty communicated to her by the Intellect, the Object of Celestiall Love. 5. Shee ascends from this Idea in her self, to the place where Celestiall *Venus* is, in her proper form; Who in fullness of her beauty not being comprehensible, by any particular Intellect, she, as much as in her lies, endeavours to be united to the first Mind, the chiefest of Creatures, and general Habitation of Ideal Beauty, obtaining this, she terminates, and fixeth her journey: this is the sixth and last degree: They are all imply'd in the 6, 7, and 8 Stanza's.

[*Form'd by th' Eternal look, &c.*]

Platonists affirm some Souls are of the nature of *Saturn*, others of *Jupiter*, or some other Planet; meaning, one Soul hath more Conformity in its Nature with the Soul of the Heaven of *Saturn*, then with that of *Jupiter*, and so on the contrary; of which there can be no internal Cause assigned; the External is God, who (as *Plato* in his *Timæus*) *Soweth and scattereth Souls, some in the Moon, others in other Planets and Stars, the Instruments of Time.*

Many imagine the Rational Soul descending from her Star, in her *Vehiculum Cæleste*, of her self forms the Body, to which by that Medium she is united : Our Author upon these grounds supposeth, that into the *Vehiculum* of the Soul, by her endued with Power to form the Body, is infused from her Star a particular formative vertue, distinct according to that Star; thus the aspect of one is Saturnine, of another Joviall, &c. in their looks wee read the nature of their Souls.

But because inferiour matter is not ever obedient to the Stamp, the vertue of the Soul is not alwaies equally exprest in the visible Effigies : hence it happens that two of the same Nature are un-

Ggg .

like

like; the matter whereof the one consists, being lesse disposed to receive that Figure then the other; what in that is compleat is in this imperfect; our Author infers, that the figures of two Bodies being formed by vertue of the same Star, this Conformity begets Love.

[*From the Suns most sublime aboad*]

The Tropick of *Cancer*: by which Soules according to Platonists descend, ascending by *Capricorn*. *Cancer* is the House of the Moon, who predominates over the vitall parts, *Capricorn* of *Saturn* presiding over Contemplation.

[*The Heart in which affection's bred*

Is thus by pleasing Errour fed.]

Frequently, if not alwaies, the Lover believes that which hee loves more becautious then it is, he beholds it in the Image his Soul hath formed of it; so much fairer as more separate from Matter, the Principle of Deformity; besides, the Soul is more Indulgent in her Affection to this Species, considering it is *her own Child* produc'd in her Imagination.

[*--one Sun passes.*

Through three resulgent Burning-glasses.]

One Light flowing from God, beautifies the Angelick, the Rational Nature, and the Sensible World.

[*--the Souls next Hand-maid--*]

The Imaginative .

[*--to the Breast*]

The *Breast* and *Heart* here taken for the Soul because her nearest Lodging; the Fountain of Life and Heat.

[*--reform'd but not exprest.*]

Reform'd by the Imagination from the deformity of Matter; yet not reduc'd to perfect immateriality, without which true Beauty is not *Exprest*.



SPVSIPPVS.

SPEVSIPPVS.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

SPEVSIPPVS was an Athenian, born at Myrrhinus [which belonged to the Pandionian Tribe] his Father named Eurymedon, his Mother Potone, Sister to Plato.

^b He was brought up in the domestick documents of his Uncle Plato, ^c who (as he used to say) reformed Speusippus's life, after

the pattern of his own.

^a Plato had foure Kins-women, Daughters of his Nieces; the eldest of these he married to Speusippus, with a small portion, thirty Minæ, which Dionysius had sent him: To this summe Chio, glad of the occasion, added a Talent, which Speusippus earnestly refused, untill at last he was overcome by the just importunities of the other to receive it, alledging that he gave it not as money, but as kindenesse, that such gifts were to be entertained, for they increased honour, the rest were dishonourable; that he ought to accept of the good-will, though he despised the money. The rest of those Virgins were Married richly to Athenians, only Speusippus, who best deserved, was poor. With these arguments Speusippus was induced to accept of Chio's gift; whereat Chio much congratulated his own good fortune, as having laid hold of an occasion, *such, as perhaps, saith he, I shall not meet again in all my life.*

When Dion came to Athens, Speusippus was continually in company with him, more then any other friend there, by Plato's advice, to soften and divert Dion's humour, with a facile companion, such as he knew Speusippus to be; and that withall, he knew discreetly how to observe time and place in his mirth: whence Timon (in Sillis) calls him, *a good Feaster.*

The last time that Plato, upon the importunity of Dionysius, went to Sicily, Speusippus accompany'd him. Whilest they lived at Syracuse, Speusippus kept more company with the Citizens then Plato did, and intinuating more into their mindes, at first they were afraid to speak freely to him, mistrusting him to be one of Dionysius's spies: But within a while they began to confide in him.

him, and all agreed in this, to pray *Dion* to come to them, and not to take care for ships, men, or horses, but to hire a ship for his own passage; for the Sicilians desired no more, then that he would lend them his name and person against the Tyrant.

Speusippus at his return to *Athens*, perswaded *Dion* to warre against *Dionysius*, and deliver *Sicily* from the bondage of Tyranny, assuring him the Country would receive him gladly. *Dion* upon this information received such encouragement, that he began secretly to levie men: The Philosophers much advanced his designe. When he went to *Sicily*, he bestowed a Country-house, which he had purchased since his comming to *Athens*, upon *Speusippus*.

CHAP. II.

His profession of Philosophy.

a Laert.

^a *Plato* dying in the first year of the 108th Olympiad, *Theophilus* being Archon, *Speusippus* succeeded him in the School of the Academy, ^b whom he followed also in his Doctrine.

b Laert.

He first, as *Theodorus* affirms, looked into the community and mutuall assistance of Mathematicall Disciplines, as *Plato* did into that of the Philosophicall.

c Laert.

^c He first, according to *Cenaus*, declared those things, which *Isocrates* conceived not to be divulged, the same perhaps which

d Epist. ad. At. ^d *Cicero* calls the *invention* of *Isocrates*.

2. 1.

e Stob. Phys. 1. 1.

^e He affirmed, that the minde was not the same, either with *Good* or *One*; but of a peculiar nature proper to it selfe.

f Laert.

^f He set up in the School which *Plato* had built the Images of the Graces.

He exacted mony of his Disciples, contrary to the custome of *Plato*.

The two Women who were *Plato's* Auditors, *Lasthenia* the Mantinean, and *Axiothea* the Phliasian, heard *Speusippus* likewise.

Having continued *Master* of the School eight years, he at last, by reason of his infirm disposition, much debilitated by the Palsie, sent to *Xenocrates*, desiring him to come and take from him the government of the School, which *Xenocrates* did.

CHAP. III.

His writings.

HE wrote ^a many things, chiefly in Philosophy, Commentaries ^a *Æt. Suid.*
 ries and Dialogues, of which were

Aristippus the Cyrenaick.

Of Riches I.

Of Pleasure I.

Of Justice I.

Of Philosophy I.

Of Friendship I.

Of the Gods I.

The Philosopher I.

To Cephalus I.

Cephalus I.

Clinomachus, or Lysias I.

The Citizen I.

Of the Soul I.

To Gryllus I.

Aristippus I.

The confutation of Arts I.

Commentary Dialogues.

Artificiall I.

Dialogues of likenesse in things IO.

Divisions and arguments to things like.

Of the genus's and species of Examples.

To Amartyrus.

Encomium of Plato.

Epistles to Dion, Dionysius, Philip.

Of Law.

The Mathematician.

Mandrobulus.

Lysias.

Definitions, of all these writings the only extant

Orders of Commentaries.

Verses.

^b *Phavorinus*, in the second of his Commentaries, saith, that ^b *Æt. Suid.*
Aristotle paid three Talents for his Books.

CHAP. IV.

His Death.

^a Laert. =
^b Laert.]

HE was (as ^a *Timotheus* saith) very infirme of body, ^b insomuch that he was fain to be carried up and down the Academy in a kinde of a running chair: Riding in this manner, he one day met *Diogenes*, whom saluting, he said, Joy be with you: But, not with you, answered *Diogenes*, who can endure to live being in that condition. At length he dyed willingly through griefe, as *Laertius* affirmes, who elsewhere citing *Plutarch* in the lives of *Lyfander* and *Scylla*, saith, he dyed of the *Phthiriasis*; but there is no such thing extant in *Plutarch*.

^c Laert.

^c Though he followed *Plato* in his opinions; yet, he did not imitate his temper, for he was austere, cholerick, and had not so great command over his pleasures. In anger he threw a Dog into a Well, and indulging to pleasure, he went to the marriage of *Cassander* in *Macedonia*: He was also so great a Lover of money, that some Poems which he had written, not very good, he sung publickly for gain: for which vices, *Dionysius* writing to him, thus derides him: *And we may learn Philosophy from our Arcadian She-Scholler.* *Plato* took no money of his Schollers, you exact it whether they are willing or not. ^d *Athenaus* cites the same Epistle, after he had reproached him for avarice and voluptuousnesse, he objects his collections of money from many persons; his love to *Lasthenia*, the Sardinian Curtezian; after all this adding, *Why do you accuse us of avarice, who your selfe omit not any sordid way of gain? Did not you after Hermias's debt was satisfied, make collections in his name amongst his friends, to your own use?*

^d Deipn. lib.

^e Laert.

To a rich man in love with a deformed person; what need you her, saith he, for ten Talents you may have a handsomer.

To him *Simonides* wrot Histories, wherein he related the actions of *Dion* and *Bion*.

There was another *Speusippus*, a Phyfitian of *Alexandria*.

XENOCRATES.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, living with Plato.



Xenocrates was of *Chalcedon*, Son of ^b *Agatho*, or ^a *Laer.* *Agathenor*. From the years of his life 82. ^b *Snid.* which in all probability ended when *Polemo* succeeded in the School, the first year of the 116. Olympiad, it may be gathered that he was born in the fourth year of the 95. Olympiad. He heard *Plato* from his Childhood. He was

dull of apprehension, whence *Plato* comparing him with *Aristotle*, said, *one needs a spur, the other a bridle; what an ass & what a horse have I to yoke together!* He was severe, and had a sad look, for which reason *Plato* oft said to him, *Xenocrates, sacrifice to the Graces*, which was an usuall phrase to melancholy people. ^c Another time *Plato* ^c *Ælian. 14. 9.* sharply reprehended the roughness of his disposition, which hee took quietly, and unmoved; saying to one that instigated him to reply in his own defence, *No, this is an advantage to me.*

^d He accompanied *Plato* in his voyage to *Sicily*, ^e where at a ^d *Laert.* drinking Feast, with *Dionysius*, being honoured with a wreath of ^e *Anth. Deipn.* Gold, instead of a Garland of flowers, which were bestow'd upon the guests upon such occasions, when he went away, he put it upon the Statue of *Mercury*, where they used to leave their ordinary Garments.

^f When *Dionysius* fell out with *Plato*, and threatened to find ^f *Laert.* one that should cut off his head, *Xenocrates* made answer, *not before he hath cut off this*, shewing his own.

^g *Ælian* saith, that *xenocrates* having taken a journey into his ^g *Var. hist. 3.* own Country, *Aristotle* with his Disciples came to *Plato*. *Speusippus* was at that time sick, and therefore could not be with *Plato*. *Plato* being fourscore years old, (which falls upon the fourth year of the 107. Olympiad, the year before his death) his memory through age much decay'd, *Aristotle* fell upon him with subtle sophistical questions, whereupon *Plato* gave over walking in publick, and retired with his friends to his own house. At the end of the three months *Xenocrates* returning from his travel, finds *Aristotle* walking where he had left *Plato*, and seeing that he and his

his friends when they went out of the School went not to *Plato*, but to some other part of the City, hee asked one there present, what was become of *Plato*, thinking he had been sick, the other answer'd, he is not sick, but *Aristotle* hath molested him, & driven him out of the School, so that now he teacheth Philosophy in his own Garden. *Xenocrates* hearing this, went immediately to *Plato*, whom he found discoursing to his Disciples, persons of great worth and eminence. As soon as he had ended his discourse, he saluted *Xenocrates*, as he used, very kindly, and *Xenocrates* him. When the company was dismiss'd, *Xenocrates* without speaking a word of it to *Plato*, getting his friends together, after he had chid *Speusippus* for permitting *Aristotle* to possess the School, made a head against *Aristotle*, and opposed him with his utmost force, untill at last he reinstated him in the School. Thus *Eliau*. But this story, which he acknowledgeth to have taken up on no better authority then vulgar report, disagrees with many circumstances of *Aristotle*'s life, supported by far more credible Testimonies.

CHAP. II.

His Profession of Philosophie.

AFTER *Speusippus* had held the School eight years, finding himself not able to continue that charge any longer, hee sent to *Xenocrates* intreating him to take it upon him, which *Xenocrates* did, ^a in the second year of the 110. Olympiad, *Lysimachides* being Archon, not without emulation and dissension with the Peripateticks, for ^b *Aristotle*, at his return out of *Macedonia*, finding *Xenocrates* possess'd of the Academy, instituted a School, in opposition to him, in the Lycaum, saying,

^a Laert.

^b Laert. vit.
Arist.

*Silent to be now most disgracefull were,
And see Xenocrates possess the Chair.*

^c Laert. vit.

Arist.

^d Laert. vit.

Xen.

^e Ethic. Serm.
37.

^f Stob. Eth.

Serm. 77. †

^c Some affirm, that *Alexander* falling out with *Aristotle*, to vex him, sent a present to *Xenocrates* ^d of 50. Talents, whereof *Xenocrates* took but 3000. Atticks, and sent back the rest, saying, that he needed it most that was to maintain so many. Or, as ^e *Stobaeus* relates it, having entertained the Messenger, after his usuall fashion, go and tell *Alexander*, saith he, that after the rate I live, I shall not need 50. Talents in all my life. ^f The money being brought back to *Alexander*, he asked, if *Xenocrates* had not any friend, adding that as for his own friends, the wealth of *Darius* was too little for them.

He

^a He asserted *Unity* and *Duality* to be *Gods*; the first as it were ^{g Stob. Ec. Phys. 1.3.} Masculine, in the nature of a Father, reigning in Heaven, whom he called also *Jupiter*, the *Odd*, and the *Minde*. The other, as it were Female, and the Mother, commanding all things under Heaven. This he called the *Minde* of the Universe. He likewise asserts Heaven to be divine, and the fiery stars to be Olympian Gods, the rest sublunary invisible Deities, which permeate through the elements of matter, whereof that which passeth through the air is called *Juno*, that which through the water *Neptune*, that which through the earth *Ceres*. This the *Stoicks* borrowed from him, as he the former from *Plato*.

^b He continued Master of the School twenty five years, untill ^{h Laert.} the first year of the hundred and sixt Olympiad; then his Disciple *Polemo* succeeded him. During that time, he lived very retired in the Academy; and if at any time he went into the City, all the tradesmen and other people thronged to see him.

CHAP. III.

His Vertues and Apophthegmes.

^a Amongst his other Vertues, he was very remarkable for his ^{a Laert. Val. Max. 4. 3.} Continnence, of which there is this instance: *Phryne*, a famous Athenian Curtezan, having laid a wager with some young men his Disciples, that he could not resist her enticements, stole privately into his bed: The next morning being question'd and laugh't at by his Disciples, she said, The wager they laid was of a man, not of a stone. To this end he used to mortifie himselfe by incision, and cauterising of his flesh.

^b His wisdom and Sanctity was much revered by the Athenians; for being to give his testimony, and to swear, as the custome was, that he spoke nothing but truth, the Judges all rose up, and cryed out, that he should not swear, indulging that to his sincerity, which they did not allow to one another. ^{b Val. Max. 2. 10. Cic. pro. Balbo. Laert.}

^c Being sent with others to *Philip* on an Embassy, the rest received gifts from him, and went to treat in private with him; *Xenocrates* did neither, and for that part was not invited by him: The Ambassadors returning to *Athens*, said, that *Xenocrates* went along with them to no purpose: whereupon the Athenians were ready to impose a mulct upon him; but when they understood by him, that they were at that time to consider chiefly concerning the Common-wealth, *Philip* having corrupted the rest with gifts, and that he would not accept any, they bestowed double honours upon him. *Philip* said afterwards, that of those who came to him, only *Xenocrates* would not take any gifts. ^{c Laert.}

Being sent in the time of the *Lamack* war (which was about

the second year of the 104th Olympiad) Ambassadour to *Antipater*, about the redemption of some *Athenian* Prisoners, *Antipater* invited him to sit down to supper, whereto he answer'd in the words of *Ulysses* in *Homer*,

O Circe, what man is there that is good,
Before his friends are freed can think of food?

Antipater was so pleased with the ingenious application of these Verses, that he caused the Prisoners immediately to be set at liberty.

d *Ælian*.
hist. 30. 3.
Laert.

^d His clemency, saith *Ælian*, extended not only to men, but, often to irrationall creatures, as once, when a Sparrow, pursued by a Hawk, flew to his bosome, he took it, much pleased, and hid it till the enemy were out of sight; and when he thought it was out of fear and danger, opening his bosome, he let it go, saying, that he had not betrayed a supplyant.

e *Laert.*

^e *Bion* deriding him, he refused to make any answer in his own defence; for, a Tragedy, saith he, being mocked by a Comedy, needs not a reply.

To one, who though he had neither learn'd Musick, Geometry, nor Astronomy; yet, desired to be his Disciple: *Away*, saith he, *you have not the handles of Philosophy*. Some affirm he said, *I teach not to card wool*.

Antipater comming to *Athens* met and saluted him; which salute he returned not, untill he had made an end of the discourse he was about.

f *Laert.*
Stob. Eth. 126.

^f He was nothing proud; he assigned a particular businesse to every part of the day, a great part thereof to meditation, one part to silence.

g *Stob. Ser.* 39.

^g Whensoever he pierc'd a vessell of Wine, it was sower'd before he spent it, and the broaths that were made for him were often thrown away the next day; whence proverbially was used, *the Cheese of Xenocrates*, of things that last well, and are not easily consumed.

h *Val. Max.* 7. 2.

^h Holding his peace at some detraactive discourse, they asked him why he spoke not? Because, saith he, I have sometimes repented of speaking, but never of holding my peace.

Yct, this man, saith *Laertius*, because he could not pay the fine imposed upon Aliens, the Athenians sold: *Demetrius Phaleareus* bought him, contenting both parties, the Athenians with their Tribute, *Xenocrates* with his liberty.

CHAP. IV.

His Writings.

HE left many Writings, Verfes, Exhortations, and Orations, their Titles thefe,

Of Nature 6 Bookes.

Of wifdome 6.

Of Riches 1.

Arias 1.

Of Indefinite 1.

Of a Child 1.

Of Continence 1.

Of Profitable 1.

Of Free 1.

Of Death 1. which fome conceive to be the fame with that which is extant amongst the ſpurious *Platonick* Dialogues, under the title of *Axiochus*:

Of Voluntary 1.

Of Friendſhip 2.

Of equity 1.

Of Contrary 2.

Of Beatitude 2.

Of writing 1.

Of Memory 1.

Of False 1.

Callicles 1.

Of Prudence 2.

Oeconomick 1.

Of Temperance 1.

Of the power of Law 1.

Of a Common-wealth 1.

Of Sanctity 1.

That vertue may be taught 1.

Of Ens 1.

Of Fate 1.

Of paſſions 1.

Of Lives 1.

Of concord 1.

Of Diſciples 2.

Of Juſtice 1.

Of Vertue 2.

Of ſpecies 1.

Of Pleaſure 2.

Of Life 1.

Of Fortitude 1.

XENOCRATES.

- Of One* 1.
- Of Ideas* 1.
- Of Art* 1.
- Of Gods* 2.
- Of the Soul* 2.
- Of Science* 1.
- Politick* 1.
- Of Scientificks* 1.
- Of Philosophy* 1.
- Of Parmenides opinions* 1.
- Archidemus, or of Justice* 1.
- Of Good* 1.
- Of things which pertain to Intellect* 8.
- Solutions concerning Speech* 1.
- Physicall auscultation* 6.
- A summary* 1.
- Of Genus's and Species* 1.
- Pythagorean assertions* 1.
- Solutions* 2.
- Divisions* 8.
- Positions* 3.
- Of Dialectick* 14, & 15, & 16.
- Of Disciplines, concerning distinctions* 9.
- Concerning Ratiocination* 9.
- Concerning Intelligence* 4.
- Of Disciplines* 6.
- Concerning Intelligence* 2.
- Of Geometry* 3.
- Commentaries* 1.
- Contraries* 1.
- Of Numbers* 1.
- Theory of Arithmetick* 1.
- Of Intervalls* 1.
- Astrologick* 6.
- Elements, to Alexander concerning a Kingdom* 4.
- To Arybas*
- To Hephæstion.*
- Of Geometry* 2.
- Verses* 345.

CHAP. V.

His Death.

HE died in the 82 year of his age by a fall in the night into a ^a *Laert.* Basin, (wherein he was drown'd) probably in the first yeare of the 116. Olympiad, for in that year *Polemō* his Successour took upon him the School.

Laertius saith, there were six more of this name, but mentions only five. One, very antient, skillfull in *Tactics*; another of the same City and Family with this Philosopher, Author of the Oration upon the death of *Arfinoe*; the fourth, saith he, a Philosopher, who writ in Elegiack verse, but not happily, perhaps the same, who, *Suidas* saith, was nothing inferiour to this *Xenocrates* for Continence; the fift a Statuary, the sixt, a writer of Songs, as *Aristoxenus* affirm.

P O L E M O.

POLEMO was an Athenian of *OEa* [a Towne ^a *Laert.* belonging to the Oenian Tribe,] his Father *Philistratus* (who according to ^b *Antigonus Ca-* ^b *Laert.* *ryllius*) was a Citizen of great account, and kept a Chariot and horses.

Polemō in his youth was very intemperate, ^a *Laert.* and dissolute; he frequently took a sum of money, and hid it in a private corner of some street, to supply his extravagances upon occasion. Even in the Academy were found three *oboli*, which he had hid under a Pillar, upon the same account. This wildnesse caused discontent betwixt him and his wife, who, thinking her self not wel used by him, accused him *ὡς μνηστὴρ οὐκ ὄντα*.

^c Neither did he delight (saith *Valerius Maximus*,) in Luxury onely, but even in the infamy thereof. On a time, coming from a Feast, not after the setting but rising of the Sun; and seeing the door of *Xenocrates* the Philosopher open, full of Wine, smelling sweet of unguents, crown'd with Garlands, richly attir'd, hee rush'd into his School, which was filled with a croud of learned persons. Nor contented with so rude an intrusion, he sat down also, intending to make sport at his excellent eloquence and prudent precepts. Hereupon all were offended as the affront deserved, onely *Xenocrates*, continuing the same Countenance and

gesture, fell from the discourse in which he was, and began to speak of modesty and temperance, with the gravity of whose discourse, *Polemo* being reduced to repentance, first took his Garland off from his head, and flung it on the ground; soon after he withdrew his arme within his Cloake; Next hee laid aside the cheerfulness of that look which he had formerly, when he affected feasting; lastly, he wholly devested himselfe of Luxury, and being thus cured by the wholsom Medicine of one discourse, he, from an infamous Prodigall became a most excellent Philosopher, being * from that time forward so addicted to study, that he surpass'd all the rest, and succeeded *Xenocrates* in the government of the School, which he began in the first year of the 116. Olympiad.

* *Iaert.*

After he began to study Philosophy, he had such a constant behaviour, that he retain'd alwaies the same Countenance, and kept the same tone in all his speech, whereby *Crantor* was taken with him. A mad dog having bit him by the Knee, he alone of all the Company seem'd to be unconcern'd in it, and a tumult happening thereupon in the City, he asked without any disturbance, what was the matter? In the Theatres also, he was nothing moved. When *Nicistratus* the Poet, surnamed *Clytemnestra*, recited something to him and *Crates*, *Crates* was much taken therewith, but hee made no more show then as if he had heard nothing, and was altogether such as *Melanthius* the Painter in his Books of Picture hath describ'd him, for he saith in his actions was expressed a stubbornnesse and hardness.

Polemo used to say, we ought to exercise our selves in things, not in Dialectick Disciplines, lest, satisfying our selves with the taste and meditation of the superficial parts of Science, we become admired for subtlety in discourse, but contradict our selves in the practise of our life.

He was facete and ingenious, shunning that which *Aristophanes* imputes to *Euripides*, sowernesse and harshnesse. He taught, not sitting, but, walking. The Athenians much honour'd him for his great Integrity, hee tooke great delight in Solitude, whence for the most part he dwelt in a Garden, about which his Disciples built themselves little lodges, near to his School. He was a studious imitator of *Xenocrates* (who, *Aristippus* saith, much loved him) alwaies remembring his innocēce, severity and gravity, to which, like a Dorick measure, he conformed his owne steps.

Ant. Deign.
lib. 2.

Antigonus Carysius saith, that from the thirtieth year of his age to his death he drunk nothing but water.

Stob. Phys. 1. 3

He held that the World is God.

He much affected *Sophocles*, chiefly in those places where (to use the phrase of the Comick Poet) a Molossian dog seemeth to have written together with him. And whereas *Phrynicius* saith, he was

Ne:

Not sweet, nor flat, but gently smooth; he said, that Homer was an Epick Sophocles, Sophocles a Tragick Homer.

He died very old of a consumption, and left behind him many writings. *Laertius* hath this Epigram upon him;

*Wert thou not told, that Polemo lies here,
On whom slow sickness (man's worst passion) prey'd?
No, 'tis the robe of flesh he us'd to wear,
Which ere to Heaven he mounted down he laid.*

Of his Disciples are remembred *Crates*, *Zeno* the Stoick, and *Arcefilaus*.

CRATES



CRATES was a *Thriasian*, Son of *Antigenes*, Laert. he was an Auditor of *Polemo*, and loved by him; He succeeded him in the government of his School. They both profited so much by one another, that living they onely follow'd the same institutes, but even to their last ends were alike, and being dead, were buried in the same Sepulchre. Upon which

occasion *Antagoras* writ thus upon them both,

*Who ere thou art, say ere thou passest by,
Crates and Polemo here buried lie;
Both for their mutual love no less admir'd,
Then for their eloquence, by which inspir'd,
O th' wisdom they profess'd, the age was proud,
Yet gladly to their sacred precepts bow'd.*

Hence *Arcefilaus*, when he went from *Theophrastus*, and apply'd himself to them, said, they were Gods, or certain reliques of the golden age.

They were nothing popular, but what *Dicynsiodorus* an antient Musician was wont to say, may be apply'd to these, when he boasted; that none had ever heard him sing, as they had *Ismenius*, nor had ever seen him in a Ship, or at the Fountains.

Antigonus saith, that, he sojourn'd at *Crantors*, when he & *Arcefilaus* lived most friendly, and that *Arcefilaus* dwelt with *Crantor*, *Polemo* with *Crates*, together with *Lysicles*, who was one of the Citizens, and truly, *Polemo*, as is before mention'd, loved *Crates*, *Crantor*, *Arcefilaus*. But *Crates* dying, as *Apollodorus* in the third of his

Chre-

Chronicle, left Books which he had written, partly of Philosophy, partly of Comedy; Orations suited for publick pleading, or Embassie.

He had many eminent disciples, of whom was *Arcefilaus*, & *Bion* the *Boristhenite*, afterwards called a *Theodorean* from that Sect.

There were ten of this name. The *First* an antient Comick Poet. The *Second*, an Oratour of the Family of *Isocrates*.

The *Third*, an Ingeneer, that went along with *Alexander* in his expeditions.

The *Fourth*, a Cynick.

The *Fifth*, a Peripatetick.

The *Sixth*, this Academick.

The *Seventh*, a Grammarian.

The *Eighth*, writ of Geometry.

The *Ninth*, an Epigrammatick Poet.

The *Tenth*, of *Tarhis*, an Academick Philosopher.

CRANTOR.

Laert.



Crantor was of *Soli*, much admired in his own Country. He came to *Athens* where hee heard *Xenocrates*, and studied with *Polemo*.

He writ *Commentaries*, 3000. *Verses*, whereof some ascribe part to *Arcefilaus*.

Being asked how he came to be taken with *Polemo*, but answer'd, from the tone of his speech, never exalted nor depress'd.

Falling sick, he went to the Temple of *Aesculapius*, and walked there; where many resorted to him from severall parts, not thinking he staid in respect of his sicknesse, but that he meant to erect a School in that place; amongst the rest came *Arcefilaus*, whom, though he lov'd him very much, he recommended to *Polemo*, whom he himself after his recovery heard also, and was extremely taken with him.

He bequeath'd his estate, amounting to 12. Talents to *Arcefilaus*, who asking him where he would be buried, he answer'd,
In Earth's kind bosom happy 'tis to lie.

He is said to have written Poems, and to have deposited them, sealed up in his own Country, in the Temple of *Minerva* of him thus *Theaetetus*,

Pleasing to men, but to the Muses more.

Crantor too soon of life was dispossest,

Earth his cold body we to thee restore

That in thy arms he peacefully may rest.

Crant.

Crantor above all admired *Homer* and *Euripides*, saying, it was hard in proper language to speak at once tragically and passionately, and quoted this verse out of his *Bellerophon*.

*Alas, yet why alas,
Through such fate mortals passe.*

Antagoras the Poet alledgeth these verses, as written by him.

* *My Soul's in doubt, for doubtlesse is his race,
Whether I love first of all Gods shall place,
Which drew from Ercebus their old descent,
And Night beyond the Oceans vast extent;
Or whether to bright Venus, or to Earth,
Thou cwest thy double form and sacred birth.*

* Read 'Εν δὲ
μὴν θυμῷ, ὁ-
μοίως, ὡς ὁ αὐ-
τομάχου ὕμνος.
1. 'Εν δὲ μὴν
λα θυμῷ, ἐν
ῥόδῳ αὐτομά-
χου. One doubt-
lesse imitating
the other, which
both the inter-
preters not ob-
serving, have
strangely rendered
this place.

He was very ingenious in imposing apt names.

He said of an ill Poet, that his verses were full of moths; and of *Theophrastus*, that his Theſes were written in a shell.

He wrote a Treatise concerning Griefe, which was generally much admired, as *Cicero* and *Laertius* attest.

He died before *Polemo* and *Crates* of the dropſy.

ARCESILAVS.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, Teachers.



Arceſilavus (whom *Cicero* calls *Arceſilas*) was a *Pi-
tanean* of *Aolis*; his Father, according to
Apollodorus, in the third of his *Chronolo-
gicks*, named *Seuthus*, or as others *Scythus*. He
was the youngest of ſoure brethren, two by
the ſame Father, only the other by the ſame
Mother; the eldeſt was named *Pylades*: of
 thoſe who had the ſame Father, the eldeſt was *Mareas*, Guardi-
an to his Brother *Arceſilavus*.

He was born by computation from his death (which was in
the fourth year of the * hundred thirty and fourth Olympiad,
the ſeventy fiſt of his age) in the firſt year of the hundred and
ſixteenth Olympiad.

* *Aldobrandi-
nus* his edition
reads the 130.

ARCESILAUS.

He first heard *Autolychns* the Mathematician, his Countryman, before he came to *Athens*, with whom he travelled to *Sardis*.

Next he heard *Xanthus* an Athenian, a Master of Musick.

He heard also *Hipponicus* the Geometrician, who, excepting his skill in that Art, was otherwise a gaping dull fellow, for which *Arcesilaus* deriding him, said, Geometry flew into his mouth as he gaped. Of *Hipponicus* falling mad, he took so great care, that he brought him to his own house, and kept him there untill he were quite cured.

He likewise, by the compulsion of his Brother, studied Rhetorick, and being by nature vehement in discourse, and of indefatigable industry, he addicted himselfe likewise to Poetry. There is an Epigram of his extant upon *Attalus*, to this effect;

*For armes and horses oft hath been the name
Of Pergamus through Pisa spread by fame :
But, now shall (if a mortall may divine)
To future times with greater glory shine.*

There is another Epigram of his upon *Menodorus*, son of *Eudemus*.

*Far hence is Thyatire, far phrygian earth,
Whence Menodore thou dost derive thy birth.
But down to Acheron unpierc'd by day,
From any place thou knew'st the ready way.
To thee this Tomb Eudemus dedicates,
Whom Love hath wealthy made, though poor the Fates.*

Although his Brother *Mareas* would have had him professed Rhetorick, yet was he naturally more enclined to Philosophy; to which end, he first became a hearer of *Theophrastus*, in which time *Crantor* being much taken with him, spoke that verse of *Euripides* to him, out of his *Andromeda*:

Mayd, if I save thee, wilt thou thankfull be ?

He answer'd in the following verse,

Stranger, for wife or slave accept of me.

From thence forward they lived in intimate friendship, whereat *Theophrastus* troubled, said, *He had lost a youth of extraordinary wit, and quicknesse of apprehension.*

He emulated *Pyrro* as some affirm, and studied Dialectick, and the Eretriack Philosophy, whence *Aristo* said of him,

Pyrro

*Pyrrho behinde, Plato before,
And in the middle Diodore.*

And *Timon*,

*Next leaden Menedemus he pursues,
And Pyrrho doth, or Diodorus choose.*

And soon after maketh him say thus;

He swim to Pyrrho, and crook'd Diodore.

He was a great admirer of *Plato*, whose Bookes he had.

CHAP. II.

Upon what occasion he constituted the middle Academy.

^a *C*Rates dying, *Arcefilaus* took upon him the government of ^{a Laert.} the School, which was yielded to him by *Socratides*. Being possessed of that place, he altered the Doctrine and manner of Teaching, which had been observed by *Plato* and his successors, upon this occasion.

Plato and his followers down to *Arcefilaus*, held, (as was said) That there are two kinds of things, some perceptible by *Sence*, others perceptible only by *Intellect*: That from the latter ^{b Acad. quest. lib. 1.} ariseth *Science*, from the former *Opinion*: That the *Minde* only seeth that which alwaies is simple, and in the same manner, and such as it is; that is, *Ideas*. But, that the *Senses* are all dull and slow, neither can they perceive those things which seem subjected to *Sense*, because either they are so little, that they cannot fall beneath *sense*, or so movable and transient, that not one of them is constant or the same; but, all are in continuall lapse and fluxion. Hence they called all this part of things *Opinionable*, affirming that *Science* is no where, but, in the notions and reasons of the minde.

^{c Cic. Acad. quest. 1.} Yet, did they professe against those, who said, the Academy took away all *sence*; for, they affirmed not, that there was no such thing as colour, or taste, or sapor, or sound; but, only maintained, there was no proper mark of true and certain in the senses, there being no such any where.

^{d Plut. cons. Color.} Hence they allowed, that we make use of the senses in actions, from the reason that appeareth out of them; but, to trust them as absolutely true and infallible, they allowed not.

Thus held the Academicks down to *Polemo*, ^{e Cic. Acad. quest. 1.} of whom *Arcefilaus* and *Zeno* were constant Auditors; but *Zeno* being older then *Arcefilaus*, and a very subtle disputant, endeavoured to correct his doctrine, not that, as *Theophrastus* saith, he did enervate vertue; but, on the contrary, he placed all things that are reckon'd among the good, in vertue only: and this he called *honest*,

honest, as being simple, sole, one good: Of the rest, though neither good nor evill, he held, that some were according to Nature, others contrary to Nature, others Mediate: Those which are according to Nature, he held to be worthy estimation, the contrary contrary; the neuter he left betwixt both, in which he placed no value. Of those which were eligible, some were of more estimation, some of lesse; those which were of more he called preferred, those of lesse rejected. And as in these, he did not change so much the things themselves as the words, so betwixt a rectitude and a sin, an office and a prateroffice: he placed some things mediate, holding that Rectitudes consisted only in good actions, sins in evill; but, offices either performed or omitted, he conceived mediate things. And whereas the Philosophers of the old Academy did not hold all Vertue to consist in Reason, but some vertues to be perfected by nature or custome: Zeno on the contrary placed all Vertue in Reason; and whereas the Academicks held, as we said [in the life of Plato,] that all those vertues may be separated, Zeno maintained that could not be, averring, that not only the use of vertue (as the Academicks held) but the habit thereof was excellent in it selfe, neither had any one vertue, who did not alwaies make use of it. And whereas the Academicks took not away passion from man, affirming that we are subject to compassion, desire, fear, and joy by nature; but, only contracted them, and reduced them within narrower limits; Zeno affirmed, that from all these, as from so many diseases, a wise man must be free. And whereas they held, that all passions were naturall and irrationall, and placed in one part of the Soule Concupiscence, in the other Reason: Neither did Zeno herein agree with them, for he asserted, that passions are voluntary, that opinions are taken up by judgment, that immoderate intemperance is the Mother of all passion. Thus much for Ethicks.

f Cic. *ibid.*

As for Physick, He did not allow that fift nature besides the foure Elements, of which the Academicks held Sence and Minde to be effected; for, He asserted Fire to be that nature which begetteth every thing, both Minde and Sence. He likewise dissented from them, in that he held, nothing can be made by a thing which hath no body, (of which nature, Xenocrates, and the old Academicks thought the soule to be) and that whatsoever made any thing, or was it selfe made, must of necessity be a Body.

g Cic. *ibid.*

He likewise asserted many things in the third part of Philosophy, wherein He asserted some things new of the Senses themselves, which he conceived to be joyned by a certain extrinsecall impulsion, which he called Phantasie. To these phantasies received by the Senses, He added Assent of the mind, which he held to be placed in us, and voluntary. He did not allow all phantasies to be faithfull and worthy credit; but, only those which

which have a proper declaration of those things which they seem, which phantasie when it is seen, is called *comprehensible*, when received and approved, he calleth it *comprehension*. That which was comprehended by sense, he calleth *Sense*, and, if it were so comprehended, that it could not be pulled away by reason, *Science*, if otherwise, *Ignorance*, of which kinde was opinion, infirmé, and common to false or unknown things. Betwixt Science and Ignorance he placed that comprehension we mentioned, not reckoning it among the good nor the bad; but affirming that only was to be credited, whence he likewise attributed faith to the Senses, for as much as he conceived the comprehension made by the Senses to be true and faithfull, not that it comprehended all things that are in being; but that it omits nothing that can fall beneath it, as also, because nature hath given it as a rule of Science and principle of it selfe, whence notions are afterwards imprinted in the minde, from which not only principles, but certain larger waies towards the invention of reason, are found out. Errour, temerity, ignorance, opination, suspicion, and in a word, whatsoever is not of firme and constant assent, he took away from Vertue and Wisdome. In these things consisteth almost all the change and dissention of *Zeno* from the old *Academicks*.

Zeno thus maintaining many things contrary to *Plato*, as that the Soul is mortall, and that there is no other World but this, which is subject to Sense, *Arcefilaus* perceiving this Doctrine to spread and take much, prudently concealed the doctrine of the Academy, lest the mysteries of *Plato* being divulg'd and made too common, should become despicable: and therefore (saith ^h St. *Augustine*) he thought it fitter to unteach the man that was not well taught, ^h *Contra Acad. demic. lib.* then to teach those, whom by experience he found not to be docile enough.

ⁱ *Hercupon Arcefilaus* undertook to oppose and contest with *Zeno*, not out of any pertinacity or desire of glory, but led thereunto by that obscurity of things, which had brought *Socrates* to a confession of his own ignorance; as likewise *Democritus*, *Anaxagoras*, *Empedocles*, and almost all the antient Philosophers, who affirmed, That nothing could be understood, nothing perceived, nothing known: That the senses are narrow, our mindes weak, our lives short, and truth (as *Democritus* saith) drown'd in an abyse. That all things are held by opinion and institution, nothing left to Truth: and finally, That all things are involved in darknesse.

^k Thus *Arcefilaus* denyed there is any thing that can be known, not so much as that which *Socrates* reserv'd, [that he knew nothing] conceiving all things to be hid in such darknesse, that there is nothing which can be seen or understood. For these reasons we ought not to professe or affirm any thing, or to approve any thing by assent; but, alwaies to restrain and withhold our

M m m

hastinesse

hastineſſe from error, which then proveth great, when it approveth a thing falſe or unknown. Neither is there any thing more vile, then by aſſent and approbation to prevent knowledge and perception.

l Cic. *ibid.*

m Euseb.

n Euseb. *prepar. Evang.*

¹ He did, as was agreeable to this tenent, diſpute againſt all aſſertions and doctrines; and having found, that in the ſame thing the reaſons of two opinions directly oppoſite, were of equal weight, he thence interr'd, that we ought to with-hold our aſſents (^m *ἐπιτηδ*) from both: [This *Laertius* means, when he ſaith, that he took away propoſitions, by reaſon of the repugnance of ſpeech, and was the firſt that taught to argue on both ſides.] " And that neither the ſenſes nor reaſon are to be credited. He therefore praiſed that Apophthegm of *Hefiod*;

The Gods all knowledge have conceal'd from men.

o *Contra Acad. dem. lib. 3.*

But this ^o Saint *Auguſtine* affirms was only done, to conceal myſteriouſly the meaning of *Plato*; but, they nevertheleſſe had and held his doctrines and decrees, which they uſed to unfold to thoſe who lived with them till they were old.

p *De finib. l. 2.*

He likewiſe, as *Laertius* ſaith, firſt alter'd the manner of diſputing which *Plato* deliver'd, and made it more litigious by queſtion and answer, of which, thus ^p *Cicero*: *Socrates* uſed to finde out by queſtion and answer, the opinions of thoſe with whom he diſcourſed, that, if there were occaſion, he might ſay ſomething upon that which they answer'd: This cuſtome not retained by his ſucceſſors, was taken up by *Arceſilaus*, who inſtituted, that they who would learn of him ſhould not queſtion him; but, themſelves tell him what they thought, which when they had done, he diſputed againſt it; but, his Auditors were to maintain their own opinion as much as they could poſſibly. This courſe took *Arceſilaus*, contrary to all other Philoſophers, amongſt whom, he that would learn held his peace; which courſe, ſaith *Cicero*, is at this time held in the Academy, where he that will learn, ſpeaks in this manner, Pleaſure ſeems to be the chief good, whereupon in a long Oration it is diſputed againſt it, whereby may eaſily be underſtood, that they who ſay, a thing ſeemeth to me to be ſo, are not really of that opinion, but deſire to hear the contrary maintained.

q *Acad. quaſt. 1.*

This School conſtituted by *Arceſilaus*, was called the ſecond Academy, in relation to its deſcent from *Plato*; or, the middle Academy, in reſpect of the new one which was afterwards ſet up by *Carneades*; though ^q *Cicero* ſeemeth to make no diſtinction between this and that, but calleth this the new Academy: But, though 'tis likely, that it was not at firſt ſo called; yet, upon the introduction of a newer, it was afterwards more generally known by the title of the middle, or, ſecond Academy.

Theſe Academicks differ from the Scepticks, in as much, as, though

though they affirmed that nothing can be comprehended; yet they took not away *true* or *false* from things. On the contrary, they held that some Phantasies were true, others false; but the *Scepticks* hold that they are both indifferent; alike defensible by reason. The *Academicks* assert some things to be wholly improbable, some more probable than others, and that a wise man, when any of these occur, may answer *yes*, or *no*, following the probability, provided that he withhold from assenting. But the *Scepticks* hold all things to be alike indifferent, not admitting Judgement, nor allowing that either our senses or opinions can perceive true or false, and therefore no faith is to be given to them, but we ought to persist firm and unmoveable without opinion, not saying of any thing that it is, any more than that it is not.

CHAP. III.

His Vertues and Apophthegms.

HE preferred *Homer* above all Writers, of whom he constantly read some piece before he went to bed, and as soon as he rose in the morning. When he went to read any thing in him, he said, he went to his *Mistress*.

Pindar also he said was proper to raise the voice, and give us supply of words.

Hee was sententious and succinct in speech, often using expressions of doubtfull meaning. He used to reprehend and chide sharply, and freely, whence *Timon* saith of him,

When thou chisest young men, think thou once wert young.

In this kind, *Laertius* instances his sayings to a young man speaking confidently, &c. to an immodest young man, &c.

Emo a *Chian*, who though very deformed, thought himself very handsome, asking him as he put on a rich Cloak, whether hee thought a wise man might not love, *Arcesilaus* answered, do you mean if he be as handsome and as fine as you?

To an effeminate person, who upbraiding him as it were of pride, spoke this verse,

Shall we demand, great Sir, or silent be?

He immediately answered,

Woman, why speakest thou these harsh words to me?

Being troubled with the talk of an inconsiderable mean person, he said,

The

The Sons of slaves intemperately speak.

Of another, who talk'd impertinently, and loudly, he said, he had a peevish nurse. For some he would make no answer at all.

To an Usurer, who said there was something he knew not, hee answer'd in these verses out of *Sophocles's Oenomaus*,

*The course of storms hid from the bird doth lie,
Untill the time that she must lay draw nigh.*

To a Dialectick Philosopher of *Alexinus's* School, who was not able to say any thing worthy *Alexinus*, he related what *Philozenus* did to a maker of Bricks, who overhearing him sing his verses false, trod upon his bricks and broke them, saying, as you spoil mine, so I yours.

He was angry at those who learned not the liberall Sciences in due time.

In dispute, he used this word, *I say, and will not such a one*, (naming the person) *assent to this*, which many of his Disciples affected to imitate, as also his manner of speaking and gesture.

He was most acute in answering appositely, and converting his discourse to the present subject, and fitting it for every time.

He was very efficacious in perswasion; whence many Disciples resorted to him, though sometimes he sharply touched them, which they took patiently.

He was very good, and much excited hope in his Auditors.

As to the necessaries of life, he was very liberall and communicative, ready to do good, and much endeavouring to conceal it, avoiding all that kind of vain-glory. Visiting *Ctesibius*, who was sick, and perceiving him to be poor, he privately put a purse under his pillow, which when he found, this, saith he, is the sport of *Arcefilaus*. Another time he sent him 1000. drachms. ^b *Plutarch* relates this as done to *Apelles* the *Chian* Painter, whom *Arcefilaus* besides many other testimonies of kindnesse coming to visit as he lay sick, and perceiving how poor he was, departed, and returning soon after, bringing twenty drachmes with him, then sitting close to *Apelles's* bed side, *Here is nothing* saies he, *besides Empedocle's* four Elements,

^b *Quom. discern.*
adul. ab. amic.

Fire, Water, Earth, and Aether mounting high, but me thinks you lie not at your ease, and with that taking occasion to remove his pillow, he convey'd the purse privately under it, which when the old woman that tended him found, and wondring, shew'd to *Apelles*, he laughing, said, *This is one of Arcefilaus's thefts.*

^c *Lact.*

^c He recommended *Archias*, an *Arcadian* to *Eumenes* King of *Pergamus*, by whom he was exalted to great dignity.

He

He was very liberall and free from covetousnesse, as appeared by his Utenfills of silver, and vying with *Archeocrates* and *Callicrates*. He had many vessells of gold, which he lent unto many upon occasion of feasting. These silver vessells a certain man borrowed to entertain his friends withall; *Arcesilaus* knowing him to be poor, would never send for them back: Others report he lent them to him on purpose, and when he brought them back, because he was poor, he freely bestowed them on him.

He had a fair estate at *Pitane*, from which *Pylades* his brother continually supplied him. *Eumenes* also, son of *Phileterus* gave him many large presents, whence to him only of all Kings he applied himselfe.

When *Antigonus* was much followed, and many persons thronged to his house, he forbore, declining his acquaintance. He was intimate with *Hierocles*, the Governour of *Manichia* and *Pircum*, and constantly, on holidays, went thither to visit him: *Hierocles* often entreated him to visit *Antigonus*, but he refused, and went along with him as far as the dore, and there parted with him. After *Antigonus*'s fight at Sea, many writing consolatory Epistles to him, *Arcesilaus* was silent. Being sent by his Country on an Embassy to *Antigonus* at *Demetrias*, he returned frustrate of his designe.

He lived the greatest part of his time in the Academy, avoiding to meddle with publick businesse; but sometimes went to the *Pircum*, as we said, out of love to *Hierocles*; for which some reproved him.

He was very magnificent (indeed a second *Aristippus*) in the entertainment of his friends. He openly professed love to *Theodore* and *Phileta*, Curtezans of *Elis*, for which being reprehended, he rehearsed the *Chria's* of *Aristippus*. He was very amarus, and much affected the company of young men, whence *Aristo* of *Chios*, a Stoick, called him a corrupter of youth, temerarious, and impudent. Of those whom he affected are mentioned *Demetrius* and *Leochares*; *Demochares* son of *Laches*, and *Pythocles* son of *Bu-gerus*, much affected him.

For these things he was much inveighed against at the house of *Hieronimus* the Peripatetick, who had invited his friends to celebrate the birth day of *Alyoneus*, son of *Antigonus*, for the keeping of which Feast, *Antigonus* sent yearly much mony. At this Feast *Arcesilaus* would not dispute amidst the cups; and when *Aridelus* propounded a question to him, requiring that he would say something to it, he answer'd, it is the best property of a Philosopher to know the seasons of all things.

But, he was so free from pride, that he counselled his Disciples to go and hear other Masters; and when a certain *Chian* youth of his School declared, that he was not pleased with what he said so much as with the discourses of *Hieronimus*, he took

him by the hand and led him to the Philosopher, desiring him to cherish him according to his quality.

To one that asked why men went from other Sects to the *Epicureans*, but never from the *Epicureans* to other Sects: Because, saith he, of men, some are made Eunuchs, but of Eunuchs never any are made men.

d Stob. Ser.
143.

^d He said, where there are many medicines, and many Physicians, there are most diseases; and where there are many Lawes, there is most iniquity.

e Stob. Ser. 212.

^e He advised to shun Dialectick, because it turneth all things upside down.

f Stob. Ser. 212.

^f He compared Logicians to Gamsters that play at Dice, who take delight whilst they are cosen'd.

g Stob. Ser. 235.

^g He affirmed, that poverty is rugged as *Ithaca*, but good to bring up a child, in that it enureth to frugality and abstinence, and is generally a good School of vertue.

CHAP. IV.

His death.

a Laert.

^a **W**Hen he drew nigh the end of his life, he bequeathed all his estate to his brother *Pylades*; to which end, *Mæreas* not knowing it, he sent him first to *Chios*, and from thence sent for him back again to *Athens*. He sent three Copies of his Will, one to *Amphicritus* at *Eretria*, an other to some friends of his at *Athens*, the third to *Thaumasias* his neer kinsman, to be kept by them; with the last he sent this Letter.

Arcesilaus to Thaumasias, health.

I Gave *Diogenes* my will to bring to you, for being often sick and infirm of body, I thought fit to make my Will, lest if any suddain accident should befall me, I should depart this life with some injurie done to you, whom I have found so bountifull towards me. I desire that you, the most faithfull of all my friends, will take it into your custody. Approve your selfe just to that extraordinary trust which I have reposed in you, that it may appear I have made a right choice.

He died, as *Hermippus* saith, in a kinde of phrenzy, after he had drunk much Wine, 75 years old, in the fourth year of the 134th Olympiad, as may be conjectured from the succession of *Lacydes*, in the School which began at that time. The Athenians buried him with such solemnity as never any was before.

He took not any women into the house with him, neither had

had he any children. He flourish'd according to *Apollodoras* in the 120. Olympiad.

There were three more of this name, one an antient Comick Poet, the second an Elegiack Poet, the third a Statuary.

LACYDES

Lacydes succeeded *Arcefilaus*; he was a *Cyrenean*, (his Father Laert. named *Alexander*) a person of much gravity, and had many Emulators. He was from his youth much given to study, poor, but pleasing to all company, and of a delightfull conversation.

As concerning his managing his household affairs, it is reported that when he took any thing out of the place where he kept his Provisions, he locked the dore, and threw the key in at a hole that none might steal ought from him; which his servants observing, frequently took it, and, opening the dore, carried away what they thought good, and then put it in the same place again, in which fact they were never discover'd.

But the most pleasant part of the story, is, that (as ** Numenius* affirms) * Euseb. præp. evang. lib. 14. he was thereby perswaded to be of the opinion of the middle Academicks; that nothing is comprehended by sense, arguing thus; why should I think that sense can comprehend any thing certainly, when I know that my own senses are so often deceived; for when I go abroad, I think that I see with my eyes those things which I leave in my storehouse; when I return I find none of them; which could not be unlesse our senses were fallible and uncertain.

Lacydes upon the death of *Arcefilaus*, being made master of the School in the 4th year of the 134. Olympiad, taught in the Academy, in the Gardens which were made by *Attalus* the King, which from him were called the *Lacydean* Gardens. *Laertius*, and, from him, *Suidas*, make him Institutor of the new Academy; but erroneously. He continued this charge 26 years, at the end whereof he resigned it, whilst he was yet alive, to *Telecles* and *Euander*, Phocians, his Disciples, in the second year of the 141. Olympiad.

Attalus sending for him to come to him, he returned him answer, that *Pictures* make the best shew at a distance.

Studying Geometry in his old age, one said to him, is it now time? he answered, when, if not now?

Athenæus saith, that *Lacydes* and *Timon* Philosophers, being invited by one of their friends to an entertainment of two daies, and desirous to suit themselves to the company, drunk very freely. *Lacydes* went away first, half drunk, and perceiving *Timon* to steal away too, said out of *Homer*. To

To our great glory Hector we have slain.

The next day meeting *Timon* again at the same place, and seeing him, not able to take off his cups at once, make a pause, when he put it to his mouth the second time, he said out of another place of *Homer*,

II. E.

Those are unhappy who contest with me.

Var. hist.

Ælian likewise numbers these two amongst the great drinkers, and perhaps not unjustly; for by excess of Wine he fell into the palsey, of which hee died in the second year of the 141. Olympiad.

He wrote Philosophicks and of Nature.

In the School, he was succeeded, as are said, by *EUANDER*, *Euander*, by his Disciple, *EGESINUS*, whom *Clemens Alexandrinus* calleth *Hegesilaus*, of *Pergamus*, *Egesinus*, by *CARNEADES*.

CARNEA



CARNEADES.

CARNEADES.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, Time, Masters.



ARNEADES (successour of Egesinus) was of ^a Cyrene, whence ^b Cicero saith, he was an acute person, as being an African. Hee ^a Laert. ^b Acad. quest. 4. was sonne of Epicomus, or Philocomus. Apollodorus, as cited by ^c Laertius, affirmeth he died in the 162. Olympiad; but there is a mistake in the Text; for the words of Apollodorus relate doubtlesse to the time of his birth,

which upon that Authority, we may affirm to have been in the first year of 162. Olympiad. Florus (cited by ^c Plutarch) addes, he was born on the 7th day of Thargelion, at what time the Carnean Festivalls were celebrated at Cyrene, whence perhaps he took his name. ^c Sympos. quasi 8. 1.

This time falling after the Callippical period, we shall compute it according to ^d Petavius his method, which although it be not exempt from question, yet is better then that of Scaliger, whose ^d De Br. temp. 8. 1. method is not reconcileable to Ptolomy's observations.

The fourth of the 164. Olympiad, was

Of the Julian period	4585.
Epoche of the Callippick period	4383.

Which subducted, there remains	202.
Subduct two perionods more	152.

remains	50.
---------	-----

The year propounded therefore is the 50th of the third period. The Neomenia of Hecatombæon, June 26. which is the 177th day of the Julian year; the 7th of Thargelion (according to Petavius) at that time was the 302. of the Attick year.

000

To



CARNEADES.

CARNEADES.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, Time, Masters.



CARNEADES (succellour of Egesinus) was of ^a Cyrene, whence ^b Cicero saith, he was an acute person, as being an *African*. Hee ^{a Laert.} was sonne of *Epicomus*, or *Philocomus*. *Apollodorus*, as cited by *Laertius*, affirmeth he died in the 162. Olympiads but there is a mistake in the Text; for the words of *Apollodorus* relate doubtlesse to the time of his birth, which upon that Authority, we may affirm to have been in the first year of 162. Olympiad. *Florus* (cited by ^c *Plutarch*) addes, he was born on the 7th day of *Tharlegion*, at what time the *Car-* ^{c Sympos. quest} *nean* Festivalls were celebrated at *Cyrene*, whence perhaps he took ^{d. i.} his name.

This time falling after the *Callippical* period, we shall compute it according to ^d *Petavius* his method, which although it be not exempt from question, yet is better then that of *Scaliger*, whose ^{d De Astr. temp} method is not reconcileable to *Ptolomy's* observations.

The fourth of the 164. Olympiad, was

Of the Julian period	4585.
Epoche of the Callippick period	4383.

Which subducted, there remains	202.
--------------------------------	------

Subduct two perionods more	152.
----------------------------	------

remains	50.
---------	-----

The year propounded therefore is the 50th of the third period. The *Neomenia* of *Hecatombaion*, June 26. which is the 177th day of the *Julian* years the 7th of *Thargelion* (according to *Petavius*) at that time was the 302. of the Attick year.

000

To

To	177.
adde	302.
Summe	479.
Subduct	365
Remains	114.

The 114th day of the Julian year is the 24th of *April*, on which fell the 7th of *Thargelion*; which, the *Dominicall* Letter being *B*, fell on Sunday, *Proleptically* taken.

e Laert.
f Cic. Acad.
quæst. 4.

* He was Disciple to *Egesinus* the *Academick*, and ^f learned *Logick* of *Diogenes* the *Stoick*; whence in arguing he would many times say, *If I have concluded right, the cause is my own; if not right, Diogenes must return the mina he had of me; which was the price the Dialectick Philosophers took.*

CHAP. II.

How he constituted the new Academy.

HE succeeded *Egesinus* in the School, and is by *Cicero* reckon'd the fourth from *Arcefilaus*, (who constituted the *middle Academy*, introducing a suspension of Assent, grounded upon the uncertainty of things:) *Carneades*, constituted the *new Academy*, maintaining the same kind of suspension, with no less eagerness; yet upon more moderate grounds: * for he held that the incomprehensibility of things, proceeded not from the nature of the things themselves, as *Arcefilaus* maintained; for as much as every thing really existeth in it self, and if any thing be affirmed or denied of another, it is true or false, as to the thing it self; but the things themselves remaining firm, we derive from them a *Phantasie* and similitude, which for the most part like false messengers lie and deceive us. To all true things there some false adjoined, and those so like, that, there is no certain note of Judication and assent, wherefore we cannot perceive any thing to be true.

* Numen. apud
Euseb.

But he was nothing less rigid as to the *Academicall* suspension, for * he denied that any thing could be perceived, not so much as that very maxime; *Nothing can be perceived*, arguing thus. All *Phantasies* are of two kinds; the first included the perceptible, and imperceptible; the second kind, the probable; and the improbable. Those which are contrary to sense and evidence,

* Cic. Acad.
quæst. 4.

dence, pertain to the former divisions; against the latter we ought not to say any thing. Wherefore there is no Phantasie followed by perception, but by approbation many; for it were contrary to nature that nothing should be probable.

More fully * *Sextus Empericus*. *Carneades*, saith he, did not only oppose the *Stoicks*, but all that went before him, as to judgment. His first and common argument against all, is, that, by which he sheweth absolutely, that there is nothing from which truth can be judged; not *reason*, not *sense*, not *phantasy*, nor any thing, for all these in a word deceive us. His second argument is that whereby he shewes, that although there be something that doth judge, yet it cannot exist without an affection from evidence. For an animall differeth from inanimate things by the sensitive faculty, it apprehendeth thereby both it selfe and externall things; but sense remaining immovable, impassible, and immutable, is not sense, nor apprehendeth any thing, but being changed, and after some manner affected by incursion of evidents, then it declareth things. In that affection therefore of the soul which ariseth from evidence, we are to seek that which judgeth. This affection is declared when that appeareth from which it proceedeth, which affection is nothing else but phantasy. *Phantasy* therefore is a certain affection in an animall, which sheweth both it selfe and some others, as when we see any thing, our sight is affected in some manner, so, as it was not before that act of seeing. By this alteration we apprehend two things: First, the alteration it selfe; that is the phantasy. Secondly, that from which this alteration proceeds, the thing visible. The like in the rest of the senses. As therefore light manifesteth it selfe and all things in it, so phantasy being the chiefe guide of knowledge in an animall, must like unto Light, manifest both it selfe, and that evident object which effecteth it. But because it doth not alwaies shew that which is true, but often erreth and differeth from the thing whence it proceedeth, like ill messengers, it necessarily followeth that all phantasies cannot leave a judgment of truth, but only if it be true. Again, because there is no phantasie so true, but it may be false; and of all phantasies that seem true there are some false, which differ little from them, that which judgeth must consist in common phantasy of true and false. But the common phantasy of these comprehendeth not, and if it comprehendeth not, neither is there any thing that judgeth. And if phantasy have not a judicative power, neither can reason judge, for that is derived from phantasy, and justly: For, that whereof it judgeth, ought first to appear unto it; but nothing can appear but through sense void of reason; therefore neither sense void of reason; nor reason it selfe is that which judgeth.

Thus

Thus disputed *Carneades* against all other Philosophers, to shew there is not any thing that judgeth. But, being demanded what judgeth, as to the leading of life and acquisition of beatitude, he hath recourse to *probable* phantasy; and together with probable, *undistracted* and *circumcurrent*, their differences these. Phantasy is the phantasy of something, *viz.* of that of which it is made, and of that *in* which it is made: That of which it is made is the externall sensible *object*; that in which, the *Man*. It hath two relations, one to the object phancyed, the other to the phantasm derived from that object. From the relation to the object it is either true or false; true, when it agreeth with the object; false, when it disagreeth: From its relation to the phantasm, there is one which seemeth true, another false. That which seemeth true is by the *Academicks* called *Emphasis*, and *probability*, and *probable phantasie*; that which seemeth not true is called *Apemphasis*, *improbability*, and *not-probable* phantasy. For, neither that which seemeth false, and is such; nor that which is true, and seemeth not such, have any thing in their nature perswasive. But, of these phantasies, that which is manifestly false, and seemeth not true, limiteth the judicatory, but is not that which judgeth, as likewise produceth from that which is, but differs from it, such as was that of the fury proceeding from *Electra* to *Orestes*. Of that which seemeth true, one kinde is *tenuious*, as that which is in a thing so little, as that it is not visible, either because it takes not up room enough, or by reason of the weakness of sight, which receiveth things confusedly, and not distinctly. The other is that which hath this common property with the true, that it seemeth to be very true. Now of these, the tenuious, loose, remisse phantasy cannot be that which judgeth; for that which cannot clearly manifest it selfe, nor the thing that effected it, cannot attract us, nor invite assent; but that which seemeth true and is manifest enough, that, according to *Carneades*, is the judge of truth.

This being that which judgeth, it hath a great latitude, and being extended into another species, hath a more probable and vehemently effective phantasy. Probable is taken three waies; first, for that which is true, and seemeth true; secondly, for that which is false, and seemeth true; thirdly, for that which is true, common to both. Whence that which judgeth must be that phantasy which seemeth true, which the *Academicks* call probable. Sometimes the false incurreth; so that it is necessary to use the common phantasy of true and false; yet, not because that more seldome incurreth, I mean that which imitateth the truth, we are not to give credit to that which is for the greater part true, whereby it happeneth our judgment and actions are for the most part directed.

That

That which first and commonly judgeth, *Carneades* held to be this. But forasmuch as phantasy sometimes is not of one kinde, but like a chain, one dependeth on another, there must therefore be a second judge, which is *probable* and *undistracted* phantasy. As he who receiveth the phantasy of a man, necessarily receiveth the phantasy of such things as are about him, and without him; of the things about him, as colour, magnitude, figure, motion, speech, cloathing, shooes; of things without him, as aire, light, day, heaven, earth, companions, and the like. When therefore none of these phantasies seems false, but all agree in seeming true, we credit it the more. That such a one is *Socrates* we believe, because he hath all those things which *Socrates* useth to have, as colour, magnitude, figure, gesture, cloak, in none of these disagreeing with it self. And as some Physicians argue a man to be in a feaver, not from one symptome, as from a high pulse, or great heat, but from the concurrence of that heat with the pulse, as also from ulcerous touch, rednesse, thirst, and the like, all agreeing together. So the *Academick* maketh a judgment of truth, from a concurrence of phantasies, and when none of all the phantasies that joyne in the concurrence retract him as false, he saith, that which incurreth is true.

That there is a credible *undistracted* concurrence, is manifest from *Menelaus*: Having left in his ship an image of *Helene* which he had brought from *Troy*, as if it had been *Helene* her selfe, landing at the Island *Pharos*, he there met with the true *Helene*, and from her attracted a true phantasy, but would not believe that phantasy, being distracted by the other, which told him, that he had left *Helene* in the Ship. Such is *undistracted* phantasy therefore, which likewise seemeth erroneous, for as much as there are some more *undistracted* then others. Of *undistracted* phantasies, that is most credible and perfect which maketh a judgment.

Moreover, there is a *circumcurrent* phantasy, the form whereof is next to be declared. In the *undistracted* we only enquire whether none of those phantasies which joyne in concurrence, attract us as false, but that they all seem true, and not improbable. But in that which is made by concurrence, which useth *circumcurrence*, strictly examines every phantasy which is in that concurrence, as in Assemblies, when the people take account of every particular person that stands for the Magistracy, whether they deserve that power and right of judging. In the place of Judgment, there is that which judgeth, and that by which the judgment is made, the distance and intervall, figure, time, manner, affection, and operation, each of which we examine strictly. That which judgeth, whether the sight be dimme, for if it be, it is too weak for judgment; that which is judged,

whether it be not too little ; that through which, whether the air be obscure ; the distance, whether it too great ; the medium, whether confused ; the place, whether too wide and vast ; the time, whether too luddain ; the affection, whether not phrenetic ; the operation, whether not unfit to be admitted. For if all these be in one, that which judgeth is *probable* phantasy, and together, *probable*, *undistracted*, and *circumcurrent*. Wherefore as when in life we enquire concerning some little thing, we examine one witnesse ; when we enquire into something of greater consequence, we examine more ; but when of a thing most necessary, we examine each of the witnesses by the joynt testimony of all. So saith *Carneades*, in light, inconsiderable matters, we make use of *probable* phantasy, only for judgment ; in things of some moment, of *undistracted* phantasy ; in things that concern well and happy living, *circumcurrent* phantasy.

And as in things of great moment they take diverse phantasies, so in different circumstances they never follow the same ; for they say, they attend only *probable* phantasy in such things wherein the circumstance of time alloweth not a strict examination: As for instance. The enemy pursues a man ; he coming to a Cave, takes a phantasy, that there are some enemies there lying in wait : transported by this phantasy as *probable*, he shunneth and flyeth from the Cave, following the probability of that phantasy, before he accurately and diligently examine, whether there really be any enemies in ambush in that Cave or no. *Probable* phantasy is followed by *circumcurrent*, in those things in which time allows a curious examination of each particular, to use judgment upon the incurrent thing. As a man coming into a dark room, and seeing a rope rolled up, thinking it to be a serpent, he flies away ; but afterwards returning, he examines the truth, and perceiving it not to stir, begins to think it is not a serpent ; but withall considering, that serpents are sometimes frozen or nummed with the cold, he strikes it with his staffe : and having thus by *circumcurrence* examined the phantasy which incurred to him, he assenteth ; that the phantasy he had taken of that body as a serpent is false. And again, as I said, when we manifestly behold, we assent that this is true, having first over-run in our thoughts that our senses are all entire, and that we behold this waking, not in a dream ; that the air is perspicuous, and a convenient distance from the object. Hereby we receive a creditable phantasy, when we have time enough to examine the particulars concerning the thing seen. It is the same in *undistracted* phantasy, which they admit, when there is nothing that can retract us, as we said of *Menelaus*. Hitherto *Sextus*.

Cic. Acad. quest.
4.

Yet, though nothing can be perceived, a wise man may assent
to

to that which is not perceived; that is, he may *opinate*; but so as he knoweth himself to *opinate*, and that there is nothing which can be comprehended and perceived.

He asserted the ultimate end to be the enjoyment of naturall principles, which, saith *Cicero*, he maintained, not that he really *De fin. lib. 2.* thought so, but in opposition to the *Stoicks*.

He read the Books of the *Stoicks* very diligently, and disputed *Laert.* against them with so good successe, that it gave him occasion to say; *If Chrysippus had not been, I had not been.*

Clitomachus used to say of him, he could never understand what he really held; for he would sometimes argue on one side, some- *Cic. Acad. quest. 4.* times on the other; and by the *calumny* of his wit, saith *Cicero*, many times deride the best causes. Of the *Sorites* used by him, see *Sextus Empiricus*.

CHAP. III.

Upon what occasion he was sent on an Embassy to Rome.

THE *Athenians* being fined by the *Romans* about 500. Talents, at the suit of the *Orepians* and *Sicyonians*, for destroying *Oropus* a City of *Bœotia*, sent three Philosophers on an Embassy to the *Romane* Senate, to procure a mitigation of this fine, which had been imposed upon them without hearing their defence; *Carneades* the *Academick*, *Diogenes* the *Stoick*, and *Critolaus* the *Peripatetick*. About the time of this Embassy there is much disagreement amongst Authors. *Agellius* saith, they came after the second *Punic* War, and maketh *Ennius* later then their coming; which *Petavius* justly conceiveth to be false, for as much as *Ennius* died in the 585th year from the building of the City. But *Cicero* affirmeth this Embassy to have been when *P. Scipio* and *M. Marcellus* were Consuls, which was the 599th year. *Pausanias* reckoneth it upon the 603^d year of the City, which *Casaubone* approveth. *a Plut vit. Cat. Agel. 7. 14. Macr. Satur. 1.5.*

Each of these Philosophers, to shew his learning, made choice of severall eminent parts of the City, where they discoursed before great multitudes of people to the admiration of all. The Eloquence of *Carneades* was violent and rapid; that of *Critolaus*, neat and smooth, that of *Diogenes* modest and sober. *Carneades* one day disputed copiously concerning justice before *Galba* and *Caro*, the greatest Orators of that time. The next day he subverted all he had said before by contrary Arguments, and took away that Justice which he had so much commended. This he did the better *Laert. de Inst. lib. 51*

ter to confute those, that asserted any thing. That dispute whereby he overthrew Justice is recorded in *Cicero* by *L. Furius*.

Plut.

To these three Philosophers resorted all the studious young men, and frequently heard and praised them. Chieflly the sweetnesse of *Carneades*, which was of greatest power and no lesse fame then power, attracting eminent and benigne hearers, filled the City with noise like a great wind; and it was reported that a *Grecian* person qualified to admiration, attracting all, had infused a serious affection into the young men, whereby forgetting other divertisements and pleasures, they were carried on as it were with a kind of madnesse to Philosophy. This pleased all the *Romans*, who gladly beheld their Sonns instructed in Greek learning by such excellent men. Onely *Cato* at the first noise of Admiration of the Greek Learning, was troubled, fearing the young men should apply themselves that way, and so preferre the glory of eloquence before Action and Military discipline. The fame of Philosophers encreasing in the City, and *C. Acilius*, (whom *Agellius* and *Macrobius* call *Cecilius*) an eminent person, having at his own request been the Interpreter of their first Oration to the Senate; *Cato* (who was then very old) under a fair pretence, moved, that these Philosophers might be sent out of the City, and coming into the Senate-house, blamed the Magistrates, that they had so long suffered such Ambassadors to continue amongst them without any answer, who were able to perswade them to any thing: wherefore he first desired that something might be determined concerning their Embassie, that they might be sent back again to their own Schools, and instruct the Sons of *Gracians*, and that the *Romane* youth might, as they did before, apply themselves to the observance of their own Laws and Magistrates. This he did not out of anger to *Carneades*, as some thought, but out of an ambitious æmulation of the *Greek* humanity and Literature.

CHAP. IV.

His Vertues and Apophthegmes.

Lib. 8. c. 7.

HE was a person infinitely industrious, lesse conversant in Physick then Ethick, and so studious that he neglected to cut his hair and nailes. *Valerius Maximus* saith, hee was so studious, that when he lay down at meales, his thoughts were so fixt, that he forgot to put his hand to the Table, and that *Melissa*, who lived with him as a wife, was fain to put him in mind thereof, and help him.

He

He was so eminent for Philosophy, that the Oratours themselves would many times break up their schools and come and hear him.

He had a great and loud voice; whereupon the Gymnasiarch sent to him not to speak so loud, whereto he answering, *send me the measure by which I should speak*; the other wisely and appositely repli'd, *you have a measure, your Hearers.*

He was sharply invective, and in argument almost invincible. He avoided feasting, out of the reason we mentioned, his great studiousness.

One named *Mentor* a Bythinian, as *Phavorinus* saith, who had endeavoured to seduce a Mistris that he kept, coming into the school, he presently jeasted at him; in turning these words of *Homer*,

*Hitherto comes one oppress'd with hoary years;
Like Mentor in his voice and looks appears,
Who from the School I charge you turn away.*

The other rising up, repli'd,

He thus proclaim'd, the rest did streight obey.

Being to dispute with *Chrysippus*, he purg'd himself by white Hellebore to sharpen his wit, lest any corrupt humours in his stomach might oppress the vigour and constancy of his mind.

He compared *Dialectick* to the fish *Polypus*, which when its claws grow long, bites them off; so Logicians, growing subtle, confute their own assertions. Stob. Ser. 212.

He advised men in their greatest prosperity to be mindfull of a change, for that which is unexpected is most grievous. Plut. de tranq. anim.

He said the Sons of rich men and Kings learn nothing well but Riding, for their Masters flatter them; they who contest with them, willingly yield to them; but a horse considers not whether a private man or a Prince, a poor man or a rich bee on his back, but if he cannot rule him, he throws his Rider. Plut. de adul. & Am. dis.

He seemed to be extremely averse from death, whence he often said, *the same Nature which hath put us together will dissolve us*; and hearing that *Antipater* dyed by drinking poison, he was a little animated by his constancy in death, and said, *then give me 100*, they asking what, *Wine*, saith he, Laert.

In the midst of the night he was struck blind, and knew not of it, but waking, bid his servant bring a light; the servant did so, telling him he had brought one, then, said he, read you. Laert.

CHAP. V.

His Death and Writings.

Laert.

HE lived according to *Laertius* 85. years, or according to *Cicero*. 90. The words of * *Apollodorus* that he died in the fourth year of the 162^d Olympiad, which falleth upon the 626th year from the building of *Rome*, may easily be evinced to be false, by the greatest part of the Circumstances of his life; particularly from this; that *Antonius* in *Cicero* saith, when hee went Pro-Consull into *Asia*, he found *Carneades* the *Academick* at *Athens*, who opposed all in dispute, according to the manner of his Sect. The year of *Antonius*'s Pro-Consulship was the 652. year from the building of *Rome*. But this account as we said before, is to be applied to the time of his birth, from which the 85th falleth upon the first year of the 184th Olympiad, the 90th upon the 2^d of the 185th.

* Doct. temp.

Laertius saith, at his death there was a great Eclipse of the Moon, which some interpreted to proceed from a Sympathy with his losse. Upon this Eclipse I conceive *Petavius* grounded his computation of *Carneades*'s death, when he saith, * it was upon the first year of the 163. Olympiad. May 2. fer. 2. hora. 5. 46. at *Athens*. But there being a mistake of the year, there is consequently a greater in the account of the feria and hour.

Carneades, as *Cicero* saith, wrote four Books of *Suspension of Assent*. He wrote likewise *Epistles* to *Ariarathes* King of *Cappadocia*, the only monument left behind him, extant in *Laertius*'s time. Whatsoever else went under his name, *Laertius* saith, was written by his Disciples, of whom hee had many, the most eminent *Clitomachus*.

There are remembred two more of this name, one a Philosopher, Disciple to *Anaxagoras*, mentioned by *Suidas*; the other an *Epigrammatick* Poet, mentioned by *Laertius*.

CLITO.

CLITOMACHVS.

^a CLITOMACHVS was a *Carthaginian*, son of ^b *Diogenes*. ^a *Laert.*
 He was first called *Asdrubal*, as *Plutarch* and *Laertius* af- ^b *Stephan.*
 firm, ^c and profess'd Philosophy in his own Country, and native ^c *Laert.*
 Language. Being forty years old, he went to *Athens*, and heard
Carneades, who being much taken with his industry, instructed
 and exercised him in Philosophy. With *Carneades*, *Cicero* saith,
 he lived untill he was old, and succeeded him in the School, and
 chiefly illustrated his Doctrines by his writings, the number of
 which bookes being above foure hundred, were a sufficient testi-
 mony of his ^d industry, and that he had no lesse of wit, then ^d *Cic. Acad.*
Carneades of eloquence. He was well vers'd in three Sects, the ^e *Qu. l. 4. Laert.*
Academick, *Peripatetick*, and *Stoick*.

Of his books are remembered by *Cicero*, one ^e of *Consolation* to ^e *Cic. Tusc. Qu.*
 his captive Country-men, *Carthage* being then subdued by the ^f
Romans; another to *Caius Lucilius* the Poet, wherein he expalmed ^f *Cic. Acad.*
 and defended the *Academick* suspension of Assent, having written ^g *Qu. 4.*
 before of the same things to *L. Censorinus*, who was Consul with
M. Manilius, the summe of which discourse was this.

§ The *Academicks* hold there are such dissimilitudes of things, ^g *Cic. Acad. 4.*
 that some seem probable, others on the contrary. But this is
 not ground enough to say that some things may be perceived,
 others cannot, because there are many false that are probable,
 but no false can be perceived and known. Those therefore ex-
 tremely erre, who affirme the *Academicks* to take away sense;
 for they say not, there is no colour, sapor, or sound; but dispute,
 that there is not any proper inherent note in these of true and
 certain: (which having expounded, he adds) A wise man sus-
 pends assent two waies; one, when [as we know] he absolutely
 refuseth to assent to any thing; another, when he with-
 holds from answering, either in approbation or improbation of
 something, so that he neither denyeth nor asserteth it. In the
 first way he assents to nothing, in the second he will follow
 probability, and according as he finds it or not, answers yes or
 no. He who withholdeth his assent from all things, is yet moved,
 and asserteth something. He reserves therefore these phantasies by
 which we are excited to action, and those of which being ques-
 tion'd, we may answer on either part, only as of a thing that
 seemeth

seemeth to us so, but without assent; neither are all such phantasies approved, but only those which are not obstructed by any thing.

^h Cic. *Tusc. quest. 5.*

^h In asserting good, he joyned pleasure with honesty, as Calipho also did.

ⁱ Sext. *Empir. adv. Math.*

ⁱ He was a great enemy to *Rhetorick*, as *Critolaus* the *Peripatetic*, and *Charmidas* were also. Arts they did not expell out of Cities, knowing them to be very profitable to life, no more then they would drive *Oeconomick* out of Houses, or Shepheards from their Flocks; but they all persecuted, and every where ejected the art of speaking, as a most dangerous enemy.

^k *Stob. Ser. 212.*

^k He compared *Dialectick* to the Moon, which is in continual increase or decrease.

^l *Stob. Ser. 48.*

^l Falling sick, he was taken with a fit of a Lethargie, out of which he no sooner came, but he said, *Love of life shall flatter me no longer*; and thereupon with his own hands ended his life.

PHILO.

PHILO.

PHILO was of *Larissa*, he heard *Clitomachus* many years, ^{a Stob. Eclog.} and is named by *Sextus Empericus*, as Constitutor of a ^{Ethic.} fourth Academy; but *Cicero* affirms, he disallowed the distinction of Academies, and wrote expressly to prove the first and the new Academy to be both one. ^{c Cicero.} Whilst he lived, the Academy wanted not a Patron. ^{d Plut. vit. Cic.} The Romans admired him, as *Plutarch* affirms, above all *Clitomachus's* Schollers, for his excellent discourse, and loved him for the sweetnesse of his disposition. *Cicero* no sooner went out of the first schooles and rudiments of learning, but he became an auditor of *Philo*, as he acknowledgeth himselfe.

Amongst other excellent things (saith ^{f Stobaeus}) he gave this ^{f Eclog. Ethic.} Division of *Philosophy*. He compared *Philosophy* to a *Physician*: As the office of a *Physician* is first to perswade the sick person to permit himselfe to be cured; next to confute the reasons of his adversary: So is it of a *Philosopher*, both which consist in exhortation. Exhortation is a discourse inciting to vertue; whereof one part explaineth its great use, the other refelleth adversaries, or such as any way calumniate *Philosophy*. The comparison holds in a second manner, thus: As the part of a *Physitian*, after he hath perswaded the Patient to admit of cure, is, to apply the means thereof, as well to remove the causes of the disease, as to induce and settle health; so is it in this Science. After exhortation, he endeavourerth to apply the cure, by removing false opinions wherewith the soul is infected, and by substituting true. In the second place therefore it treats of good and evill; for the sake of which the exhortation was made. Thirdly, the comparison holds thus: As all Medicines refer to one end, health; so all *Philosophy* to Beatitude. That part which treats of ends is joyned with another which treats of life. For as in Medicine, it is not sufficient to restore health, unlesse it likewise deliver rules by which it may be preserved; so in life, some precepts are required for conservation of the end: And this part also is twofold; private, or common: One considers the affairs of particular persons; as, whether a wise man should mannage a Common-wealth, whether he may live with Princes, whether he may marry: The other considers

the businesse of all in generall; as, what Commonwealth is best, how Magistrates are to be chosen. This common part is called *Politick*, and is treated of distinctly by it selfe, as being of greatest latitude. Now if all were wise men, there would be no need of more places, for the more subtle divisions would emerge from the precedent. But because there must likewise be a care of the middle sort of men, who cannot apply themselves to long disputations, either through want of time, or diversion of businesse, there must not be omitted a treating of precepts, which delivereth short rules concerning the use of each.

Sex. Emp.
Pyrrh. Hyp. 1.
33.

As to the *Stoicall* judicatory, *comprehensive phantasy*, he held all things to be incomprehensible; as to the nature of the things themselves, comprehensible. Thus he took away the *comprehensive phantasy* asserted by *Zeno*.

Sex. Emp.
Pyrrh. Hyp. 2.
11.

He held that to be a good connex, which beginneth from true and endeth in false, as (if it be day, and I dispute) this, *If it is day, I dispute*: According to which tenet there may be true axioms three waies, a false only one way: For, when it beginneth from true, and endeth in true, it is true; as, *If it is day, it is light*: And when it beginneth from false, and endeth in false, it is true; as, *If the earth flies, the earth hath wings*. Likewise if it beginneth from false and endeth in true, it is true; as, *If the earth flies, it is earth*. That which is false, is that which beginneth from true, and endeth in false; as, *If it is day, it is night*; for, the antecedent, *it is day*, is true; but the consequent, *it is night*, is false.

Tusc. Qu. 1. 2. He appointed, that the precepts of Oratours should be delivered at one time, those of Philosophers at another.

ANTIOCHVS.

^a *Plut. vit.*
Cicer.

^b *Cic. Ac. qu. 1.*

^c *Acad. Qu. 4.*

^d *Cic. de Leg.*

lib. 2.


^e *Vit. Cicer.*

^a **ANTIOCHVS** was an *Ascalonite*, ^b brother of *Aristus*, a Disciple of *Philo*. He lived with *L. Lucullus*, the Quæstor and Generall; he was also a great friend to ^d *Atticus*, whom he invited to the Academy. He is named by *Sextus Empericus*, as Constitutor of a *fifth Academy*: For, as ^e *Plutarch* saith, he fell off from the Sect of *Carneades*, either moved by the evidence of sense, or, as some thought, by ambition, and dissention with the Disciples of *Clitomachus* and *Philo*. So that with some little altera-

alteration, he made use of the Doctrines of the *Stoicks*; and though he were called an *Academick*, he had been, but for some alterations, an absolute *Stoick*; whence it was said of him, *He taught the Stoicall Philosophy in the Academy*; for he manifested, that the Doctrines of the *Stoicks* were in *Plato*. In his old age, saith ^h *Cicero*, he betook himselfe to the old *Academicks*, forsaking the *new*, and diligently enquiring into the opinion of the Antients, ^k endeavoured to follow *Aristotle* and *Xenocrates*, professing, that the *Stoicks* and *Peripateticks* agreed in the thing, and differed only in words. To which effect *Cicero* mentions a Book which he sent to *Balbus*: He wrote also ^m another against his Master *Philo*, entituled *Sosus*. ⁿ *Cicero* being at *Athens* heard him, and was much taken with the eloquence and volubility of his discourse, (^o declaring him to be the most polite and acute of all Philosophers in his time) ^p but not with the new Doctrine which he introduced.

Thus far there is a continued series of the *Academick* Philosophers.

FINIS.



THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

The Sixt Part,

Containing the *Peripatetick* Philosophers.



LONDON,
Printed for *Humphrey Moseley*, and *Tbo: Dring*.
An. Dom. 1656.

THE
HISTORY
OF
PHILOSOPHY.

The Sixth Part.

Containing the History of Spirituality.



Printed for J. B. Nichols, No. 10, N. York St.



ARISTOTELES.

ARISTOTLE.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents , and time of his Birth.



Upon the death of *Plato* his Disciples separated themselves into two Sects. The first continued in the same school, where he taught, the *Academy*; the other possess'd the *Lyceum*. The first was known by the generall name of *Academicks*, or *Peripateticks of the Academy*; the other by the generall name of *Peripateticks*, or more particularly; *Peripateticks of the Lyceum*. Of the first we have discoursed already; we come now to the other, of which *Aristotle* was the Head.

^a *Ammon. sub. finem: comment. in proam. Por. phyr.*

^b *Aristotle* was born at *Stagira*, a City of *Thrace*, according to ^c *Herodotus*, ^d *Thucydides*, ^e *Pausanias* and *Suidas*, by others placed in *Macedonia*, to take from him the imputation of a Barbarian. It was seated upon *Strymon* a River which parts those two Count-^{ies}, having a Haven called *Amphipolis*, and a little Island of the same name belonging to it. This place, to which *Aristotle* ow'd his birth, he afterwards requited with extraordinary Gratitude.

^b *Laert.*
^c *Polymn.*
^d *Lib. 4. & 9.*
^e *Eliac.*

^f His Father was named *Nicomachus*, descended from *Nicomachus* Son of *Machaon* (whose skill in Medicine is celebrated by *Homer*) Son of *Æsculapius*; from whom *Nicomachus*, *Aristotle's* Father, derived not only his Pedigree, but his art also, for he was a Physician. *Suidas* saith; he wrote six Books of Medicine, and one of Physick. ^g *Galen* alledgeth a Plaister of one *Nicomachus*, either this or the elder. This *Nicomachus* (^h whom some affirm to have been grandson to *Hippocrates* the Physician) lived in the time of *Amyntas* King of *Macedonia*, (Father of *Philip*) a Prince (as *Justine* witnesseth) eminent for all Royall Vertues. To him *Nicomachus* was not only Physician, but friend and favourite. ⁱ *Tzetzes* forgot these relations of *Aristotle* (as *Nunnesius* observes) when he affirmed that he was called an *Æsculapian* figuratively, in respect of his skill in Medicine, though it be true also that he did professe that Art.

^f *Laert. Ammon.*

^g *De compos. medicam.*
^h *Basilius.*

ⁱ *Chilias.*

His Mother *Laertius* and *Suidas* name *Phæstias*, ^k *Dionysius Halicarnassæus*, and *Ammonius*, *Phæstis*. ^l *Ammonius* saith, she also was

^k *Epist. ad Ammon.*
^l *Vit. Arist. if he were the Author,*

descended from *Æsculapius*, alledging in testimony thereof this Epigram,

*His Mother Phæsis, Sire Nicomachus,
Descended both from Æsculapius.*

But *Dionysius Halicarnassæus* saith, she was daughter a *Chalcidian*, one of the Colony which was sent from *Chalcis* to *Stagira*. Her Picture, *Aristotle*, in piety to her memory, caused to be made by *Protopogenes* an eminent Painter of that time, which Picture

m Lib. 35. cap. 9. *Pliny* reckons amongst the choicest pieces of that Master.]

Aristotle (as *Suidas* affirms) had a Brother named *Arimnestus*, and Sister *Arimnestæ*. His Brother died before him, without issue, as appears by his will.

n Laert.

o Epist. ad

Ammaeum.

p Deipn. lib.

q Lib. 17. cap. 21.

r Nunnes. in

vit. Aristot.

repeated by

Schottius in vij.

comparat. A-

rist. & demosth.

Aristotle was born, according to the testimonies of *Agellius*, *Dionysius Halicarnassæus* and others, in the first year of the 99th Olympiad, at what time *Diotrephes* was Archon at Athens, 44. years after the Birth of *Plato*, as *Athenæus* accounts; more justly then *Ammonius* and *Suidas*, who reckon but 42. before the birth of *Demosthenes*, three years. *Agellius* affirms, he was born the seventh year after the recovery of the City of Rome from the Gauls by *Camillus*; but because (as *Plutarch* saith) it is hard to find out on what year the City was taken, it will be hard also to find upon what year it was recovered. The recovery was seven months after its taking, but, in the following year, for it was taken in July, recover'd in February. If therefore as *Valerius Flaccus*, *Agellius*, and *Cassius Hemina* account, the taking of the City was in the 363^d year from the building thereof, it was recover'd in the 364th. Thus *Aristotle* was born in the first year of the 99th Olympiad, the 370th from the building of Rome.

But, if as *Livy* affirms, the taking of Rome was in the 365th year from the building thereof, and its recovery in the 366th, *Aristotle* according to that account must have been born in the third year of the 99th Olympiad, in the 372^d year from the building of the City. Again, if the City were taken, in the 364th year after the building thereof, and recover'd in the 365th year, as *Varro*, *Pliny*, *Dionysius Halicarnassæus* account, whom *Scaliger* followeth, *Aristotle* must have been born in the second year of the 99th Olympiad, the 371. from the building of the City, reckoning alwaies ten months for a year, and not casting them off, as *Pliny* and others seem to do, and beginning immediately the next year, which months being reckoned, the account will agree with ours; hitherto *Nunnesius*.

CHAP. II.

His first Education and Studies.

^a **N**icomachus and Phæstis the Parents of Aristotle being both dead, he was brought up by Proxenus an *Atarnean*, during which time being yet very young, he learned the Liberall Sciences, as appeareth, saith Ammonius, from those writings of his which partly concern Poetry, partly the Poets themselves, as likewise from his *Homerickall questions*, and severall Books of the Art of *Rhetorick*. ^{a Ammon.}

^b In gratitude for this care taken by Proxenus in his education, Aristotle afterwards, not only bred up in like manner Nicanor, the Son of Proxenus, in all kinds of Learning, but adopted him his Son, and with his Estate bequeathed his Daughter to him. ^{b Ammon.}

^c He likewise caused the Statues of Proxenus and his wife, to be made and set up in honour of them, as is manifest by his Will. ^{c Laert. in Testam. Arist.}

^d Athenæus (citing an Epistle of Epicure) and ^e Alian relate, that having consumed the inheritance left by his Father in prodigality and luxury; he betook himself to the Warres, wherein having ill successe, he profess'd Medicine, and by chance, coming into Plato's School, and hearing their disputes, being of a wit far beyond the rest, he addicted himself to Philosophy, and became famous therin. But this agrees not wel with the circumstances of his story, as related by Authors of greater credit and lesse prejudice. ^{d Deipn. lib. 8. e Var. hist. 5. 9.}

CHAP. III.

How he heard Plato.

^a **H**AVING attained the age of 17. years, he went (in obedience ^{a Ammon.} to the *Pythian Oracle*, which advised him to addict himself to Philosophy) to *Athen*s, Laertius saith (out of *Apollodorus*) that he was then but seventeen years old, in which year *Nausigenes* was Archon; *Dionysius Halicarnassæus* saith, it was the year following, at what time *Polyzelus* was Archon, perhaps it was upon *Nausigenes*'s going out of his Office, whom *Polyzelus* succeeded. But ^b *Eumenes* is much mistaken, who saith, he was thirty years old when hee came first to *Plato*, perhaps (as *Nunnesius* conjectures) because he had read in *Plato*, that *Dialectick* ought not to be studied till the thirtieth year. And no lesse erre Ammonius, (if he be Author of that Life) and *Olympiodorus*, who affirm, that *Aristotle*. ^{b Laert.}

Aristotle coming to *Athens* in the seventeenth year of his age, heard *Socrates* three years, whereas *Socrates* was put to death when *Laches* was Archon, thirty two years before *Nausigenes*, under whom *Aristotle* was seventeen years old.

Being recommended to *Plato*, he became his Disciple, and so continued twenty years, as an Epistle of his to *Philip* (cited by the old Interpreter of his life) did testifie.

Plato much loved him, and admired his acutenesse of apprehension, and diligence in study; for which (^c *Philoponus* saith) *Plato* used to call him the Minde of the Schoole; and when ^d he was not at his Lectures, he would say, *The Intellect is not here*, or, as *Rhodiginus*, *The Philosopher of truth is absent*. And comparing his acutenesse with the dulnesse of *Xenocrates*, *Plato* was wont to say, ^e *What an horse, and what an asse have I to yoke together: Xenocrates needs a spur, Aristotle a bit.*

^c Laert.

^f Ammon.

^g Interp.

^h Vit. Epic.

^f Whilst he lived with *Plato*, he was extremely studious, and given to reading, insomuch that *Plato* called his house, *the house of the great Reader*, and would often say, ^g *Let us go to the great Reader's house*. This may be confirmed by that great number of antient Authors which are cited in his works. And though ^h *Laertius* (either in his own, or *Carneades's* words) saith, that *Aristotle* hath thrust in as many sentences of old Authors in his writings, as both *Zeno* and *Chrysippus*; yet, every one that is acquainted with the writings of *Aristotle*, knoweth how judiciously and concisely he giveth an account of their opinions, not for ostentation, but disquisition.

Some report there was a great enmity betwixt *Plato* and *Aristotle*, ⁱ which first arose from *Plato's* dislike of his manner of habit: For, *Aristotle* wore rich garments, and rich shooes, and contrary to *Plato's* rule, cut his hair short, and wore rings. He had likewise (say they) a scornfull derision in his look, and tenacious contradiction in his discourse, which *Plato* not approving, preferred before him *Xenocrates*, *Speusippus*, *Amyclas*, and others, to whom he communicated his Doctrine and many favours; but repudiated *Aristotle*, who thereupon, ^k whilst *Plato* was yet alive, set up a School in opposition to him, in the *Lycæum*: at which ingratitude, *Plato* much troubled, said, *Aristotle kicks at us as young Colts at the damme that foaled them, when they have sucked their fill*, and ^l for that reason, usually called *Aristotle* the Colt.

^k Laert.

^l *Ælian*. var. *hisl.* 4. 9. *Heladius*, apud *photium*, in *biblioth.*
^m *Ælian*.

^m They add, that *Xenocrates* being gone into his Country, and *Speusippus* not well, *Aristotle* came into *Plato's* School with some of his followers, and circumvented him with fallacious arguments, whereupon *Plato* retired to his own house, and there taught privately, leaving *Aristotle* in possession of the Schoole, which he kept, till *Xenocrates* returning, ejected him, and reinstated *Plato*. The chiefe author of this report seemes to have been

been *Aristoxenus*, cited by ^p *Eusebius*, who as ^p *Suidas* observes, ⁿ *Prap. Evang. lib. 15.* as soon as *Aristotle* was dead, cast many aspersions upon him, out of a malicious revenge, because *Aristotle* preferred *Theophrastus* before him in the succession of the School, notwithstanding that *Aristoxenus* had gained a great name and credit among the Disciples. ^o *In Aristoxeno.*

But as *Ammonius* argues, it is not likely that *Aristotle*, if he would, could have ejected *Plato* out of the School, or have obtained licence to erect a new one in opposition to him; for as much as at the same time, *Chabrias* and *Timotheus*, *Plato*'s kinsmen, were in great power, and Generalls of the Athenian forces. Yet, some there are who affirm this; grounding it only on *Aristotles* contradicting of *Plato* in many things; to which *Ammonius* answers, that *Aristotle* doth not simply contradict *Plato*, but those who misinterpret his writings. For, if he do sometimes contradict *Plato*, what wonder? seeing that therein he followeth *Plato* his Author, whose saying it was, that Truth ought to be preferred before all things; as also that saying, *Socrates* indeed is dear, but Truth most dear. And elsewhere, What *Socrates* saith, we must not so much regard, as we ought to be solicitous concerning Truth. The same course *Aristotle* took, if at any time he confuted *Plato*'s assertion; therein obeying him, by following the Truth, and it is observed by ^p some, that he is very sparing in naming him, where he opposeth his doctrine, and that thrice he makes honourable mention of him in his ^q *Rhetoric*, his Book of the world, (if that be his) and his ^r *Problems*. ^p *Licetus de piet. Aristot.* ^q *Lib. 1. cap. 15.* ^r *Probl. lib. 30.*

True therefore it is, (as ^t *Apollodorus*, *Dionysius Halicarnassensis*, but especially *Aristotle* himselfe, in his ^t *Epistle to Philip*, affirm, ^u *Ver. Interp.*) that he was a constant, sedulous hearer of *Plato* twenty years, ^u unto the thirty seventh of his age, even untill *Plato* died, ^u and then was so great an honourer of his memory, that in testimony of his extraordinary affection, he erected an Altar to him, bearing this inscription:

* This Altar *Aristotle*'s hand did raise
To *Plato*, whom the impious must not praise.

x *Ammon.*

^y *Olympiodorus* speaking of the honour which *Aristotle* gave to his Master, confirmeth it by this argument, that he writ a whole oration in commendation of *Plato*, wherein he first made a relation of his life, then praised him. He adds, that *Aristotle* in his Elegies to *Eudemus*, extolls him thus:

y *Comment. in Gorg. Plat.*

And coming to the fam'd *Cecropian Town*,
In signe of friendship did an Altar raise
To him, whom impious persons must not praise:
Who straying man to vertue did restore
Much by his precept, by example more.

One

*One to the Gods so pious, good to men,
No future age must think to see again.*

² Athen. deipn.

⁸.

² Some affirm, that whilst he lived with Plato, he profess'd

Medicine, and kept a shop: but those ² Aristocles confutes.

² 5. 9.

² Euseb. pra.

par. Evang.

CHAP. IV.

How he lived with Hermias.

² Laert. Suid.

Plato dying in the first year of the 108th Olympiad, and Spensippus, his Nephew succeeding in the School, Aristotle went to Hermias the Eunuch, King of Atarna, a City of Mysia in Asia, who heretofore had been his fellow Disciple under Plato, and had a particular kindness for him. Hermias received him with great testimonies of love and respect. With him he lived three years, [^b instructing him in Philosophy,] at the end whereof, Hermias was (as ^c Strabo saith) surpris'd by Memnon, a Rhodian, and sent to Artaxerxes, King of Persia, who put him to death. Pythais his sister, a woman of extraordinary vertue, (whom Hermias, having no children, had design'd his heir) being upon this accident reduced to great extremities and afflictions, Aristotle, in a pious gratitude to the memory of his friend, (as his own ^d Letter to Antipater attesteth) took her to wife, and ^e set up the statue of Hermias in the Temple at Delphi, with this Inscription.

^b Suid.

^c Lib. 13.

^d Euseb. contr.

Philos.

^e Laert.

*This man the Persian King against all right
A sacrifice to his fierce anger made,
Not like a foe by martiall armes in fight;
But as a friend by show of love betray'd.*

He wrote likewise a Hymne to Vertue, in memory of his Friend, to this effect.

*Vertue, whom we all obtain
With much labour, but more gain,
For your sake to dy would please,
Toyle and torments were but ease.
You direct men in pursuit
Of immortall sacred fruit,
Richer far then gold refin'd,
Soft as sleep, as parents kinde.
Great Alcides for your sake
Labours vast did undertake.*

Leda's valiant twins made known
 More your glories then their own;
 Ajax and Achilles too
 Only dy'd for love of you;
 Ah! for you Atarna's pride,
 Hermias untimely dy'd.
 But his name we will revive;
 That our Muse shal keep alive,
 Paying hospitable Jove
 Pious thanks for a friends love.

There wanted not those who cast many aspersions and calumnies upon this Vertuous friendship: some affirm'd that *Hermias* lov'd *Aristotle* inordinately (an imputation not well suiting with an Eunuch) and that for this Reason, he gave him *Pythais* to wife, whom *Suidas* and the Greek *Etymologist* affirm to have been his Daughter either by Nature or Adoption, *Demetrius Magnesian* his Neece, *Aristippus* his Concubine, so little do they agree in their relation. They adde that *Aristotle* was so passionately in Love with her, that he sacrificed to her after the same manner, as the Athenians to *Ceres* at *Eleusis*. This *Laertius* relates as done whilst she was alive; But *Lyco* first Author of this calumny, that it was after her death. Moreover, that *Aristotle* in a thankfull acknowledgement of his Bounty, wrote a *Pæan* in praise of *Hermias*, meaning the Hymn last mentioned, which *Athenæus*, proveth ^{f Deipn.lib. 15.} against the calumniation of *Demophilus* not to be a sacred hymne or *Pæan*, but a *Solion* or Festivall Song. Hence *Theocritus* the Chian derides him in this Epigram.

To the slave Eunuch who Atarne swai'd
 An empty tombe empty Aristotle made,
 Who from the Academy did retire
 To wallow in vain pleasures faithless mire.

In answer to these calumnies (first raised by *Lyco*, dispersed further by *Aristippus*, and continued by those that maligne the memory of *Aristotle*) *Apellio* writ certain Books, wherein he accurately confutes those who durst in this manner impudently blaspheme (such are his words) the name of *Aristotle*; so much prejudice and malice being in the accusation, as might easily argue the falseness thereof.

^{g Laert.} Upon the death of *Hermias*, *Aristotle* (^h and with *Xenocrates*) fled from *Atarna* to *Mitylene*, as *Apollodorus* and *Dionysius Halicarnassæus* affirm in the fourth year of the 108. Olympiad, *Eubulus* being Archon. ^{h Strab.lib. 13.}

CHAP. V.

How he lived with Philip and Alexander.

ABout this time *Philip* King of *Macedonia*, Father of *Alexander*, taking care for the Education of his Son, now growing towards mans estate, and unwilling (saith ^a *Plutarch*) to commit his Education to Professors of Musick, or any other of the liberall Sciences, as knowing him fit for higher designs, sent to *Aristotle* the most famous and learned of Philosophers, to come and instruct him. ^b *Agellius* recites his Epistle, which was to this effect.

^a *Vit. Alexand.*

^b *Lib. 9. cap. 3.*

Philip to Aristotle, health.

KNow that I have a Son, I render the Gods many thanks; not so much for his birth, as that he was born in your time, for I hope that being educated and instructed by you, he will become worthy both of us, and the Kingdom which he shall inherit.

Aristotle at this request of *Philip*, went to *Macedonia* to him, in the 4th year of the 108. Olympiad, as ^c *Apollodorus* and *Dionysius Halicarnassensis* affirm, at what time *Alexander* was fifteen years old.

^c *Laert.*

^d *Ammon.*

^e *Vet. Interp.*

^f *Vit. Alexand.*

^g *Plut.*

^d He lived there infinitely esteem'd and beloved of *Philip* and *Olympia* his Wife, *Alexander's* Mother, ^e They caused his Statue to be made and set up in honour of him. *Philip* had a kindnesse so particular for him that he allo'wd him in manner an equal share in the Government of the Kingdom, which interest, *Ammonius* saith, he employed to the advantage as well of private persons, as of the publick, as appeareth (saith the Latine Interpreter of his life) by his Epistles to *Philip*. ^f *Plutarch* affirms, that *Philip* as a recompence to *Aristotle*, reedified the Town where hee was born, *Stagira*, which he had before laid wast. He likewise assign'd him a School and study, near *Mieza* a Town of *Macedonia* not far from thence, where, unto this day (saith *Plutarch*) they shew the stony seats and shady walks of *Aristotle*.

^g He instructed *Alexander* in the deepest parts of Learning, not only in Ethick and Politicks, but his most reserved and solid Doctrines call'd *Acroatick* and *Epopick*; never communicated to the Vulgar.

That he taught him likewise the Art of Medicine, *Plutarch* argueth, for as much as *Alexander* was not only exceedingly delighted with the Theory thereof, but practised it successfully upon many of his friends, to whom he prescribed Receipts and diets, as appeareth, saith he, by his Epistle.

Hence

ARISTOTLE.

9

^h Perceiving *Alexander* to be much taken with *Homer's Iliads*, ^{h Plut.} as conceiving, and calling it the best institution of military Vertue, he took much pains in correcting and restoring the text, and then gave it to *Alexander*, which copy he infinitely prized.

He writ a Book to *Alexander*, intituled; *Of a Kingdom*, mentioned by *Laertius* and *Ammonius*, wherein he instructed him how to rule.

ⁱ So much did he incline the mind of *Alexander* to do good, ^{i Vel. Interp.} that he used to say, if any day pass'd wherein he had not conferred some benefit, *I have not reign'd to day.*

^h *Alexander* so much affected him, that he professed he admir- ^{h Plut. vii.} ed and loved him no less than his Father, because his Father, ^{Alex.} he said, only gave him being, but *Aristotle* well-being.

The love which *Philip* and *Alexander* bore him was so great, that *Theocritus* the Chian cast the same aspersions upon it, as he did on his friendship with *Hermias*.

In the first year of the 111th Olympiad; *Pythodorus* being Archon; *Philip* dyed, and was succeeded by his Son *Alexander*, whose active spirit, soon after his coming to the Crown, designed an expedition against the King of *Persia*. Hereupon *Aristotle* having now lived with *Alexander* eight years, (though *Justine* saith but five, which some interpret of the time before *Philips* death, but not without some violence, for that was above seven) preferring the quiet of a Contemplative life before the troubles of War, took leave of him, returned to *Athens*, leaving in his room *Callisthenes* an Olynthian, his Kinsman (Son of his Cozen *Hero*) and Disciple; whom before his departure observing to speak with too much liberty and obstinacy to the King, he reprov'd in these words, ^{i Laert.}

*Son, if thou thus employ thy tongue;
Thy thread of life cannot be long.*

And so it came to passe not long after upon this occasion. *Hermolaus* Son of *Sopolis*, a youth of a noble Family that studied Philosophy under *Callisthenes*, hunting the Wild Bore with *Alexander*, prevented the King by casting his dart first at him; for which he was by the Kings command punished with many stripes. Troubled at the ignominy thereof, he conspired with *Sostratus*, *Antipater*, and some other companions of his to murder *Alexander*; which treason being discovered by *Epimenes* one of the Conspirators, they were all put to death. *Aristobulus* and *Ptolemæus* Son of *Lagus* affirms they accused *Callisthenes*, as him who instigated them to this attempt. Hereupon *Callisthenes* was put into an iron Cage, and so carried up and down in a miserable fordid condition, and at last, as *Laertius* relates (though others otherwise) thrown to Lyons and devoured.

(bbb 2)

CHAP:

His School and manner of Teaching.

a Laert.
b Epist. ad
Amm.

THUS *Aristotle* having lived eight years with *Alexander*, returned to *Athens*, as ^a *Apollodorus* and ^b *Diomysius Halitarnassæus* affirm, in the second year of the hundred and eleventh Olympiad, *Pythodorus* being Archon, where he found *Xenocrates* teaching in the Academy, which place was resigned unto him by *Speusippus*, in the fourth year of the hundred and ninth Olympiad.

c Laert.

d Discuss. Perip.

Hence it appeareth, that ^c *Hermippus* erreth, in affirming, that *Xenocrates* took upon him the School of *Plato*, at what time *Aristotle* was sent by the Athenians on an Embassy to *Philip*. For as ^d *Patricius* hath observed, it can no way agree in time, it being certain, as *Laertius* attests, that *Speusippus* succeeded *Plato* in the School in the first year of the hundred and eight Olympiad, immediately upon *Plato's* death, and continued therein eight years, that is, to the end of the hundred and ninth Olympiad; in the second year of which Olympiad, *Aristotle*, as we said, went to *Philip*, not on an Embassy, but upon his invitation to educate *Alexander*.

e Laert.
f Suid.

Neither is the Author of *Aristotle's* life lesse mistaken, who saith, that upon the death of *Speusippus*, the Athenians sent to *Aristotle*, and that both of them, *Aristotle* and *Xenocrates*, took upon them *Plato's* School, *Xenocrates* in the Academy, *Aristotle* in the *Lyceum*. But this error is easily detected by the same computation; for at the time of *Speusippus's* death, *Aristotle* was with *Alexander*, nor did he leave him untill six years after, all which time *Xenocrates* profess'd Philosophy in the Academy.

The Academy being prepossess'd by *Xenocrates*, *Aristotle* made choice of the *Lyceum*, (a place in the suburbs of *Athens*, built by *Pericles* for the exercising of Souldiers.) Here he taught and discoursed of Philosophy, to such as came to him, walking constantly every day till the houre of anointing, which the Greeks usually did before meals, whence he and his followers are called *αὐτὸν μεμνῆται*, from walking *Peripateticks*. Others say, he was called *Peripatetick* from walking with *Alexander*, newly recovered of a sicknesse, in which manner he used to discourse of Philosophy with him.

g Laert.

The number of his auditors encreasing very much, he gave over walking, and taught sitting, saying,

*Now to be silent most disgracefull were,
And see Xenocrates possesse the chair.*

Though

Though *Cicero* and *Quintilian* affirm, he used this verse against *Isocrates*, in emulation of whom, he taught Rhetorick to his Disciples every morning. ^b So many Disciples resorted to him, ^h *Laert.* that he made Lawes in his School, as *Xenocrates* did in the *Academy*, creating *Archons* that ruled ten daies.

ⁱ The discourse and doctrine which he delivered to his Disciples was of two kinds. One he called *Exoterick*, the other *Acro-* ^{i Agell. lib. 21. cap. 5.} *atick*. *Exoterick* were those which conduced to Rhetorick, meditation, nice disputes, and the knowledge of civill things. *Acroatick* those in which more remote and subtile Philosophy was handled, and such things as pertain to the contemplation of nature, and *Dialectick* disceptations. *Acroatick* Discipline he taught in the *Lyceum* in the morning, not admitting every one to come and hear them, but those only, of whose wit and principles of Learning, and diligence in study, he had before made tryall. His *Exoterick* Lectures were in the afternoon and evenings; these he communicated to all young men without any distinction, calling the latter his *evening walk*, the former, his *morning walk*.

CHAP. VII.

His Philosophy.

IN *Philosophy* (saith ^a *Ammonius*) he seemeth to have done more ^a *Vit. Ar.* than Man, for there is not any part of Philosophy whereof he treated, but he doth it most accurately, and many things he himselfe (such was his sagacity and acutenesse) finding out, completed and finished.

^b In *Logick* it was his invention, that he separated the precepts ^b *Ammon. vit. Ar.* of Disputation from the things themselves of which we dispute, and taught the manner and reason of disputation. For they who went before, though they could demonstrate, yet they knew not how to make a demonstration; as they who cannot make shooes, but only wear them. *Alexander Aphrodisseus* affirms, that he first reduced Syllogismes to *Mood* and *Figure*. *Philoponus*, that he invented all *Dialectick Method*, whence *Theodorus* calls him, both *inventer* and *perfecter* of *Logick*, which he indeed in a manner challengeth (but modestly) to himselfe, in the last Chapter of his *Elenchs*, affirming nothing had been done in that kinde before, but what the *Eristicks* and *Sophists* taught. As for the *Categories*, the invention whereof some ascribe to the *Pythagoreans*, it is much more probable that they were wholly his own; for those books entituled *αρχαὶ ἀρχαί*, under the name of *Archytas*, from which some conceive *Aristotle* to have borrowed much, the particulars whereof are instanced by ^c *Patricius*

^c *Disserat. Peripat.* ^e *Patricius*, *Themistius* affirms, to have been written, not by the *Pythagorean* (neither hath *Laertius* made mention of any writings of his, for the *Pythagoreans* at that time wrote but little, the first that wrote any thing being *Philolaus*) but by some *Peripatetic*, who thought his work might passe with greater credit, if published in the name of so antient a Philosopher.

In *Physick* the first essence, whereof celestiall bodies consist, distinct from the foure Elements, is generally ascribed to his invention, only *Simplicius* citeth the authority of *Xenocrates*, in his book of the life of *Plato*, that *Plato* constituted five simple bodies, Heaven, and the foure Elements asserting they differ no lesse in nature then in figure, for which reason he assigned the figure of a *Dodecaedron* to Heaven, differing from the figure of the foure Elements. But these, as the learned *Nunnesius* observes, seem to be rather Symbolicall, and Pythagoricall, then the true meaning of *Plato*. For *Plato* in his *Timæus* expressly avers, that the Heavens are of their own nature dissolute, but by the divine Will, are kept together, as it were, by a Tye from being dissolved. *Xenarchus*, a Philosopher, wrote against the first Essence, introduced by *Aristotle*, whom *Alexander Aphrodisæus* exactly answereth. *Theodorus* calleth *Aristotle*, the Perfeiler of *Physick*, adding, that only his writings upon that subject were approved by following ages, who rejected whatsoever others had written in the same kinde, as appeareth by their losse. What *Epicure* and others have objected against him as a fault, that he enquired with such diligence into the minute, and meanest things of nature, is a sufficient testimony of his excellence and exactnesse in this study.

^d In *Ethick*, whereas *Polyæus* placed Felicity in externall goods, *Plato* in those of the soule only, *Aristotle* placed it chiefly in the soule; but affirmed it to be defiled and straightned if it want exteriour goods, properly using these terms. For those things which are defiled have the same beauty within, but their superficies only is hidden; and those which are straightned have the same reall magnitude.

^e In *Metaphysick*, which he calleth *First-Philosophy*, and *Wisdom*, and (as the more antient Philosophers before him) *Theologie*,^f though there be not any invention of his extant, yet, he perfectly went through all the parts thereof. For he was not only acquainted, as some falsely imagine, with terrestriall things, and those which belong to this World; but even with those things which are above this World, as may appear from the eight book of his *Physick*, where he saith, that the first cause is not subject to motion, neither in it selfe, nor by accident, in which words he declareth, that God is not a body, nor any way passible. And in his 12th book of *Wisdom*, or *Metaphysicks*, he discourseth accurately of God and *Intelligences*, in a ratiōall clear way, not involv'd in Fables, or Pythagoricall Symbols; but, founding his asser-

^e *Ammon.*

^f *Ammon.*

assertion upon reason and demonstration, as much as the subject, and human reason alloweth. ^g *Patricius* labours much to prove that whatsoever he had in this kind excellent, he borrow'd from *Hermes Trismegistus*. But (^h as we have already said,) Mr. *Casaubon* hath fully evinc'd that Book to have been imposed upon the World by some later writer. ^g *Dissert. Peripat.* ^h *In the life of Plato. cap.*

What is added by the antient Latine Interpreter concerning *Aristotle's* sentence of that visuall Hexagonall Pyramid, (which ⁱ a learned person hath observed to be chosen as a middle way betwixt the sentence of those who made the optick penicill a pyramid of a quadratick base, and those who made it of a Conick figure,) is very obscure, and hardly admits of an Interpretation worthy so great an Author. ⁱ *Nunnius in 7th. Arist.*

CHAP. VIII.

His correspondence with Alexander.

WHilst *Aristotle* taught Philosophy at *Athens*, his Disciple *Alexander* was employed in an Expedition to *Asia* against *Darius* King of *Persia*, incited thereunto by the principles of Honour, which were infused into him by *Aristotle*, particularly from the Presidents of *Achilles*, *Ajax*, and other Heroes celebrated by *Homer*, whose *Iliads* *Aristotle* had so carefully recommended unto him. He began this expedition in the third year of the 11th Olympiad, at which time *Ctesicles* was Archon at *Athens*, immediately after the departure of *Aristotle*, who (it is probable) came only for this reason from him, as preferring a quiet and studious life before the troubles of War.

The first thing that *Alexander* did, was to visit the Tombe of *Achilles* in the *Sigeum*, at the sight whereof he broke forth into these words; *O fortunate young man, that hadst a Homer to celebrate thy praise ! for had it not been for his Iliads, addes* ^a *Cicero*, in the same Tombe where *Achilles's* his body lay, his name also would have been buried. He took with him the *Iliads* of *Homer*, corrected by *Aristotle*, and made it his constant companion, insomuch that hee put it every night with his dagger, under his pillow. And in a Victory over *Darius*, having taken a Casket of Unguents of extraordinary value amongst the spoiles of *Darius*, beset with Pearles and precious stones, (as ^b *Pliny* describes it,) his friends telling him how many uses it might be put to, because Unguents did not become a Souldier; Yes, saith he, it shall serve to keep the Books of *Homer*, that the most precious work may be kept in the richest case; hence was this correct copy called, as *Plutarch* saith, *ἐν τῷ νυφίῳ*. ^a *In Licin.* ^b *Lib. 29.*

Whilst he was in *Asia*, engaged in the Warrs against *Darius*,
in

in the midst of his continuall Victories and businesse; hearing that *Aristotle* had published his *Acroatick* books of naturall Philosophy, he sent this Letter to him;

d Agell. 20. 5.
Plut. vit. Alex.

^d *Alexander to Aristotle, Health.*

YOU have not done well in publishing your *Acroatick* discourses, for wherein shall we excell others, if this Learning, wherein we have been instituted, be made common to all? As for me, I had rather excell others in knowledge then in power. Farewell.

To which *Aristotle* returned this answer.

c Agell. 20. 5.
Epist. Grac.

^c *Aristotle to Alexander, health.*

YOU wrote to me concerning my *Acroatick* Discourses, that they ought not to have been communicated but kept secret. Know, that they are made publick, and not publick, for none but they who have heard us can understand them. Farewel.

f Lib. 2. 16.

g Lib. 9.

h De offe. lib.
2. 19.

i Lib. 4. 19.

Thus, notwithstanding *Alexander* were busied in the Warres, yet he forgot not his Master *Aristotle*, but kept a friendly correspondence with him. So constant was he in his love to Learning, and particularly so much enflam'd (as ^f *Pliny* saith) with a curious desire of understanding the natures of living Creatures, that he sent thousands of men, throughout all *Asia* and *Greece* to procure all kinds of living Creatures, birds, beasts and fishes, at an excessive charge; ^g *Athenæus* saith, 800. Talents, which according to ^h *Budeus's* account is 840000. crowns: these men he sent with what they took to *Aristotle*, that he might not be ignorant of any thing that any Nation afforded; by which information, he composed, as *Pliny* affirmeth, 50. excellent Volumes, of *Living Creatures*, of which ten are only left, unlesse we put into the same number, those Books of his which have some near relation to this subject; as *Of the going of living Creatures*, 1. *Of the parts of living Creatures and their causes*, 4. *Of the Generation of living Creatures*, 5. If this were done by *Alexander*, as *Pliny* and *Athenæus* attest (though ⁱ *Ælian* ascribe it to *Philip*) it must necessarily have been whilst he was in his *Asiatick* expedition. For *Aristotle*, as hath been already proved, staid but a very short time with him after the death of his Father.

Aristotle made the same use of this correspondence with *Alexander*, as he had done of the Interest he before had with *Philip*, the advantage not only of particular person, but of whole Cities.

This City of *Stagira*, the place of his Birth, did acknowledge, which, at the suit of *Aristotle*, *Alexander* caused to be reedified, and

and repeopled, and restored to its former state, having before by *Philip* been laid levell with the ground, For, though *Plutarch* relate this as done in the time of *Philip*, *Laertius*, *Ammonius*, *Dion*, *Chrysostome*, *Ælian*, and others hold, that it was done by *Alexander*, to which *Valerius Maximus* addes, that it was not long before *Aristotles* death. In memory of which Benefit, the people of *Stagira* used to celebrate a yearly Festivall, which they called the *Aristotelean Feast*, naming the month in which it fell *Stagirites*.

¹ *Erebus* likewise, the Country of *Theophrastus*, which *Alexander* determined to punish very severely; by the mediation of *Aristotle* was pardoned. 1 Ammon.

That he benefited many particular persons is evident, saith *Ammonius*, from his Epistles to the King, yet extant, wherein he recommends severall persons to him.

Hence it is manifest, that the Author of his life is mistaken, when he affirmes, that in *Alexanders* Asiatick expedition, *Aristotle* accompanied him to the *Brachmanes*, where he writ that noble piece of the *Laws* and institutions of 255 Cities. That likewise he travelled over all Persia with *Alexander*, where during the war, *Alexander* died, and *Aristotle* returned into his own Country. This relation agrees not with the other circumstances of *Aristotles* life. *Alexander* died in the fourth year of the hundred and thirteenth Olympiad, two years before *Aristotle's* departure from *Athens*.

But as it is apparent, that this mistake proceeded only from ignorance (yet that so great, that ^m *Patricius* argues from thence, neither *Ammonius* nor *Philoponus* to be the Authors of his life) m Disser. Pe-
ripat. l. 1. so are there some other errors, which so lesse manifestly appear to have proceeded from malice, raised, it is likely, by the Authors of the other scandalls and imputations, wherewith they sought to blast his memory.

ⁿ Some affirm, that *Alexander* upon the treason of *Callisthenes*, n Laert. took a great displeasure against *Aristotle*; for having recommended him to him. For though at first, writing to *Criterus*, *Attalus*, and *Alcetas*, immediately upon this accident, he sent them word, that the youths had confessed, the plot proceeded only from themselves, not by the instigation of any other: ^o Yet afterwards, o Plut. vir
Alex. 1 in an Epistle to *Antipater*, he imputes the same crime to *Callisthenes*; not without this sharp reflection upon *Aristotle*: The youths, saith he, were stoned to death by the *Macedonians*; but, as for the Sophist, I will punish him my selfe, and those who sent him, and those who entertain in their Cities such as are Traitors to me. Hereupon they interpret the bounty of *Alexander* to *Xenocrates*, and favour to *Anaximenes*, as not proceeding from the magnificence of his disposition, ^p but from the displeasure he had conceived p Laert. against *Aristotle*, whom he endeavoured to vex, by obliging his adversaries and emulators.

(ccc)

Upon

Upon this supposed displeasure was grounded another report, that ^a *Aristotle* conspiring with *Cassander* against *Alexander*, sent him, by *Antipater*, some of the water of *Styx*, wherewith he poisoned *Alexander*. But the Relators hereof differ not a little amongst themselves: *Diodorus Siculus* and *Suidas* affirme, that *Alexander* was poisoned by *Cassander* son of *Antipater*; *Arianus* by *Jolla* his younger son: *Porphyrius* saith, that nothing but the horn of an Asse, such as the Asses of *Scythia* had, would contain the poyson: *Justine* and *Pausanias*, the hoofs of a Horse; *Pliny* and *Arrian* of a Mule; *Plutarch* and *Zonaras*, of an Asse: They differ no lesse about the place whence the water was fetch'd. Neither indeed can it be expected there should be a better harmony amongst the Relators of this Fable, when there is so great dissention, and variety of relations, concerning the occasion and manner of his death. But the most creditable is that of *Ephippus* (^c cited by *Athenaus*) (^c *Orosius*, ^c *Justine*, and others, who averr, that *Alexander* died of a Feaver, caused by excesse of drinking.

^r Deipn. 10. 11.
^f Lib. 3. cap. 21.
^t Lib. 12.

CHAP. IX.

Upon what occasion he left Athens, and went to Chalcis.

^a Laert.

^a Twelve years *Aristotle* profess'd Philosophy in the *Lycæum*, not molested by any; for though his eminence in Learning procured him many Emulators and enemies, yet, the favour he had with *Alexander*, whilst he lived, awed them so much, that they durst not make any discovery of the ill will they bore him. No sooner was *Alexander* dead (according to *Dionysius Halicarnassæus*) but some of them conspired against his life. To which end, *Eurymedon*, a Priest, or (according to *Phavorinus*) *Démophilus*, accused him of impiety; that he introduced some Philosophicall assertions, contrary to the Religion of the Athenians; that he celebrated *Hermias* as a God, with a hymne, and had caused his statue to be set up in the *Delphian Temple*, with an honourable inscription. Some affirm hereupon he made an Oration in defence of himselfe, at the Court of *Arcopagus*, wherein he openly pronounced this verse, made out of two in ^b *Homer*.

^b Odyss. 5.

Pearres upon pearres, and figs on figs grow here;

By *ἄνω ἐπὶ οὐκ*, (*figs on figs*) reflecting upon the multitude of *Sycophants* which sprang up every day in the City. Hence *Phavorinus* saith, he was the first Philosopher that pleaded for himselfe, and there was an Oration to that purpose went about many years after under his name. But, of the truth hereof, *Athenæus* maketh question. ^c Others

Others affirm, that *Aristotle* perceiving the conspiracy that was against his life, stole privately out of *Athens*, and went to *Chalcis*, where he spent the rest of his daies, returning to his friends, who demanded the reason of his going, this answer, *We left Athens, that we might not give the Athenians occasion to commit again the same wickednesse they committed against Socrates, that they might not be guilty of a double crime against Philosophy.* To *Antipater* he wrote the fore-mentioned verse,

Pears upon pears, and figs on figs grow here;

Giving him to understand how dangerous it was for him to live in *Athens*, since the Athenians were wholly addicted to Syco-phantisme and calumny. This departure of *Aristotle* from *Athens*, *Dionysius Halicarnassæus* placeth in the second year of the hundred and fourteenth Olympiad, *Apollodorus* a yeer latter, perhaps lesse rightly.

Being neer lixtie two yeers of age, very sickly, and without hope of living much longer, the whole company of his followers came to him, and besought him to make choice of a Successor, whom after his death they might look upon as the perfecter of those studies whereinto he had brought them. There were at that time many excellent Scholars in his School, but especially two; *Theophrastus* and *Menedemus*, or rather as *Patricius* reads, *Eudemus*. These excelled the rest in Wit and Learning. The first was of *Lesbos*, *Eudemus* of *Rhodes*. *Aristotle* answered them, he would do as they requested, when he saw it convenient. Soon after, the same persons being present who had made this request to him, he complained, the wine which he then drank did not agree with his health, but was unwholesome and harsh; and therefore desired they would send for other sorts, both *Rhodian* and *Lesbian*, saying, he would make use of that which he should finde best for him. They go, seek, finde, bring. *Aristotle* first calls for the *Rhodian*, tastes it, a strong wine, saith he, and pleasant: then calls for the *Lesbian*, which having tasted, both, saith he, are good, but *the Lesbian is the sweeter*; whereby every one understood that his choice was not of the wine, but of his successour, which was *Theophrastus* of *Lesbos*, a man of extraordinary sweetnesse in discourse and conversation: Whence not long after, as soon as *Aristotle* was dead, all his Disciples applyed themselves to *Theophrastus*.

CHAP. X.

His Apophthegms.

a Laert.

OF his *Apophthegms* are remembered these.
Being demanded what a man got by lying, he answered, *not to be believed when he spoke truth.*

Being reproved for giving money to a wicked man: *I, saith he, gave it compassionating, not ~~τὸν ἄνθρωπον~~, the condition; but, ~~τὸν ἀνθρώπου~~: or as Stobæus, not to the man, but to humanity.*

He used this saying frequently amongst his disciples and friends, *the eye receives light from the air, the soul from learning.*

Inveighing against the Athenians, he said, *They had incensed two things, Corn and Law; but made use only of one, the Corn.*

He said, *The root of learning is bitter, the fruit sweet.*

Being demanded what growes old soonest, he answered, *a Benefit.*

Being demanded what is Hope, he answered, *a waking Dream.*

Diogenes the Cynick offered him a fig: *Aristotle* perceiving that *Diogenes* had prepared some sharp saying, in case he should have refused it, took the fig, telling *Diogenes*, he had lost both his figg and his conceit. Then throwing it up into the aire, and catching it, as boyes use to do, *O worthy Diogenes*, said he, and restored it.

He said, *to Learning three things are requisite, Nature, Institution, Exercise.*

Being told, that one had reviled him: *when I am absent*, said he, *let him beat me too.*

He said, *Beauty was a better recommendation then any Letter.* Others ascribe this to *Diogenes*, adding, that *Aristotle* called beauty, *the gift of a specious form.*

He called *Socrates* a short-liv'd Tyranny; *Plato*, *Natures Privilege*; *Theophrastus* silent fraud; *Theocritus*, specious hurt; *Carneades*, a guardlesse Kingdome.

b Meant per
haps of that
Carneades
who was Disci-
ple to Anaxa-
goras.

Being demanded what difference there is betwixt the learned and unlearned, he answered, *as much as between the living and the dead.*

He said, *Learning in prosperity is an ornament, in adversity a refuge.*

He said, *they who educated children well, are more to be honoured, then they who beget them; for these only gave them life, others well-living.*

To one, boasting of the greatnesse of his Country: *That*, saith he, *is not to be considered, but whether a man deserve to be of a great Country.*

He said, *Friends are one soul in two bodies.*

He

He said, *some men lived so sparingly as if they were to live alwaies, others so prodigally, as if they were to die to morrow.*

To one that asked why we love the company of those that are fair; *That, saith he, is a question for a blind man to ask.*

Being asked what he had gotten by Philosophy, he answer'd, *to do those things voluntarily, which others do for fear of the Law.*

Being demanded how Disciples should profit most; he answer'd, *if they follow those that are before them, and stay not for those behind them.*

To a foolish talker, who after a long Discourse said to him, *I am afraid I have been tedious to you; not at all,* answer'd he, *for I did not mind you.*

Being asked how we should behave our selves towards our Friends, he answer'd, *as we would have them do towards us.*

He said, *Justice is the vertue of giving to every one according to his desert.*

He said, *Learning was the best provision against old age.*

He used, as *Phalarinus* relates in the second of his Commentaries, to say frequently, *he who hath many friends hath none; which is likewise extant in the seventh book of his Ethicks.*

He said, *when things happen not as we would, we must will as they* *Stob. ser. 28. happen.*

Seeing a youth very self-conceited, and withall ignorant; *Ser. 45.* young man, saith he, *I wish I were what you think your self, and my enemies what you are.*

Seeing a young man proud of a fine Cloak, *why boast you,* saith *Ibid.* he, *of a Sheeps Fleece?*

He said, *they who demonstrate plain things, light a candle to see the* *Ser. 46. Sun.*

Being reviled by an impudent person; *Thou,* saith he, *who art* *Ser. 101.* *vers'd to bear all things, speakest them with delight, I who am not used to speak them, take no delight in hearing them.*

Being demanded why he who taught others to speak, himselfe *Ser. 128.* held his tongue, *a whetstone,* saith he, *cannot cut, yet it sets an edge upon swords.*

Being asked who can keep a secret, *He,* saith he, *that can hold* *Ibid.* *a glowing coal in his mouth.*

Seeing a young man very neatly dress'd, *are you not ashamed,* *Ser. 151.* saith he, *when Nature made you a man, to make your self a woman.*

A handsome young man, much courted, said to him, *If I were* *Ibid.* *hated of the Citizens as you are, I would hang my self; And Is reply'd* he, *would hang my self if I were lov'd by them as you are.*

Being demanded how a man should come to be rich; he answer'd, *by being poor in desire.* *Serm.*

It repented him of three things; that he had ever committed a se- *Ser. 305.* *cret*

cret to a Woman; that he had rid when he might have gone a foot; that he had lived one day not having his Will made.

CHAP. XI.

His will and Death.

From that speech of *Aristotle* last mentioned, may be gathered how carefull he was to make his Will, but more from the exact form thereof which was thus :

a Laert.

BE all well; but if it happen otherwise, thus *Aristotle* maketh his Will Be Antipater my sole Executor during the Minority of Nicanor. Let Aristomenes, Timarchus, Hipparchus, Dioteles, (and if he please, and have leifnre) Theophrastus, be Guardians of the children of Herpylis, and all that I leave. I will that my Daughter, as soon as she shall be marriageable be given Nicanor, for Wife. If any thing happen otherwise (which God forbid) before she be married, or, after she be married before she hath any Children, let Nicanor have the ordering of my Sonne, and the disposall of all other things, for his reputation and mine. Let therefore Nicanor take care of the Maid Pythais, and my Son Nicomachus, and order their Estates according to their condition, as a Father and a Brother. If in the mean time any thing shall happen to Nicanor (which God forbid) either before my Daughter be married, or, if married, before she hath any Children, if he make any Will, as he appointeth, so let it be. Otherwise, if Theophrastus approve of it, let him marry the Maid, and have the same power, that Nicanor should have had. Otherwise let the Estates as well of the Maid as the Boy be disposed with the joint consent of the Guardians, and Antipater, as they shall think fit. Let likewise the Executors of Nicanor take care to remember us and Herpylis, since that she hath been faithful to me, and, if she will take a husband, that such a one be given unto her as may be no disparagement unto us. Let them give her out of my Estate, besides what is already mentioned

mentioned, a Talent of Silver, three Maid-servants, if shee so please, and the handmaid which she hath, and the boy Pyrrhæus. And moreover, if she will dwell at Chalcis, let her have that habitation which joyneth to the Garden, if at Stagira, our Patrimoniall seat; which, howsoever Herpylis shall choose, let the Executors furnish it; as they shall think convenient and proper for Herpylis. Let likewise Nicanor take charge of the Boy Mirmax, that he may be restored honourably, as becommeth us, unto his own, with all his goods which we delivered to our Trust. Let likewise Ambracis be a free woman, and have bestowed upon her, at her marriage, fifty Drachmes, and the Girle which she hath. I will likewise that to Thales, be given, besides the Handmaid he hath bought, a thousand Drachmes, and another Handmaid. Likewise to Simo, besides that money which he hath already received to buy a Servant; let another Servant be bought, or the like Sum be given again, wherewith he may purchase one. As soon as my Daughter shall be married, let Tycho, Philo, Olympias and his Son be free men. Of those boyes which served me, let none be sold, but let my Heirs make use of their service, and when they come to age, as they deserve let them be manumitted. Let the Executors take care to those Statues of Nicanor, and his Mother, and Proxenus, which I gave order for to Gryllius, as soon as they are perfected, be set up. Let likewise the Statue of Arimnestus be set up, that this monument may remain of him; since he died without Children. I will likewise that the Statue of my Mother be consecrated to Ceres in the Nemeæan Temple, or where else shall be thought fitting. Wheresoever my Body is buried by the Executors, thither let the bones of Pythais, according as she desired, be brought, and laid with mine. Let likewise Nicanor, if he continue well in health, dedicate at Stagira, to Jupiter Soter, and Minerva Sotira, Statues of Beasts, of stone, of four cubits, in performance of the vow which wee vowed for him.

ARISTOTLE.

b Laert.

He died at *Chalcis*, in the third year of the 114th Olympiad, *Philocles* being Archon, in the 63. the great Climaſtericall year, of his age (not as ^b *Eumelus*, 70. years old) as appeareth by the computation of *Apollodorus* and *Dionysius Halicarnassensis*; thus;

	y.
He came to <i>Athens</i> at	18.
Heard <i>Plato</i>	20. .
Lived with <i>Hermias</i>	3. .
With <i>Philip</i> and <i>Alexander</i>	8.
Taught in the <i>Lyceum</i>	12.
Lived at <i>Chalcis</i>	2.
in all	63.

c Lib. 1.

The manner of his life is variously related, ^c *Strabo*, ^e *Hesychius Illuſtris*, and from him *Suidas* relate, that he drunk Hemlock, either being condemn'd thereunto by the Athenians, as *Socrates* was; or to prevent their Judgement.

d *Paran. ad*
gent.
e *Stelicut. 1.*
f *Ant. Jeſt. 19. 8*

^a *Justine Martyr*, ^c *Gregory Nazianzene*, ^e *Cælius Rhodoginus*, the Greek *Etymologiſt*, *Nonnus*, and others follow the common report, that a question was propos'd to him of the wonderfull nature of *Euripus*, an arm of the Sea, coming into *Chalcis* (as *Lucian* avert:) which ebberh and floweth seven times in 24. hours. Not being able to resolve it, he died of shame and anxiety. Some affirm that as he ſate on the bank, having considered long upon it, he at last threw himself headlong into the River, saying, *ſince Aristotle could not take Euripus, Euripus take thou Aristotle.*

g *Laert.*
h *Epist. ad*
Amm.
i *De die. natali.*

But the Authors of greatest credit, ^g *Apollodorus*, ⁱ *Dionysius Halicarnassæus*, ⁱ *Censorinus*, *Laertius* and others affirm, that he died of a pain in his stomach, caused by over-watching, and excess of study. For *Laertius* affirms he was a most indefatigable student, and when he went to bed, he held a brazen ball in his hand, that when he fell asleep, the noise of it falling into a Basin set under it for that purpose, might awake him, which *Alexander* his Disciple imitated. To this pain of the stomach he was very subject, and sometimes asswaged it by applying a bottle of hot oile to his Breast. Notwithstanding this naturall infirmity of his stomach, saith *Censorinus*, and the frequent indisposition of a sickly constitution, hee preserved himself a Long time through his Vertue and Temperance, for it is much more strange that he attained the age of 63. years, then that he lived no longer.

k *Antiq. Jeſt.*
18. 31.

The Author of the book *de Pomo*, affirmeth, that when he was dying, he said to his Disciples standing about him, it was not without reason that *Homer* said, the Gods came down to earth to relieve mankind. ^k *Coelius Rhodoginus* adds from the same Author, that when he felt the pangs of death to come upon him, weeping between grieve and hope, he often repeated these words

words, *Thou Cause of Causes, have mercy on me*: And his Disciples, when they saw he was departing, said, *He who receiveth the souls of Philosophers, may he take thine likewise, and lay it up in his own Treasury, as the soul of a right and perfect man, as we have known thee to be.* Of this, there is no testimony more antient, then that of the Author of the book *de Pomo*, who (as *Patricius* clearly observes from his writings) was a Christian.

¹ The *Stagirites* fetch'd his body from *Chalcis* to *Stagira*, where ¹ *vet. interp.* they buried it with much solemnity, building a magnificent Tombe for him, and erecting an Altar to his memory.

CHAP. XII.

His Person and Vertues.

^a **A**S concerning his person, he was slender, having little eyes, ^a *Laert.* and a small voice. When he was young, *Laertius* and *Plutarch* affirm, he had a great hesitation in his speech. ^b He went in ^b *Ælian. var. hist.* a rich habit, and wore rings: his beard was shaven, his hair cut short; he had a high nose, if we credit the head put up by *Fulvius Ursinus*, found at *Rome*, at the bottome of the *Quirinall* hill. He was of a sickly constitution, troubled with a naturall weaknesse of stomach, and frequent indispositions, which he over-mastered by his Temperance.

Saint Hierome affirmeth, he was the Prince of Philosophers, an absolute Prodigie, and great miracle in nature; into whom seemeth to have been infused whatsoever mankinde is capable of.

He was extreemly pious towards God and Man, upon which subject, *Fortunius Licetus* hath lately written two books.

Eusebius, *Cassiodorus*, and others affirm, that many persons, eminent for sanctity, especially followers of School-learning, have, through the means of *Aristotles* Philosophy, been carried on to Inspection into the highest doctrines of true Faith; as, that there is one God, &c.

As concerning his gratitude to men, besides those instances already mentioned to *Proxenus* and his sonne, to *Hermias* and his sister, to his Master *Plato*, to his own Mother, Brother, and Country, and infinite others; many Philosophers, whose opinion he takes occasion to alledge, he mentions with their due praise: of which were his Master *Plato* (of whom we have already spoken) whom, as we have said, he sometimes mentioned honourably, and sometimes concealeth his name, where he preferreth his own opinion. Amongst others, of whom he maketh honourable mention, are observed *Democritus*, in his first book *de Generatione*; *Diogenes Apolloniates* in the same book, *Anaxagoras*, in the first of his *Metaphysicks*.

(d d d)

For

For that he was very moderate, the Interpreter of his life confirms, instancing in his book of *Categorijs*, where he saith, *we ought not to determine any thing hastily, but to consider often, and to doubt of every thing, is not unusefull.* And again, in his book of *Good*, *We must remember, being men, not only that we are happy, but that we ought to be able to prove it by firm reason.* And again, in his *Ethicks* to *Nicomachus*: *Man is our friend, Truth our friend; but above all, we ought to honour Truth.* And in his *Meteorologicks*: *As concerning these, we doubt of some of them, others we touch superficially.* And in the same, not once or twice, but infinite times, *Men do happen upon the same opinions, therefore we ought not to be proud of our owne wisdom, in any thing whereof we conceive our selves to be the Inventors.*

The common report therefore (grounded upon no authority) that he collected the books of the antient Philosophers, and having taken out of them what he intended to confute; burnt them, is manifestly false; for any one that reads *Cicero*, will finde, they were most of them extant in his time.

CHAP. XIII.

• *His Wives and Children.*

HE had two wives, the first *Pythais*, sister to *Hermias*, the Eunuch, Tyrant of *Atarna*, and his adopted heir. Of the scandals that were cast upon him by this marriage, *Aristotle* fully acquits himselfe in his *Epistles* to *Anipater*, where he professeth, that he married her only out of the good will which he bore unto *Hermias*, and out of a compassion, for the great misfortunes that had happened to her Brother; adding, that she was a woman endowed with extraordinary modesty, and all other vertues.

His second wife was named *Herpylis*, a woman of *Stagira*, whom *Apellico* (cited by *Eusebius*) and (perhaps from him) *Suidas* affirm, he married after the death of *Pythais*: With her he lived to his end, as *Hermippus*, cited by *Athenæus*, and *Timotheus*, by *Laertius* affirm. *Timæus*, a profess'd calumniator of *Aristotle*, saith, she was his Concubine, and that *Aristotle* lived with her, following the counsell of *Hesiod* in his *Georgicks*; from which calumny, *Hesiod* is fully vindicated by *Proclus*.

^a Euseb. prepar. Evang.

^b Defin. l. 5.

^c Euseb.

By *Herpylis* he had one son, as ^a *Apellico* affirmeth, whom he named after his own Father *Nicomachus*: To him he dedicated his great *Moralls*, which ^b *Cicero* thinks to have been written by *Nicomachus* himselfe: For I see not, saith he, why the son might not be like the Father.

^c This *Nicomachus* was a disciple of *Theophrastus*, and much beloved

loved by him; under whom he profited exceedingly in Philosophy, and arrived at much eminence therein. *Suidas* saith, he writ eight Books of Physick, four of Ethick. *Cicero* compares him both with his Tutor and Father. *Aristocles* cited by *Eusebius* affirmeth he was bred up an Orphan, by *Theophrastus*, afterwards died young in the Warrs, which relation agrees not with *Aristotle's* Will, nor with *Suidas* or *Cicero*, who averr that he writ Books, out of which *Laertius* brings a citation, in *Eudoxo*.

He had a Daughter also called *Pythais*, who as *Sextus Empericus* affirmes, was thrice married. First to *Nicanor* the Stagirite, friend to *Aristotle*. Secondly, to *Procles*, who derived his pedigree from *Demaratus* King of *Lacedemonia*. By him she had two Sons, *Procles*, & *Demaratus*, who studied Philosophy under *Theophrastus*. Her last husband was *Metrodorus*, Disciple of *Chrysippus* the Gnidian, Master of *Erasistratus*. By him she had a son named, after her Father, *Aristotle*. Of this *Aristotle* there is mention in the Will of *Theophrastus*, where he is called the Son of *Midias*, not *Metrodorus*. *Suidas* affirmeth, he died before his Grandfather.

CHAP. XIV.

His Disciples and Friends.

THE Disciples of *Aristotle* were so many and so eminent, that *Nicanor* of *Alexandria*, wrote an expresse Book upon that subject, which, had it been extant, would doubtlesse have given us an exact account of them, whereas now we must rest satisfied with an imperfect Catalogue.

To omit the three Princes that were his Disciple, *Hermias*, *Alexander* (of whom already) and *Antipater*; Successor to *Alexander* in *Macedonia* (who amongst other things wrote two books of *Epistles*, in one whereof he related the death of *Aristotle*) in the first place mentioned,

Theophrastus of *Eressus* a City of *Lesbos*, the most eloquent of his Disciples. Him he appointed to succeed him in the School.

Phanias of *Eressus* also. He wrote many Books often cited by *Athenæus*; amongst the rest, *Ammonius* cites his *Categories*, *Analyticks*, and of *Interpretation*.

Eudemus of *Rhodes*, esteemed by *Aristotle* in the second place next to *Theophrastus*. His life was written by *Damias*, as *Simplicius* affirmes, who often mentions him. He wrote *Analyticks*, and a *Geometricall History* (both cited by *Simplicius*) and some other Histories cited by *Laertius*, wherein hee said the *Magi* were of opinion; that men should rise again after death. He survived *Aristotle*.

For that he was very moderate, the Interpreter of his life confirms, instancing in his book of *Categorijs*, where he saith, *we ought not to determine any thing hastily, but to consider often, and to doubt of every thing, is not unusefull.* And again, in his book of *Good*, *We must remember, being men, not only that we are happy, but that we ought to be able to prove it by firm reason.* And again, in his *Ethicks* to *Nicomachus*: *Man is our friend, Truth our friend; but above all, we ought to love our Truth.* And in his *Meteorologic*: *As concerning these, we doubt of some of them, others we touch superficially.* And in the same, not once or twice, but infinite times, *Men do happen upon the same opinions, therefore we ought not to be proud of our own wisdom, in any thing whereof we conceive ourselves to be the Inventors.*

The common report therefore (grounded upon no authority) that he collected the books of the ancient Philosophers, and having taken out of them what he intended to confute, burnt them, is manifestly false; for any one that reads *Cicero*, will finde, they were most of them extant in his time.

CHAP. XIII.

* *His Wives and Children.*

HE had two wives, the first *Pythais*, sister to *Hermias*, the Eunu-ch, Tyrant of *Atarna*, and his adopted heir. Of the scandals that were cast upon him by this marriage, *Aristotle* fully acquits himselfe in his *Epistles* to *Anipater*, where he professeth, that he married her only out of the good will which he bore unto *Hermias*, and out of a compassion, for the great misfortunes that had happened to her Brother; adding, that she was a woman endowed with extraordinary modesty, and all other vertues.

His second wife was named *Herpylis*, a woman of *Stagira*, whom *Apellico* (cited by *Eusebius*) and (perhaps from him) *Suidas* affirm, he married after the death of *Pythais*: With her he lived to his end, as *Hermipus*, cited by *Athenaeus*, and *Timotheus*, by *Laertius* affirm. *Timaeus*, a professed calumniator of *Aristotle*, saith, she was his Concubine, and that *Aristotle* lived with her, following the counsell of *Hesiod* in his *Georgicks*; from which calumny, *Hesiod* is fully vindicated by *Proclus*.

^a *Ensebj. prepar. Evang.*

^b *De fin. l. 5.*

^c *Ensebj.*

By *Herpylis* he had one son, as ^a *Apellico* affirmeth, whom he named after his own Father *Nicomachus*: To him he dedicated his great *Moralls*, which ^b *Cicero* thinks to have been written by *Nicomachus* himselfe: For I see not, saith he, why the son might not be like the Father.

^c This *Nicomachus* was a disciple of *Theophrastus*, and much beloved

loved by him; under whom he profited exceedingly in Philosophy, and arrived at much eminence therein. *Suidas* saith, he writ eight Books of Physick, four of Ethick. *Cicero* compares him both with his Tutor and Father. *Aristocles* cited by *Eusebius* affirmeth he was bred up an Orphan, by *Theophrastus*, afterwards died young in the Warrs, which relation agrees not with *Aristotle's* Will, nor with *Suidas* or *Cicero*, who averr that he writ Books, out of which *Laertius* brings a citation, in *Eudoxo*.

He had a Daughter also called *Pythais*, who as *Sexus Empericus* affirmes, was thrice married. First to *Nicanor* the Stagiritre, friend to *Aristotle*. Secondly, to *Procles*, who derived his pedigree from *Demaratus* King of *Lacedemonia*. By him she had two Sons, *Procles*, & *Demaratus*, who studied Philosophy under *Theophrastus*. Her last husband was *Metrodorus*, Disciple of *Chrysippus* the Gnidian, Master of *Erastratus*. By him she had a son named, after her Father, *Aristotle*. Of this *Aristotle* there is mention in the Will of *Theophrastus*, where he is called the Son of *Midias*, not *Metrodorus*. *Suidas* affirmeth, he died before his Grandfather.

CHAP. XIV.

His Disciples and Friends.

THE Disciples of *Aristotle* were so many and so eminent, that *Nicanor* of *Alexandria*, wrote an expresse Book upon that subject, which had it been extant, would doubtlesse have given us an exact account of them, whereas now we must rest satisfied with an imperfect Catalogue.

To omit the three Princes that were his Disciple, *Hermias*, *Alexander* (of whom already) and *Antipater*; Successor to *Alexander* in *Macedonia* (who amongst other things wrote two books of *Epistles* in one whereof he related the death of *Aristotle*) in the first place mentioned,

Theophrastus of *Eressus* a City of *Lesbos*, the most eloquent of his Disciples. Him he appointed to succeed him in the School.

Phanias of *Eressus* also. He wrote many Books often cited by *Athenæus*; amongst the rest, *Ammonius* cites his *Categories*, *Analyricks*, and of *Interpretation*.

Eudemus of *Rhodes*, esteemed by *Aristotle* in the second place next to *Theophrastus*. His life was written by *Damias*, as *Simplicius* affirmes, who often mentions him. He wrote *Analyricks*, and a *Geometrical History* (both cited by *Simplicius*) and some other Histories cited by *Laertius*, wherein hee said the *Magi* were of opinion; that men should rise again after death. He survived *Aristotle*.

Eudemus of *Cyprus*, who died in *Sicily* where he took *Dion's* part, as appeareth from *Plutarch*. *Aristotle* in honour of him, called his Dialogue of the Soul after his name.

Pasicrates, Brother of *Eudemus* the *Rhodian*. To him some ascribe the first lesser Book of *Metaphysicks*, as *Philoponus* affirmeth.

Theodectes; To him *Aristotle* dedicated some Books of Rhetorick, mentioned by *Valerius Maximus*, which hee afterward retracted. *Patricius* conceives hee was rather a companion then a Disciple of *Aristotle*, because he mentions him seven times in his Rhetorick, which he is never observed to have done of any Disciple.

Clearchus, of *Soli*. He wrote many Books often cited by *Athenæus*.

Dicaearchus, Son of *Phidias* of *Messena* in *Sicily*, a Philosopher, Oratour and Geometrician, as *Suidas* affirmeth. He is cited by *Cicero*, mention'd often by *Plutarch* amongst the best Philosophers.

Aristoxenus, Son of *Mnesias* a Musician of *Tarentum* in *Italy*, who going to *Manitina* there studied Philosophy and Musick. He heard his Father; and *Lamprus* an *Erythraean*, and *Xenopholus* a Pythagorean, and last of all *Aristotle*, whom after his death he calumniated and wronged much, because he had left *Theophrastus* his successour in the School, whereas himself was in great esteem amongst the Disciples. Thus *Suidas*.

Nicanor, mentioned in his Will.

Philo, who wrote against one *Sophocles*, who caused the Philosophers to be voted out of *Attica*.

Plato, the younger, mentioned by *Laertius* and *Philoponus*.

Socrates a *Bithynian*, mentioned by *Laertius*.

Mnason, a *Phocian*, mentioned by *Ælian* as one of those who assisted *Aristotle* in the ejection of *Plato* out of the Academy, *Galen* likewise mentions him as Author of some medicinall writings ascribed to *Aristotle*.

Phrasidemus, a *Phocian*, mentioned by *Laertius* as a Peripatetick Philosopher. It is likely he was a Disciple of *Aristotle*, for he was contemporary with *Theophrastus*.

Palæphatus, of *Abydas*, an Historian much beloved of *Aristotle*.

Callisthenes an *Olynthian*, *Aristotles* Sisters Sonne, of whom already.

Hipparchus, a *Stagirite*; of kin to *Aristotle*. He wrote, as *Suidas* affirmeth, of the distinctions of Sexes amongst the Gods, of marriage, and the like.

Leor, a *Byzantine*, a Peripatetick Philosopher and Sophist. Some affirm he was a Disciple of *Aristotles*. He was so excessively fat, that coming to *Athens*, upon an Embassy, the people laugh at

In *Platone*.

In *Socrate*.

at him; to whom he said, do you laugh to see me thus fat, I have a wife a great deal fatter; yet, when we agree, one bed will hold us both, but when we disagree, not the whole house. The people suspecting him of confederacy with *Philip*, upon a Letter of his, came in a tumult to his house, whereupon fearing to be stoned, he strangled himselfe.

Eschyrion of *Mitylene*, a heroick Poet, loved much by *Aristotle*, as *Suidas* saith.

Callippus an Athenian, who also heard *Plato*.

Satyrus, whose books of *lives and characters* are cited by *Athenæus*.

Hieronymus the *Rhodian*, eminent in Philosophy. That he was *Aristotle's* disciple is acknowledged by *Athenæus*.

Heracledes of *Pontus*, a great Philologist.

To these add of lesse note, *Echecratides* a *Methymnean*, and *Adrastus* a *Macedonian*, both mentioned by *Stephanus*. *Euxithius*, mentioned by *Plutarch*: *Clitus* a *Milesian*: *Menon* the Historian; *Dioteles* and *Timarchus*.

CHAP. XV.

His Detractions.

AS the friends and followers of *Aristotle* were more in number than those of any other Philosopher, so were also his detractors, of whom having already had occasion to make some mention, we shall not need to give any further account than this of *Aristotles*, alledged by *Eusebius*.

a Prepar. Evang. lib. 15.

How then is it possible, that what *Epicure* relates of *Aristotle* can be true, that when he was a young man, he wasted prodigally all the means his father left him, whereby he was necessitated to betake himselfe to the Warres; but therein being unfortunate, he set up an Apothecaries shop, and *Plato* keeping open School, amongst the rest admitted him?

And who will credit *Timæus* the *Tauromenite*, who writes, that being come to riper years, he shut up his poor shop, and gave over his mercenary profession?

Who can be perswaded to believe what *Aristoxenus* the Musician saith in the life of *Plato*, that when he was from home, some strangers rose up, and set up a School in opposition to him? which words some interpret of *Aristotle*, but erroneously; for *Aristoxenus* alwaies commendeth *Aristotle*; [yet *Suidas*, as we said, avers the contrary.]

Who does not esteem the Commentaries of *Alexandrus* ridiculous? for he bringeth in *Alexander* as a youth talking with his Father *Philip*, sleighting the instructions of *Aristotle*, but approving those of *Nicagoras*, surnamed *Hermes*.

Eu-

Eubulides manifestly falsifies in the book he wrote against *Aristotle*: For first, he bringeth in some dull Poems as written by others, upon his marriage and affinity with *Hermias*: then he saith, that he injured *Philip*, that he was not present with *Plato* at his death, and that he corrupted his writings.

As for the accusation of *Demochares* against Philosophers, it is not worth the mention; for he asperseth not only *Aristotle*, but all the rest; and whosoever looks upon his calumnies, will say they are trivially; for he affirms, that some Letters of *Aristotle's*, against the City of *Athens* were intercepted and discovered; that he betrayed his own Country *Stagira* to the Macedonians; that when *Olynthus* was taken, he informed *Philip* upon the sale and rancome of the goods and prisoners, which were the most wealthy of the *Olynthians*.

No lesse foolishly doth *Cephisodorus*, disciple of *Isocrates*, caluminate him as an effeminate person, and a glutton, with many other aspersions of the same kinde.

But of all, the most foolish is that of *Lyco*, who professed himselfe a Pythagorean, for he saith, that *Aristotle* sacrificed to his wife after she was dead, as the Athenians to *Ceres*; and that using to bath himselfe in warme oyle, he afterwards sold it; and that when he went to *Chalcis*, those who bought his goods, found in one bark 75 brasse pots. Indeed neer so many were the first calumniators of *Aristotle*, from whom sprung up others, some in the same age, others little after, all Sophists, Litigious persons, and Orators; of whose names and bookes no more remains then of their bodies.

As for those who flourished after these, some repeat only what these had said before, and therefore we need not take any notice of them; much lesse of those, who not lighting upon those books, have fram'd some inventions of their own, such as they, who affirm, he had 300 pots, for there was not any Author of that time who made mention thereof, but *Lyco*, and he saith, there were found only 75 pots.

And not only from computation of time, and from the persons who assert these calumnies, may any man perceive all they say to be but false, but also from this, that not any two of them lay the same thing to his charge, but every one hath a particular calumny different from the rest. But, if any one of these had been true, *Aristotle* should have heard of it, not only once from them, but a thousand times.

It is manifest therefore, the same thing befell *Aristotle* which happened to many others, that as well for the respect and friendship he had with Princes, as for the excellency of his Dissertations, the envy of the Sophists of that age persecuted him. But such as are ingenious ought not to minde calumniators, but those

ARISTOTLE.

those who have praised and imitated him, whom they will find
to fall nothing short of the others, either for number or worth.
Hitherto *Aristocles*.

C A P. XVI.

His writings.

L Aertius hath given a large Catalogue of his *writings*, as a
testimony of his excellency in all kinds of learning. Their
Titles, as reduced to their severall heads by *Patricius*, are these.

LOGICK.

T *He Sophist* 1.
 Of Sciences 1.
Sophistick distinctions 4.
Of Eristick 2.
 Eristick solutions 4.
Of Genus and Species 1.
Of Proprium 1.
Epichirematick Commentaries 1.
 Instances 1.
 Of those which are said many waies, as according to the propo-
 sition 1.
 For Science 1.
 Distinctions 17.
 Diareticks 1.
 Of interrogation and answer 2.
 Propositions 1.
 Eristick Propositions 4.
 Syllogismes 1.
 First Analyticks 9.
 Second Analyticks 2.
 Of Problems 1.
 Methodicks 8.
 Termes Antetopical 7.
 Syllogismes 2.
 Syllogistick and Termes 1.
 Ante-Topicks 1.
 Topicks to Termes 1.
 Diaretick 1.
 Definitions 13.
 Argumentations 2.
 Propositions 1.
 Epichiretick Theses 25.
 Methodick 1.

Of

ARISTOTLE.

*Of Speech 1.**Categories 1.**Of Interpretation 1.**In all 123.*

PHYSICK.

*Of the Soul 1.**Of suffering and being passive 1.**Of Elements 3.**Of motion 1.**Theses of the Soul 1.**Of Nature 3.**Physick 1.**Of Animals 9.**Anatomy 7.**Anatomick selections 1.**Of compound Animals 1.**Upon not Generating 1.**Of Plants 2.**Physiognomick 1.**Signes of Tempest. 1.**Physicks by Elements 38.**Perspective Problems 2.**Of Stone 1.**In all, 75.*

ETHICK.

*Of Justice 4.**Of Philosophy 3.**Politick 2.**Of Riches 1.**Of Nobility 1.**Of Pleasure 1.**Alexander; or, of Colonies 1.**Of a Kingdome 1.**Of Education 1.**Of Good 3.**Oeconomick 1.**Of friendship 1.**Propositions concerning Vertue 3.**Of the passions of anger 1.**Ethicks 4.**Of the Better 1.**Of Elegeble and Accident 1.**Of Pleasure 1.**Of Voluntary 1.**Of Faire 1.*

Amicable Theses, 2.
Politicks 2.
Laws 4.
Constitutive Law 1.
Politick Auscultation 8.
Of Just 2.
Of Consultation 1.
Jurisdictions 1.
Passions 1.
Governments of Cities 158.
Proper Democracies,
Oligarchicks.
Aristocraticks.
Tyrannicks.

In all 217.

METAPHYSICK.

O*F Contraries* 1.
Of Principle 1.
Of Idea 1. In all 3.

MATHEMATICK.

M*athematicks* 1.
Of Magnitude 1
Of Unity 1.
Astronomick 1.
Optick 1.
Of Musick 1.
Mechanicks 1.

In all 7.

PHILOLOGICK.

O*F Poets* 3.
Gryllus, of Rhetorick
Works of Rhetorical art 2.
Collection of the Theodestic art, 1
Rhetoricall Enthymemes 1.
Homericall Difficulties 6.
Poeticks 1.
Comparisons 1.
The Olympionica 1.
Pythionick Musick.
Pythick 1.
Pythionick Elenchs 1.
The Dyonyssiack Victories 1.
Of Tragedies 1.

(ccc)

Poems,

ARISTOTLE.

Poems, 3. So *Hermias*, to *Democritus*, *Elegies*.
In all 27.

UNCERTAIN, or EXTRAORDINARY.

N *Erinthus* 1.
Ménexenus 1.
Erotick 1.
Symposium 1.
Protreptick 1.
Of prayer 1.
Collection of arts 12.
Art 1.
Another art 1.
Collection, 2.
Of fabulous living creatures 1.
Medicine 2.
Memorials 1.
Encyclicks 2.
Inordinate 12.
Expounded by their Genus 14.
Doctrines 1.
Proverbs 1.

In all 46.

EPISTLES.

To *Philip and Alexander* 4.
To *Antipater* 9.
To *Mentor* 1.
To *Aristo* 1.
To *Olympias* 1.
To *Hephestion* 1.
To *Themistagoras* 1.
To *Philoxenus* 1. In all 19.

AGAINST THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS.

Out of *Plato's Laws* 2.
Out of *Plato's Commonwealth* 2.
Out of *Timæus and Archytas their writings* 1.
Problems one of *Democritus* 2.
Against Melissus 1.
Against Alcmaeon 1.
Against Gorgias 1.
Against Xenophanes 1.
Against Zeno 1.

Of the Philosophy of Archytas 3.
Of the Philosophy of Speulippus and Xenocrates 1.
 In all 19.

The Sum of all these Books, excepting the Epistles, is 513. *Laertius* reckons them to be, near 400. perhaps accounting the severall Books that are upon the same subject for one. But of these the greatest part is lost, and of many that are extant, the Titles altered; of the extant there are only these:

LOGICK.

C*atēgories 1.*
Of Interpretation 1.
First Analyticks 2.
Second Analyticks 2.
Topics 8.
Elenchs 1.

PHYSICK.

O*f natural Auscultation 8.*
Of Heaven 4.
Of Generation and Corruption 2.
Of Meteors 4.
Of the World 1. Suspected.
Of the Soul 3.
Of Sense and Sensibles 1.
Of memory and Reminiscence 1.
Of sleep and waking 1.
Of Dream 1.
Divination by dreams 1.
Of the motion of living Creatures 1.
Of the length and shortness of life 1.
Of youth and age, life and death 1.
Of Respiration 1.
Of the going of Animals 1.
Of Breath 1.
Of the generation of Animals 3.
Of the parts of Animals 4.
The Historie of Animals 10.
Of Colours 1.
Of Physiognomy 1.
Spurious 2.

ETHICK.

E*thick, to Nicomachus 10.*
Great Ethick 2.
Ethick to Eudemus 7.
 (ccc 2)

ARISTOTLE.

Of Vertues 1.

Oeconomick 2.

Politick 8.

METAPHYSICK.

Metaphysick 14.

Of the abstruse part of Divine Wisdom according to the Egyptians, translated out of Arabick; but suspected to be spurious 14.

MATHEMATICKS.

Mathematick 2.

Mechanick 1.

Of insecable lines 1.

PHILOLOGICK.

Rhetorick 3.

Rhetorick to Alexander 117

Poetick 1.

EXTRAORDINARY.

Problems 38.

Wonders 1.

Of Zenophanes; Zeno and Gorgias 1.

Besides these, there are many other Books cited for his, under these Titles.

Magick, Laert. Proem.*Epitome of Oratours*, Laert. Aristip.*Of Beanes*, Laert. Pythag.*Of Mixtion*, Aristot. de sensu, cap. 3.*Of Savors*, Arist. de sensu cap. 4.*Physical History*, Arist. de incess. Animal. cap. 2.*Of Nurriment*, Arist. de Somno, cap. 3.*Selection of Contraries*, Arist. Metaph. lib. 3. cap. 2.*Division of Contraries*, Arist. Metaph. lib. 10. cap. 3.*Of Opposites*, Simplic. in cap. de Opposit. Comm. 8.*Collection of Pythagorick Opinions*; Simplic. in lib. 2. de Cœlo. Com. 4.*Of Idea's*, Alexand. in lib. 1. Metaphys. Comm. 59. where he cites the fourth Book, though Laertius, but one, as if there were no more.*Of Enunciation*, Alexand. in lib. 4. Metaphys. Com. 25. & 44.*Of Affirmation*, Alexand. in lib. 4. Metaphys. Com. 62.

of

Of Platonic assertions, Plut. contra Colot.
Eudæmus, Plut. Consol. ad Apollon.
Of Drunkenness, Plut. Sympotiac. 3. *Athenæus* cites the
 tenth book hereof.
Animal, or of Fishes, Athen. Deipn. 7.
*Of living Creatures, and of things pertaining to living Crea-
 tures*, Athen.
Of the manners of living Creatures, Athen.
Of Pheasants, Athen.
Of Consanguinity, Athen.
Of wonderful luxury, Athen.
Apologies, Athen.
Histories, Athen.
Barbarous Jurisdicions.
Of Audibles, Porphy. Comm. in Ptol. Mus. Proclus in
 Timæum Plat.
The Cohabitant, Proclus. Proëm. in Répub. Platon.
Onomasticon, Macrobi. Saturnal. lib. 1.
Of Nature, Clem. Alexandrin. Strom. lib. 6.

We shall not add the *Pappus*, cited by *Nicephorus*, and the *Chrys* by *Stobæus*, under his name, since it is manifest they belong not to the same *Aristotle*, as *Patricius* hath evinced.

These Books *Aristotle* gave to *Theophrastus*; when he made him his successor in the School, as *Sirabo* affirmeth; adding, that *Aristotle* was the first, we know of, that made a Library, which the Egyptian Kings learned of him to do. *Theophrastus* bequeathed all his books to *Nelius* a Scepsian, who carried them to *Scepsis*, and dying, left them to his heirs, men of no Learning, who only kept them confusedly locked up: And when they understood what care was taken by the Attalick Kings (in whose jurisdiction *Scepsis* was) to make a Library in *Pergamus*, they hid them in a hole under ground [where they continued about 130 years,] by which means they received some injury by the wet and worms. At last, some that were descended from *Aristotle* and *Theophrastus*, sold them to *Apellico* a Teian, [who, according to *Athenæus*, was made free of the City of *Athens*; a person very rich, who, besides many other Libraries, bought this of *Aristotle*, being himselfe a lover of Peripatetic Philosophy,] for a great summe of money. This *Apellico* was more a lover of Books, then of Learning, so that, because they had received some injury, he caused them to be transcribed, supplying the defects not rightly, and by that means put them forth full of faults. The antient Peripatetics that succeeded *Theophrastus*, wanting Books, as having but very few, and those Exoterick, could not treat exactly upon any part of Philosophy. They that lived latter, after that these books were published, had much greater helps to Philosophy; and the imitation of *Aristotle*, al-
though

though by reason of the infinite faults, they were forced to say many things by guesse. Hereunto Rome conducted not a little; for, (soon after the death of *Apelluco*, *Sylla* taking *Athenz*, in the fourth year of the 173 Olympiad, seized upon his Library, and causing it to be carried to Rome, *Tyrannio*, a Grammarian, a person studious of *Aristotle*, obtained leave of the Library-Keeper to be permitted the use of them) the Book-sellers not having good writers, and not comparing well the Copies, it occasion'd many faults, as well in those Books that were at Rome, as in those transcribed and sold into *Alexandria*. *Plutarch* adds, that from this *Tyrannio*, *Andronicus* the Rhodian had them, who first made them publick, setting forth those volumes, which, saith he, we have.

Thus *Strabo* and *Plutarch*; *Athenæus* saith, that *Nelius* sold them to *Ptolemæus Philadelphius*, by whom they were translated to *Alexandria*, wherehow long they lay hid is uncertain, which Library was afterwards burn'd by *Julius Cesar*.

CHAP. XVII.

His Commentatours.

NO sooner were the writings of *Aristotle* communicated to the world, but they were entertained with generall approbation, which some expressed, by employing themselves in Commenting upon them, whose example was followed by many in all following ages. To omit *Pasocrates* the Rhodian, brother of *Eudemus*, who wrote, as *Galen* affirmeth, upon the book of *Categories*, we shall name in the first place,

Andronicus the Rhodian, who first published *Aristotles* writings, put forth a Paraphrase or Comment upon the greatest part of them.

Next, his Disciple *Boethus*, a *Sidonian*, took much pains in the exposition of *Aristotle*, whence he is often mentioned honourably by *Anthonius* and *Simplicius*.

Aristo a *Coan*, Disciple also to *Andronicus*, as ^a *Strabo* affirmeth, living in the time of *Nicias*, Tyrant of *Coos*, is reckoned by *Simplicius* amongst the old Commentatours upon *Aristotles Categories*.

Nicolaus Damascenus, who lived in the time of *Augustus*, by whom much loved, is cited by *Simplicius* and *Averroes*, as an Expofitor of *Aristotle*.

Athenodorus of *Tarsis*, a *Stoick*, who lived also under *Augustus*, as *Plutarch* affirmeth, is cited by *Simplicius*, as having written upon *Aristotle's Categories*; but, rather by way of confutation then interpretation, as did likewise *Alexander*. *Egeus Nero's Tutor*, mention'd

^a *Geogr. lib. 14.*

mention'd *Simplicius*, *Cornutus*, who lived at the same time; cited by *Porphyrus* and *Simplicius*; *Lucius* and *Nicostratus* a Macedonian, who lived under *Antonius*.

Soion of *Alexandria*, and *Achacius*, seem to have written upon the *Categories*, being often cited by *Simplicius* upon that subject.

Taurus the *Berisian*, a *Platonick* Philosopher, living under *Antonius*, wrote first concerning the difference between the Doctrines of *Plato* and *Aristotle*.

Adrastus the *Aphrodisæan*, wrote a Comment on *Aristotle's Categories*, and of his *Physicks*, and a Book concerning the Method of his Philosophy.

Aspasius, wrote a Comment on all *Aristotle's Works*, taking particular care to restore the Text, to which end he is often quoted by *Simplicius* and *Boetius*. There is a Comment upon some books of the *Ethicks* extant under his name.

Herminius, somewhat later, seems to have written upon all, or the greatest part of *Aristotle's works*, cited by all the Greek Commentatours that are extant, and by *Boetius*.

Alexander the *Aphrodisæan*, who lived under *Antonius* and *Severus*, wrote upon the *Analyticks*, *Topicks* and *Elenchs*, whence filed by the latter Interpreters, ~~being~~ the *Expositor*.

Galen, who lived at the same time, wrote three Books upon *Aristotle* of *Interpretation*, four Books upon the first of the first *Analytick*, four upon the second of the first, six upon the first of the second *Analytick*, five upon the second.

^b *Atticus* a *Platonick* Philosopher, besides seven Books wherein ^b *Suid.* he proved *Plato* and *Aristotle* to be of the same Sect, contrary to the assertion of *Taurus*, he wrote also a Dialogue upon the *Categories* extant, seven Books upon the *Categories* cited by *Simplicius*, a Comment upon the Book of *Interpretation*, cited by *Boetius*. Not to mention what he wrote upon *Aristotle de Anima*, since it appears from *Suidas*, that it was rather by way of opposition then exposition, which ^c *Theodoret* likewise confirms.

Iamblicus of *Chalcis* in *Cælosyria*, Master to *Julian* the Emperour, ^c *Gra. aff. l.* 12. wrote in an abstruse way upon the Book of *Categories*.

Dexippus, by some thought to be sonne of *Iamblicus*, wrote a Dialogue on the *Categories*, extant.

Maximus a *Byzantine*, Disciple of *Iamblicus*, wrote Commentaries on the *Categories*, and other Books of *Aristotle*, as *Simplicius* and *Suidas* affirm.

Plutarch the younger Son of *Nestorius* flourishing under *Valentinian* the first, *Gratian* and *Theodosius* the first, according to *Suidas* and *Philoponus*, wrote Commentaries upon some Books of *Aristotle*.

Syrianus, furnamed the great, of *Alexandria*, a Philosopher, who flourished under *Arcadius*, *Honorius*, *Theodosius* the second, and *Valentinian* the second, wrote Commentaries upon *Aristotle's*

Aristotle's Books of Nature, of Motion, of Heaven, and upon the Categories, cited by Simplicius and Philoponus. Likewise upon the 2^d. 5. and 6. Book of Metaphysicks, which are extant.

Olympiodorus, an Alexandrian, who derived himself from Ammonius Saccus, and was contemporary to Plutarch and Syrianus, wrote upon Aristotle's Meteors, extant. He was later then than Olympiodorus, who writ upon Plato.

Themistius, living, according to Suidas, under Julian and Jovian, wrote a Paraphrase upon Aristotle's Physick, 8. Books; a Paraphrase on the Analyticks, 2. Books; upon his Books of the Soul, 7. Books. Of the scope and title of the Book of Categories, one Book.

Proclus, Disciple of Syrianus, wrote two Books concerning Motions, wherein he made an abstract of Aristotle's second Book of Motion. That he wrote also upon his book of Heaven, and the Elements may be conjectured from the frequent citations of Simplicius.

Marinus, who succeeded Proclus in the School, seemeth to have written something upon Aristotle's Book of the Soul, being often cited upon that subject by Philoponus.

Ammonius Hermæus wrote upon Aristotle's Categories, and upon his Book of Interpretation, both which are extant; as likewise upon his Books of the Soul, cited by Philoponus.

Damascius, a Platonick Philosopher, Disciple to Ammonius, besides what he wrote in confutation of Aristotle concerning Time, epitomiz'd the four first, and the eight Book of his Physick, and the first Book of Heaven. To these adde

Philoponus and Simplicius, and Asclepius, Disciples to Ammonius.

Johannes Damascenus, whose compendium of Aristotle's Logick and Physick are extant; he lived about the year 770.

Eustathius wrote upon some of the Nicomachian Ethicks; and Eustratius upon his book concerning Demonstration.

*Michael Psellus, about the year 800. and Michael Ephesus, upon the *parta naturalia*.*

Magentinus upon the Categories and the book of Interpretation.

Nicephorus Blemmydes, (under Iohannes duca,) upon the Logick and Physick.

Georgius Plachymerius and Theodorus Metochita lived about the year 1080. and wrote Epitoms extant.

Of Arabick Commentatours were Avicenna and Averroes; about the year 1216.

The later writers it will be unnecessary to mention, there being a Catalogue of them annexed to Aristotle's works of the Paris Edition.

ARISTOTLES

Epist. Græc.

EPISTLES.

To Philip 1

THEY who undertake a Command for the good of their Subjects, not preferred thereunto either by Fortune or Nature; trust not in their own power, which they know subject to chance, but grow great in Vertue, whereby they order the Commonwealth wisely. For there is nothing amongst men so firm, and solid, but the rapid motion of the Sun changeth it ere the Evening. Nature, if we enquire into the truth, varieth all lives, interweaving them like the Action of a Tragedy with misfortunes. Men, like flowers, have a set time wherein they flourish and excell others. Wherefore behave not your self towards Greece tyrannically or loosely, for one argues petulance, the other temerity. Wise Princes ought not to be admired for their Government, but Governance; so that though Fortune change, they shall have the same praise. As for the rest, do all things well, preferring the health of your Soul, by Philosophy, that of your body by exercise.

To Philip 2.

MOST Philosophers assert beneficence to be something equall to God. To speak the truth, the whole life of Mankind is comprised in conferring and returning Benefits. So as, some bestow, others receive, others return. Hence is it just to commiserate all that are in adversity, for pitty is the signe of a mild Soul, sternness of a rude, it being dishonest & impious to neglect vertue in misfortunes. For this I commend our disciple *Theophrastus*, who saith, we never repent of doing good, it brings forth good fruit the prayers and praises of the obliged. Wise men therefore must study to oblige many, thinking that, beside the praise, there may some advantage accrew from hence in the change of Affaires, and if not all, at least some one of those to whom he hath done good, may be in a capacity to requite him. For this reason, endeavour to be ready in doing good, but give not way to your passions, for that is kingly and civill, this barbarous and odious. As you see occasion, practise and neglect not this usefull advise.

To Philip. 3.

THE most excellent Princes, whose honour toucheth the Starrs, have conferred most benefits, and not accommodating their sway only to the present, but considering the instability of Fortune, have treasured up good deeds as usefull in either condition. In prosperity it procures them Honour, for Honour is proper to Vertue, in adversity Relief, for friends, are much better try'd in bad fortune then in good. The sight of benevolent persons is like to that of Land to men in a storme. All Fortune apt to desert us, is the true scope which they propose to themselves who war, or do unjustly, or comply dishonestly, only the clearnesse of Vertuous persons is not unacquainted with the instability of Fortune, but, by reason, sustaining all accidents, and being, as *Plato* saith, above them, they are never disordered. Take heed therefore of the rapid motion of things; look upon them as a Circle which reverts into it self; cast up the accounts of life, for chance imposeth many things upon life, and maketh our inclinations follow it. Pardon those that offend ignorantly; be ready to acquite those that do good. This if you perform not once, but continually, your Court will be secure from all danger. This, considering the greatnesse of the things, I have said is but little, but, considering the person to whom I write, All.

To Alexander. 4.

I Am in doubt how to begin, for upon whatsoever I reflect, all seems great and wonderfull, not fit to be forgotten, but proper for remembrance, and exhortation, not to be defaced by Time. Good precepts and exhortations of Masters have Eternity for their Spectator. Endeavour to make use of your power, not to oppresse, but to oblige others, then which nothing can bee greater in Man's life. Mortall Nature, which often yieldeth and is overcome by Fate, obtaineth eternall memory by the greatnesse of such works. Consider this well; you are not unreasonable as some are, who think good advice ridiculous. Your descent is honourable, your Kingdome hereditary, your Learning sound, your glory admirable; and as much as you exceed others in the Goods of Fortune, so ought you to be excellent amongst the good in Vertue. In fine, do that which is profitable, and finish what you designe.

To Theophrastus 5.

A Sudden Injury is better then a slow benefit, for the remembrance and harme of that lasts but a little while, but this groweth old, as if it hated to build a work to perpetuity, and many times deferring what we intend to bestow upon another, he meets with a calm else-where which allaiies the tempest of his mind. Wherefore I say, mutuall society ought not onely to do no wrong, but, if any be received, to be ready to forgive it; for perhaps to do no wrong is above the power of Man. As for him who hath erred, to make use of reproof, is the property of a good well-seated Judgement.

(fff 2)

THE

THE
DOCTRINE
OF
ARISTOTLE.

The First PART.

CHAP. I.

*Of Philosophy in generall, and particularly
of DIALECTICK.*



HE Philosophy of Aristotle is well known, many abstracts thereof have been published, many are read daly in Universities by publick Professours; yet, will it be requisite to our designe, to give a short account thereof, that it may appear wherein the doctrine and method of the *Peripateticks* is different from that of the *Academicks* and *Stoicks*.

a Laertis

^a Philosophy, according to Aristotle, is two-fold, *Practick* and *Theoretick*. To the *Practick* belongs *Ethick* and *Politick*; this, concerning the well ordering of a City, that, of a House. To the *Theoretick* belongs *Physick* and *Logick*; but *Logick* is not properly a part thereof, but a most expedient Instrument.

Of *Logick* he asserted two ends, *probable* and *true*; for each he makes use of two faculties, *Dialectick* and *Rhetorick* for the *probable*; *Analytick* and *Philosophy* for the *true*, omitting nothing towards *Invention*, *Judgment*, and *Use*. For *Invention*, his *Topicks* and *Methodicks* afford a plentifull supply, out of which may be taken problems for *probable* arguments. For *Judgment*, his first and second *Analyticks*; in the first, propositions are examined; in the second, he treats exactly of their composition, and the form of *Syllogisme*. To *Use* belongs his *Agonistics*, and his Books concerning *Interrogation*, and his *Eristicks*, and his *Sophistick Elenchs*, and of *Syllogismes*, and the like. Hitherto *Laertius*.

Of his *Logick* we have only these books remaining, Of *Categories*, of *Interrogation*, *Analyticks*, *Topicks*, and *Sophistick Elenchs*. The first considers *simple terms*: The second *Propositions*: The rest

rest Syllogismes, Demonstrative, Dialectick, and Sophistick. The Categories are placed first by the generall consent of all Interpreters, neither is it to be doubted, but that the rest are disposed according to the genuine method of Aristotle. For, in the beginning of his *Analytics*, he saith, We must speak of Syllogism before we come ^{b Lib. 1. cap. 2.} to speak of Demonstration, because Syllogisme is the more generall. And in his *Elenchs*, Of Didascalick and demonstrative Syllogismes, we ^{c Cap. 2.} have spoken already in the *Analytics*, of the Dialectick and Pirastick in the book immediately preceding these: We come now to speak of the Agonistick and Eristick.

CHAP. II.

Of Termes.

^a Termes are of three kindes, Homonymus, Synonymus, and Pa- ^{a Categ. cap. 1.} ronymous. Homonymus, whose name only is common, their essence divers: Synonymus, whose name and definition are common to either: Paronymus have denomination from the same thing, but differ in case or termination.

Synonymus, (or Univocall) termes, are reduced to ten generall heads, called Categories.

1. ^b Substance, of two kinds: First, which is most properly sub- ^{b Cap. 5.} stance, is neither prædicated of, nor inherent in a subject. Second substances are species and genus's, which subsist in the first. The properties of first-substances are, 1. Neither to be in, nor prædicated of a subject. 2. To be all substances equally. 3. To signify this particular thing. 4. To have no contrary. 5. To admit no degrees of more or lesse. 6. To be susceptible of contraries.

2. ^c Quantity, of two kinds; Discrete, as Number; Continuous, ^{c Cap. 6.} as a Line. Their properties, 1. To have no contraries. 2. To admit no degrees of more or lesse. 3. To denominate things equal or unequal.

3. ^d Relatives, whose whole being is in some manner affected ^{d Cap. 7.} towards one another; their properties, 1. To have contraries, as Father and Son. 2. To admit degrees of more and lesse, as in kindred. 3. To follow one another mutually. 4. To be naturally together.

4. ^e Quality, from which things are denominated qualified: ^{e Cap. 8.} it hath foure kinds: 1. Habit and disposition. 2. Naturall power and impotence. 3. Passible qualities and passions. 4. Form and figure. The properties, 1. To have contraries, as black and white. 2. To admit intension or remission. 3. To denominate things, like or unlike.

5. ^f Action. 6. Passion. Their properties are, to admit contra- ^{f Cap. 9.} ries,

ries, to admit degrees of intension and remission.

7. *When*. 8. *Where*. 9. *Position*. 10. *Habit*. These admit not contraries, nor degrees of intension or remission.

Of those which cannot be reduced to any certain Category, are 1. *Opposites*. 2. *Precedents*. 3. *Coequals*. 4. *Motion*. 5. *Possession*.

g Cap. 16. Of *Opposites* there are foure kinds, *Relatives*, *Contraries*, *extreams* in the same kinde, as black and white: *Privatives*, as privation and habit, light and darknesse: *Contradictories*, which affirm and deny, as learned, not learned.

CHAP. III.

Of Proposition.

a De Interpret.
cap. 1.

Voice is a signe of the notions of the minde; as, in the minde are two kinds of Intellection, one simple, expert of truth and falsitie, the other either true or false: So in voice, some is simple, some complexe.

b Cap. 2.

^b A *noun* is a voice signifying according to institution, whereof no part is significant by it selfe.

c Cap. 3.

^c A *Verb* is a voice implying time, whereof no part is significant by it selfe.

d Cap. 4.

^d A *Speech*, *λογος*, is a voice signifying according to institution, whose parts are significant separate.

Of Speech, the enunciative only (called proposition) belongs to Philosophy, the precatory and imperative, to Rhetorick, Poetry, &c.

e Cap. 5. &c.

^e Propositions are divided foure waies; into *simple* and *complex*; into *affirmative* and *negative*; into *universall*, *particular*, *indefinite* and *singular*; into *pure* and *modall*; the modall is either *necessary*, *possible*, *contingent*, or *impossible*.

f Cap. 12.

^f Propositions have three accidents, *opposition*, *consecration*, *conversion*.

Opposition is either contradictory of a particular to an universal; or contrary, of an universal to an universal; or subcontrary, of a particular negative to a particular affirmative.

Consecration, (*ἀντιστοιχία*) or æquipollence, is the consideration of those affections of a proposition, in respect whereof, two propositions signify together the same thing, and are together true or false.

Conversion is a transposition of the termes, preserving the affirmation, negation, and verity of the proposition: it is either absolute, which reserves the same quantity, but alters the quality; or partiall, which reserves not the same quantity.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Of Syllogisme.

^a *Syllogisme* is a speech, in which some things being laid down, another necessarily followes. *Perfect Syllogisme* is that which requireth no other to shew its power, clearnesse, and efficacy. *Imperfect* requires another to that purpose, by conversion, or transposition of the propositions.

^b The *matter* of Syllogisme is three termes, the *form* is the right disposition of the matter, according to figure and mood. ^{b cap. 4.}

Figure is an apt disposition of the medium with the extremes, apt for concluding aright. *Mood* is a disposition of propositions, according to quantity and quality. There are three figures.

The first, when the *medium* is first *subject*, then *predicate*. It hath nine moods, 4. usefull, 5. uselesse and illegitimate: of the usefull, two are universall, two particular.

The first. { Every A is B.
Every C is A.
Therefore every C is B.

The second. { No A is B.
Every C is A.
Therefore no C is B.

The third. { Every A is B
Some C is A.
Therefore some C is B.

The fourth. { No A is B.
Some C is A.
Therefore some C is B.

^c In the second figure, the medium is predicated of both the extremes. It hath 16 Moods, 4 true, 12 false and illegitimate. Of the true, two are universall, two particular. ^{c cap. 5.}

The first. { No M is N.
Every O is N.
Therefore no O is M.

The second. { Every M is N.
No O is N.
Therefore no O is M.

The third. { No M is N.
Some O is N.
Therefore some O is not M.

The

The fourth. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Every M is N.} \\ \text{Some O is not N.} \\ \text{Therefore some O is not M.} \end{array} \right.$

d Cap. 6.

^d In the third figure, the medium is subjected to both extremes. It hath 16 Moods, 10 false and illegitimate; 6. legitimate, which conclude particularly.

The first. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Every P is R.} \\ \text{Every P is S.} \\ \text{Therefore some S is R.} \end{array} \right.$

The second. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{No P is R.} \\ \text{Every P is S.} \\ \text{Therefore some S is not R.} \end{array} \right.$

The third. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Some P is R.} \\ \text{Every P is S.} \\ \text{Therefore some S is R.} \end{array} \right.$

The fourth. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Every P is R.} \\ \text{Some P is S.} \\ \text{Therefore some S is R.} \end{array} \right.$

The fifth. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Some P is not R.} \\ \text{Every P is S.} \\ \text{Therefore some S is not R.} \end{array} \right.$

The sixth. $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{No P is R.} \\ \text{Some P is S.} \\ \text{Therefore some S is not R.} \end{array} \right.$

e Cap. 23.

^e Every Syllogisme ought to be framed in one of these three Figures; but those of the second and third being imperfect, ought to be reduced to the first, which is the most absolute and perfect.

f Anal. Prior.
lib. 2. cap. 22.
Etc.

^f There are six other formes of argument, *Conversion of Terms, Induction, Example, abduction, Instance, Enthymem.* All these have their efficacy from the power of Syllogisme, and are reducible to Syllogisme.

As concerning the invention, power, and conversion of Syllogisme, he is exact and curious to admiration.

CHAP. V.

Of Apodeictick (or demonstrative) Syllogisme.

^a ALL discursive knowledge is made by a prænotion of the things themselves whereof we discourse; for ratiocination is not concerning things unknown. *Demonstration* is a discursive know-

a Analyt. poster.
lib. 1. cap. 1.

knowledge, and therefore requireth three præcognitions. First, that the subject is, and what it is in a rude confused manner. Secondly, what the prædicate is, and what it signifieth. Thirdly, that the principles are true.

^b *To know* is to understand that a thing is, that this is cause ^{b cap. 1.} thereof, and that it cannot be otherwise. *Demonstration* is a scientific Syllogisme. *Demonstrative Science* is from true, first, immediate; more known, causes of the conclusion. *First*, as having none precedent, and being adæquate to, and convertible with the effect. *Immediate* or concomitant, as having no terme betwixt to joyne them. *More known*, as being præmites to the conclusion, not to be demonstrated by any thing.

^c *Demonstrative Science* is of a thing necessary, whence the demonstration it selfe consists of necessary propositions; which necessity requireth explication of that which is prædicated, of all by it selfe, and which is *universall*.

Of all, is that which is attributed to every one and at all times, as a living creature to man.

By it selfe, as being of essence, proper; competent *per se*, and competent to it selfe; for it selfe.

An universall attribute is that which is in every one by it selfe, in as much as it is it selfe.

^d *Demonstration* is of conclusions of *eternall truth*, for they are ^{d cap. 2.} universall propositions; whence it followeth, that neither demonstration nor Science are of perishable things; neither are definitions of such, which are the principles of demonstration.

That there is demonstration, it is not necessary to have recourse to *Plato's Idæas*, separate from singulars; it is enough that there are common natures which are in singulars, and are prædicated of them.

^e It is one thing to know that a thing is so, another to know ^{e cap. 11.} why it is so. Hence there are two kinds of demonstration, *ἰστί*, and *ἰστί*, the first is the true and most perfect, of which hitherto.

^f The other kinde of demonstration, *viz. ἰστί*, is more im- ^{f cap. 13.} perfect; it is made two waies in the same Science: First, when the cause is demonstrated by the effect thus, *Starrs which do not twinkle are nearest to the earth; but, the Planets do not twinkle, therefore they are nearest to the earth..* Secondly, when the effect is proved by a cause remote, and not reciprocally, or by an effect of the remote cause; as this, *Every thing that breatheth is a living creature; but no wall breaths, therefore no wall is a living creature.*

To know *ἰστί*, is proper to subalternat principle Sciences, as Geometry and Arithmetick, which contemplate the first proper causes; to know *ἰστί*, is of the subalternate and inferiour, as Optick and Musick.

^g Of all figures, the first is most accommodate to knowledge, ^{g cap. 14.} for that only concludes with an universall affirmative, and

(ggg)

there-

therefore in that only is a demonstrative *διάν.*
 h Cap. 15. &c. ^h Thus far concerning Science; the opposite to Science is *Ignorance*, which is two-fold: One of *pure negation*, as when a boy or ignorant fellow knowes not that the Sun is greater then the Earth, because he is ignorant of Astrologie. The other, of *depraved disposition*, as when an Astrologer or ignorant Optick believes, that things are as they seem: this is error, which erroneous ignorance is in false propositions, or in a Syllogisme through a false medium.

Detect of sense causeth ignorance of pure negation, for if any sense be wanting, it is necessary, that some science of sensibles be likewise wanting; for, we learn all things either by induction or demonstration. *Induction* is made of singulars perceived by sense. *Demonstration* is of universals, which are declared by induction; wherefore the beginning of Science is from singulars, which are sensibles. Hence it is impossible for a man born blinde to have the Science of colours. Yet no science is next and immediately from sense, for sense is of singulars, which are here and now; but science and demonstration is of universals, which are every where and ever, not subject to sense. Yet, sense conduceth to science and demonstration, for as much as an universall is collected from particulars, known by sense.

CHAP. VI.

Of Dialectick Syllogisme.

a Topic. lib. 1. cap. 1. ^a *Dialectick Syllogisme* is that which concludes from probables; Probables are those things which appear such to all, or to most, or only to the wise and most eminent.

b Cap. 3. ^b *Dialectick* is a conjecturall Art, as Rhetorick and Medicine; therefore (like those) it attaineth not alwaies its end; it is enough for a *Dialectick*, that he omit nothing of his Art for concluding probably.

c Cap. 4. ^c All disputation is of things controverted, either by Problem or proposition. A *Problem* questions both parts, as, *a living Creature, is it the genus of man or not?* A proposition questions but one part, as, *Is not living creature the genus of man?* Every proposition and problem is either *genus*, (under which is contained the difference) *definition*, *proprium*, or *accident*.

d Cap. 5. &c. ^d *Definition* is a speech, signifying what a thing is. *Proprium* is that which declarcth, not what a thing is, but is in it only; and reciprocally with it. *Genus* is that which is prædicated, *in quid*, of many that differ specifically. *Accident* is that which is neither definition, nor genus, nor proprium, and may be, or not be, in its subject.

^e *Diale-*

^c *Dialectick proposition* is a probable interrogation, received by ^e Cap. 10. all or many, or the most excellent, yet so as it is not wholly alienate from the common opinion.

^f *Dialectick problem* is threefold; *practick* or Morall, pertaining to ^f Cap. 11. election or repulse; *Theoretick*, pertaining to Science; *neutrall*, which conduceth to the rest, viz. Logick.

Thesis is a paradoxall sentence of some eminent Philosopher, contrary to the vulgar opinion.

^g *Dialectick Argument* is twofold; *Induction* and *Syllogism*. ^g Cap. 12.

^h Arguments are gained by four instruments, 1. *Choice of propositions*. 2. *Distinction of Equivoques*. 3. *Invention of differences*. 4. *Consideration of Similitudes*. ^h Cap. 13. &c.

Problems are either universall or particular; the same places which confirm or confute one, confirm or confute the other. From *proprium*, *genus*, and *definition* is immediately and simply made *Demonstration*, but not from *Accident*, because that is external, not necessarily and intimately inherent in the Subject. Wee shall not here say any thing of the multitude of places he hath invented, which are more necessary to those that will learn the Art, then suitable to this abridgement.

The Disputant must first find out a place (or medium) secondly, dispose and question it within himself; thirdly, propose it to his adversary.

In disputation against the learned, Syllogism is to be used, against the vulgar induction.

ⁱ The office of the *opponent* is to compell his respondent to this ⁱ Lib. 8. cap. 4. incredible and absurd consequent from his *Thesis*; of the *Respondent* to take care, that nothing absurd bee collected from his *Thesis*.

CHAP. VII.

Of Sophistick Syllogism.

^a **A** *N Elench* is a Syllogism which contradicts the conclusion ^a *Sophist. elench* asserted by the respondent. Of Elenchs some are true, some ^c Cap. 1. false; that proper to a *Sophos*, whose office is to pursue and defend truth, and to discover and confute falsehood; this to a *Sophist*, who from seeming wisdom acquireth gain, and had rather seem then be.

^b A Sophist hath five ends, whereto he endeavoureth to reduce ^b Cap. 2. his adversary; the first is *Elench*, or redargution, ^c Cap. 3. of which there are two kinds; one in the word, the other out of the word.

Sophisms in the word, are six. 1. By *Homonymie*, as that Ill is good, for *ἰσχυρὰ* are good, but Ills are *ἰσχυρὰ*. The fallacy con-

sits in the word *ἐν Νύκτι*, which signifies sometimes necessarily inevitable, sometimes beneficiall.

2. By *Amphibolie*, as *βέλεσθαι λαβὴν μὴ τῶν πολεμίων*; which signifies either that the Enemies would take me, or that I would take the Enemies.

3. By *composition*, as *ἢ δυνάσθαι περιπατεῖν βιάσθαι*, that he who sits can walk, which is true in a divided sense, not in a compounded.

4. By *Division*; as five are two and three, therefore even and odde.

5. By *accent*, which is not so easily done in Logick as in Poetry.

6. By *figure of the word*, when things which are not the same, are interpreted in the same manner as a male for a female.

d Cap. 4.

^d *Sophisms out of the word* are seven. 1. *From accident*, when that which is demanded is equally competent to the thing, and to the accident; for whereas many things are competent to the same, it is not necessary that they be all in the subject and prædicate, as, if *Coriscus differs from a man, he differs from himself*; for he is a man.

2. *From that which is simply*, or *κατὰ τὸ*, when that which is said in part is taken as of all, as, if *that which is not, is imaginative*, that *which is not, is*.

3. *From ignorance of the Elench*, when not understanding the true Nature of a contradiction, they think that to be an absolute contradiction which is none, omitting either the same respect in the thing, or the same respect of the same thing; or the simplicity, or the time. To this all Sophismes may bee reduced.

4. *Of the consequent*; when we allow those to be true reciprocal consequences which are not such, as, *it is yellow, therefore it is honey, and the contrary, it is not yellow, therefore it is not honey*.

5. *Of petition of the principle*, neither by requiring that to be granted, which was to be proved, or proving the same by the same, the termes only changed; as *the Soul is immortal because it is not subject to death*.

6. *Of a not-cause as a Cause*, as when that is taken to be the cause of the thing or conclusion, which is cause of neither; as *Arms disturb peace, therefore they are to be taken away*.

7. *Of Plurality of Interrogations as one*, when many things are asked in ones; as *Justice and Impiety, are they Vertues or not?*

Hitherto of Elenchs; the four other Ends whereto a Sophist endeavours to reduce his adversary, are, *Falsitie, Paradox, Solæcism, and Tautologie*.

Sophismes are solved either by *distinction* or *negation*.

Thus much may serve for a slight view of his *Logick*, whereof we have but few Books left, in respect of the many which he wrote upon that part of Philosophy.

THE SECOND PART.

CHAP. I.

Of PHYSICK.

NOT to question the Method of *Aristotle's* Books of *Physick*, much lesse their titles (as some, to make them better agree with *Laertius's* Catalogue, have done) and least of all their Authority, with *Patricius*; we shall take them in that order which is generally received; according to which, next *Logick* is placed *Physick*.

^a *Physick* is a science concerning that substance which hath the principle of motion and rest within it self. *a Metaphys. 5. 1.*

The *Physicall* Books of *Aristotle*, that are extant, treat of these nine generall heads. *Of the principles of naturall things; of the Common affections of naturall things; of Heaven; of Elements; of the action and passion of Elements; of Exhalation; of Plants; of Animals; of the Soul.*

CHAP. II.

Of the Principles of Naturall Bodies.

^a **T**HE *Principles* of naturall Bodies are not one, as *Parmenides* *a Physic lib. 1. cap. 3. 4.* and *Melissus* held; nor *Homoimeria's*, as *Anaxagoras*; nor *Atomes*, as *Leucippus* and *Democritus*; nor *sensible Elements*, as *Thales*, *Anaximander*, *Anaximenes*, *Empedocles*; nor *numbers*, or *figures*, as the *Pythagoreans*; nor *Idea's*, as *Plato*.

^b That the *Principles* of things are *Contrary* (privately opposite) was the joint opinion of the *Ancients*, and is manifest in Reason. For *Principles* are those which neither are mutually of one another, nor of others, but of them are all things. Such are first contraries; as being first, they are not of any other; as contrary, not of another. *b Cap. 5.*

^c Hence it follows, that being contrary they must be more than one, but not infinite; for then naturall things would not be comprehensible by Reason: yet more than two; for of contraries only nothing would be produced, but that they would rather destroy one another. *c Cap. 6.*

^d There

d Cap. 7.

^d There are therefore *three* Principles of naturall bodies; two contrary; *privation* and *form*, and one common subject of both, *Matter*. The constitutive Principles are matter and form; of privation, bodies consist not, but accidentally, as it is competent to Matter.

e Cap. 8.

^e Things are made of that which is *Ens potentially*, *Materia prima*, not of that which is *Ens actually*, nor of that which is *non-ens* potentially, which is pure nothing. ^f Matter is neither generated nor corrupted. It is the first infinite subject of every thing, whereof it is framed primarily, in it self and not by accident, and into which it at last resolveth. To treat of forme in generall is proper to Metaphysicks.

f Cap. 9.

CHAP. III.

*Of Nature and the Causes of Naturall bodies.*a Phys. lib. 2.
cap. 1.

^a **O**F Beings, some are by Nature, as Plants, others from other causes; those have in themselves the principle of their motion; these have not. *Nature* is a Principle and Cause of the motion and rest of that thing wherein it is, primarily, by it self, and not by accident. Materiall substances have nature; Natural properties are according to Nature; Nature is twofold, Matter and Form, but Form is most Nature, because it is in act.

b Cap. 3.

^b Of *Causes* are four kinds; the *Material*, of which a thing is made; the *Formall*, by which a thing is made, or reason of its essence; The *efficient*, whence is the first principle of its mutation or rest as a Father; the *Finall*, for which end it is made; as health is to walking. Causes are *immediate* or *remote*, *principall* or *accidental*; *actuall* or *potential*; *particular* or *universall*.

c Cap. 4. &c.

Fortune and *Chance* are Causes of many effects; *Fortune* is an accidentall Cause in those things which are done by election for some end; *Chance* is larger; an accidentall cause in things which are done for some end at least that of Nature. They are both efficient.

d Cap. 8.

^d Nature acts for some end; not temerariouly, or casually; for those things which are done by nature, are alwaies or for the most part done in the same manner, yet sometimes she is frustrated of her end, as in Monsters, which she intends not.

e Cap. 9.

^e *Necessity* is twofold; *absolute*, which is from Matter, *conditional*, which is from the end or form; both kinds are in naturall things.

CHAP. IV.

Of the affections of naturall Bodies, Motion, Place, Time.

^a **M**otion is of a thing which is not such, but may be such, the way or act by which it becommeth such, as curing of a body which is not in health, but may be in health, is the way and act by which it is brought to health. Neither is it absurd, that the same thing should be both in act and power, as to different respects; for the thing moved, as water in warming is in act, as to the heat which it hath, in power, as to the greater heat which it is capable of. a Physic. lib. 3. cap. 2.

^b *Infinite* is that which is pertransible without end, such an *infinite in act* there is not: not amongst simple bodies, for the elements are confined to certain number and place; neither amongst mixt bodies, for they consist of the elements which are finite. But, there are things *infinite potentially*; as, *in addition*, Number which may be augmented infinitely; *in division*, Magnitude, which may be divided infinitely; *in time*, and continued succession of generation. b cap. 7.

^c The properties of place are, that it contains the thing placed; that it is equall to, and separable from the thing placed; that the place and thing placed are together; that it hath upwards or downwards, and the like differences; that every Physicall body tends naturally to its proper place, and there resteth. c Lib. 4. cap. 3.

Place is the immediate immovable superficies of a continent body. Those things which are contained by another body are in place; but those which have not any other body above or beyond them are not properly in place. Bodies rest in their naturall places, because they tend thither as a part torn off from the whole.

^d *Vacuum* is place void of body: such a vacuum there is not in nature, for that would destroy all motion, seeing that in vacuum there is neither *upwards* nor *downwards*, *backwards* nor *forwards*. Nor would there be any reason, why motion should be to one part more then to another. Moreover it would follow, that it were impossible for one body to make another to recede, if the triple dimension, which bodies divide, were vacuous. Neither is the motion of rare bodies upwards caused by vacuity, for that motion is as naturall to light bodies, as to move downwards is to heavy. d cap. 8.

^e *Time* is the number of motion by *before* and *after*. Those two parts of time are conjoynd by (*τὸ νῦν*) the *present*, as the parts of a line are by a point. Time is the measure of rest as well as of motion; for the same measure which serves for the privation, serves for the habit. All motion and mutation is in time; e cap. 10. 11.
for

for in every motion there is a swiftnesse or flownesse, which is defined by time. The Heavens, Earth, Sea, and other sensibles, are in time, for they are movable.

f Cap. 14.

^f Time being a *numerate* number, exists not without a *numérant*, which is the *Soule*. The measure of time and other things, is that which measureth the first, and most equall motion; this is the motion of the *primum mobile*, for the first in every kinde is the measure of the rest.

CHAP. V.

Of the kinds and properties of Motion.

a Phys. lib. 5.
cap. 2.

Motion appertaines to three Categories, to Quantity, *accretion and diminution*; to Quality, *alteration*; to Where, *local motion*.

Rest is a privation of motion in a body, when, where, and how it is apt for motion.

b Lib. 6. cap. 1.

^b As all Magnitude is primarily, and *per se*, continuous and divisible into infinite, so is all motion, by reason of magnitude, and time it selfe. For whatsoever is not composed of indivisibles, is divisible into infinite; but no continuous thing is composed of indivisible things, for it is quantitative, whereas indivisibles having no extreames or parts, can neither be conjoynd by continuous nor contiguous motion.

c Cap. 2.

^c Yet it followeth not, that if there be infinite magnitude, there can be no motion, for it is not infinite in act, but in power, as are likewise time and motion.

d Cap. 3.

^d Neither is there any motion in the instant, *τὸν αὐτὸν*, for nothing is moved or resteth, but in time.

e Cap. 4.

^e Motion therefore is divisible, as well in respect to the time wherein it is made, as in respect to the thing wherein it inheres; as both these are alwaies divisible, so may motion it selfe be divided according to these.

f Cap. 5.

^f Whatsoever is changed, as soon as it is changed, must necessarily be in the (next) terme *to which*, for it leaveth the state or form in which it was, and assumeth that to which it tendeth: yet though in motion, there is a first motion of perfection, wherein we may truly say, the mutation is made, yet there is no first motion of inception.

g Cap. 6.

^g Whatsoever is moved in any whole time, is necessarily moved in every part of that time.

h Cap. 7.

^h All motion is finite, for it is in time, which is finite.

Whatsoever is thus proper to motion, is to be applyed also to rest and quiescence.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of the first Mover.

WHatsoever is moved must necessarily be moved by another, either external or internal. But lest this progression be into infinite, we must of necessity at last come to one first mover, which is not moved by another. This first mover, the cause and origine of all motion, is *immovable, one, eternall, and indivisible, void of all quantity.*

^b *Immovable*, for whatsoever things are moved, are either ^{b Lib. 3. cap. 6.} immediately moved by a first immovable mover; or by some other which is likewise moved by another, untill at last we come to some first mover; for nothing can move it selfe, unlesse there be a first mover: but of infinites there is no first.

^c *One*, for he is most perfect, as being Author of the most perfect and most simple motion, that of the *primum mobile*. Besides, the best in every kinde is one; for good is simple, ill multiplications. ^{c Cap. 6.}

^d *Eternall*, for motion it selfe is eternall, as appears thus: The ^{d Cap. 7.} mover and the movable must either be from eternity, or have had beginning in some time; if they began at any time, it must have been by motion, and consequently before the first motion there was another, by which the mover and movable began, which were absurd. Again, if they were eternall, yet without motion, it must be either by reason of the inaptitude of the movable, or of its remoteness from the mover. But neither could the movable be made more apt, or brought nigher to the mover, except by motion, whence would follow, that there was a motion before the first motion. Again, Time; the measure of motion is eternall, therefore motion it selfe is such. That Time is eternall (besides that it is the generall agreement of Philosophers) is thus proved; it cannot be conceived without *ἰσχύς*, the instant, which is intermediate betwixt the past and future, both the end of one, and the beginning of the other; but, if time had a beginning, this *ἰσχύς* would have been only a beginning, not end; if time should have an end, this instant would be only an end, not a beginning, both which are repugnant to the nature of a moment.

^e *Indivisible, void of quantity*, the proof whereof is grounded upon three Theoremes: ^{e Lib. 8. cap. 10.} 1. That no finite mover can move in infinite time; therefore the first mover is infinite. 2. That there cannot be infinite power in finite quantity; therefore the first mover is incorporeall. 3. That there cannot be finite power in that which is infinite; therefore the first mover is infinite in power. Hence may be collected, that it is impossible the first mover
(h h h) should

should be divisible, corporeall, or affected with quantity; for if he had any, it would either be infinite, of which kinde actually there is none; or finite, wherein could not consist his infinite power.

CHAP. VI.

Of Heaven.

HAVING treated of the principles, causes, and affections of naturall bodies in generall, he proceeds next to particulars.

^a De Celo lib.
1. cap. 1.

^a The World is perfect, because it consists of bodies which are perfect, and comprehendeth all perfection, it selfe not being comprehended by any other.

^b Cap. 2.

^b Of Bodies, some are *simple*, others *compounded of the simple*. All naturall bodies are movable locally *per se*. There is a two-fold *local motion*, *simple*, which is comperible to simple bodies; and *mixt*, which to the mixt. Hence it followeth, that there are so many kinds of simple bodies, as variations of simple motion; for of one simple body, there is one proper motion. Simple local motion is two-fold: *circular*, about the center, and *right*: the right is either upwards from the center, or downwards to the center, and both these either simply, or *retro*. This four-fold variation of right motion, evinceth that there are *four* simple bodies called *Elements*; circular motion must be proper to some other fifth essence, different from the constitutions of the other four simple bodies, more divine and precedent to all the rest: This is *Heaven*.

^c Cap. 3.

^c Heaven hath neither gravity nor levity; this is manifest from its motion which is circular, not from the center which is proper to light things, nor to the center, as is proper to heavy, but about the center.

Heaven is void of generation and corruption, and consequently of accretion, diminution, and alteration, for it hath no contrary, it is therefore the first body, not to be consumed by time and age.

^d Cap. 5, 7.

^d No body can be infinite, therefore the world it selfe is not infinite; neither is there any body beyond it infinite, not intelligible or mathematicall.

^e Cap. 8.

^e There is but one world, for if there were more, the Earth of one would move to the Earth of the other (as being of one kind) and ascend out of its proper place.

^f Cap. 12.

^f The world is eternall; whatsoever is eternall is ingenerate and incorruptible. Plato therefore erred, in affirming the world to be generated, but incorruptible. If he meant that as it was generated, it is by nature corruptible; yet, shall never be actually dissol-

dissolved; because of the eternall cause of its conservation, God, he erreth also; for then there would be something that should be alwaies, and yet could not be alwaies.

^s Heaven is void of labour (*ἀπὸ τοῦ*) for it hath no contrary to *g Lib. 2. cap. 1* retard its motion.

^h Heaven *hath the threefold difference of position*, upwards and *h Cap. 2.* downwards, backwards, right and left; for these are proper to all animate things which have the principle of motion within themselves. The right side of Heaven is the *East*, for from thence begins its motion; the left side the *West*; and consequently the Arctick pole is lowermost, the Antartick uppermost; forwards our Hemispher, backwards the other.

ⁱ Heaven *naturally moveth circularly*, but this circular motion is not uniform throughout all Heaven, for there are other Orbs *i Cap. 3.* which move contrary to the *primum mobile*; that there may be a vicissitude in sublunary things, and generation and corruption.

^k Heaven is *Sphericall*, for to the first body the first figure is *k Cap. 4.* most proper. If it were quadrangular, triangular, or the like; the angles would sometimes leave a space without a body, and occupy another space without a body. The motion of Heaven is circular, as being the measure of all others, therefore most compendious and swiftest.

^l The motion of the *primum mobile* is *æquable and uniform*, for *l Cap. 5.* it hath neither beginning, middle nor end; the *primum mobile* and first mover being eternall both, and subject to no variation.

^m *Starrs* are of the same body with that wherein they are *m Cap. 7.* carried, but more thick and compact; they produce warmth and light in inferiour things through friction of the Air by their motion, for swift motion fires wood, and melts lead; yet the spheres themselves are not heated, but the Air only, and that chiefly by the sphere of the Sun, which by his accession towards us increaseth the heat, his beams falling more directly, and with double force upon us.

ⁿ The *Starrs* being infixed in the Heavens are moved not by *n Cap. 8.* themselves with a proper motion, as fishes in the water, and Birds in the Air, but according to the motion of their Orbes. Otherwise those in the eight Sphere would not be alwaies equidistant from one another; neither would the stars have alwaies the same side turned towards us, as we see the Moon hath.

^o The *primum mobile* is carried about with the swiftest motion *o Cap. 10.* the seven Orbes of Planets under it, as they are nearer to it, are carried so much the more swiftly about by the motion thereof; and as they are further distant, more slowly. Whence by how much the higher they are to the *primum mobile*, so much the slower is their proper motion, because it is contrary to that of the *primum mobile*, as being from *East* to *West*.

(h h h 2)

^p The

p Cap. 11.

The Starres are round, for that figure is most unapt for self-motion: wee see the Moon is round by her orbicular sections; therefore the other Starres are so likewise, for the reason is the same in all.

q Cap. 13. 14.

The Centre of Heaven is the *Earth*, round, seated immovable in the midst; which together with the Sea makes up one Globe.

CHAP. VII.

Of Elements.

a De Caelo lib.
3. cap 3.

THe Element of Bodies is a simple Body, into which other Bodies are divided, in which it is either actually or potentially; as in flesh, wood, and the like; there is fire and earth potentially; for into these they are segregated; but actually they are not; for then should the flesh and wood bee segregated.

Whereas every naturall Body hath a proper motion; motions are partly simple, partly mixt; the mixt proper to mixt bodies, the simple to simple; it is manifest that there are simple bodies, for there are simple motions; the circular proper to Heaven, the right to the Elements.

b Cap. 5.]

The Elements are not eternall; for they are dissolved with reciprocall mutations, and perish, and are mutually generated of one another.

c Lib. 4. cap. 1.

The motive qualities of the Elements are *gravity* and *levity*. *Heavy* is that which is apt to be carried downwards to the Centre or midst of Heaven; *light* is that which is apt to be carried upwards towards the extremities of Heaven. These are either simple or comparative. *Simply heavy* is that which is below all, as the Earth; *Simply light* is that which is above, as all the fire; *Comparatively heavy and light* are those in which are both these; above some, below others; as Air and Water. From these have mixt things, gravity and levity; the heavy are carried downwards; to a definite medium; the light upwards to a definite extream, for nothing tends to infinite. Whence it followeth that two Elements are extreemly contrary, simply heavy, and simply light, Fire and Earth; which tend to contrary places. Betwixt these are two means, participating of the nature of each extream, Air and Water. Those Elements which are highest and lightest are most perfect, and have the nature of forms in respect of the inferior, because these are contained by those; to be contained, is the property of matter, to contain, of form.

d Cap. 5.

Hence it followeth that there are *four* kinds of particular second

cond matter, differing by the accidentall differences of heat, cold, humidity, ficcity, levity and gravity, (simple and comparative) though there be but one common matter of them all; for they are made mutually of one another. The mean Elements are heavy in their proper places; for Earth being taken away, Water tending downwards, succeeds in its room; Air descends into the place of Water, but not contrariwise; for Water ascends not into its place of Air, unlesse by force. In the extream it is otherwise; for the Air being taken away, the fire will not descend into its place, nor the Earth ascend into the place of Water or Air; for Fire is not heavy, nor Earth light, in their naturall place; because they are extream Elements.

* Figure conduceth to the swiftnesse or slownesse of motion ^{c Cap. 6.} either upwards or downwards, but is not simply, and in it self the cause of motion; so an acute figure cuts the medium swiftly, a broad obtuse figure slowly. Hence a thin plate of Lead or Iron will swim on water, because it comprehends much of the subjected body, which it cannot easily divide or penetrate.

CHAP. VIII.

*Of generation, Corruption, Alteration, Augmentation
and Diminution.*

* There is a perpetuall succession of generation, as well simple as accidentall, which proceeds from two causes, ^{a De gener. & corrup. lib. 1. cap. 3.} the first mover, and the Heavens, alwaies moving, and alwaies moved, and *Materiall*, the first matter, of which, being *non-ens* actually, *ens* potentially, all things generable and corruptible consist. This is incorruptible in its self, susceptible of all forms, whereby the corruption of one natural substance, becometh the generation of another, whatsoever matter remaineth upon the corruption, being assumed towards the generation of another.

Generation and Corruption are twofold, simple, of a substance, ^{et 2^a 7^a} of an accident, generation of the lesse noble substance is called generation, ^{et 2^a 7^a} in respect of the more noble, as that of Earth in respect of fire.

Corruption alwaies succeedeth generation, because the terme, *to which* of corruption (*viz. non-ens*) is the terme *from which* of generations and the terme, *to which* of generation (*viz. ens in act*) is the terme *from which* of corruption. The matter of that which is generated, and that which is corrupted is the same, for as much as they are, or may be made reciprocally of one another, as Air, of Water, water of Air; but differently disposed.

^b Altera-

b Cap. 4.

^b *Alteration* and *generation* are different mutations; in alteration the subject remaineth entire, the affections only are changed, as of sick sound; in generation the whole is changed; not any sensible subject remaining. Alteration is a mutation according to quality; *augmentation* and *diminution*, according to quantity; *local motion* according to place.

c Cap. 5.

^c *Augmentation* and *diminution* differ from other mutations; first, in the object, generation and corruption concerneth substances; alteration, quality; lation, place; *augmentation* and *diminution*, quantity. Again, in the manner, that which is generated, or corrupted, or altered, not necessarily changeth place, but that which augments or diminisheth, in some manner changeth place, for it is bigger or lesser.

Augmentation is an addition to præexistent quantity; *diminution* a detraction. Whatsoever is augmented or decreased, is augmented or decreased according to every part thereof; by reception of something throughout all parts; decretion on the contrary. The animate body encreaseth, but not the aliment, for the living creature remaineth, the aliment is converted into the substance of the living creature. Hereupon that which is augmented is like unto that which is altered, for both of these remain. All parts of a living creature are augmented; the similar first, as bones and flesh; then the dissimilar, as consisting of the others.

Augmentation is made by accession of something according to form, not according to matter; for by it the whole is augmented, and made more such. Accession of parts, according to matter, is not augmentation, for by materialls only (destitute of that form, which the parts to be augmented have) the whole living creatures cannot encrease. Aliment therefore, whereby the living creature is augmented, must be the same potentially which the things augmented is in act. At first, it is contrary, and dissimilar, being in power the part of a living creature, in act something else: at last it becommeth assimilate to the living creature, taking the form of a part (by aggeneration) through the digestive power of the animate body, which changeth the aliment into its own substance.

For this reason augmentation presupposeth nutrition. *Nutrition* is, when the aliment as substance is converted into the substance of the living creature. Augmentation, when the same aliment as quantitative, is added to the quantity of the living creature. Hence a living creature as long as it is sound is alwaies nourished, but not alwaies augmented. As that which is added is potentially quantitative flesh, so it can augment flesh; as it is potentially flesh only, so it nourisheth; which when it can only do (as when so much wine is poured into water that it turnes all into water) then there is a diminution of the quantity, but the form remaineth.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Of Action and Passion.

Contact is of severall kinds, *Mathematicall*, by contiguity; *Physicall*, when the extreamis of severall bodies meet, and mutually act and suffer; *virtuall*, by power and metaphoricall.

^a De gener. & corrupt. lib. 1. cap. 6.

The mutuall action and passion of *Physicall* contact is betwixt things, partly unlike as to their form, partly like as to their genus (for they are contraries) matter; each endeavouring to reduce the patient to his own likeness, as fire, wood.

^b Cap. 7.

Every *Physicall* agent in acting, suffers from the patient, for both the agent and patient are active; endued with formes elementary, susceptible of contraries. But as the first mover is immovable, so is the first agent impassible.

Every thing acts, as it is such, actually; suffers, as it is such, potentially. The conditions of action and passion are five: 1. What the agent is in act, the patient is in power. 2. The patient is such according to each part. 3. That which is more disposed suffers more, and so on the contrary. 4. Every patient is continuous, and not actually divided. 5. The agent must necessarily touch the patient, either immediately or mediately.

^c Cap. 9.

CHAP. X.

Of Mixtion and Temperament.

Mixtion is not generation, for the matter is not mixt with the forme; nor alteration, for the quality is not mixed with the subject; nor augmentation, for aliment, the matter of augmentation, is not mixed with, but converted into the animate body. Conjunction of small bodies is not true mixtion, but coaccervation, for those bodies remain actually the same according to their forms, not composing one third according to every part. Things which have not the same matter are not mixt, because they cannot be active and passive reciprocally.

^a De gener. & corrupt. lib. 1. cap. 10.

Those things which are properly said to be mixed must have one common matter, they must mutually act upon, and suffer one from another, they must be easily divisible; yet so, as that one be not excessive in respect of the other, for then it is not mixtion, but mutation into the more predominant, as a drop of wine into a great quantity of water.

The principles and differences of Elements (sensible tactile bodies) are tactile qualities, in as much as by such qualities, sensible

^b De gener. & corrupt. lib. 2. cap. 2.

sensible bodies, as such, are constituted and differ. Of tactile qualities there are seven orders, hot, cold, moist, dry, heavy, light, hard, soft, viscous, arid, rugged, smooth, thick, thin. From the two first orders, are derived the differences of Elements, for by heat and cold, humidity and siccity they act and suffer, and are mutually changed by alterative passions. Of these first qualities two are active, heat and cold, two passive, humidity and siccity. Heat is that which congregates homogeneous things; cold that which congregates heterogeneous things; humid that which is not easily contained in its own bounds; dry the contrary.

c Cap. 3:

As there are four Elements, there must be four conjunctions of the primary qualities, from each of which the Elements are severally collected. The first conjunction is of hot and dry, whence proceedeth fire; the second of hot and moist, whence Air; the third of moist and cold, whence Water; the fourth of cold and dry, whence Earth. In each of these one quality is predominant; Earth is more dry then cold, water more cold then moist, Air more moist then hot, Fire more hot then dry.

All these Elements may be mutually transmuted into one another; the Symbolicall which agree in one primary quality are more easily transmuted into one another then the asymbolical, because it is lesse difficult to change one then many. This transmutation is not a generation, but a kind of alteration, whence it is manifest one Element cannot be the principle of another.

d cap. 7:

^d *Mixtion*, whereby the Elements concur to the composition of a mixt body, is made by coacervation, as *Empedocles* held, but after such a manner that their contrary qualities remain in the mixt; not potentially only, nor simply actually in their height, but in a mean kind of way; their extremities being reduced to some temper. From this contemperation come mixt bodies, differing according to the various proportion of the temperament; and as they are compounded of the Elements, so they resolve into the same.

e cap. 8.

All these mixt bodies consist of all the Elements; of Earth, for every thing participates of the nature of that thing wherein it is produced; of water, because every mixt thing must be concrete and terminated; which properties Water best affordeth to Earth; of Air and Fire, because every perfect mixt body is made by temperament of contraries, such is Air to Earth, Fire to Water. Again, the nature of all mixt bodies as well animate as inanimate, as to mixture, is the same, but that the animate consist of all the Element, is manifest in that they are nourished by them.

f Cap. 9.

The causes and common principles of mixt bodies are three; materiall, formall, efficient. The *Materiall* is the power to be and not to be, by which elementary things are generated and corrupted.

red, The *formall* is the reason of the essence of every thing; ^f the *universal efficient* is the circular motion of Heaven, not onely as being eternall, continuall and before generation, but chiefly because it bringeth nigh to us, and carrieth far from us that which hath the generative power of all things, that is, the Sun, and the other Stars, which by their accession and reccession are the causes of generation and corruption.

^g All these are so disposed according to the order of Nature, ^g Cap. 11. that because no naturall being can be permanent in the same individuall state, they may be at lest preserved by a continuall succession of many individuum's of the same species. Whence the naturall cause of generation is onely conservation of the species.

CHAP. XI.

Of imperfect mixt bodies.

^a **M**ixt bodies are twofold, *imperfect* and *perfect*: *Meteors* are ^a Meteor. lib. 1. 1. imperfect mixt bodies produced according to Nature, but after a lesse orderly and constant manner. ^b The generall matter thereof are the Elements; the efficient, the celestiaall bodies which act upon inferiours by a kind of coherence. ^c Heaven is highest; next Heaven the Element of fire; next fire, air, under air, water and earth. Clouds are not generated in the sphere of fire, nor in the region of the air, partly by reason of the heat which is there, partly because of the motion of the Heavens which carrieth along with it the element of fire, and the upper region of the air, by which motion heat is produced in inferiour bodies; for the air being carried along by the Heaven, is heated by that motion, and by the proximity of the Sunne and of the Element of fire.

^d *Flames* that appear in the upper part of the air are made thus; ^d Cap. 4. The Sun by his warmth extracteth a kind of breath out of the Earth, which, if hot and dry, is called *exhalation*, and if hot and moist, *vapour*. Exhalation ascends higher, as being higher, and being got into the upper region of the air, is there enkindled by the motion of the air, and proximity of the fire. Hence come those they call *fire-brands*, *goates*, *falling-stars* and the like. ^e Hence are also *Phasmes*, such as are called *gulfes*, *chasmes*, *bloody colours*, and the like; the exhalation being variously colour'd by reflection of the light, but chiefly seeming purple, which colour ariseth from the mixture of fire and white.

^f The efficient cause of Comets are the Sun and stars; the materiall an exhalation, hot, dry, condensed, and combustible; ^f Cap. 6, 7.

so as it burnes not much, nor is soon extinguished. It is called a *Comet*, or *airy starre*, when it is alike on every side: a *pogoneia* or *bearded starre*, when it hath a long train. That it consists of fire is manifest, because at the same time, there is commonly great winde and drought. It appears seldome, and then single, and beyond the Tropicks, because starres, especially the Sun, dissipate the matter whereof it consists.

g Cap. 8.

^g The *Galaxie* is not the light of many starres together, as *Anaxagoras* held, but an exhalation hot and dry, kindled by the motion of many great starres, which are in that part where the *Galaxie* appeareth.

h Cap. 9.

^h We come next to those meteors which are in the middle and lower region of the air. When the Sun and other Starres draw up vapours out of waterish places, into the middle region of the air, they are there kept so long, untill they are condensed by the cold of that place into drops of water, which if they come down very small, are called *missing*, if greater, *rain*. This thick vapour, which is seen suspended in the aire, and changeth from air to water, is a *Cloud*. *Mist* is the superfluity of a cloud, condensed into water.

i Cap. 10.

ⁱ Vapour attracted by a small heat not much above the earth, and descending more condensed by the nocturnall cold, becometh either *dew* or *frost*: *Frost* when it congealeth before it resolves into water; *Dew*, when it turnes into water, so as the warmth cannot dry it up, nor the cold freez it.

k Cap. 11.

^k *Snow* is a congealed cloud; *rain*, *dew*, *frost*, and *snow* differ almost only in bignesse and smalnesse.

l Cap. 12.

^l *Haile*, though it be of the same nature as ice, yet is seldome produced in winter, as being caused by *Antiperistasis*.

m Cap. 13.

^m As the air above the earth condensed, becommeth vapour, and vapour by cold becommeth water, so doth it also in the caverns and receptacles of the earth, by a continuall mutation; first it turnes into little drops, then those little into greater. Hence comes all springs, and heads of rivers, abundantly flowing out at one part of the earth. Hence great Rivers and Fountains commonly flow from great hills, which have greatest caverns.

n Cap. 14.

ⁿ The parts of the earth are in continuall mutation, sometimes humid; sometimes dry, sometimes fertile, sometimes desert, by new eruptions or defections of rivers, or accessse or recessse of the sea, according to certain periods of time. Thus have the parts of the earth their youth and age, as well as plants and living creatures, by the heat and conversion of the Sun. Time and the world are eternall; but *Nilus* and *Tanais* were not alwaies, for those places whence they first issued, were once dry grounds.

o Lib. 2. cap. 2.

^o The proper place of water is the concave superficies of the aire.

aire: This place the Sea, compassing the earth, possesseth; for the swift and more rare water is drawn upwards by the heat of the Sun; the salt, more thick and terrene setteth downwards. For this reason all waters tend to the sea, as to their proper place: yet, hereby the Sea is not enlarged, for the sun draweth out of it, by reason of its expansion, as great a quantity of water, as it receiveth from rivers. ° The sea is, as the world, eternall, the saltnesse thereof proceedeth from admixtion of some terrene, adust, exhalation. From the top of the Sea is drawn up a fresh vapour; from the bottom, heated by the Sun, an exhalation, which passeth through the Sea, and commeth up with the vapour; but falling back into the Sea, bringeth that saltnesse with it, as water passed often through ashes.

° Winds are produced by the Sun and Starrs, of a hot, dry exhalation, which ascending, is driven down again by the coldnesse of the middle region of the air, and by reason of the lightnesse of its nature, cannot go directly to the bottom, but is carried by the air up and down. We call it a hot and dry exhalation, as being more dry then humid. Winde is weakest in the beginning, but gaineth strength, by taking along with it other light exhalations, which it meets with by the way.

° Winds are laid by heat and cold, excessive heat consumeth the exhalations, as soon as it commeth out of the earth: excessive cold binds up the pores of the earth, so as it cannot passe.

° Earthquake is a trembling of the earth, caused by an exhalation hot and dry, inclosed in the bowells of the earth, which striving to get forth, as its nature requirerh, and not able, by reason of the solidity of the earth, to passe, maketh the earth shake, forcing a way through it, and bearing down whatsoever opposeth it. The more hot this included spirit is, the more vehement.

Of the same nature is lightning, thunder, and the like. Thunder is when an exhalation enclosed in a thick cold cloud, rolleth it up and down, and at last breaketh through it with more or lesse noise, according to the thicknesse of the cloud. By this eruption it acquireth a rare kinde of heat and light, which is lightning, subsequent to the noise of the eruption; yet, seen before the other is heard, by reason of the quicknesse of the sight beyond the hearing.

° As of dry exhalations, the rare and dispersed produce thunder and lightning; so of the great and condensed is made *νεφέλαι*, and thunder-bolts.

° Of lucid Meteors appearing in the clouds; are Haloes, Rain-bowes, Parelies, and Streaks: All these are caused by refraction, but differ according to the objects from which they are reflected. A Halo appeareth about some starre, when there happeneth a cloud to be; the middle part whereof, by reason of its rarity, being

being dissipated, the rest of the parts about, by reflection, represent the colour of the star. *Rainbow* is a refraction of the Sun's beam upon a humid cloud, ready to dissolve into rain. In like manner are caused *Parelies* and *Streaks*.

u Cap. 7.

" There are likewise imperfect mixt bodies, under, or within the earth, and these also of two kinds; some caused by exhalation, called *Mineralls*; others by vapour, called *Metalls*, fusile or ductile.

CHAP. XII.

Of perfect mixt bodies.

a Meteor. lib.
4. cap. 1.

THE common affections of perfect mixt bodies, are those which proceed from the primary qualities of the Elements, whereof two are active, heat and cold, two passive, humidity and siccity. The naturall effect of these is *Generation*, when heat and cold overcome the matter; otherwise it is *inquinat*ion and *inconcoct*ion. The opposite to simple generation is *Putrefaction*; every thing unless violently dissolved putrifieth. Hence those things that putrifie, become first humid, then dry; for the externall heat expelleth the internall, and at last consumeth it. All things therefore putrifie except fire, for putrefaction is the corruption of the naturall heat in every humid body, by the externall. For this reason, things are lesse subject to putrifie in cold or in motion, and the hotter or greater they are, as a part of the sea may putrifie, the whole cannot.

Out of putrid things are bred living creatures; for the naturall, heat whilst it is separating, endeavoureth as much as possible, that what is taken asunder and segregated by corruption, may gather together in some small parts, which afterwards, by help of the Sun, receive life. Thus are wormes, beetles, gnats, and other insects bred.

b Cap. 2.

^b *Concoct*ion is the effect of heat, *inconcoct*ion of cold. *Concoct*ion is a perfection caused by naturall heat of the opposite passive qualities, which are mixed with the matter, as being passive. The end of *concoct*ion in some things is mutation of the essence, as when food is converted into flesh or blood; in others only a mutation according to quantity or quality, as in fruites that ripen. *Inconcoct*ion is an imperfection in the opposite passive qualities, proceeding from defect of heat.

*Concoct*ion is three-fold, *πρώτης, μέσης, ὀψίτης*. *Inconcoct*ion is also three-fold, *ωμότης, μέθυσις, σάτυσις*.

c Cap. 3.

^c *πρώτης* is the *concoct*ion of that Element which is in fruites; it is perfect, when the seeds that are within the fruit are capable of producing their like, hereto is opposite *ωμότης*, the *inconcoct*ion

coction of fruits not able through want of heat to overcome the humidity.

Ectasis is a concoction of an humid interminate by externall humidity and heat; Hereto is opposite *μείλιξις*, the inconcoction of a humid interminate, caused by defect of externall humidity and heat.

Exsiccatio is a concoction by dry and externall heat, yet not excessive, for then it were adustion: to this is opposed *αδρυσίς*, an inconcoction caused through defect of heat and fire, or excess of humidity in the subject.

^{d cap. 4.} As concerning the two passive qualities; things are humid and dry, either actually, or potentially. Those things which are mixt of humid and dry, are terminate, for these qualities mutually terminate one another, whence bodies consist not without earth and water, this humid, that dry. And for this reason Animals can onely live in Earth and Water, which are their matter.

The first affections of terminate bodies are hardnesse and softnesse; hard is that which yields not to the touch, soft the contrary. Both these are such, either absolutely, or relatively. They are made such by concretion, which is a kind of exiccation.

^{e cap. 3.} Exiccation is of things that are water, or of the Nature of water, or have water in them, either naturally insite, or adventitious. It is done principally by heat, accidentally by cold. Humectation (its contrary) is the concretion of a vapour into water, or liquefaction of a solid body, as Metall. *Concretion* is, when the humidity being removed, the dry is reduced together and condensed, either by cold, as in generation of stones, or by heat, as in segregation of salt from water. To concretion is opposite, resolution, which is effected by its contraries. Those things which are condensed by heat only, are resolved by cold only, and so on the contrary.

^{f cap. 2.} Besides these principall affections, there are others secondary, chiefly competent to homogeneous bodies, some passive, some active.

Of passive qualities in mixt bodies, there are 18. differences, *Concreteile, Eliquabile, Mollificable, Humectable, Flexible, Frangible, Impreßible, Formable, Compressible, Trassile, Ductile, Fissile, Scissile, Unctious, Friable, Condensable, Combustible, exhalable*, and their contraries. From these are thus denominated, *homionerious* mixt bodies, as Metalls, Gold, Brasse, Silver, Stone and the like; and whatsoever is made out of these; as likewise similar parts in Animals and in Plants, as flesh and bone, whereof some are more cold, which consist most of water, others more hot, which most of earth and air.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Plants and Animals.

AT the end of his meteors he proposeth to speak of *Similar parts*, as Blood, and the like; what they are, and to what end, their matter and reason, but especially whence they have their motion; next to proceed to *dissimilar parts*, and lastly to speak of those which consist thereof, as men, Plants, and the like. Hence *Patricius* conjectures that his Books of the parts of living Creatures did immediately succeed those of the Meteors, wherein he treateth (as he proposeth) of *Similar parts* unto the tenth Chapter, of the second Book, and from thence of the *dissimilar*: But to reduce his Books of living Creatures to this method is the lesse certain, for as much as many of these (besides those which treated particularly of *Anatomy*) have been lost, of which perhaps were some which might better have cleared the series, for in the Books themselves concerning *Animals*, there is nothing to ground it upon.

For the same reason, it is uncertain where his Books of *Plants* ought to have been placed, which are lost. Perhaps they might precede those of *Animals*; for he asserts that Plants have souls, (contrary to the *Stoicks*) endued with vegetative power; that they live even though cut asunder, as insects, whereby two or more are made of one; that the substance they receive by aliment and the ambient air is sufficient for the preservation of their natural heat.

As concerning *Animals*, we have, *Of their Going*, one Book. *Of their History*, ten Books. *Of their parts*, four Books; *Of their Generation*, five Books. So exquisitely hath he treated upon this subject, as cannot well be expressed by an abridgement, and therefore we shall omit it; the rather because little or nothing was done herein by the *Academicks* or *Stoicks*, a collation with whom is the principall design of this summary.

CHAP. XIV.

Of the Soul.

^a *De anima*
lib. 1. cap. 1.

THe knowledge of the *Soul* conduceth much to all Truth, and especially to *Physick*, for the *Soul* is as it were the principle of animate things. Animate things differ from inanimate chiefly by motion and sense.

^b *Cap. 21*

Whence the antient Philosophers defined the *Soul* by these;
Democritus

Democritus the *Pythagoreans*, *Anaxagoras* by motion; *Empedocles* and *Plato* by knowledge; others by both; others by incorporeity, or a rare body; *Thales* something that moveth; *Diogenes*, air; *Heraclitus*, exhalation, an immortall substance; *Hippo*, water; *Critias*, blood.

^c The soule doth not move it selfe, as *Democritus* held, for whatsoever is moved, is moved by another. Again, if the soul were moved *per se*, it would be in place, and it were capable of being moved violently, and it would be of the same nature with the body, and might return into the body after the separation. Neither is the soul moved by it selfe; but from its objects; for if it were moved essentially, it might recede from its essence. The soul therefore is not moved *per se*; but by accident only, according to the motion of the body. c Cap. 3.

^d The soul is not *Harmony*, (a proportionate mixture of contraries) for then there must be more souls in the same body, according to the different constitution of its parts. But though we commonly say, the soul *grieveth*, *hopeth*, *feareth*, &c. we are not to understand that the soul is moved, but only that these are from the soul in the body, that is moved; some by locall motion of the Organs, others by alteration of them. To say, the soul is angry is no more proper then to say she builds; for it is the man that is angry by the soul, otherwise the soul were liable to age, decay, and infirmity, as well as the organs of the body. d Cap. 4.

^e Neither is the soul a rare body, consisting of elements, for then it would understand nothing more then the elements themselves; neither is there a soul diffused through all things, as *Thales* held, for we see there are many things inanimate. e Cap. 5.

Some from the different functions of the soul argue, that there are more souls then one in man; or that the soul is divisible, the supream intellectuall part placed in the head, the irascible in the heart, concupiscible in the liver: But this is false, for the Intellect is not confined to any part of the body, as not being corporeall, nor organically, but immateriall and immortall.

^f The soul is the first *entelechie* of a naturall organically body, f Lib. 2. cap. having life potentially. *First, Entelechie.*] *Entelechie* is two-fold, the first is the principle of operation, as Science; the second, the Act it selfe. Of a *Naturall*,] ^g not of an artificiall body, as a g Laert. Tower or Ship. *Organically body*,] that is, endued with instruments for operation, as the eye for seeing, the ear for hearing; even plants have simple Organs. *Having life potentially*,] as it were in it selfe, for potentially is lesse then actually; actually, as in him that wakes; potentially, as in him that is asleep.

The soul is otherwise defined, that by which we first live, feel, and understands whence appeareth, there are three faculties of the soul, *nutritive*, *sensitive*, *intellective*; the inferiour comprehended by the superior potentially, as a triangle by a quadrangle.

CHAP. XV.

Of the Nutritive faculty.^a Cap. 4.

^a THE first and most common faculty of the Soul is the *Nutritive*; by which life is in all things, the acts and operation thereof are to be generated, and to take nourishment.

Nutrimēt is received either towards Nutrition or augmentation. Nutrition is the operation of the Nutritive faculty conducing to the substance it self of the animate being. Augmentation is the operation of the Nutritive faculty, whereby the animate body encreaseth to perfect Magnitude. In nutrition are considered, the Soul nourishing, the body nourished, and the food by which the nourishment is made; hereto is required a Naturall heat, which is in all living creatures. The aliment is both contrary, or unlike, and like, to the body nourished: as it is undigested, we say nourishment is by the contrary; as altered by digestion, like is nourished by its like.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the Sensitive Faculty.^a Cap. 5.

^a THE *Sensitive* faculty of the Soul is that by which sense is primarily in Animals. Sense is a mutation in the Organ caused by some sensible Object. It is not sensible of it self, nor of its Organ, nor of any interiour thing. To reduce it to act, is requisite some externall sensible object, for sense cannot move it self being a passive power, as that which is combustible cannot burn it self.

^b Cap. 6.

^b Of sensible Objects there are three kinds; *proper*, which is perceived by one sense, without error, as colour in respect of light. *Common*; which is not proper to any one, but perceived by all. *Accidentall*; which, as such, doth not affect the sense.

Sense is either *Externall* or *Internall*, the externall are five, *Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Touching, Tasting.*

^c Cap. 7.

^c The object of *Seeing* is Colour, and some thing without a name that glisters in the dark, as the scales of fish, glow-worms and the like. Colour is the motive of that which is actually perspicuous; nothing therefore is visible, without light. Perspicuous is that which is visible, not by it self, but by some other-colour or light, as Air, Water, Glasse. Light is the act of a perspicuous thing, as it is perspicuous. It is not fire, nor a body, for

for then two bodies would be in the same place.

To sight and all other senses is requisite a *medium* and convenient distance. The object first affects the *medium*, then the organ.

^d The object of *hearing* is sound. Sound is made by collision of ^{d cap. 8.} two bodies, hard, smooth, and hollow, in a *medium*, as air or water, swiftly and vehemently before the medium be dissipated.

Echo is a reflex sound, when the air, gathered together and forced into a vessel, or some place which hindereth its diffusion and progresse, reverts as a base against a wall. Sound is alwaies reflected, though not alwaies perceptibly, as light also, otherwise all places would be dark, which were not directly opposite to the Sun, or some lucid body.

Sound is made by that which moveth the air, and continually stirreth it, till it arrive at the organ, wherein there is an insite, connaturall, animate, immovable air, which being moved by the externall air, yeeldeth the sense of hearing. Hence it cometh that we can hear under water, for the water cannot get into this air, because of the winding narrow passages of the ear: If it do get in, or the membrane which containeth this air be otherwise broken, it causeth deafnesse.

Voice is the impulsion of air attracted by respiration, and forced against the vocall artery by the soul, which is in the lungs, with some intent of signification. Voice therefore is not proper to all animals, but to such only as have blood and breath. Fishes therefore have not voice.

^e The object of *smelling* is Odor. This sense is not so perfect in ^{e cap. 9.} men as in other creatures, whence men perceive not odors, unlessse with delight or dislike, when they are so strong, as to excite one of these. This defect proceedeth from the organ of smelling, which in us is more obtuse. The *medium* of smelling is air and water, for fishes smell. Hence all living creatures smell not after the same manner; they which breath smell by drawing in the air, the rest not so, because of the different accommodation of the Organ. Those therefore which smell by drawing in the air, cannot smell under water. *Odor* consists chiefly in dry, as *sapor* in humid. The organ of smelling is dry potentially, as the object is actually.

^f The object of *Tast* is sapor. Whatsoever is gustable is ^{f cap. 10.} taste-ble, and humid, either actually, or at least potentially. Dry things are subject to tast as they are potentially humid, and melt as salt. The tast perceiveth that which is gustable, and that which is ingustable, as the sight darknesse, the hearing silence; for every sense perceiveth the presence and absence of its object. That which is potable is perceived by the touch; as humid by the tast, as having sapor. The tongue tastes not that which is dry, because the organ of tast must be such potentially, as the object is actually; but, without humidity nothing is gustable. The

(k k k)

kinds

kinds of savors are sweet and bitter; to sweet are referred unctious, to bitter salt. The mean are sharp, piccant, acid, acute; gustable is that which moveth the tast, and reduceth it to act.

g Cap. 11. ^g The objects of *Touch* are the primary qualities, the organ is that part which is potentially that which the object is in act; for that which is like cannot suffer from its like. We feel not things of equall heat, cold, hardnesse, or softnesse. The flesh is the *medium*; the first sensory is something more internall. Herein touch and tast differ from the other senses, whose objects are at greater distance. Touch perceiveth things tactile and not tactile.

h Cap. 12. ^h All these senses receive sensible species without matter, as wax the impression of a seal without the gold. The organ or sensory is that in which the sensitive faculty primarily exists; a vehement object destroyeth the organ.

i Lib. 3. cap. 1. ⁱ That there are no more externall senses then these five, is manifest, in that there are no more in perfect animals; neither is there any need of a sixth sense to perceive common objects, which every sense discernes by accident, as motion figure.

The act of the object, and the act of the sense it selfe, as Sonation and Audition, are really the same, differ only intentionally. This act is generally in the sensitive, not in the object.

k De Sensu. cap. 6.

^k Sensible qualities are finite, as being bounded by extreams and their contraries, but divisible by accident into infinite, according to the division of their continuous subject.

l Ibid.

^l In sensibles, some are potentially sensible, as a part joyned to the whole; others actually, as the whole it selfe, or a part separated from the whole. But of separate parts some are so little, that sense cannot actually perceive them, by reason of their want of due magnitude.

m Ibid.

^m Sounds and odors are successively generated in the *medium*, and by degrees deduced to the organ; but light is produced in an instant in the medium, not carried through it by locall motion.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Common sense.

a Lib. 3. cap. 2. ^a Every externall sense perceiveth the differences of its own object, as sight judgeth of black and white; but the differences of divers objects cannot be perceived by the same sense; there is therefore a *common sense*, which judgeth the actions of externall sense, and the differences of all sensible objects. The judgment being of a sensible object, must be done by sense, and by

by one sense only; for, if there were more, one would object one object apart, the other another, and consequently could not judge between them. For, that which judgeth must have knowledge of all that whereof it judgeth, which no exteriour sense can afford, as being confined to its proper object.

Common sense judgeth contrary or different sensibles in the same instant, for it discerneth together sweet and black, bitter and sweet. Hence it is like the center of a circle, which in diverse respects is called one and many. It is one, as all the externall senses are united in it; many, as it is the fountain and judge of them.

^b Sense differs from Intellect; for sense is in all living creatures, intellect in few. Sense erreth not about its proper object, but is alwaies true; intellect often erreth by false opinions and habits. ^{b De anima, lib. 3. cap. 3.}

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Phantasy and Cogitation.

^a **F**rom *Sense* is derived *Phantasy* and *Cogitation*. *Phantasy* ^{a Cap. 3.} differs from sense and intellect, though it exist not without a previous knowledge of sense, as neither doth cogitation, which is in action of the Intellect, comprehending science, opinion, and prudence.

The act of *Phantasy* differs from *Cogitation*, for we phantasy things false and at our own pleasure; but, we think only what is true, and like unto truth, and that not as we please our selves, but as the thing seemeth. Moreover, when we think that things are ill or good, we are moved with fear, joy, hope; but when we phantasy only without application of judgment, we are not moved no more then we are frighted at a picture.

Phantasy is not properly *Sense*, *phantasy* acteth in him that sleepeth, sense doth not. Sense was with us from our birth, *phantasy* not. Sense is in all animals, *phantasy* is not. Sense is true, *phantasy* often false. Sense is only of things present, *phantasy* of the absent likewise:

Phantasy is not *Science* or *Intellect*, for that is alwaies of things true and reall, *phantasy* often is of things false. *Phantasy* is not *opinion*, for opinion is follow'd by faith, *phantasy* is not.

Phantasy is a motion in animals from sense in act, by which motion they are variously affected, and conceive things sometimes true, and sometimes false. The error of *phantasy* ariseth from the error of the senses: *Phantasy* therefore is of neer affinity with sense; for though it be not sense, yet it exists not without sense, or in things that have no sense. It is de-

rived *ἀπὸ τοῦ φωτός* from light, for sight the most excellent of senses cannot act without light.

Many things are done by Animals according to phantasie, either because they have not Intellect as Beasts, or that intellect is obscured in them.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Memory and Reminiscence.

^a Lib. de Me-
mor.
^c Rem. cap. 1.

FROM *Phantasy* proceeds *Memory*, which is of things *past*, as sense is of the *present*, opinion of the *future*. Sense and Intellection are necessarily previous to memory. Hence those Animals only which have sense of time, remember, as horses and dogs; yet memory is not without phantasm, even not that memory which is of Intelligible things, for he that remembreth, is sensible that he first saw, heard, or learn'd what he remembreth. Memory therefore is reducible *per se* to phantasie, as being of Phantasmes, to intellect only by accident. Hence in the same part of the Soul, wherein Phantasie exists, resideth likewise memory; for if it were placed only in the intellectual faculty, it would not be competent to Beasts, which we see it is.

Memory is made by impression of some image by the sense upon the Soul. Hence they who retain not the image and figure of sense, either by continuall motion, or excessive humidity, as children, or drought, as old men, remember not. To memory therefore is required a moderate temperature of the brain; yet more inclined to dry.

^b Cap. 2.

^b *Reminiscence* is not a resumption or assumption of memory, but differs specifically from both these, for Beasts have not Reminiscence though they have memory, Reminiscence being made by discourse and diligent disquisition, collecting one thing from another by a continued series and order, untill at last we call that to mind which we had forgotten.

CHAP. XX.

Of Sleep and Waking.

^a Lib. de Som. a
^c Vigil. cap. 1.

TO Sense belongeth *Sleep* and *Waking*; for those animate things which want sense, neither sleep nor wake, as Plants. Sleep is an immobility, and band as it were of senses waking is a solution and remission of sense.

^b Cap. 2.

^b The chief seat of sleep is the common sense, which being bound

bound up by sleep, all the exterior senses, whereof this is the common Centre, are bound up likewise and restrained, for the rest and health of the Animal; which is the end of waking also.

Every impotence of sense is not sleep, but only that which is caused by evaporation of the Aliment. Hence we are most subject to sleep after meat; for then much humid vapour ascends, which first maketh the head heavy by consistence there, then descends and repels the heart, whereby is induced sleep. That sleep is made in this manner, is evident from all soporiferous things, as poppy, which causeth heaviness in the head by sending up vapours. Labour produceth sleep, by dispersing the humours, whence produceth vapour. Drunken men & Children are subject to sleep much, melancholy persons little, for they are so cold within, that the vapour exhalet not, especially they being of a dry constitution. Sleep therefore is a recession of the heat inward with a naturall kind of circumobistence. c Cap. 2.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Dreams.

Dreaming is an affection of the sensory part, in as much as it is phantastick. A Dream is an apparition or phantasme seen in sleep. a Lib de in-
sem.

After the functions of the externall senses, there remain their motions and similitudes induced by their objects into their Organs. These occurring in sleep cause dreams, but not at all times, nor at every age, for their species shew not themselves but upon cessation of the humours. Hence Dreams are not immediatly after sleep, nor in infants soon after their birth, for then there is too great commotion by reason of the alimentary heat. As therefore in troubled water no image appeareth, or if any, much distorted, but when it is calm, the image is rendred clearly; so when there is a tumult and agitation of the humours, there are no images presented, or those dreadfull, such as are the Dreams of melancholly and sick persons; but when the blood passeth smoothly, and the humours are settled, we have pure and pleasing Dreams; A Dream therefore is a phantasm caused by motion of sensibles already perceived by sense, occurring to Animals in sleep.

Of the Intellective Faculty.

^a *De Anim. lib.*
3. cap. 4.

^a The third faculty of the Soul is the *Intellective*, proper to man. Intellect is that part of the Soul whereby it knoweth and understandeth. It is twofold, *Patient* and *Agent*. *Patient Intellect* is that by which Intellect becometh all things, for Intellection is like sense; Sense is by passion from a sensible object, intellect from an intellectuall. The properties of patient Intellect are these; it is void of corruptive passion; it is apt for reception of species; it is that species potentially; it is not mixt with the body; it hath no corporeall Organs; it is the place of species.

^b *Cap. 5.*

^b That there is also an agent Intellect is manifest; for in whatsoever kind, there is something that is potentially all of that kind, there is something likewise which is the efficient cause of all in that kind; this is the agent Intellect, a cognoscitive power which enlighteneth phantasms and the patient Intellect. The properties thereof are, that it is separable from the body, immortall and eternall; that it is not mixt with the body; that it is void of passion; that it is ever in act; but the patient Intellect is mortall, which is the cause of Forgetfulness.

^c *Cap. 6.*

^c The action of the Intellect is twofold, one, *Intellection of indivisibles*, in which is neither truth nor falsehood, as all *simple* apprehensions; the other *complex*, when we compound and unite notions by affirmation or negation. This is alwaies either true or false, the other neither. The simple is precedent to the complex.

^d *Cap. 8.*

^d Intellect in act is either *Practick* or *Theoretick*. As a sensible object reduceth the sensible faculty from power to act, so doth an intellectuall object the intellectuall faculty; and as the operation of sense is threefold, simple apprehension, judgment if it be good or ill, and lastly, appetition or aversion according to that perception: So likewise is the operation of the *practick intellect* threefold: First, it is moved by phantasmes, as sense is by externall sensibles. Secondly, it judgeth the object to be good or ill, by affirmation or negation. Thirdly, it moveth the will to pursue or shun it, whence it is called *practick*. This practick intellect is moved as well when the sensible object is absent, as when it is present, only excited by the phantasy. The object of the *Theoretick Intellect*, is, true or false; of the practick, good or ill.

^e *Ibid.*

^e The rationall soul in some manner is every thing; for that which actually knoweth, is in some maner the same with the thing known.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of the Motive faculty.

^a Besides the *nutritive*, *sensitive*, and *intellective* faculties, ^{a Cap. 9.} there is also a *motive* faculty in animate creatures. That it is not the same with the *nutritive* is manifest, in as much as it proceeds from imagination and apprehension, which plants have not, neither have they organs fit for motion, which nature would have given them if they had this power. That it is not the same with the *sensitive*, appears, in that some animals which have sense have not the power, as *Zoophytes*, which have not the organs fit for this motion. Neither is it the same with the *Theoretick Intellect*, for that judgeth not as to action; but progressive motion is the action of an animal flying ill, or pursuing good.

^b The principles of *locall motion* in animals, are the *practick* ^{b Cap. 10.} *Intellect* (under which is comprehended phantasy) and *appetite*. These two direct and impell the motive faculty to action; intellect and phantasy by directing what is to be shunned, what to be embraced, appetite by shunning or embracing it. Appetite is the chief principle thereof, for that may move without intellect, as in beasts, and many times in men, who desert their reason to follow their pleasure: But intellect never moveth without appetite, that is, will; for appetite is the principle of all motion, honest and dishonest, intellect only of honest motion.

In man, appetite is two-fold; *Will*, which followeth the judgment of reason; and *sensuall appetite*, irascible or concupiscible, which followeth sense and phantasy.

In the motion of animals, three things are considered: First, that which moveth, and that is two-fold; the *appetible* object, which moveth the appetite as a finall cause, not as an efficient; and the appetite it selfe, which being moved by the appetible object, moveth the animal. Secondly, by what it moves, which is the heart of the animal, by which instrument the appetible object moveth it. Thirdly, that which is moved, the animal it selfe, perfect.

^c *Insects* are moved locally, as *perfect* animals are, and consequently by the same principles, appetite and phantasy; but this phantasy is imperfect, diffused through the whole body, as appeareth by their uncertain motion, only towards present occurrent objects. That they have appetite is manifest, in as much as they are sensible of pain and pleasure. ^{c Cap. 11.}

Beasts have *sensitive* phantasie only; ratioll creatures, *deliberative*, which compareth many things conducing to some fore-known end, and chooseth the most expedient. Yet sometimes the

the sensitive appetite in man overſwayeth the rationall, but by the order of nature, the will, which is the rationall, ought, as being the ſuperiour to it, to overſway the ſenſitive. Thus there are three motions, one of the will commanding, another of the ſenſitive appetite reſiſting, and a third of the body obeying. But when the ſenſitive overruleth, there are only two motions, for the will reſiſts not, but is deceived.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Life and Death.

^a *De vit. & Mort. cap. 23.* ^a **G**eneration and diſſolution are common to all living Creatures, though all are not produced and diſſolved in the ſame manner.

^b *Cap. 24.* ^b The generation of a living Creature is the firſt conjunction of the nutritive Soul with the naturall heat.

Life is the permanence of that Soul with the ſaid heat.

Youth is the encrease of the firſt refrigerative part, *age* the decrease thereof, *αἰμα*, the conſtant and perfect life which is betwixt both.

As long as an animate Creature liveth, it hath naturall heat within it ſelf, and as ſoon as that faileth, dieth. The principle of this heat is in the heart. If it be extinguiſh'd in any other part, the Animal may live, but if in the heart, it cannot.

This heat is extinguiſh'd two waies; firſt by *conſumption*, when it faileth of it ſelf; ſecondly, by *extinction*, from ſome contrary, as in violent death; the cauſe is the ſame in both, defect of aliment, which in the living Creature is its vitall moiſture, as fire wanting refrigeration, groweth more violent, and ſoone conſumeth the humidity, which being gone, it ſelf muſt of neceſſity go out.

Refrigeration therefore is neceſſary to the conſervation of the naturall heat. Plants are refrigerated by the ambient air, and by aliment: their naturall heat is extinguiſh'd by exceſſive cold, and dry'd up by exceſſive heat. Animals which live in the air, or in the water, are refrigerated by the air or water, ſome by breathing, others without.

^c *Cap. 23, 24.* ^c *Death*, according to the extinction of naturall heat, is two-fold, *violent* or *naturall*; violent, when the cauſe is extrinſecall; naturall, when the principle thereof is in the animate Creature. For that part wheron life dependeth (the Lungs) is ſo ordered by nature that its cannot perform its office for ever. Death therefore cometh from defect of heat, when through want of refrigeration the radical humidity is conſumed and dry'd up. Refrigeration faileth naturally, when by progreſſe of time the lungs

in Creatnres that have breath, the gills in fishes grow so hard, that they are unapt for motion.

^d Old men die easily, as having but little naturall heat, and ^{d cap. 23.} without pain, because his dissolution comes not from any violent affection.

^e The lives of living Creatures, as well of the same, as of divers ^{e Lib. de lon. & brev. cap. 4} species differ in length; the longest life, most commonly, is that of some Plants, as the Palm and Cypress; that of Creatures which have blood rather than the bloodlesse; that of terrestriall creatures rather than the aquatile; that of those which have great bodies, as of Elephants, rather than those of little.

^f The causes of long life are first the quantity and quality of the vitall moisture, if it be much and fat, not easily dry'd up nor congealed. Secondly, natural heat, which suffereth not that humour to be congealed. Thirdly, a due proportion betwixt this heat and that moisture. Fourthly, fewnesse of excrements, for excrements are contrary to Nature, and sometimes corrupt nature it self, sometimes a part. ^{f cap. 5.}

Salacious creatures, or laborious grow soon old by reason of exiccation. For the same reason men are shorter liv'd then women, but more active.

In hot Countries, animate creatures are larger, and live longer then in cold. Those animals which have little or no blood, either are not at all produced in the Northern parts, or soon dye.

Both Plants and Animals, if they take not aliment, die, for the naturall heat; when the aliment faileth, consumeth the matter it self, wherein it is, the vitall moisture.

Aquatile creatures are shorter liv'd then the terrestriall, and the bloodlesse then those that have blood, because their humidity is more waterish, and consequently more apt to be congealed and corrupted.

^g Plants live long, as having lesse of waterish moisture, which therefore is not so apt to be congealed. The largenesse of the upper parts, as well in Plants as Animals, is a signe of long life, because it argues much naturall heat. The upper part of a Plant is the root, not the boughes. ^{g cap. 6.}

THE THIRD PART.

CHAP. I.

ETHICK.

WE come next to the *Morall* part of Philosophy, including *Ethick*, *OEconomick* and *Politick*. Of the first, we have ten Books of *Aristotles*, written to (his Son) *Nicomachus*, two Bookes called his *Great Ethick*; one of *Vertues*. Of *OEconomick*, two Books; of *Politick* eight. We shall not have recourse to these for an account of his Doctrine in this kind, being furnished by *Stobaeus* with a summary of what he and the rest of the *Peripateticks* asserted in Morality.

^a *Eclog. Ethic.*

Ethick (^a saith he) is so called, *ἠθικὸν*, from *Custom*; for those things, the principles and seeds whereof we receive from Nature, are to be perfected by Custom and right institution. Hence *Ethick* pertaineth only to living Creatures, and particularly to man, for the rest acquire Custom, not by Reason, but Necessity, man by Reason.

Of the *Soul*, one part is *Rationall*, the other *Irrationall*; the *rationall* part is *Judicative*, the *irrationall* *Appetitive*; of the *rationall*, that which is *Theoretick*, conversant in divine things, is called *Science*; that which is *Practick*, conversant in humane Actions, is called *Counsell*. Of the latter, one part is *concupiscible*, another *irascible*.

In like manner *Vertue* is twofold, *rationall* and *irrationall*, consisting in Theory and practise. *Ethick* Vertue consisteth not in Science, but in election of Goods.

Vertue is perfected by three things; *Nature*, *Custom* and *Reason*. For man differing from other Creatures both in body and mind, as being a species placed between divine essences and *irrationall* Creatures, hath some affinity to both; in what is *rationall*, and agrees with the *Soul*, he is ally'd to the Divinity; in what is *irrationall*, proper to the body, he agrees with the *irrationall*. Both these desire perfection by Reason; and first, he desireth to be, for this is naturally insite in him. Hence he affecteth things that are according to his Nature, and is averse from things
contra-

contrary to his nature. He endeavoureth to preserve *health, pleasure, life*, these being according to nature, expetible in themselves and good. On the contrary, he shunneth *sickness, pain, and death*, as being repugnant to nature, and therefore ill, and to be avoided. We love our own bodies, we love our own soules, their parts, their faculties, their acts: the principle of appetite, office, and vertue is a providentiall care of these. If error did not happen concerning things expetible and avoidable, but that we lived continually participant of good, and void of ill, we should not enquire in these for a true election. But being in things expetible and avoidable, through ignorance often deceived, sometimes rejecting the good, sometimes admitting the ill for good, we necessarily have recourse to *constancy of Judgment*, which having obtain'd convenient to nature, we call it, from the excellency of its function, *Vertue*, admiring and honouring it above all things. For actions, and those which are called Offices, proceed from election of things according to nature, and rejection of things repugnant to nature. Herein consist *right actions* and *sins*; even on these dependeth almost the whole reason of *Election*, as we shall briefly demonstrate.

That Children are *expetible* to parents, not only *for use* or benefit, but also *in themselves*, is most evident. There is no man so cruell and savage, who doth not rather desire his children after his death should live happily and well, then otherwise: By this affection dying persons make Wills, providing even for the unborn, choosing Tutors and Guardians to assist them. And as *Children* are loved for themselves, so likewise we love *Parents, Brethren, Wife, Kindred, Acquaintance, Country-men*, for themselves, as having some interest in them by nature. For, man is a sociable communicative creature; and though of Friendships, some are more remote then others, it is nothing to the purpose, for all friendship is for its own sake, and not for use only. And if friendship with Country-men be expetible in it selfe, it will likewise be expetible in it selfe with all men; for all those who benefit others, are so affected towards them, that they do most actions for the office sake. Who will not free any man from a wilde beast, if he be in his power? Who will not direct a man that is out of his way? Who will not relieve a man that is ready to starve, or direct a man in a desert to a spring? Who desires not to be well spoken of after death? Who abhorrs not these speeches as unnaturall?

*When I am dead, let earth be mix'd with fire,
I care not, so I now have my desire.*

It is manifest therefore, that we have a naturall goodwill
(111 2) and

and friendship towards all mankind, as being a thing expetible in it selfe, and consonant to reason.

*The race of Gods and Men is one,
From Nature both alike begun.*

Love of all mankind being thus common to us, much more evidently it is expetible in it selfe towards those, whom conversation hath made our friends. A Friend, Friendship, and Good-will are expetible in themselves.

In like manner *praise* is expetible *in it selfe*; for we contract society with those who praise us: And if praise, *glory* likewise, which is nothing but the praise of many persons.

Now seeing that *externall* Goods are expetible in themselves, much more are the goods of the soul and body expetible in themselves. For, if man be expetible in himselfe, the parts of man must likewise be expetible in themselves. The parts of man in generall are *Soul* and *Body*; the body therefore is expetible in it selfe. Why should the body of another person be dear to us, and not our own? Or, why should our body be dear to us, and not the parts and functions thereof? *Health* therefore, *strength*, *beauty*, *swiftnesse*, *sound sense*, and the rest, are expetible in themselves; for none of ordinary capacity would choose to be *deformed* or maimed, though no inconvenience would happen thereupon; so that deformity, even without any inconvenience, seemeth justly avoidable. And if deformity be avoidable in it selfe, beauty is expetible, not *for use* only, but *in it selfe*. For, that beauty pleaseth, is manifest, in as much as all have a naturall inclination (besides that of conversation) to such as are beautifull, and endeavour to confer benefits on them, so as it seemeth to procure benevolence. In this respect therefore, beauty is judged expetible in it selfe, deformity avoidable in it selfe. It is the same in *health* and *sickness*, *strength* and *weaknesse*, *activity* and *heaviness*, *sense* and *privation* of sense.

And if *Corporeall* goods are expetible in themselves, and their contrary evils avoidable, the parts and vertues of the soul must necessarily be expetible also. For, vertue, beginning, as we said, from the body, and externall goods, and reflecting upon it selfe, and considering how much more neer relation it hath to the soul, contracteth a neerer affinity with it. So that the vertues of the soul are much to be preferred before those of the body, which is easily collected from what hath been said. For, if corporeall health be expetible in it selfe, much more is *Temperance*, which freeth us from the fury of the passions. And if corporeall *strength* ought to be numbered amongst goods, much more ought *magnanimity*, by which the soul is strengthened. And if corporeall *Beauty* be expetible in it selfe, much more is that of the soul, *Justice*.

In

In like manner is it with the virtues. For, there are three kinds of *Goods*, which though different, have some kinde of analogie. That which in the body is called *Health*, in the soul is called *Temperance*, and in externals, *Riches*. What in the body is *Strength*, in the soul is *Magnanimity*, in externals, *Power*. What in the body is *Vigour of Sense*, in the soul is *Prudence*, in externals, *Felicity*. What in the body is *Beauty*, in the soul is *Justice*, in externals, *Friendship*.

There are *three* kinds of Goods expetible in themselves, those concerning the *soule*, those concerning the *body*, and the *externall*; but, especially those of the soul, for the soul is more excellent then the body.

Yet though corporeall and externall virtues be inferiour to those of the soul, they are not to be neglected, partly, as being expetible in themselves; partly, as conducing to civill, sociable, and contemplative life, for life is defined by civill, sociable, and contemplative actions; *Virtue* (according to this *Señ*) not being a lover of it selfe, but communicative and civill. For when we say, virtue is necessary to it selfe, the desire of the knowledge of truth necessarily followeth it, so as wise men may rightly part with their life, and fools rightly preserve theirs; since that to those who are perfect, it is an equall thing to depart this life or not.

The excellency of virtue is much encreased by corporeall and externall goods; yet, the end cannot any way be compleated by them. The function therefore of virtue is *Beatitude*, by successfull actions. Corporeall and externall goods are said to be efficient of beatitude, for as much as they confer something thereto, not that they compleat it, for *Beatitude* is life. Life consists of actions, but those can neither be reckoned amongst actions nor functions.

Hereupon comes in *Beneficence*, *grace*, *humanity*, *love of Children* and *Brethren*, of our *Country*, *Parents*, *Benevolence*, of *Kinsfolk*, *Friendship*, *Equality*, and the whole company of *Virtues*; which who neglect, manifestly sin, as to expetible goods, and avoidable evils; and also in the acquisition and use of Goods, they sin in election, by judgment; in acquisition, by the manners in use, by ignorance. In election they sin, as desiring that which is not good, or preferring the lesser good, as most prefer *Pleasant* before *Profitable*, profitable before *Honest*. In acquisition, as not considering whence, nor in what manner, nor how far it ought to be acquired. In use, for as much as all use being referred either to it selfe or some other, in the former they observe no *moderation*, in the latter no *decency*.

In these things, though the wicked sin, yet do the just behave themselves uprightly, following virtue as their leader.

In all virtues, there is *Judgment*, *Election*, and *Action*; there is

no

no Vertue without these; Prudence hath the first place, the rest follow.

Vertue is called the *best affection*, which may be collected from Induction. The Vertue of a shoemaker is that by which he knoweth how to make shoes, and of an Architect, that by which he knoweth how to build a handsom house. Vertue therefore is the best of Affections.

Of Vertue there are two principles as it were, *Reason* and *Passion*, which sometimes agree, sometimes disagree; for Pleasure or grief, when Reason gets the Mastery, it is called *Temperance*, when passion, *Intemperance*; The *Harmony* and Concord of both is *Vertue*, one rightly commanding, the other obeying.

Expetible is that which attracteth the *appetite* to it self, avoidable that which repelleth it, reason consenting thereto. Expetible and good were by the Ancients esteemed the same, for they affirmed Good to be that which all desire.

Of Goods, they say some are expetible *for themselves*, some, *for others*; the first are either *honest* or *necessary*. Honest are the *Vertues* and their functions; necessary *Life*, and those things which pertain unto it, as the body with its parts and uses, and those which are called externall goods, as *riches, peace, glory, Liberty, friendship*, for each of these conferreth to the use of Vertue.

Beatitude consisteth of Good and successful actions; wherefore it is wholly good, as playing upon pipes is wholly Artificial; for the use of the matter doth not take away the goodnesse from *Beatitude*; as the use of Instruments taketh not away from the Art of Medicine. Such things as are made use of towards this perfection, are not to be reckoned as parts; for they, without which the action cannot be, are not rightly parts thereof; for parts conduce to the whole, the rest conduce to the end.

Good is divided into *honest, profitable* and *pleasant*, these are the scopes of all actions. *Beatitude* consists of all these. It is *the use of perfect Vertue, in perfect life, with prosperous successes*; and the *function of perfect life according to Vertue*; and *the use of Vertue according to nature without any impediment*.

Though some assert, that the *End* is to be happy, and *Beatitude* the *scope*, as, Riches are Good, and to be rich that which is be-hovefull; yet is it better to follow the Antients, who assert the End to be that for whose sake all things are, it self not being for the sake of any other; or the ultimate of things expetible; or Life according to Vertue, in corporeall and externall goods, either in all or the most principall.

This being the greatest Good, useth the Ministry of the rest; for as those things which conferr hereunto are to be esteemed Goods, so those things which resist it are Indifferents, for every good action doth not effect *Beatitude*.

They

They assert *Beatitude* to be the use of *perfect Vertue*, as holding some Vertues to be *perfect*, others *imperfect*. The perfect are *Justice* and *Integrity*; the imperfect are *Ingenuity* and *Progression*. The perfect agreeth with the perfect, so as the end thereof is the function of that Vertue, whereof no part is wanting.

They added *perfect life*, to shew that *Beatitude* is in men of full age, for a young man is imperfect, and so is his life. *Beatitude* therefore is in perfect time, the longest that is appointed for us by the Gods. As one Verse makes not a Poem; nor one step a dance, nor one swallow a Summer; so neither doth a short time conferre *Beatitude*, for *Beatitude* is perfect, and requireth a perfect Man and Time.

They added *successfull Function of Vertue*, because the Goods of Nature are necessarily requisite to *Beatitude*; for a good man may exercise Vertue in misery, but cannot be happy. For as *Vertue* is the only efficient of *honest* actions, so is *Beatitude* of *honest, good, and excellent*. Neither doth it abide amongst ill or unhappy things, but enjoyeth the Good, nor is deprived of the contemplation of good, or the conveniences of life.

Beatitude being the most pleasant & fairest of things, increaseth like an Art by the multitude of its Instruments. It is not the same in God and Man, neither is it equall amongst good men, for it may sometimes be taken away by oppression of miseries. Hence it is to be doubted whether a man may be termed happy as long as he is alive, considering the uncertainty of Fortune, whence *Solon* said, *Consider the end of a long life, whether it be happy*.

Those who sleep are not participant of *Beatitude*, but after some manner, as the function of the Soule is capable of awaking.

Lastly, they added, *Nature*, because every waking of good men is not the use of perfect Vertue, but only that which is according to Nature, that is free from madnesse, for madnesse as well as sleep priveth men of use, and of this Reason, and maketh them like Brutes.

As *Beatitude* is said to be the use of Vertue, so is misery of Vice, yet not so, that as this sufficeth to misery, so that doth to *Beatitude*.

Life is made four and unpleasant to the Good by excessive adversity, to the ill even in prosperity, because they sin more, nor can rightly be termed happy.

Having asserted *Beatitude* to be the chief Good, it followeth that we expound how many waies it is taken.

Good is understood three waies. First, for that which is the cause of preservation to all beings; next for that which is predicated of every good thing; Lastly, for that which is expetible in it self. The first is *God*; the second the *Genus* of Goods; the third, the end, to which all are referred, *Beatitude*.

That

That which is expetible in it selfe, is said *three* waies, either that for which something is done; or, for which all things are done; or, some part of these.

Again, of these, some are *finall*, some *efficient*: finall, are the actions proceeding, according to vertue; efficient, the materials of expetible things.

Of goods, some are *honourable*, some *laudable*, some *faculties*, some *profitable*. Honourable, as *God*, our *Prince*, *Parent*: Laudable, as *Riches*, *Empire*, *Liberty*: Profitable, the efficient, as *Health*.

Again, of things good and expetible, some are expetible *in themselves*, some for others; in themselves, as the *honourable*, *laudable*, and *faculties*; for others, as the *Profitable*, which effect and conserve other things.

Again, of things good in themselves, some are *ends*, others, *not ends*: Ends, as *Justice*, *Vertue*, *Health*, and whatsoever consisteth of these; Not ends, as *Ingenuity*, *Memory*, *Learning*.

Again, of Goods, some are *wholly* perfect, others *not*; of the first are *Vertue* and *Prudence*, which benefit all; of the latter, *Riches* and *Power*, which require to be used by a good man. The same things whereof a good-man maketh right use, a wicked man abuseth, as the same which a good Musician useth well, he who is ignorant of Musick useth amisse. Whosoever maketh ill use of any thing is hurt thereby; as, a good horse, which is a help to him that knoweth how to ride, hurts the unskilfull rider.

Again, of Goods, some are in the *soul*, some in the *body*, some *externall*: In the soul are *ingenuity*, *art*, *vertue*, *wisdome*, *prudence*, *pleasure*; in the body, *health*, *soundnesse of sense*, *beauty*, *strength*, *soundnesse of limbs*, and all *parts*, with their *faculties* and *functions*. Externall are *riches*, *glory*, *nobility*, *power*, *friends*, *kindred*, *country*. The goods of the soul are either conferred by *nature*, as *Wit* and *Memory*; or acquired by *diligence*, as the *Liberall Sciences*; or fall into perfection, as *Prudence*, *Justice*, and lastly, *wisdome*.

Again, of Goods, some may be both *obtained* and *lost*, as *Riches*; some *obtained*, but *not lost*, as *Felicity* and *Immortality*; some *lost*, but *not obtained*, as *Sense* and *Life*; some *neither obtained nor lost*, as *Nobility*.

Again, of Goods, some are *only* expetible in themselves, as *Pleasure* and *Indolence*; some *efficient only*, as *Riches*; some *both* efficient and expetible in themselves, as *Vertue*, *Friends*, *Health*.

Goods are divided more waies then these, as not belonging all to one *Genus*, but to all the ten Categories.

These things laid down, we come next to speak more accurately concerning Vertue, which they place in both parts of the soul: In the *rationall* part, *Integrity*, *Prudence*, *wisdome*, *Memory*, and the like: In the *irrationall* part, *Temperance*, *Justice*, *Fortitude*, and

and other virtues. These (say they) may be extinguished by excess, which they prove by testimony of the senses, as things obscure by manifest. For, as by excess or defect of exercise, *health* is corrupted, but by moderate exercise is preserved: In like manner is it in *Temperance*, *Fortitude*, and other virtues. For, as we do call him who feareth the Thunder, mad, not valiant; so on the contrary, he who feareth shadows is a coward; but, he is valiant, who neither feareth all things, nor nothing. These things encrease or extinguish virtue; being moderate, they encrease courage; being too great, or too little, they extinguish it. In like manner are all other virtues extinguished by *excess* or *defect*, increased by *mediocrity*.

Neither is virtue only limited by these, but by *pleasure* and *grief* likewise, in as much as for pleasure we commit wickedness, and for grief shun good. To explain this more fully, they unfold the nature of the soul, wherein are seen three things, *passions*, *faculties*, *habits*: *Passions*, as, *anger*, *fear*, *hate*, *love*, *emulation*, *pity*, and the like; to which is subsequent *pleasure*, or *grief*. *Faculties*, by which we make use of passions, and are angry, do emulate, and the like. *Habits* are those from which the functions of these proceedeth rightly, or otherwise. If any man be so disposed, that he is angry upon any occasion, he hath the habit of *anger*; if so, as to be angry upon no occasion, he hath the habit of *stupidity*, both which are blamable. The laudable habit is that of *meekness*, by which we are angry in due time and place. Virtues therefore are habits, by which the functions of passions become laudable.

All virtue consisteth in action; all action is continuous. Whatsoever things are continuous, like magnitude, have excess, defect, and mediocrity, either in relation to one another, or to us. The mean, relating to us, is in all the best, (this is not quantitative, but qualitative, and therefore is perfect; whereas the extremes, excess and defect, being contrary, are repugnant to one another, and to the mean. But, the mean is to both extremes as equality is to inequality, greater then the least, less then the greatest.) Virtue therefore is a deliberative habit, consisting in mediocrity, relating to our selves.

Theophrastus having laid down some qualities, (following his Master) endeavourerth to conclude from each of them: The examples he alledgeth are these; *Temperance*, *Intemperance*, *Stupidity*, *Meekness*, *Wrath*, *Indolence*, *Fortitude*, *Boldness*, *Timidity*, *Justice*, *Liberality*, *Prodigality*, *Avarice*, *Magnanimity*, *Puillanimity*, *Arrogance*, *Magnificence*, *Ostentation*. For of these habits, some are ill, through excess or defect, others good through mediocrity. He is not temperate who desireth nothing, nor he who desireth all things; one like a stone, desireth not even natural expetibles; the other, through excessive desire, becometh

(m m m)

intem-

intemperate. He only is temperate, who desireth honest things with reason, in due time and measure. He is not meek who is angry upon all occasions, nor he who is angry upon none; but, he who is endued with the mean habit. He is not *valiant* who feareth nothing, not God himselfe nor he who feareth all things, even his own shadow. Nor *just*, who either assumeth or derogateth too much from himselfe, but who observeth equality. He is not *liberall* who giveth away all, nor he who giveth nothing; nor magnanimous, who esteemeth himselfe worthy all great things, nor he who esteemeth himselfe worthy none; but he who observeth a decorum. He is not magnificent who is splendid every where, nor he who no where; but who observes due time and place.

Thus the Genus of vertues is placed in *Mediocrity*, and mutually consequent in it selfe; yet, not alike in all, for prudence is consequent to the rest in its own proper nature; the rest are consequent to it by accession, for he who is just, must necessarily be wise, but not on the contrary.

Of passions and appetites, some are *good*, some *bad*, some *mean*; the good are *friendship*, *benevolence*, *indignation*, *shame*, *confidence*, *compassion*; the bad, *envy*, *malevolence*, *contumely*; the mean, *griefe*, *fear*, *anger*, *pleasure*, *desire*.

Every passion is conversant in pleasure and griefe, for which reason, the vertues depend upon them; but, *love of money*, *love of pleasure*, *love-melancholy*, and the like, are habits distinct from vices.

Of *Love*, one kinde is of *Friendship*, another of *Conjunction*, the third of *both*. The first is good, the second bad, the third mean.

Of *Friendship* there are *four* kinds: *Sodality*, *Affinity*, *Hospitality*, *Erotick*: whether that of *Benevolence*, and that of *Admiration* be to be added to these, is doubtfull. The first is derived from *conversation*; the second from *nature*; the third from *cohabitation*; the fourth from *affection*; the fifth from *good-will*; the last from some *facultie*. Of all these, there are in generall three ends, honest, profitable, and pleasant: All persons that are studious of friendship aim at one or more of these ends. The first friendship is that, which every man hath to himselfe; the next, to his parent; the rest, to his friends and neighbours. Whence excessse in the first, and defect in the rest ought to be avoided; that being esteemed *selfe-love*, this *reservednesse*.

Xenia is taken three waies, for a profitable benefit, or for the profitable return of a benefit, or for the remembrance of a benefit. It is placed likewise in the face and speech, whence a man is termed *gracious*, *ειχαρις*, or *επιχαρις*.

A good man must lead a life conjoynd with vertue, whether according to the necessity of the times, he execute the office of a Magistrate, or cohabit with Princes, or impose Lawes, or governe

vern some other part of the Common-wealth. If he be not busied in any of these, he must addict himself to a popular life, either by contemplation, or action, or (which is between both) Instruction. For though he ought to follow the action and contemplation of excellent things; yet if the time will not allow him to use both, he may make choice of one, and preferre the contemplative life, yet not neglecting the Common-wealth. He shall therefore marry, to the end he may have issue, and addict himself to chaste love, and as occasion requireth, drink wine freely, and finally maintain his life by due observance of Vertue, and bee ready to resign it, if there be a necessity, taking care to be buried in his own Country, according to the rites thereof.

Thus there are three kinds of life, the *Active* and *Contemplative*, and that which consists of *both*. As the voluptuous is esteemed beneath the dignity of a man, so is the contemplative preferred before the rest. A good man shall addict himself to the Government of the Common-wealth, by choice, not chance; for the active life is conversant in civill affairs. That life is best which is led according to Vertue and Nature; the next is that which is a mean condition, as to both; these are both expetible. But the life which is conjoined with Vice is to be avoided. A *happy* life differs from a *Good* in this. The happy is alwaies consonant to Nature, the good sometimes repugnant to Nature. To the first, Vertue onely is not requisite; to the other, it is requisite. A *mean* life is that which is placed in mediocrity, not destitute of offices. *Reclitudes* in life are according to Vertue, *finis* according to Vice; *Offices* in the mean kind of life.

To these things thus declared we must adde, that Vertue is a habit desiring mean pleasures and griefs, pursuing that which is honest, as it is honest; Vice is the opposite hereto.

Wisdom is the Science of the first Causes.

Prudence, a habit examining and acting good things, as they are good.

Fortitude, a habit betwixt boldnesse and Fear.

Meekness is a mean betwixt wrath and stupidity.

Liberality is the mean betwixt *Prodigality* and *Penuriousnesse*.

Magnanimity is the mean betwixt *Arrogance* and *Puillanimity*.

* *Magnificence* is the mean betwixt *ostentation* and *sordidnesse*. * For the text

doublese is defective, and thus to be supplied. μεγαλοπρεπείας ἢ μεσότης [βαυαυσίας ἢ μικροπρεπείας. Νέμεσις δὲ μεσότης] φθονείας καὶ ἀνταγωνιστίας. See Arist. Nicom. 4. 2. and Mag. mor. 1. 28.

Indignation is the mean betwixt *envy* and *malevolence*.

Gravity is the mean betwixt *assentation* and *contradiction*.

Modesty is the mean betwixt *impudence* and *Bashfulness*.

Urbanity is the mean betwixt *Scurrility* and *Rusticity*.

* *Friendship* is the mean betwixt *dotage* and *enmity*.

Truth is the mean betwixt *detraction* and *boasting*.

(m m m 2)

Justice

* But Arist. otherwise, placing Friendship betwixt Arrogation and Derogation.

Justice is the mean betwixt *exceſſe* and *deſect*.

There are other Vertues, part ranked by themſelves, part under the former. As under *Justice* are, *εὐσέβεια*, *δεδόκητος*, *χρηστότης*, *εὐνομία*, *εὐσυνλλαξία*, under *Temperance* *εὐκοσμία*, *ἐνταξία*, *αὐταρκεία*, *εὐψυχία*, *φιλοπονία*; defined thus.

Εὐσέβεια, is a habit of worſhipping the Gods and Demons, a mean betwixt *Atheiſm* and *δυσσεμειονία*.

Ὀσιότης, a habit obſerving right towards the Gods and the dead, a mean betwixt *ἀνοσιότης*, and ſomthing that wants a name.

Χρηστότης, a habit of doing well voluntarily for their own ſakes; a mean betwixt *ποιηρία*, and ſomthing that wants a name.

Εὐκοιτητοσία, a habit, rendring men gratefull in Society, a mean betwixt *ἀκοιτητοσία*, and ſomthing that wants a name.

Εὐσυνλλαξία, a habit avoiding injuſtice in Contracts; a mean betwixt *ἀσυνλλαξία*, and ſomthing that wants a name, which pertaineth to *exream right*.

Εὐκοσμία, a habit of obſerving order, a mean between *Ἀπξία*, and ſomthing that wants a name.

Ἀυταρκεία, a habit liberally content with the preſent, a mean betwixt *πρωχία* and *πολοπλεία*.

Εὐψυχία, a habit of ſuſtaining grievous things unconquer'd, a mean betwixt *ἀψυχία*, and *αειτρυφία*.

Φλοπονία, a habit performing excellent things indefatigably, a mean betwixt *μαλακία*, and *ματαιοπονία*.

Laſtly, *Probity* is a vertue conſiſting of all the reſt; it is perfect, as well becauſe it rendreth good things honeſt and profitable. as, for that it deſireth honeſt things, for their own ſake.

CHAP. II.

OECONOMICK.

HAVING thus explained the Vertues and the chief Heads of *Ethick*, it remaineth that we ſpeak of *OEconomick* and *Politick*, for as much as Man is by Nature a *Civill Creature*. The firſt Common-wealth is the lawfull congreſſion of man and woman, for procreation of children, and ſociety of life. This is called *ὄκος*, a *Family*, it is the ground and beginning of a *City*. A Family ſeemeth to be a little *City*, for marriage being contracted, and children growing up one under another, and join'd one to another, there is deduced another family, and ſo a third, and a fourth. Of theſe is conſtituted Neighbourhood and a *City*, for many Neighbourhoods make us up a *City*. Thus as a Family hath in it the ſeeds of a *City*, ſo likewise of a Commonwealth, for in a Family there are the prints of *Monarchy*, an *Ariſtocracy*, and a *Democracy*. The Society between Parents and children

children represents a Monarchy; that betwixt man and woman an Aristocracy, as being contracted for issue, mutuall comfort and assistance. To these is added a *servant*, appointed to be such by nature, able for service, but not to live of himselfe, requiring therefore a Master to govern him. Of all these reduced to a community, is constituted a *Family*.

The government of a Family is by nature given to *Men*, for the counsell of *Women* is weaker, *Children* are not yet arrived to it, *Servants* never can. The whole ordering therefore of a family depends upon the Man; the whole prudence of *Oeconomy* therefore is in Man: This is partly *Paternall*, partly *Nuptiall*, partly *Herile*, partly *Acquisitive*. For, as an Army requirerth *Provision*, a City, *Merchandise*, Art, *Instruments*; so a Family *Necessaries*, as well for common life as convenience. Of these the Master of the Family takes the first care, how honestly to encrease his revenues, and moderate his expenses. He, as being the head of the Family, ought to be skilfull in many things, as in *Agriculture*, *Graſing*, *Metals*, whereby he may advantage himselfe without doing injury to others. Of Acquisition there are two kinds, one better then the other; that by *Nature*, this by *Art*.

CHAP. III.

POLITICK.

THus much concerning *Oeconomick*; we come next to speak in short of *Politick*.

First then, *Cities* are constituted as well for the naturall propensity of man to society, as for utility. A City is the most perfect society. A Citizen is he who is concern'd in the Magistracy. A City is a compleat number of such persons, which proceedeth so far, as that it be not disagreeing within it selfe, nor contemptible, but may conveniently provide for life, and defend it selfe against enemies.

Oeconomickall prudence is one kinde, *Legislative* another, *Politick* a third, *Military* a fourth.

A City is govern'd either by one man, or some few, or all; and each of these either rightly, or unjustly: Rightly, when the Princes respect the common good; unjustly, when they consider their own private interest. The right are *Monarchy*, *Aristocracy*, *Democracy*: the unjust, *Tyranny*, *Oligarchy*, *Ochlocracy*. There is also a mixt Government, consisting of the good kinds. And whereas a Common-wealth is often changed into better or worse; that is best which is guided according to *Vertue*; that worst, which according to *Vice*.

They who command, or advise, or judge in *Democracy*, are taken

ken out of *all*, either by suffrage, or lot: In *Oligarchy*, out of the *Richer*; in *Aristocracy*, out of the *Best*.

Sedition in *Cities* is either according to *Reason* or *Interest*; the first, when equals are reduced to unequall extremities; the second, for honour, power, or gain.

Common-wealths are overthrown either by *force* or *fraud*. They last longest which respect the publick utility.

Courts of *Judicature*, *Processes*, *Pleas*, and *Magistracies*, are ordered according to the formes of every Common-wealth. The most generall commands are *Priesthood*, *Generallship*, *Admiralty*, *ναυαρχία*, *ἀρχιεπισκοπία*, *γυμνασιάρχια*, *γυναυτονομία*, *παιδονομία*, *ἀστυνομία*, *ταμνία*, *ἐμπορικία*, *περιβολία*, whereof some relate to *Cities*, others to *Havens* and *Traffick*.

The office of a Commonwealths-man is to reform a Commonwealth, which is much harder then to erect one; and to divide the common-people into two parts, one for necessary offices, the other for convenient: *Mechanicks*, *Husband-men*, and *Merchants* are for the necessary sort, continually serving the Commonwealths; but *Souldiers* and *Counsellours*, who are servants for vertue, and performe noble things, are the more excellent.

Old men are most proper to be Counsellours, and also Priests, to perform the sacred rites; young men for Warre. This order is exceeding antient, first constituted by the *Egyptians*, who, amongst other things excellently disposed, appointed the Temples of the Gods to be built in the highest places, and the lands of private persons to be disposed, partly at the confines of the Country, partly neer the City, whereby both parts of the Country should meet in Tribute and Tax. They likewise well ordered the institution of *Sodalities*, and a publick care for the education of children, and that those who are too young or too old should not marry, to prevent their having weak children. Likewise, that nothing mixt be taken away, nothing perfect exposed, abortion not procured. Thus much of *Politick*.

THE FOURTH PART.

CHAP. I.

Of METAPHYSICK.

THE fourth and last part of Philosophy, which treateth of *Ens* in generall, is by *Aristotle* termed sometimes, *First, Philosophy*, sometimes *Wisdom*, sometimes *Theologie*, by his followers and Interpreters called *Metaphysick*, from the order thereof, as *Alexander Aphrodisæus* and *Philoponus* affirm, being placed after *Physick*, as treating of a lesse known, and more noble object.

Upon this subject, there are fourteen bookes of *Aristotle* extant, which, saith *Alexander Aphrodisæus*, by the method of the discourse and stile, are easily evinced to be his.

^a *Metaphysick* considereth *Ens* as it is *Ens*, and the primary cause thereof. ^b *Ens* is Analogous, prædicated primarily of substance, which is one essence; of Accidents, not simply, but in regard of their common attribution to substance. *Ens* thus being one analogically, the science thereof is one likewise; but it treateth chiefly of substance, because that is the first essence upon which the rest depend, and from which they are denominated.

CHAP. II.

Of the first Principle.

THE first most common axiom, or complex principle, is this, ^{cap. 3.} *It is impossible that the same thing should be and not be in the same, and according to the same respect.*

To this principle, all demonstrations and opinions are reduced. ^{cap. 4. 5.} It is it selfe indemonstrable, as being the first; otherwise there would be an infinite progression in demonstration, and consequently no demonstration. There is nothing more known by which it may be proved, no greater absurdity then the deniall of it, that an adversary can be reduced to.

With the first negative principle, the first affirmative hath a near affinity. ^{cap. 7.} *It is necessary that every thing be prædicated affirmatively or negatively of another.* It is not true in matter of a future contingent determinately, but only indeterminately. This affirmative princi-

principle therefore is not absolutely the first, yet is it true, neither can there be a medium betwixt contradictory propositions, no more then betwixt even and uneven numbers: Every proposition either affirms or denies, therefore every proposition is either true or false; between these there is no medium.

CHAP. III.

Of Substance and Accident.

^a Lib. 6. c. 2.

^a OF *Ens* in generall there are three divisions, first, by *accident* and *per se*; secondly, *Potentiall* and *actives*; thirdly, *intentionall* and *reall*.

Of *Ens* by *accident* there is no Science, for it is in a manner *non-ens*, it hath no caule *per se*; it is not generated or corrupted *per se*; it is not alwaies, nor for the most part, nor necessary, whereas Science is of things contrary to these.

^b Lib. 7. c. 1.

^b *Ens per se* is divided into ten Categories. The first is *substance*, and the first *Ens*, and consequently the first Category, for it is predicated *in quid* of the first subject, whereas Accidents are predicated *in quale* or *quantum*. Again, substance only is *Ens per se*, accidents are *Ens* as they are affections of substance. Substance is the first *Ens*, by *Reason* or *definition*, because accidents are defined by Substance. By *knowledge*, because the knowledge of accidents, depends on the knowledge of substance. By *time*, for there is some substance without accident, as God and Intelligences, but there is no accident without a substance. Likewise material substances are precedent in Time, at least to some accidents, which arrive unto them after they have some time generated. And lastly, by *Nature*, for the subject is, by Nature, before that which inhereth in it. Hence this part of Physick treateth onely of substance.

^c Cap. 3.

^c Subject or substance is threefold; *matter*, *form*, *compositum*. The two latter are more *Ens* then matter, though matter be truly substance, as being the first and last subject which remaineth, though all the affections of a body be taken away. This is first matter, which in it self is neither compleat substance nor quantitative, nor in any other Category. Neither is it first substance, for that is separable, and may exist by its own power without others. That is likewise a determinate, perfect, singular substance; but matter cannot be separated from form, neither is it singular or determinable.

^d Cap. 4.

^d Form is that which the thing it selfe is said to be, *per se*, *τὸ τί ᾗ ὢν*, the being of a thing what it was, the whole common nature and essence of a thing, answerable to the definition. Com-
pound

pound sensible substances have a proper definition; but *ens by accident*; consisting of subject and accident, hath not, though it may be by accident described and explained. Even *Categorical* accidents being one *per se*, and of one nature, have a *quiddity* and definition, not simply as substances, but after their owne manner.

^c *Matter* and *form* are not properly generated, but the whole ^{c cap. 8.} *Compositum*, whereto *Ideas* [separate substances,] confer nothing, neither as efficient, nor exemplary Causes.

^f The common substantiall, or formall parts of the thing defined, are to be put into the definition of the whole; but the materiall parts of the *Individuum* it selfe, must not.

CHAP. IV.

Of Power and Act.

NEXT *Substance* we come to *Power* and *Act*. Power is either ^{a Lib. 9. c. 1.} *active* or *passive*: Active power is the principle of changing other things, or acting on another, in as much as it is another. Passive power is in a manner the same with active, for the motion of passion and action is really the same, neither can one be without the other, though simply they are diverse; being in different subjects, passive in the Patient, active in the Agent.

^b Of powers, some are void of Reason, as the power of war-^{b cap. 2.} ming; some rationall, as Arts: The rationall are of contraries, as Medicine is of health and sick; the irrationall of one only, as heat produceth heat.

^c The power (contrary to the *Megarick* Philosophers, followers ^{c cap. 3.} of *Zeno*) remains, although not reduced to act; for we call a man *Architect*, though he be not actually employed in building. Again, Animals have sense, even when they are not in act. Thirdly, it were impossible any thing could be which were not actually. Possible is that whose power, if it were reduced to act, would not imply any impossibility.

^d They are mistaken, who think there is any thing possible ^{d cap. 4.} which shall never actually be, or that there are powers whose acts are impossible; for hence it would follow, that all things should be possible, nothing impossible. Possible is that which doth or may follow from some power; if it never followeth, or cometh out of that power, it is impossible. That which is possible therefore, must at some time or other be in act.

^e Of powers there are three kinds, some naturall, as Senses; ^{e cap. 5.} some acquired by custom, as playing on a Pipe; some by discipline, as Arts. The two last require previous operations, the naturall do not. Naturall and irrationall powers are necessarily reduced

(n n n)

to

to act, when the Agent and Patient are at a due distance, and there is nothing betwixt to hinder them. The ratiōall powers are not so, for they are free to act or not to act as they please.

f Cap. 6.

^f Act is, when the thing that was in power is otherwise then when it was in power.

g Cap. 8.

^g All act is before power, and before all nature which is contained under power, by *reason*, *essence*, and *time*. By *reason*, because power is defined by act. By *time*, because though power be temporall before act in the same numericall object, for a man may first be learned before he actually be such; yet, in different things of the same species, act is ever before power in time; for nothing can be made or reduced from power, unlesse by an agent actually existent.

Lastly, act is before power *in essence*; first, because it is later in generation, for generation beginneth from the imperfect state of a thing, and proceedeth to the perfect. Now all generation proceedeth from power to act. Secondly, act is the end of power; but the end, as it is later in generation, so is it more perfect by nature, and first in intention.

CHAP. V.

Of True and False.

^a Lib. 6. c. 2.
^b Lib. 9. c. 10.

^a **T**HE first division of *Ens* is into *intentionall* and *reall*. ^b The intentionall is either *true* or *false*. The intellect asserteth *truly*, if its judgment be conformable to the thing; *falsely*, if not conformable, for there is composition and division in the things themselves, as well as in the intellect. Whence if the intellect compound things by affirmation, as they are really compounded, or divide them by negation, as they are really divided, it asserteth truly, otherwise falsely. True and false are in the *simple* apprehension of things, but simply, not enunciatively, so as that truth is nothing, but a simple perception of the object; falsehood a non-perception or ignorance thereof, though ignorance be not properly falsity. Whence simple apprehension may be true in it selfe, false it cannot be, for falsity requireth composition.

Complex truth and falsehood may be of the same separate substances.

He cannot be deceived in the knowledge of things *immovable*, whosoever hath once conceived them *immutable*; for either he will judge alwaies truth, or alwaies erre, because things immovable are alwaies in the same manner. The vicissitude and deception, and true and false judgment, is only in things contingent and mutable.

CHAP. VI.

Of one, the same, and diverse.

^a **O**ne is an affection of *Ens*, not a *substance* as *Pythagoras* and ^a *Cap. 2.* *Plato* affirmed, but a *Categoreme*, predicated of every thing as it is *Ens*. To *one* is opposite *many*; by *privative* opposition, and therefore one is manifested by many, as indivisible by divisible, the privation by the habit. For divisible is more known to sense than indivisible, and multitude than unity. To *one* are referred *the same, equall, like*; to *many, divers, unequall, unlike*.

^b Things are *diverse*, either by *Genus* or *species*; *by genus* those ^b *Cap. 3.* which have not the same matter, nor a mutuall generation; or whereof one pertaines to *corruptible* substance, the other to *incorruptible*. By *species*, those which have the same *genus*. *Genus* is that wherein those things that are diverse are said to be the same according to substance.

CHAP. VII.

Of immortall, eternall and immoveable substances.

^a **S**ubstance is threefold; two kinds *naturall*, whereof one is ^a *Lib. 12. c.* *corruptible*, as *Animal*, the other *sempiternall*, as *Heaven*. The ^{14. cap. 5.} third is *immoveable*.

That there is a perpetuall immoveable substance, is proved thus. Substances are first *Ens*, therefore if all substances are corruptible, all things likewise must be corruptible, which is false; for there is an eternall locall *motion*, circular, proper to *Heaven*, which it is not possible should have had a beginning, or shall have a dissolution, no more then time. If therefore *Time* be eternall as motion, there must necessarily be some incorruptible and eternal substance, not only that wherein that eternall motion exists, the *Heaven* it self; but one substance, which so moveth, that though it remain its self moveable, yet it moveth others from eternity to eternity, not having only the power of moving, but being continually in the act of motion. For *Plato* and the rest, who conceived *God* to have done nothing for a great while, erre, because that power were frustraneous which were not reduced to act. Besides, motion would not have been eternall, unless the moving substance were not only eternall, and in perpetuall actuall motion; but such likewise, that it could not but it must move allwaies, as being a pure act void of power.

Hence the substances which cause eternall motion are void of
 (n n n 2) matter

matter, for they move from an eternall act, and are void of all power.

In things that sometimes are, sometimes are not, power is precedent to act; but simply and absolutely act is precedent to power. For, neither things naturall nor artificiall are reduced from power to act, but by something that actually exists. Now if the same thing alwaies return by a circular motion, it necessarily followeth, that there is something eternall which remaineth ever the same, and operateth in the same manner. Such an eternall first moving substance is the first Heaven. The vicissitude of *Generation* and *corruption* is not caused by the first Heaven, for that moveth alwaies in the same manner, but by the inferiour Orbes, especially the Sun, which by his accession bringeth life, by his recession death to all things mortall.

Thus is the first Heaven *eternall*, for it is moved with eternall motion; besides which there is something which alwaies moveth, and is never moved it self, and is *eternall*, and *substance*, and *act*.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Gods.

^a Cap. 7.

^a **T**His *first mover*, moveth in the same manner as things appetible and intelligible, that is, it so moveth others, as it self remaineth immoveable. The motion of the first Agent, as it is the first efficient cause, consisteth in that influence thereof, whereby it concurrerh effectively with the inferiour Intelligences in moving its own orb. Wherefore the effience of the first mover is an application of the powers of the inferiour movers to their proper works, wherein he concurrerh with them actively, and independently. Thus the Intelligences move the Heavens, not for the generation of inferiour things (for the end must be more noble then the means) but for that chief and amiable good, whereunto they endeavour to be like, as their ultimate end.

The first mover is void of *mutation*, an *ens*, wholly and simply necessary, and consequently the principle of all. Upon this first principle depend Heaven and nature, because without him, their ultimate end and first efficient, nothing can be, or be operated.

This first mover, *God*, enjoyeth the most perfect life, perpetual and most pleasant, which absolute felicity is proper to him; for as much as he understandeth and contemplateth himself with infinite delight. For, as we are happy in contemplation that lasts but a little while, so is God most happy, in the infinite and most perfect contemplation of himself, who is of all things most admirable.

God

God is an eternall living being, the best of beings, an immoveable substance, separate from sensible things, void of corporeall quantity, without parts and indivisible; for such must that principle or substance be which moveth in infinite time. Nothing finite hath infinite power. All magnitude must be either finite or infinite. Finite magnitude cannot move in infinite time; infinite magnitude there is not, as we proved in the *Physick*.

God is impassible, not subject to alteration; the first locall motion, which is the circular, not being competent to God, because he is immoveable, it followeth that other motions that induce passion or alteration, and are later then locall motion cannot likewise be competent to him.

CHAP. IX.

Of Intelligences.

^a BESIDES this first Substance the mover of the first Heaven, there ^{a cap. 8.} must likewise be other substances separate from matter, eternall and immoveable, president over the motions of the inferiour orbes; so that after what number and order those orbes are disposed, according to the same are these eternall moving, and immoveable substances ordered.

From the number of the motions may be collected the number of the *Spheres*, and consequently of the substances moving, which according to *Aristotle* are 47.

Heaven is numerically one, because the first mover is one. It is an ancient Tradition that these first substances that move the Heavens are *Gods*. This opinion is truly divine; but what is added, that they had the shape of men, or some other Animal, was only invented for perswasion of the common people, for use of Laws, and the convenience of Life. Thus much may serve for a short view of his *Metaphysicks*.

THEO.

THEOPHRASTVS.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, Masters.

* Deezil.

a Lib. 13.

b Laert.

c Suid.



THEOPHRASTUS succeeded Aristotle, he was born at Erethus, (as * Plutarch, Laertius, and others affirme) a Sea-town of Lesbos, seated upon a hill, as ^c Strabo describes it, distant from Sigrium 18 Stadia.

d Praef. lib. 1.
e Lib. 13.

f Laert.

His Father was named Melantes, as ^b Athenodorus affirmeth, according to ^c others, Leo, by profession a Fuller. Theophrastus was first called Tyrtamus. He heard Leucippus in his own Country, afterwards went to Plato, and lastly became an auditor of Aristotle, who changing the roughness of his name, called him, as Suidas saith, first Euphrastus, afterwards Theophrastus, from the divine eloquence of his speech, wherein (as Cicero, ^d Pliny, Laertius, ^e Strabo, and others aver) he excelled all the rest of his Disciples.

^f He was likewise so quick of apprehension, that what Plato had said of Aristotle and Xenocrates, Aristotle apply'd to him and Callisthenes. Theophrastus was acute to admiration, ready to apprehend every thing that he taught; Callisthenes was dull: so that one needed a bridle, the other a spur.

CHAP. II.

His Profession of Philosophy, and Disciples.

Laert. Suid.

Aristotle retiring to Chalkis, in the 2^d year of the 114th Olympiad, being importuned by his Disciples to appoint a successor, made choice of Theophrastus (as hath been already related in the life of Aristotle) who thereupon undertook the government of the School, and, Aristotle dying, lived in his Garden, Demetrius Phalerius cohabiting with him. This time wherein Theophrastus flourished, is reckoned by ^b Pliny to be about the 440th year from the building of Rome; ^c 390 years, as ^d Salmasius rightly reads, before that time wherein Pliny wrote.

e Athen. lib. 1.

^f Hermippus saith, he went at certain houres to the School, neatly

neatly dressed, and there sitting down, discoursed in such manner, that he omitted no gesture suitable to the argument whereupon he treated, so that once to expresse a Glutton, he licked his lips.

^f In the fourth year of the 118th Olympiad, *Xenippus* being ^{f Laert. Athen. deign.} Archon, *Sophocles*, son of *Amphiclides*, procured a Law to be made, forbidding all Philosophers to keep publick Schooles, unlesse such only, as the Senate and people should think fit to license; if any did otherwise, he should be put to death. By this decree, saith *Athenaeus*, he banished all the Philosophers out of the City, amongst the rest *Theophrastus*, who the year following returned, when as *Philo*, a Disciple of *Aristotle*, accused *Sophocles* for having done contrary to Law: Whereupon the Athenians revers'd the decree, fined *Sophocles* five Talents, and called home the Philosophers; by which means, *Theophrastus* returning, was reinstated in the School.

Laertius saith, there came to hear him 2000 Disciples; *Suidas* saith (if there be no mistake in the number) 4470. of whom were *Strato*, his Successor, *Demetrius Phalereus*, *Nichomachus* son of *Aristotle*, whom *Aristippus* saith, he much affected; *Erasistratus* the Physician, as some affirme, and *Menander* the Comick Poet.

CHAP. III.

His Vertues and Apophthegmes.

^a HE was exceeding learned and studious, as *Pamphila* affirmeth. ^{a Laert.}

^b He was very liberall in conferring benefits, and a great ^{b Laert.} cherisher of learning.

^c He made collections of mony for the conventions of Philosophers, not for luxury, but for temperance, and learned discourses. ^{c Athen. lib. 5.}

^d He twice freed his Country, being under the oppression of ^{d Plut. adv. Color.} Tyrants.

^e *Cassander* son of *Antipater* much esteemed him, and *Ptolomy* the ^{e Laert.} first wrote Letters to him.

^f He was so much honoured by the Athenians, that *Agonides* ^{f Laert.} accusing him of Impiety, very hardly escaped from being fined himselfe.

^a Of his Apophthegmes are remembered these. He said, it is ^{a Laert.} more safe trusting to an unbridled horse, then intemperate speech.

^b To a young man at a Feast silent; If you hold your peace, ^{b Laert.} saith he, because you are foolish, then you are wise; but, if you

- you are wise, you do foolishly in holding your peace.
- c Laert. Stob. ^e He used to say, of all things that are spent, time is the most precious.
- d Plut. vit. Demost. ^d Being demanded, as *Aristo* saith, what he thought of *Demosthenes*; he answer'd, he is worthy of this City; of *Demades*; he is above the City.
- e Symp. lib. 2. ^e To *Philip* Son of *Cassander* he said, I wonder your eyes do not make musick, the pipe of your nose coming so directly upon them.
- f Plut. de Anar. ^f To prove that riches are not to be lov'd and admir'd hee instanced *Callias*, a rich Athenian, and *Ismenias* a Theban; these saith he, use the same things, as *Socrates* and *Epaminondas*.
- g Plut. de frat. amor. ^g He said we must not love strangers, to the end we may make tryall of them, but make tryall of them to the end we may love them.
- h Plut. de sanit. tuend. ^h He said the Soul paid a dear rent for her habitation in the body.
- i Stob. ⁱ He said Falshood raised from Calumny and Envy, endureth a little while, but soon perisheth.
- k Stob. Ser. 101. ^k Seeing a young man blush, be of good comfort saith he, that is the complexion of Vertue.
- l Ser. 122. ^l He used to say, stand in awe of thy self, and thou shalt not be ashamed before other.
- m Ser. 136. ^m He said the good need but few Laws, for things are not accommodated to Laws, but, Laws to things.
- n Ser. 139. ⁿ The envious are more unhappy then others in this respect, that they are troubled not only at their misfortunes, but also at the good fortunes of others.
- o Ser. 141. ^o Being demanded what preserved humane life, he said, beneficence, reward, and punishment.
- p Ser. 162. ^p He said, Honours are to be acquired, not by conversation and favour, but by action.
- q Ser. 185. ^q Being demanded what Love is, he answered, the passion of an idle soul.
- r Ser. 193. ^r He said a woman ought not to be seen her self, nor behold others richly attired, for both are inticements to dishonesty.
- s Ser. 297. ^s He said, Love is an excessive desire of something irrational, the entrance thereof easie, the disingagement difficult.

CHAP. IV.

His Will and Death.

^a His Will is thus delivered by *Laertius*.

^a *Laert.*

BE all well; but if any thing happen otherwise, thus we give order. All those goods which belong to the House, I bequeath to Melantes and Pancreon Sonnes of Leo; Those which are set apart for Hipparchus, I will be thus disposed. First, that the study and Ornaments belonging thereunto be perfected, and if any thing may be added more to beautifie them, that it be done. Next, that the statue of Aristotle be set up in the Temple, and the other Donaries which were before in the Temple. Moreover that the little walk which is near the School be built new, not worse then it was before, and that the Maps of the World be placed in the lower Walk. That an Altar likewise be built, wanting nothing of perfection and splendor. I will that the statue of Nicomachus as big as the life be finished; it is in Praxiteles's hands; let him go on with it. Let it be placed wheresoever they shall think good, who have the disposall of the rest, and are named in my Will. Thus much for the Temple and Donaries. My Land at Stagira I bequeath to Callinus, all my Books to Neleus. The Garden and Walk, and all the houses belonging to the Garden I bequeath to my Friends hereafter named, that they may exercise themselves and study Philosophy therein, for men cannot alwaies be abroad. But with condition, that they do not alienate it, nor pretend any propriety thereto, but esteem it a thing sacred in common possession, making use of all things therein as becometh just and loving Friends. The persons to whom I wil that this be in common, are, Hipparchus, Neleus, Strato, Callinus, Demotimus, Demaratus, Callisthenes, Melantes, Pancreon, and Nicippus. Let also Aristotle, sonne of Midias and Pythias, if he desire to study Philosophy,

(o o o)

partake

THEOPHRASTUS.

partake likewise of the same priviledge, and let the most antient of the Overseers take great care of him, that he be instructed as well as is possible in Philosophy. Let us be buried in that part of the Garden, which they shall think most convenient, not erecting a Monument, or any thing that is sumptuous over our Graves. Thus let all things be ordered according as is said; the Temple, Monument, Garden, and walk repaired; let Pompylus, who dwelleth in them, take charge of them, and of other things as he did heretofore, for whose pains therein; let the Possessors thereof consider him. As for Pompylus and Threpta, who have been long since manumitted, and done us good service, if there be any thing which we have bestowed upon them, or they themselves have required, as also the 2000 Drachmes which I appointed to be given to them and Hipparchus, let them firmly possess it all, as I have often expressed to Melantes, & Pancreon, who assented therunto. Moreover I bestow on them Somatales and the Girl. Of my servants, I manumit Molon, and Cimon, and Parmenon; as for Manes and Callias, when they shall have lived four years in the Gardens, discharging their Office unblamably, I will they be set at liberty. Of the Domestick Utenfills, let the Overseers bestow on Pompylus as many as they think fit, and sell the rest. To Demotimus I give Cario, to Neleus, Donax; let Eubiys be sold. Let Hipparchus give to Callinus 3000 drachms. And for Melantes & Pancreon, if we did not look upon Hipparchus, as having heretofore been very beneficial to us, and now quite shipwrack'd in his Fortunes, wee should have appointed him a joint-estate with Melantes and Pancreon. But because I conceive it were not easie for them to be joined in the ordering of one Family with him, and that it would be more to their advantage to receive something certain from Hipparchus, for these reasons, let Hipparchus give to each of them, Melantes and Pancreon, a Talent. Let him likewise duly furnish the Overseers with all charges necessary for the performance of the forementioned works;

works; which done, let Hipparchus be free and discharged from all debts and Covenants to me. If any benefit come to Hipparchus from Chalcis on my behalf, let him wholly enjoy it as his own. Be these the Overseers of those things contained in my Will; Hipparchus, Neleus, Strabo, Callinus, Demotimus, Callisthenes, Ctesarchus.

Copies of the Will of Theophrastus, signed with his Ring, are kept; the first by Hegeias son of Hipparchus. Witnesses, Callippus a Pelanean; Philomelus, an Euonymean; Lysander an Hytaean; Philion, an Alopecian. The second Olympiodorus hath attested by the same persons. The third is in the hands of Adimantus, delivered to his son Androsthenes. Witnesses, Aimnestus, son of Cleobulus; Lysistratus son of Phidion, a Thasian; Strato, son of Arcesilaus, a Lampfacene; Theippus, son of Theippus, of the Potters street; Dioscorides, son of Dionysius, an Epicephisian. Thus (saith Laertius) was his Will.

He died old, having lived eighty five years, his spirits being wasted, as Suidas affirms, with continuall writing; and, upon the marriage of one of his Disciples, giving himselfe some intermission and rest, it occasion'd his end.

As he lay upon his death-bed, * Cicero saith, He blamed Nature * Tusc. lib. 4. for giving Harts and Crows so long life that could do no good thereby, and to Man, who could do must goods, so short; whereas if man had been allowed longer time, his life might have been adorned with the perfection of arts and learning. Thus he complained, that as soon as he came within the view of these, he was taken away.

His Disciples came to him, and asked him if he had any thing to say to them; Nothing, saith he, but that the life of man loseth many pleasures only for glory. When we begin to live, then we die; nothing is more unprofitable then the desire of glory. But be happy, and either give over study, for it is very laborious, or go perseverantly through it, for it is of great glory. The vanity of life is much greater then the benefit thereof. But, I have not time to advise you what to do; do you consider at leisure what is best for you: In saying which words he expired. The whole people of Athens followed his body on foot to the grave,

CHAP. V.

His writings.

HE left many writings, whereof, saith Laertius, because they are full of all kinde of learning, I thought good to give this Catalogue.

THEOPHRASTUS.

- First Analyticks* 3.
Latter Analyticks 7.
Of the Analysis of Syllogisms, 1.
Epitome of Analyticks 1.
Places of Deduction 2.
Agonisticks, concerning the Theory of Eristick arguments.
Of the Senses 1.
To Anaxagoras 1.
Of Anaxagoras 1.
Of Anaximenes 1.
Of Archelaus 1.
Of salt, nitre, allom 1.
Of Combustibles; or, as the other Edition, of things that may be petrified 2.
Of indivisible lines 1.
Of Auscultation 2.
Of Winds 1.
The differences of Vertue 1.
Of a Kingdome 1.
Of the Discipline of a King 1.
Of Lives 3.
Of old age 1.
Of the Astrology of Democritus 1.
Of sublime things 1.
Of Apparitions 1.
Of humor, colour, flesh 1.
Of the Description of the world 1.
Of Man 1.
A collection of the Doctrines of Diogenes 1.
Of Definitions 3.
Erotick 1.
Another of Love 1.
Of Felicity 1.
Of Species 2.
Of the Epilepsie 1.
Of Divine inspiration 1.
Of Empedocles 1.
Epichirems 18.
Instances 3.
Of Voluntary 1.
Epitome of Plato's Commonwealth 2.
Of the diversity of voice in Creatures of the same kinde 1.
Of Subitaneous apparitions 1.
Of biting and blowes 1.
Of Animals that are said to have wisdom 7.
Of those which dwell in dry places 1.

- Of those which change colour 1.
 Of those which dwell in caves 1.
 Of Animals 7.
 Of Pleasure according to Aristotle 1.
 Of Pleasure, another, 1.
 Theses 24.
 Of hot and cold 1.
 Of dizziness and dimness 1.
 Of Sweat 1.
 Of Affirmation and Negation 1.
 Callisthenes, or of Griefe 1.
 Of Labours 1.
 Of Motion 3.
 Of Stones 1.
 Of Pestilence 1.
 Of Fainting 1.
 Megarick 1.
 Of Melancholy 1.
 Of Metals 1.
 Of Honey 1.
 Of the collections of Metrodorus 1.
 Sublime discourses 2.
 Of Drunkenness 1.
 Of Lawes alphabetically 24.
 Epitome of Lawes 10.
 To Definitions 1.
 Of Odors 1.
 Of Wine and Oyle.
 First propositions, 18.
 Legislative 3.
 Politicks 6.
 Politick according to severall occasions 4.
 Politick Customs 4.
 Of the best Commonwealth 1.
 Collection of Problems 5.
 Of Proverbs 1.
 Of Congelation and Liquefaction 1.
 Of Fire 2.
 Of Winds 1.
 Of the Palsey 1.
 Of Suffocation 1.
 Of Madnesse 1.
 Of Passions 1.
 Of Signes 1.
 Sophismes 2.
 Of the solution of Syllogisms 1.
 Topicks 2.

THEOPHRASTUS.

Of punishment 2.
 Of Haire 1.
 Of Tyranny 1.
 Of Water 3.
 Of sleep and dreams 1.
 Of friendship 3.
 Of Ambition 2.
 Of Nature 3.
 Of Physick 17.
 Of the Epitome of Physicks, 2.
 Physicks 8.
 To Naturall Philosophers 1.
 Of Naturall Histories 10.
 Of Naturall Causes 8.
 Of Chyles 5.
 Of false Pleasure 1.
 Of the Soul 1. Thesis.
 Of undoubted Faith 1.
 Of simple dubitations 1.
 Harmonicks 1.
 Of Vertue, 1.
 Occasions or Contradictions 1.
 Of Sentence 1.
 Of Ridiculous 1.
 Meridians 2.
 Divisions 2.
 Of Differences 1.
 Of Injuries 1.
 Of Calumny 1.
 Of praise 1.
 Of Experience 1.
 Epistles 3.
 Of casuall Animals 1.
 Of Selection 1.
 Encomiums of the Gods 1.
 Of Festivals 1.
 Of Prosperity 1.
 Of Enthymemes 1.
 Of inventions 2.
 Morall disputes 1.
 Morall descriptions 1.
 Of Tumult 1.
 Of History 1.
 Of the judgment of Syllogismes 1.
 Of flattery 1.
 Of the Sea 1.
 To Cassander, of a Kingdome 1.

- Of Comedy* 1.
- Of Meteors* 1.
- Of Speech* 1.
- Collection of words* 1.
- Solutions* 1.
- Of Musick* 3.
- Of Meteors* 1.
- Megacles* 1.
- Of Laws* 1.
- Of things contrary to Law* 1.
- A Collection of the Doctrines of Xenocrates* 1.
- Confabulations* 1.
- Of an Oath* 1.
- Rhetorical Precepts* 1.
- Of riches* 1.
- Of Poësy* 1.
- Problems, Politick, Ethick, Physick, Eronick* 1.
- Proverbs* 1.
- Collection of Problems* 1.
- Of Physicall Problems* 1.
- Of Example* 1.
- Of Proposition and Narration* 1.
- Of Poësy, another,* 1.
- Of the wise men* 1.
- Of Advice* 1.
- Of Solæcismes* 1.
- Of the Art of Rhetorick* 1.
- Of Rhetoricall Arts, 71 kinds.*
- Of Hypocrisy* 1.
- Aristotellick, or Theophrastick Commentaries* 6.
- Naturall Sentences* 16.
- Epitome of Physicks* 1.
- Of Gratitude* 1.
- Ethick-Characters*
- Of Falshood and Truth* 1.
- Of the History of Divinity* 6.
- Of the Gods* 3.
- Geometricall Histories* 4.
- Epitome of Aristotle, concerning Animals* 6.
- Epichirems* 2.
- Theses* 3.
- Of a Kingdom* 2.
- Of Causes* 1.
- Of Democritus* 1.
- Of Calumny* 1.
- Of Generation* 1.
- Of the Prudence and Manners of Animals* 1.

THEOPHRASTVS.

- Of Motion* 2.
- Of Sight* 4.
- To definitions* 2.
- Of being Given* 1.
- Of Greater and Lesser* 1.
- Of Musick* 1.
- Of the diuine Beatitude* 1.
- To those of the Academy* 1.
- Protreptic* 1.
- How a City may be best inhabited* 1.
- Commentaries* 1.
- Of the fiery ebullition in Sicily* 1.
- Of Things granted* 1.
- Of the waies of Knowing* 1.
- Of the Lying Argument* 3.
- Ante-Topick* 1.
- To Æschylus* 1.
- Astrological History* 6.
- Arithmetical Histories of Encrease* 1.
- Acicharus* 1.
- Of Judicial Orations* 1.
- Epistles concerning Altycreon to Phantias and Nicanor.*
- Of Piety* 1.
- Euias* 1.
- Of opportunities* 2.
- Of seasonable discourses* 1.
- Of the Institution of Children* 1.
- Another, different* 1.
- Of Institution, or, of Vertues, or, of Temperance* 1.
- Protreptic* 1.
- Of numbers* 1.
- Definitions of Syllogistick speech* 1.
- Of Heaven* 1.
- Politick* 2.
- Of Nature* 1.

Of Fruits and Animals. All which, saith *Laertius*, amount to 1182. Divisions, These Books, as *Theophrastus* had ordered in his Will, were delivered to *Neleus*. What afterwards became of them, hath been related in the life of *Aristotle*

STRA-

STRATO.

CHAP. I.

His Life.



Strato was successour to Theophrastus. He was of ^a Laert. ^b Lampſacum, his Father ^c Arceſilaus, or, as ^b Cic. Laert. some, ^d Arceſius, mentioned in his Will. ^c He ^{Suid.} was a person of great worth, eminent faith Laer- ^d Suid. ^e tius, in all kinds of Philosophy, but especially in ^c Laert. that which is called Physick, the most antient and solid part, ^f wherein he introduced many things ^f Cic. de finib. 5. new, ^g dissenting not only from Plato, but from his Master Aristo- ^g Plut. adv. ^h ile. ^h From his excellency herein he was called the Naturall Philo- ^h Nat. Colot. ⁱ sopher: ⁱ He prescribed all divine power to Nature. ⁱ Etinick hee ⁱ Cic. de. Nat. ^j touched but little. ^j He took upon him the government of the ^j deor. ^k Schöol, according to Apollodorus, in the [third year of the] 123 ^k Cic. de finib. 3. Olympiad, and continued therein 18. years. He instructed Ptolomy ^l Laert. the son of Philadelphus, who bestowed 80 Talents upon him.

CHAP. II.

His Will and Death.

His Will, faith Laertius, was to this effect.

THus I order, against the time that I shall die. All those things which are in my house I bequeath to Lampyrion and Arceſilaus. Out of the money which I have at Athens, let my Executors first defray the charges of my Funeral, and the solemn rites after my enterrement, doing nothing superfluously, nor niggardly. The Executors of these things I appoint in my Will be these; Olympicus, Aristides, Mnesigenes, Hippocrates, Epicrates, Gorgylus;
(PPP) Di-

Diocles, Lyco, Athanes. I leave the School to Lyco, for the rest are either too old, or otherwise employed. All the rest shall do well if they confirm this choice that I have made. I bequeath likewise all my Books unto him, except those which are written by our own hand, besides all Utenfils, Carpets, and Cups for Feasting. Let the Executors give 500. Drachmes to Epicrates and one of the servants, which Arcefilaus shall think good. Let Lampyrion and Arcefilaus discharge all the debts, which Daippus undertook for Hiræus. Let nothing be owing either to Lampyrion or to the heirs of Lampyrion, but let him be discharged of all, and the Executors bestow on him 500. Drachmes, and one of the servants, as Arcefilaus shall think good; that having taken much paines with us, he may have sufficient for food and rayment. I manumit Diophantus, and Diocles, and Abus. I give Simmias to Arcefilaus. I manumit Dromo. When Arcefilaus shall come, let Hiræus with Olympicus and Epicrates, and the rest of the Executors cast up the Accounts of the charges of my Funerall and other things; whatsoever is over and above, let Arcefilaus take it of Olympicus, not pressing him upon the day of payment. Let Arcefilaus discharge the Covenants which Strato made with Olympicus, and Aminias, which are in the hands of Philocrates Son of Tisamenus. As for my Tombe, let it be ordered as Arcefilaus, and Olympicus, and Lyco shall think good.

This was his will, preserved by *Aristo the Chian*. He was of so thin and low a constitution, that he felt not any pain at his death.

Of this name *Laertius* reckons eight.

The first a Disciple of *Isocrates*.

The second, this Philosopher.

The third a Physician, Disciple of *Erasistratus*.

The Fourth an Historian, who wrote the Wars of *Philip* and *Persæus* with the *Romans*.

The fifth, is wanting.

The sixth, an Epigrammatick Poet.

The seventh, an antient Physician.

The eighth, a Peripatetick, who lived at *Alexandria*.

CHAP. III.

His Writings.

Suidas saith, he wrote many Books : *Laertius* gives this Catalogue of them.

Of a Kingdom 3.
 Of Justice 3.
 Of Good 3.
 Of God 3.
 Of Principles 3.
 Of Lives.
 Of Felicity.
 Of Philosophy.
 Of Fortitude.
 Of Vacuum.
 Of Heaven.
 Of Breath.
 Of humane Nature.
 Of the generation of Animals.
 Of mixtion.
 Of Sleep.
 Of Dreams.
 Of Sight.
 Of Sense.
 Of Pleasure.
 Of Colours.
 Of Diseases.
 Of Judgements.
 Of Faculties.
 Of Metallick Machines.
 Of Hunger and Offuscation.
 Of Light and Heavy.
 Of divine inspiration.
 Of Time.
 Of Aliment and augmentation.
 Of uncertain Animals.
 Of fabulous Animals.
 Of Causes.
 Solutions of Questions.

Proems of Places.

Of Accident.

Of More and lesse.

Of Unjust.

Of Priority and Posteriority.

Of Priority of Genus.

Of Proprium.

Of Future.

Confutations of Inventions.

Commentaries, which are suspected.

Epistles; beginning thus, Strato to Arsinoe, Health:

 LYCO.

LYCO.

CHAP. I.

His Life.



Trato, saith *Laertius* was succeeded by *Lycø*, Son of *Astyanax* of *Troas*, an eloquent person, and excellent for the education of Children. He heard also *Panthædus* the Dialectick.

He said, that as Horses need both bridle spur, so in Children there must joined both modesty and ambition. Of his florid expression is alledged this instance. Of a poor

Maid hee said, *Βαρὺ γὰρ φορτίον πατρὶ ἀρεὴν δὲ καὶ ἀνδρὶς ἐμπερίχουσι τὴν ἀμείλιον τῆς ἡλικίας ὡρεῖν*, *A maid is a heavy burden to her Parent when she outruns the flowry season of her youth for want of a dower. Whence Antigonus* said of him, that as the fragraney and pleasantness of an excellent apple will not admit Transplantation; so whatsoever he said was to be heard only from himself. For this sweetness of discourse some added the letter *γ*. to his name, calling him *λυγγος*, which implyeth *sweetness*: so * *Plutarch*.

* *De exilio.*

In stile he was very different from himself.

Upon those who were sorry they had not learned when time was, and wished it might be recalled, he jested thus. He said, that they who endeavoured to make amends by a late penitence for their past negligence, were conscious of the impossibility of their wishes; and of those that sought to bring it to passe, he said, they had lost all reason, in applying the nature of a straight line to a crooked ruler, or beholding their face in troubled water, or a confused mirrour.

He said, that to the wreath of publick games in the *Forum*, many aspired; to the *Olympick*, few or none.

He many times by his Counsell much advantaged the Athenians.

In his garments he affected neatness so much, that, as *Hermippus* saith, he wore an upper garment very precious and fine.

He

He was very expert in all exercises, active and well made for a Wrestler, being thin-car'd and well set, as *Antigonus Carystius* affirmeth: Whence in his own Country he practised the *Elean Games*, and played at Ball.

He was intimate with *Eumenus* and *Attalus* beyond all men, who supply'd him with many things. *Antiochus* also would have had him lived with him, but could not get him.

He was so great an enemy to *Hieronymus* the *Peripatetick*, that upon a solemn day (of which already in the life of *Arcejlus*) he only forbore to come to him.

He compared *Orators* to Frogs; these, saith he, croak in the water, those by the water of an houre-glass.

He was Master of the School forty years, succeeding *Strato* in the hundred twenty seventh Olympiad; as he had given order by his Will.

CHAP. II.

His Will and Death.

Laertius produceth a Will of his to this effect.

THUS I dispose of my estate, if I shall not recover of this sicknesse. All that is in my house I bequeath to the Brethren, *Astyanax* and *Lyco*, out of which is to be paid whatsoever I owe at Athens to any man, as also the charges of my Funerall and Exequies. What is in the City and *Ægina*, I bestow upon *Lyco*, because he is of our name, and hath lived long with us, to our great content, as one that deserved the place of a Son. The *Peripatium* I leave to those friends that will make use of it, as *Bulo*, *Callinus*, *Aristo*, *Amphio*, *Lyco*, *Pytho*, *Aristomachus*, *Heraclius*, *Lycomedes*, *Lyco* my Kinsman. Let them put him in that place who they conceive will persevere in it, and discharge it best, which let the rest of my friends confirm for my sake and the places. My Funerall and the burning of my Body be so ordered by *Bulo* and *Callinus*, that it be not prodigall nor niggardly. Out of my estate at *Ægina*, let *Lyco* after my death give to the young men as much Oyle as shall serve their turnes, that hereby the memory of me and him that honours me may be justly preserved. Let them set up my * Statue, and

* For VVrestling and other Exercises.

and choose a fit place for the setting up of it, wherein let Diophantus and Heraclides, son of Demetrius assist them. Out of my Rents in the City, let Lyco pay all that I have named after his departure; in the next place let Bulio and Callinus and the expenses of my funerall be discharged. Let that household stuffe be taken away which I have left in common betwixt them. Let likewise the Physicians, Puthemmis and Midas be honoured and rewarded for their care of me, and for their skill. To the son of Callinus I leave a couple of Thericlean Pots, and to his Wife, a couple of Goblets, and a fine Carpet, and a shaggy Carpet, and a Coverlet, and two Couch beds, the best that are left, that we may not seem unmindfull of their due respect towards us. As for those that served me, I order thus: Demetrius, who hath been long a Free man, I forgive the price of his redemption, and bestow upon him five Minae, and a Cloak and a Coat; and, as having undergone many labours with me, let him be decently supplied with necessaries. Crito, the Chalcidonian, I forgive the price of his redemption, and bestow further on him foure Minae. Micrus also I manumit, whom let Lyco bring up, and six years hence let him instruct him. In like manner I manumit Chares, whom let Lyco also bring up; I give him two Minae, and my bookes, that have been published: The rest that have not been published, let them be given to Callinus, and let him take diligent care for the publishing of them. To Syrus the Free-man I give foure Minae, and Menodora, and if he owe me any thing, I forgive it him. To Hilara I give five Minae, a shaggy Coverlet, two Couch-beds, a Carpet, and which bed he shall choose. I manumit likewise the Mother of Micrus, and Noemones, and Dion, and Theon, and Euphranor, and Hermias; as also Agatho, after he hath served two years more; as also Ophelio and Possidonius, the bearers of my Litter, after they have served four years more, I will that they be set at liberty. I give moreover to Demetrius, Crito, and Syrus, to each a Bed and Coverlet, such as Lyco shall think fit. This I bestow on them, for as much as they have express'd

express'd themselves faithfull in the performance of such things as were committed to their charge. As for my buriall, whether Lyco will have it here or at home, let it be as he will; for I perswade my selfe, he will do what is fitting no lesse then if I had done it my selfe. When he shall have faithfully performed these things, let the bequests of my Will remain firm. Witnesses, Callinus, an Hermonean, Aristo, the Chian, Euphronius, a Poëanien.

Thus, saith *Laertius*, having wisely managed all things appertaining to Learning and Humanity, his prudence and diligence extended even to the making of his Will; so that in that respect also he deserveth studiously to be imitated.

He died 74 years old of the Gout.

There were foure of this name.

The *first*, a Pythagorean, mentioned in the life of *Aristotle*.

The *second*, this Peripatetick.

The *third*, an Epick Poet.

The *fourth*, an Epigrammatick Poet.

DEME-

THE
HISTORY
OF
PHILOSOPHY.

The Seventh Part,


Containing the *Cynick* Philosophers.



LONDON.

Printed for *Humphrey Moseley*, and *Thomas Dring*;

An. Dom. 1656.





ANTISTHENES.

Antisthenes: ∞

Chap. I.

His Life.

The Cynicks are derived from Antisthenes; Disciple of Socrates, who being most pleased with those discourses of his Master, which treated of Tolerance and laboriousness, instituted this Sect. he was born at Athens, his Father an Alacrit Athenian named Antisthenes also; his Thracian or as Plutarch, a Phrygian in whose defense to those who reproached him that he was a Foreigner, he answered Cibeles the Mother of the Gods was a Phrygian, he likewise derided the Athenians for being slaves, saying, bottling of them they were nothing more noble then Snails or Locusts. neither did Socrates the less esteeme him; but on the contrary, hearing that he had behaved himselfe valiantly at the Fight at Tanagra, he said of him, I know no Parents as both Athenians could not beget so excellent a Person: he first heard Gorgias the Orator, whence his Dialogues are written in a Rhetoricall stile, consisting chiefly in verity and exhortation. Hermippus saith at the Iamian meeting, he used to make Orations in praise and dispraise of the Athenians, Thebans and Lacedaemonians, before all the Assembly; but being many of the Citizens com thither he refrained. Next he applyed himselfe to Socrates; and profited so much vnder him, that he counsell'd his Scholers to become his fellow Disciples vnder that Master. He lived the Piræum, and went every Day 40 Stadia to heare Socrates. He affected a bit, and once having turned the torn part of his garment outermost Socrates spying it, said, I see vanity glory through a hole; or as Alian do you vse this ostentation before us also; Vpon the death of Socrates he was the occasion of banishment to Anytus; and of death too, Selytus; for Selytus meeting with some young men of Pontus invited to Athens by the fame of Socrates; he brought them to Anytus telling them he was wiser then Socrates where vpon the standers by in indignation, turned them both out of the City; of which already in the life of Socrates.

Chap. II ∞

His Institution of a Sect

Socrates being dead of whom he learned tolerance and apathy; he made choice of Cynolarges, a Gymnasium at Athens iust without the Gates as of the fittest place in which he might discourse of Philosophy. It was so called vpon this occasion. Didymus the Athenian a sacrificing in his owne house, a white Dog that was by snatcht the Victim, and running away with it laid it downe in another place; Didymus much troubled thereat consulted the Oracle, which enjoyned him to erect a Temple in that place where the

el. i. c. 1.

the Dog had laid down the Victim and to dedicate it to Hercules, which was called Cynosarges *κυνος ἀργεῖς*: *cynvads*, The Temple of the white Dog, Hence Antisthenes and his followers Cynicks, and by those that disapproved their Institution, Dogs, Antisthenes himself being termed *Ἀνδοκύων*, the sincere Dog.

d. Laert.

He first doubled his old sordid Cloake, and wore it alone (without a Coat) as Diocles affirmeth; he carried likewise a staffe and satchell Neanthus saith he first vsed a single Cloak. Socrates in the third of his Successions, saith, Diodorus the Aspendian wrote along beard, and carried a staffe and Wallet. His assertions were these, that vertue may be acquired by teaching; that those persons are noble who are vertuous; that was self sufficient to felicity, not needing anything but a Socratick courage; That vertue consisteth in Actions not requiring many words nor much learning, and is self sufficient to wisdom, for all othe things haue a reference thereunto; That infamy is good and equall to labour, and that a wise man ought not to gouerne the Commonwealth according to the laws in force, but according to vertue; That a wise man to haue hisse may make choice of a beautifull woman, and loue for a wise man only knoweth what ought to be loued. Diocles addeth these that nothing is new to a wise man; That a good man deserueth loue; that vertuous persons are friends; that wee ought to get assistance in war, valiant and iust; that vertue is an armour never can be taken from vs; That it is better with some good men to oppose all the wicked, then with many wicked men to contend with few good; obserue your Enemies for the first find out your faults; Esteem a iust man more then a neighbour; The same vertue belongeth to man or woman; those things are good which are honest; all which are dishonest; All things esteem strange; wisdom is the safest fortification, for it will neither fall a way nor can be betrayd; in these inexpugnable things we ought to build forts by meditation. Agellins saith esteemed pleasure the greatest ill whence he vsed to say I had rather be mad then addicted to pleasure.

el. lib. 1. c. 1.

ANTISTHENESES: ∞

As the opinion of the Cynicks in generall not esteem'd a part, vit-
ing them forth Laertius a meer form and institution of the *ethicorum*
but true seed of philosophy) they were these: The took
away, with Aristo the Chian, Dialectick, and Physick, and
only omitted Ethick; whence, what some said of Socra-
tes, Diocles applyed to Diogenes affirming he vsed
the same expressions that recought to enquire.

what good and ill
Our houses fill.

The likewise reied the liberall sciences whence An-
tisthenes said, these who have acquired Temperance
ought not to study any learning, least by other things
they be diverted. Geometric likewise, music and the
like the wholly took away. Whence Diogenes, to one
that shew'd him a Wall, it is an excellent invention.
saith he, against supping to late. And to one that
entertained him with Musick;

Wisdom the greatest Cynics doth protect;
But Musick cannot one poor house direct.

The likewise as the Stoicks affirmed to be happy so long
according to vertue, a Antisthenes, in his Heracles ex-
for there is of a kind of affinity betwixt those two sects
whence the Stoicks asserted Cynisme to be the nearest
way to vertue, and so lived Zeno the Cittiean.

Their diet was slender their reed only, such as might
satisfie nature, their Cloake sordid; they despised
riches, glory, and nobility. Some of them used only on
herbs and cold water, living tender, such as those
as they could finde or in Tubbs as Diogenes did who
affirmed, it was proper to the Gods to want nothing
and that those who stand in need of the best things come
nearest to the Gods.

They held also according to Antisthenes, in Heracles
that vertue may be acquired by learning, and that
it cannot be lost; that a wise man deserves to be be-
loved and never smeth, and is a friend to such as
are like him, and trusteth nothing to fortune.

They took a way with Aristo the Chian, all things
between vertue and vice

ANASTHOMES

CHAP. III : ∞ His Apothegmes

of his Apothegmes are remembered these.
He proued Labour to be good, by the exam-ples of a Hercules and Cyrus one a Grecian the other a Bar-barian. He first defined Speech thus; Speech is that which declareth that which is or was.
To a young man of Pontus that came to be his Dis-ciple asked him what he must bring with him, he answered

A new Book, a New pen and new Tablet, where the word καὶ, is equivoall, and signifieth deni'ded καὶ ὅτι wit.
To one demanding what kinde of wit he should take, if a faire one, saith he he will be common; if foul, a-ment. Hearing that Plato spok, if of him it is Kinglike, saith he to doe well and be ill spoken of.

being initiated into the Orphick Solemnities, the Priest telling him that they who were initiated into those rites were made partakers of many things in the next world, why saith he doe you not die.

To one reproached that both his Parents were not free, neither saith were they both wrasters, and yet I am a wraster. Being demanded why he had few Disciples I beat them away with a Syluer staffe.

Being demanded why he rebuked his Disciples so shar-ply, so saith, do Phylitians the tick.

Seeing an Adulterer running away vnhappy man saith he how much danger might you haue for one halfe penny he saith according to Hecaton it is better to fall among Crowes then flatterers; for those only devour the dead the the living.

Being demanded what was most happy for man he answered to die in proserity.

To a friend complaining he had lost his notes you haue written them in your mind, saith and not in your booke.

As rust consumeth Iron, so envie saith he, consumeth the euous man.

Those who would never die saith he must live piously and iustly.

He said Citties were then perishing when they could not distinguish the good from the bad.

Being commended by some wicked men I am troubled saith he to think what ill I haue done.

He said the colabitation of conording bretheren is firmer any wall.

He said wee ought to carry such prouision along with vs as if

we should happen to be shipwrack'd, we might swimme away with.

To those who reproached him for conversing with wicked persons; *So do Physicians with the sick*, saith he, *yet are not sick themselves.*

He said, *It is absurd to separate corn from the weeds, and in war to reject the unserviceable person; yet, in a Common-wealke, not to extirpate the wicked.*

Being demanded what he had gain'd by Philosophy, he answer'd, *that I can converse with myselfe.*

At a Feast, to one that said to him, *Sing*; he reply'd, *Do you then pipe.*

Diogenes demanding a Coat, he bad him double his Cloak.

Being demanded what learning is most necessary; *That*, saith he, *which unlearneth ill.*

He advis'd those who were provoked by revilings, to bear it with greater Fortitude, then if stones were cast at them.

He derided *Plato*, as being proud, and seeing at a show a horse going loftily, turning to *Plato*, *Me thinks*, saith he, *you would have acted the part of this horse very well.* This he said, because *Plato* at the same time had commended the horse.

Another time visiting *Plato*, as he lay sick, and looking into the basin whereinto he had vomited, *I see here*, saith he, *the choler, but not the pride.*

He advis'd the *Athenians* to love Asses as well as Horses, which they conceiving absurd; and yet, saith he, you choofe those for *Generalls*, who know nothing, but how to stretch out the hand.

To one that said to him, many praise thee; *why*, saith he, *what ill have I done?*

To one that demanded (as *Phanias* saith) what he should do to be a good and an honest man: *if you learn*, saith he, *of knowing persons, that the vices which you have are to be avoided.*

To one that praised a life full of delicacies; *Let the sons of my enemies*, saith he, *live delicately.*

To a young man, who desired his statue might be made handsomer then himselfe; Tell me, saith he, if the brasle it selfe could speak, what you think it would boast of; the other answer'd, of its handsome figure: *Are you not ashamed then*, replies he, *to be proud of the same that an inanimate creature would be?*

A young man of *Pontus* promised to supply him, as soon as his ship came home laden with saltfish; hereupon he took him to a meal-woman, and filling his satchell departed; she calling to him for mony: *This young man*, saith he, *will pay you as soon as his ship comes home.*

When at any time he saw a woman richly dress'd, he went to her house, and bad her husband bring out his horse and armes, that

if he were so provided, he might allow her those freedoms, being better able to justify the injuries it occasion'd; otherwise, that he should take off her rich habit.

- Stob. Ser. 1. He said, *Neither a feast is pleasant without company, nor riches without Vertue.*
- Stob. Ser. 38. He said, *Those pleasures which come not in at the dore, must not go out by the dore, but by incision or purging with Hellebor, or by *starving, so to punish those surfeits which we have incurred for a short pleasure.*
- Ser. 50. He said, *whosoever feareth others is a slave, though he know it not himselfe.*
- Ser. 53. He said, *No covetous man can be a good man, or a King, or a free-man.*
- Ser. 87. Being demanded what a feast is, he answered, *The occasion of surfeits.*
- Ser. 117. He said, *We ought to aim at such pleasures as follow labour, not at those which go before labour.*
- Ser. 148. He said, *Common Executioners are better then Tyrants; those put on-ly guilty men to death, Tyrants, the innocent.*
- Ser. 171. He said, *we ought to wish our enemies all good things but Fortitude, for that they possesse would fall into the hands of the Victor, not the Owner.*
- Ser. 212. Him that contradicteth, he said, *we must not again contradict, but instruct; for a mad-man is not cured by anothers growing mad also.*
- Plat. rep. Stoic. He said, *A man should alwaies have in readinesse his wits or a rope.*
- Plat. vit. Lyc. Seeing the Thebans much exalted with their successe at the Luctrian fight, he said, *They were like boyes that triumph when they have beaten their Masters.*
- Plat. vit. Per. To some that commended a Piper; But, saith he, *he is an ill man, for else he would never have been so good a Piper.*

CHAP. IV.

His Writings.

OF his Bookes saith Laertius, there are ten Tomes.

The first containeth these.

Of speech, or of Characters.

Ajax, of the speech of Ajax.

Ulysses, or of Ulysses.

An apology for Orestes.

Of Lawyers.

Ifographe, or Desias, or Isocrates.

Against Isocrates's ^{Ambassadors}.

The second Tome.

Of the Nature of Animals.

ANTISTHENES.

7

Of Procreation of children, or of Marriage, Erotick.
Of Sophists, Physiognomick.
Of Justice and Fortitude Protrepick 1, 2, 3,
Of Theognis.

The third Tome.

Of Good.
Of Fortitude.
Of Law, or of Policy.
Of Law, or of Fair and Just.
Of Freedom and Servitude.
Of Faith.
Of a Guardian, or of Trusting.
Of Victory, Oeconomick.

The fourth Tome,

Cyrus.
Hercules the Greater, or of Strength.

The first Tome.

Cyrus, or of a Kingdom.
Alpasia.

The sixth Tome.

Truth.
Of Dissertation, Anti-logick.
Sathon, of Contradiction 3.
Of Dialectick.

The seventh Tome.

Of Discipline, or of names, 5.
Of dying.
Of Life and Death.
Of things after death.
Of the use of names, or Eristick.
Of Interrogation and answer.
Of Opinion and Science 4.
Of Nature 2.
Interrogation concerning Nature 2.
Opinions, or the Eristick.
Problems concerning Learning.

The eighth Tome.

Of Musick.
Of Interpreters.
Of Homer.
Of Injustice and impiety.

Bbbb:

of

ANTISTHENES.

*Of Chalcas.
Of the spie.
Of Pleasure.*

The ninth Tome.

*Of the Odysseis.
Of Minerva's wand, or of Telemachus, Helena, and Penelope.
Of Proteus
The Cyclops, or of Ulysses.
Of the use of wine, or of Drunkenesse, or of the Cyclops.
Of Circe.
Of Amphiaraus.
Of Ulysses and Penelope.
Of the Dog.*

The tenth Tome.

*Hercules, or Midas.
Hercules, or of Prudence, or of strength.
The Master, or Lover.
The Masters, or spies.
Menexenus, or of Ruling.
Alcibiades.
Archelaus, or of a Kingdom.*

These saith *Laertius*, were his writings, the great number whereof *Timon* derides, calling him an ingenious Trifler.

There is also among the *Socratick* Epistles one under his name to this effect.

Antisthenes to Aristippus.

IT is not the part of a Philosopher to live with Tyrants, and to waste time at Sicilian Feasts, but rather to be content with a little in his own Country; but you esteem it the greatest excellence of a Vertuous person, to be able to acquire much wealth, and to have powerfull friends. Riches are not good; neither if they were in themselves good, are they such, being thus obtained, nor can a multitude of unlearned persons, especially Tyrants, be true friends. wherefore I would counsell you to leave Syracuse and Sicily; but if, as some report, you are in love with Pleasure, and aim at such things, as be seem not wise persons, go to Anticyra and cure your self by drinking Hellebore, for that is much better for you then the wine of Dionysius; this causeth madnesse, that asswageth it. So that as health and discretion differ from sicknesse and folly, so much

much shall you be better then you are in these things which you now enjoy Farewell.

The Answer to this Epistle, see in the life of *Aristippus*.

CHAP. V.

His Death.

HE died saith *Laertius* of sicknesse. As he lay on his death-bed, *Diogenes* came to him and asked him if he wanted a friend. Another time he came to him with a dagger; *Antisthenes* crying out, who will free me from this pain, he shewed him the dagger, saying, *This shall*, *Antisthenes* reply'd, I say from my pain, not from my life; for he bore his sicknesse somewhat impatiently through love of life.

Theopompus commends him above all the Disciples of *Socrates*, as being of such acute and sweet discourse, that he could lead any man to what he would.

There were three more of this name, one a Heraclitean Philosopher; the second of *Ephesus*, the third of *Rhodes* a Historian.

Bbbb2

DIO:

ANTISTHENES.

*Of Chalcas.
Of the spie.
Of Pleasure.*

The ninth Tome.

*Of the Odysseis.
Of Minerva's wand, or of Telemachus, Helena, and Penelope.
Of Proteus
The Cyclops, or of Ulysses.
Of the use of wine, or of Drunkenesse, or of the Cyclops.
Of Circe.
Of Amphiaraus.
Of Ulysses and Penelope.
Of the Dog.*

The tenth Tome.

*Hercules, or Midas.
Hercules, or of Prudence, or of strength.
The Master, or Lover.
The Masters, or spies.
Menexenus, or of Ruling.
Alcibiades.
Archelaus, or of a Kingdom.*

These saith *Laertius*, were his writings, the great number whereof *Timon* derides, calling him an ingenious Trifler.

There is also among the *Socratick* Epistles one under his name to this effect.

Antisthenes to Aristippus.

IT is not the part of a Philosopher to live with Tyrants, and to waste time at Sicilian Feasts, but rather to be content with a little in his own Country; but you esteem it the greatest excellence of a Vertuous person, to be able to acquire much wealth, and to have powerfull friends. Riches are not good; neither if they were in themselves good, are they such, being thus obtained, nor can a multitude of unlearned persons, especially Tyrants, be true friends. Wherefore I would counsell you to leave Syracuse and Sicily; but if, as some report, you are in love with Pleasure, and aim at such things, as becom not wise persons; go to Anticyra and cure your self by drinking Hellebore, for that is much better for you then the wine of Dionysius; this causeth madnesse, that assurgeth it. So that as health and discretion differ from sicknesse and folly, so

much shall you be better then you are in these things which you now enjoy
 Farewell.

The Answer to this Epistle, see in the life of *Aristippus*.

CHAP. V.

His Death.

HE died faith *Laertius* of sicknesse. As he lay on his death-bed, *Diogenes* came to him and asked him if he wanted a friend. Another time he came to him with a dagger; *Antisthenes* crying out, who will free me from this pain, he shewed him the dagger, saying, *This shall*, *Antisthenes* reply'd, I say from my pain, not from my life; for he bore his sicknesse somewhat impatiently through love of life.

Theopompus commends him above all the Disciples of *Socrates*, as being of such acute and sweet discourse, that he could lead any man to what he would.

There were three more of this name, one a Heraclitean Philosopher; the second of *Ephesus*; the third of *Rhodes* a Historian.

Bbbb2

DIO:

DIOGENES.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, Time, Banishment.

^a *Leert.*



^a **DIOGENES** was of *Sinopsis*, a City of *Pontus*, his Father named *Icesius*, or, as others, *Icetes*; by profession a money-changer.

He was born (as appears by computation from his death, which was in the 90th year of his age, in the first year of the 114th Olympiad, *Hegesias* being Archon) about the third year of the 9th Olympiad. *Suidas* saith, he was first called *Cleon*.

Diocles saith, his Father trading publicly in exchange of money, was surpris'd, coining false money, and thereupon fled: But *Eubulides* saith, *Diogenes* himselfe did it, and fled together with his Father; even *Diogenes* in his *Podalus*, acknowledgeth as much. Some affirme, that being made overseer, he was perswaded by the work-men to go to *Delphi*, or *Delus*, the Country of *Apollo*, to enquire of the Oracle if he should do that whereto he was advis'd, *αὐτοματὴν τὴν νόμον*, which is of ambiguous signification, implying, to alter the course of life, and to coine false money. The Oracle assented: *Diogenes* not understanding it in the *Civill* sense, betook himselfe to coyning, and being taken in the act, was banished, or, as others say, fled for fear. Some affirme, he adulterated the money he received from his Father, for which the Father was cast in prison, and there dyed; the Son fled, and coming to *Delphi*, enquired of the Oracle by what means he should become eminent, whereupon he received that answer.

^b *Alian. var.*
Hist. 13. 28.

^b When he left his Country, one of his servants followed him, named *Manes*, who not enduring his conversation ran away from him; some perswaded *Diogenes* to enquire after him, who answer'd, Were it not a shame, since *Manes* doth not need *Diogenes*, that *Diogenes* should need *Manes*. The fellow wandring up and down came at last to *Delphi*, where he was torn in pieces by doggs.

CHAP.



DIOGENES.

DIOGENES.

11

CHAP. II.

How he lived at Athens.

Coming to *Athens*, saith *Laertius*, he apply'd himselfe to *Antisthenes*, following the Cynicall Philosophy instituted by him. ^a *Antisthenes* having invited many to hear him, and but a few coming, at last in anger would not suffer any to come to him, and therefore bad *Diogenes* be gone also. *Diogenes* continuing to come frequently, he chid and threatned him, and at last struck him with his staffe: *Diogenes* would not go back, but persisting still in his desire of hearing him, said, *Strike if you will, here is my head, you cannot finde a staffe hard enough to drive me from you, untill you have instructed me.* *Antisthenes* overcome with his perseverance, admitted him, and made him his intimate friend. From that time forward he heard him. ^a *Alian. var. Hist. 10. 15.*

Some affirm, saith *Laertius*, he first wore a double Cloak, upon which he used to lie [at night:] He likewise carried a wallet, wherein was his meat. He made use of all places for all things, dining, sleeping and discoursing in any place, insomuch that pointing to *Jupiter's* walke, and the *Pompæum*, two publick places at *Athens*, he said, the Athenians built them for his dwelling. Falling once sick, he walked with a staffe, which afterwards he continually used, as likewise a wallet, not in the City, but when he travelled. He wrote to one to build him a little house, which the other not doing so soon as he required, he made use of a *Tub* in the *Metroum* to live in, as he declareth in his *Epistles*. In Summer he used to roule in the burning Sand, in Winter, to embrace statues covered with Snow, accustoming himselfe continually to sufferance. ^b A Lacedæmonian seeing him in this posture in the depth of Winter, asked him if he were not a-cold; *Diogenes* said, he was not: What you do then, reply'd the other, is no great matter. ^b *Plut.*

At first he used to beg, of which there are many instances: He one time begged of a man thus, *If you have given to others, give also to me? if to none, begin with me?*

^c Another time he begged of a Statue, whereof being demanded the reason, *That I may the better, saith he, bear a refusal.* ^c *Laert.*

He requested something of a covetous person, who delaying to give; *Man*, saith he, *I ask you in ἑσπερίῳ, not in τῆμέῳ, food, not a grave.*

He requested something of a person very obdurate, who answered yes, if you can perswade me to it; *Nay*, replied he, *if I were able to perswade you to any thing, it should have been to have hang'd your selfe.*

Of a Prodigall he begged a *Mina*; the other asked why he begged

DIOGENES.

begged a Mina of him, and of others but an *Obolus* : *Because*, saith he, *I hope to receive of others again ; but whether I shall ever have any more of you, the Gods know.*

Being reproach'd that *Plato* begged not, but he begged : *Yes*, saith he, *he beggeth too ; but,*

*Close in your ear,
Lest others hear.*

^d *Ælian. var.
Hist. 4. 27.*

^d Having received some little mony from *Dionysius* the Cary-fian, he said,

*The Gods afford thee thy desire,
A man and house —*

Alluding to his effeminacy.

^e *Laert.*

^e For this reason he said, the imprecations of *Tragedians* concurred in him, for he was without any City, without a house, depriv'd of his Country, a begger, a vagabond, having his livelyhood only from day to day. And yet, addes ^f *Ælian*, he was more pleased with this condition, then *Alexander* with the command of the whole world, when having conquer'd the Indians, he returned to *Babylon*.

^g *Laert.*

^g Seeing a Mouse, as *Theophrastus* saith, running up and down, he thence took occasion of comfort, considering it a creature that looked not for lodging, and was not displeased with darknesse, nor nice, as to diet.

He walked in the snow bare-foot, and tri'd to eat raw flesh, but could not.

He said, he imitated singing-Masters, who raise their voice too high, thereby to teach others the just tone.

The Athenians loved him much, for a youth having bor'd holes in his Tubbe, they punish'd him, and gave *Diogenes* a new one.

He used to perform the offices of *Ceres* and *Venus* in publick, arguing thus; *if it be not absurd to dine, it is not absurd to dine even in the market-place; but, it is not absurd to dine, therefore it is not absurd to dine even in the market-place.*

^h *Laert. It is explained by Plutarch de rep. Stoic. i Laert.*

^h *καὶ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ ἀγορᾷ* in the publick Forum; *I would*, saith he, *I could as easily satisfy my hunger.*

ⁱ As he dined in the Forum, some that were present called him Dog; *Nay*, saith he, *you are Dogs that stand about me when I am at dinner.*

Being reproached for feeding in the open Forum; *In the Forum*, saith he, *I grew hungry,*

Being reproached that he drunk in a victualling house; *And in a Barbers shop*, saith he, *I am shaved.*

He

He lived without any servant; Being demanded by one whether he would have a maid-servant, or a man, he said, neither; who then, answer'd the other, shall carry you out to your grave when you die? *Diogenes* reply'd, *hee that wants a house?*

C A H P. II.

How he lived at Corinth.

IN his old age he took a voyage to *Aegina*, but was by the way ^{a Laet} taken by some pirates, the name of whose captain was *Scirpalus*. They carried him to *Creet*, & there expos'd him to sale, they ask'd him what he could do, he answer'd, *he could command men*, and to the Cryer, he said, *if any man want a Master let him buy me*. Offering to sit down, they would not suffer him, (it being the custom of such as were to be sold for slaves, to leap up and down) *tis no matter for that*, saith he, *Fishes are sold which way so ever they lie*, adding, hee wondred that men being to buy a pot or vessel, examine it curiously on the inside, but if a man, they are satisfied with his look and outside. Pointing to a Corinthian richly attir'd that pass'd by, named *Xeniades*, tel me saith he, *to that man, for he wants a Master*. To *Xeniades* as soon as he had bought him, he said, *Be sure you do as I command you*, he answer'd in the common proverbial verse.

The springs of Rivers upwards run.

Diogenes reply'd, if being sick you had bought a Physician would you obey his advice, or would you say as before, *The springs of Rivers upwards run*.

His friends, according to *Cleomenes*, offer'd to redeem him, but he told them they were fools, for Lyons were not slaves to their Keepers, but the Keepers to the Lyons, for the property of ferocity is to fear, and men fear Beasts.

^{b Laet} *Xeniades* having bought him, carried him to *Corinth*, asking ^{c Laet} him what he could do, he answer'd, *he knew how to command* free persons. *Xeniades* wondring at his answer, set him at Liberty, and deliver'd his Sons to his charge, saying, *take them for children and command them*. He put the Government of his family also ^{d Laet} into his hands, which he acquitted himself of excellently well in every thing, in so much that *Xeniades* said, *he had brought a Good Genius into his House*.

He did not suffer the young men that were under his charge, to exercise themselves as *Vrattlers*, but only till they were warm, and for their health sake. He taught them many sayings of Poets

by

DIOGENES.

begged a Mina of him, and of others but an *Obolus*: *Because*, saith he, *I hope to receive of others again; but whether I shall ever have any more of you, the Gods know.*

Being reproach'd that *Plato* begged not, but he begged: *Yes*, saith he, *he beggeth 100; but,*

*Close in your ear,
Lest others hear.*

^d *Eliau. var.
Hist. 4. 27.*

^d Having received some little money from *Dionysius* the Caryl-ian, he said,

*The Gods afford thee thy desire;
A man and house —*

Alluding to his effeminacy.

^e *Laert.*

^e For this reason he said, the imprecations of *Tragedians* concurred in him, for he was without any City, without a house, depriv'd of his Country, a begger, a vagabond, having his livelihood only from day to day. And yet, addes ^f *Eliau*, he was more pleased with this condition, then *Alexander* with the command of the whole world, when having conquer'd the Indians, he returned to *Babylon*.

^g *Laert.*

^g Seeing a Mouse, as *Theophrastus* saith, running up and down, he thence took occasion of comfort, considering it a creature that looked not for lodging, and was not displeased with darknesse, nor nice, as to diet.

He walked in the snow bare-foot, and tri'd to eat raw flesh, but could not.

He said, he imitated singing-Masters, who raise their voice too high, thereby to teach others the just tone.

The Athenians loved him much, for a youth having bor'd holes in his Tubbe, they punish'd him, and gave *Diogenes* a new one.

He used to perform the offices of *Ceres* and *Venus* in publick, arguing thus; *if it be not absurd to dine; it is not absurd to dine even in the market-place; but, it is not absurd to dine, therefore it is not absurd to dine even in the market-place.*

^h *Laert. It is
explained by
Plutarch de rep.
Stoic.
i Laert.*

^h *ἔσθιον* in the publick Forum; *I would*, saith he, *I could as easily satisfy my hunger.*

ⁱ As he dined in the Forum, some that were present called him Dog; *Nay*, saith he, *you are Dogs that stand about me when I am at dinner.*

Being reproached for feeding in the open Forum; *In the Forum*, saith he, *I grew hungry,*

Being reproached that he drunk in a victualling house; *And in a Barbers shop*, saith he, *I am shaved.*

He

He lived without any servant; Being demanded by one whether he would have a maid-servant, or a man, he said; neither; who then, answer'd the other, shall carry you out to your grave when you die? *Diogenes* reply'd, *hee that wants a house?*

C A H P. II.

How he lived at Corinth.

IN his old age he took a voyage to *Aegina*, but was by the way ^{a Laert.} taken by some pirates, the name of whose captain was *Scirpalus*. They carried him to *Creet*, & there expos'd him to sale, they ask'd him what he could do, he answer'd, *he could command men*, and to the Cryer, he said, *if any man want a Master let him buy me*. Offering to sit down, they would not suffer him, (it being the custom of such as were to be sold for slaves, to leap up and down) *tis no matter for that*, saith he, *Fishes are sold which way so ever they lie*, adding, hee wondred that men being to buy a pot or vessel, examine it curiously on the inside, but if a man, they are satisfied with his look and outside. Pointing to a Corinthian richly attir'd that pass'd by, named *Xeniades*, tel me saith he, *to that man, for he wants, a Master*. To *Xeniades* as soon as he had bought him, he said, *Be sure you do as I command you*, he answer'd in the common proverbial verse.

The springs of Rivers upwards run.

Diogenes reply'd, if being sick you had bought a Physician would you obey his advice, or would you say as before, *The springs of Rivers upwards run*.

His friends, according to *Cleomenes*, offer'd to redeem him, but he told them they were fools, for Lyons were not slaves to their Keepers, but the Keepers to the Lyons, for the property of servitude is to fear, and men fear Beasts.

^b *Xeniades* having bought him, carried him to *Corinth*, ^{b Laert.} asking him what he could do, he answer'd, he knew how to command free persons. *Xeniades* wondring at his answer, set him at Liberty, and deliver'd his Sons to his charge, saying, *take then my Children and command them*. ^{c Gell.} He put the Government of his family also ^{p Laert.} into his hands, which he acquitted himself of excellently well in every thing, in so much that *Xeniades* said, *he had brought a Good Genius into his House*.

He did not suffer the young men that were under his charge, to exercise themselves as *Wrastlers*, but only till they were warm, and for their health sake. He taught them many sayings of Poets

by

by heart, and some of his own, and that they might more easily remember the full sum of Learning, he made a brief Collection thereof. He taught them at home to minister, using thin diet, and drinking water, to go negligently in habit, shaven, without coats, without shoes, and silent, looking upon themselves as they went. He brought them up likewise to Hunting. On the other side, they took great care of *Diogenes*, and recommended him to their Parents.

*c Plut. vit.
Alex.*

^c When *Alexander* was upon expedition against the *Persian*, many Philosophers came to salute him, the same duty he expected from *Diogenes*, who was at that time at the *Craneum*, a Gymnasium in *Corinth*, where he lived idly, not minding *Alexander*. *Alexander* therefore went and found him out sitting in the Sun, he rose a little to look upon the great crowd of people that came along with *Alexander*, who saluting him, asked *Diogenes* what he would desire of him, he answer'd, *that you would stand aside a little from betwixt me and the Sun*. Hereat *Alexander* was so surpris'd, and so much admir'd his high mind, that his Attendants in returning, laughing thereat, but *I*, saith he, were I not *Alexander*, would choose to be *Diogenes*.

CHAP. IV.

His Philosophy.

a Laert.

^a **A**ND concerning *Opinions*, he said, there is a twofold *Exercitation*, one *spirituall*, the other *corporeall*; If in the first of these we employ our selves constantly, frequent phantasies will occur, which facilitate the performance of Vertue; the one cannot be without the other, a good habit and strength being necessary both in respect of the soul and the body.

That Vertue is easily acquired by exercitation he argued, in as much as in the Mechanick Arts and others, that Artists by practise quickly arrive at an extraordinary readinesse therein, and Wrestlers and Musicians excell one another according to the continuall paines they take therein one more then another, and if they should have taken the same pains about their souls, it would not have been unprofitably and imperfectly employ'd.

He said nothing in life can be rightly done without exercitation, and that exercitation could master any thing, for whereas men should choose Naturall Labours, whereby they might live happily; they on the contrary make choice of the unprofitable, and through their own folly, are in continuall misery. For even the contempt of Pleasure, if we accustome our selves thereto will be most pleasant; and as they, who inure themselves to a voluptuous

ruous life cannot be taken off it without much trouble and grief ; so they who exercise themselves in a contrary manner with as great ease condemn even the pleasures themselves.

He ascribed not so much to Law as to Nature ; Hee affirmed that he followed the same course of life with *Hercules*, preferring nothing before Liberty.

He asserted that all things belong to the wise, arguing thus; *all things belong to the Gods, the Gods are friends to wise persons, all things are common amongst friends; therefore all things belong to the wise.*

As concerning Law, he held that without it a Commonwealth could not be ordered, for, saith he, *without a City there cannot be any profit of Civill things; a City is a Civill thing; of Law without a City there is no profit; therefore Law is Civil.*

He derided *Nobility, glory*, and the like, saying, they were the Ornaments, or veiles of wickednesse, and that only a right Commonwealth ought to be honour'd.

He held that there ought to be a Community of women, conceiving marriage to be nothing, and that every man and woman might enjoy one another as they pleased themselves, and consequently that all Children should be in common.

Hee held that it was not unlawfull to take any thing out of a Temple, or to feed upon living Creatures, neither was it impious to eat mans flesh, as appeared by the practise of other Nations, adding that all things are in all and by all; in bread there is flesh, in flesh bread; the remainders of flesh and bread being insinuated by occult passages into other bodies, and evaporating in like manner. This *Laertius* cites out of a Tragedy of his named *Thyestes*, if saith he, that Tragedy belong to him, and not rather to *Philibiscus*, or *Pasiphon*.

Musick, Geometry, Astronomy and the like he rejected as unprofitable and unnecessary.

CHAP. V.

His Apophthegms.

^a HE was very acute saith *Laertius* in deriding others. Hee ^a *Laert.* said *Euclides* school was not *σχολή*, but *σχολή*, not a School, but *Anger*, for the Dialecticks affected *Litigious* dispute. He said *Plato's* School was not *διατριβή*, but *κατατριβή*, not an exercitation, but Consumption.

He said, when he look'd upon *Pilots, Physicians* and *Philosophers*, Man was the wisest of all Creatures; but when he looked upon *Interpreters of Dreams, Prophets* or persons puff'd up with wealth or honours, nothing is more foolish then man.

Hee said that he often found it convenient in life to have ready an answer or a rope.

At a great Feast, seeing *Plato* eat Olives; Why, saith he, you being a wise man, and going to *Sicily* for such entertainments, did you not enjoy them: He answer'd, by the Gods *Diogenes*, I fed upon Olives there likewise as well as upon other things. *Diogenes* replied, why then needed you to have gone to *Syracuse*, were there no Olives at that time in *Attica*? This *Phalarinus* ascribes to *Aristippus*, adding, that as he was eating figges, he met him, and said, tast: the other taking and eating; I bad you, saith he, tast, and not devour.

In the presence of some friends of *Plato* sent to him by *Dionysius*, *Diogenes* trod under foot *Plato's* robe, saying, I tread under foot *Plato's* pride: But *Diogenes*, answer'd *Plato*, how proud are you your selfe, when you think you contemn pride? *Sotion* relates this as said to the Cynick by *Plato*.

b *Stob. Ser.* 133

^b *Diogenes* sent to *Plato* for wine and figgs, he sent him a large vessell of wine and figgs; whereupon *Diogenes*, as you, saith he, being demanded how much 2. and 2. are, answer 20. so you neither grant what I request, nor answer what I demand; thus censuring his verbosity.

Being demanded in what part of *Greece* he had seen good men; *Alexander*, saith he, no where, but good loyes at *Lacedæmon*.

Making a serious discourse, and perceiving that no man came to hear him, he began to sing, whereat a great many gather'd together, whom he reproached for coming to trifles, being so backward to serious things.

He said, men contested in undermining or kicking, but none about goodnesse.

He wondred at *Grammarians*, who enquiring after the misfortunes of *Ulysses*, forgot their own; and at *Musicians*, who whilst they tune their instruments, have discordant affections in their souls; and at the *Mathematicians*, that gazing upon the Sun and Moon, neglected what was just at their feet; and at *Oratours*, who studied to speak just things, and neglected to act them; and lastly at covetous persons, for dispraising mony, which they loved above all things.

c *Stob.* 296.

He reprehended those, who though they commended just men for thinking themselves to be above mony, yet esteemed the rich happy.

He was angry at those, who when they sacrificed to the Gods for their health, feasted at the same time contrary to their health.

He wondered at Servants, who seeing their Masters eat excessively, did not take away their meat.

He praised those, who being about to marry, would not marry; who being about to go sea, would not go to sea; who being about to undertake some publick office, would not undertake it; and who being about to bring up children, forbore to bring them up; and who could compose themselves to live with great men,

yet

yet never went to them.

He said, when we stretch out our hand to our friend, we should never clutch our fist.

One bringing him into a new house, and forbidding him to spit, he spat in his face, saying, he could not finde a worse place. Some ascribe this to *Aristippus*.

Crying out upon a time, *Men come hither*, a great many flocked about him, whom he fell upon with his stick, and beat 'em, saying, *I called men, not varlets*. This *Hecaton* in his *Chriae* relates.

Alexander said, if he had not been born *Alexander*, he would have desired to have been born *Diogenes*.

He said, they were not maimed who were dumb and blinde, but they who had not a wallet.

Going once halfe shaven to a feast of young men, as *Metrocles* relates, they beat him, whereupon he took their names, and setting them down in a parchment roll, he wore it at his breast, whereby being known, they were reviled and beaten.

He said, he was the *Dog of the praised*, but none of the praisers durst go a hunting with him.

To one saying, at the *Pythian Games* I overcame men; *No*, saith he, *I the men, you the slaves*.

To those who said to him, you are now old, take your ease; what, saith he, *if I were to run a race, should I give over when I were almost at the end, or rather contest with greater courage?*

Finding *Demosthenes* the Orator at dinner in a common victualling house, who ashamed, would have stollen away; nay, saith he, you are now the more popular. *Alian* relates it thus, *Diogenes* being at dinner in a common victualling house, and seeing *Demosthenes* passe by, invited him in, *Demosthenes* refusing; do you think it, saith *Diogenes*, a disparagement to dine here, when your Master dines here every day? meaning the common people, to whom Oratours are but servants.

To some strangers who were desirous to see *Demosthenes*, pointing to him with his middle finger; this, saith he, is he that leads the *Athenians*.

In reproofe to one who had throwne away his bread, and was ashamed to take it up again, he tyed a string about the neck of a bottle, and dragg'd it after him through the *Ceramick*.

He said, most men were mad *præter digitum*, all but the finger; if any man should walk pointing with his middle finger, he will be thought mad; if his fore-finger, not so.

He said, the most precious things were sold cheapest, and so on the contrary; for a Statue will cost 3000 pieces of silver, a peck of wheat, two pieces of brasse.

To one, who came to him to study Philosophy, he gave a fish, and bid him follow him, the other ashamed, threw it away and departed: not long after, meeting the same person; he laughing,

said, *The friendship betwixt you and me was broke off by a Fish.* Diocles relates it thus; One saying to him, command me *Diogenes*, he gave him a pennyworth of cheefe to bring after him; the other refusing to carry it, our friendship, saith he, a pennyworth of cheefe hath dissolved.

Seeing a boy drink water in the hollow of his hand, he took his little cup out of his wallet and threw it away, saying, *The boy out-went him in frugality.* He threw away his dish also, seeing a Boy that had broken his, supping up his broth in the same manner.

Seeing a woman prostrate her selfe unhand somely in prayer, and desirous to reprove her superstition, as *Zoilus the Pergean* reports, came to her, and said, Are you not ashamed, woman, that God who stands behinde you (for all things are full of him) should see you in this undecent posture.

He said, such as beat others ought to be consecrated to *Æsculapius*, the God of *Chirurgery*.

He said, *against Fortune we must oppose courage; against Nature, Law, against Passion, Reason.*

In the *Cranecum*, *Alexander* standing by him, as the Sun shone, said to him, ask of me what thou wilt; he answer'd, *Do not stand between me and the Sun.*

One reading a long tedious discourse, and coming at last neer a blank leafe at the end of the book, *Be of good courage friends*, saith he, *I see land.*

To one, proving by the *horned Syllogisme* that he had hornes, he feeling of his forehead, *but I*, saith he, *feel none.* In like manner another maintaining there was no such thing as motion, he rose up and walked. To one disputing concerning *Meteors*, *How long is it*, saith he, *since you came from heauen?*

A wicked man having written over the dore of his house, *Let no ill thing enter here: which way then*, saith he, *must the Master come in?*

He anointed his feet with sweet *Unguents*, saying, the scent went from the crown of his head into the air; but from his feet to his nostrills.

To some *Athenians*, that perswaded him to be initiated into some Religious *Mysteries*, alledging, that such as were initiated had the chiefest places in the other World: It is ridiculous, saith he, if *Agessilaus* and *Epaminondas* live there amongst bogges, and the common people that are initiated live in the blessed Islands. Or as *Plutarch*, hearing these verses of *Socrates*:

—*Twice happy they
Who do these Mysteries survey;
They only after death are blest,
All miseries pursue the rest;*

What, saith he, *shall Patocion the thiefe be in better condition (because he was initiated) then Epaminondas.* Mice

Mice comming to him as he was at dinner; See, saith he, Diogenes also maintaineth Parasites.

^d Diogenes being present at a discourse of Plato's; would not minde it, whereat Plato angry, said, Thou dogge, why mind'st thou not: Diogenes unmoved, answered, *Yet I never return to the place where I was sold, as dogs do, alluding to Plato's voyage to Sicily.* d Ælian. var. hist. 14. 33.

Returning from a Bath, one asked him, if there were many men there; he said, *no*: The other asking if there were much company; he said, *there was*.

Plato defining Man a two-footed Animall without wings, and this definition being approved, Diogenes took a Cock, and plucking off all its feathers, turned it into Plato's School, saying, This is Plato's Man; whereupon to the definition was added, *having broad nailes*.

To one demanding at what time he should dine, *if thou art rich*, saith he, *when thou wilt, if poor, when thou canst*.

At Megara, seeing their sheep with thick fleeces, and their children almost naked; *It is better*, saith he, *to be the sheep of a Megarian, then his son*.

To one, who hitting him with the end of a long pole, bad him him take heed, *why*, saith he, *do you mean to hit me again?*

He said, *the Oratours were the servants of the multitude; Crownes, the biles of glory*.

^e He lighted a candle at noon, saying, *I look for a man*.

e Stob. Ser. 4.

He stood in the rain without any shelter, some that were present pittying him, Plato, who was there likewise, said, *if you will shew your selves pitifull to him, go away*, reflecting upon his vain-glory.

One giving him a box on the eare, *O Hercules*, saith he, *I knew not that I should have walked with a Helmet*.

Medias giving him many blowes with his fist, saying, there are 3000 drachmes [alluding to the fines imposed upon such outrages] ready counted for you upon the table: The next day he got a Cæstus, and beat him with it, saying, *There are three thousand drachmes ready counted for you*.

Lysias an Apothecary asking him, if he thought there were many Gods: *How*, saith he, *can I think otherwise, when I take you to be their enemy*. Others ascribe this to Theodorus.

Seeing one that had besprinkled himselfe with water: *O unhappy man*, saith he, *dost thou not know, that the errors of life are no more to be washed away by water, then errors in grammer*.

He rebuked those who complained of Fortune, saying, *They did not request what was good, but that which seemed good to them*.

Of those, who are terrified with dreams, he said: *You never are concern'd for the things you do waking, but what you fancy in your sleep you make your greatest businesse*.

At the Olympick Games the Cryer proclaiming Dioxippus f Et Plut. de curiositate.

DIOGENES.

hath overcome men; he *slaves*, saith he, *but I men*.

Alexander sending an Epistle to Antipater at Athens¹, by one whose name was Athlias, Diogenes being present said, *Athlias from Athlias, by Athlias to Athlias*, alluding to the name, which implyeth misery.

Perdiccas threatening him with death unlesse he would come to him; *that is no great matter*, saith he, *for a Cantharides or spider may do as much; you should rather have threatned, that you would have liv'd well without me*.

He often said the Gods had given to men an easie life, but that it was hidden from those who used choice diet, unguents and the like; whence to one whose servant put on his cloaths, *you will not be truly happy*, saith he, *untill he wipe your nose also*, that is, *when you have lost the use of your hands*.

Seeing some that had the charge of the things belonging to the Temple, leading a man to Prison, who had stoln a Cup out of the Treasury, *the great thieves*, saith he, *lead Prisoner the lesser*.

To a young man that throwing stones at a Gibbet, *well done*, saith he, *you will be sure to hit the mark*.

To some young men that coming about him, said, take heed you do not bite us: *fear not boies*, said he, *Diogenes eat not Beetes* [for so he termed effeminate persons.]

To one feasting, cloath'd in a Lyons skin, *do not* saith he, *defile vertues Livery*.

To one extolling the happinesse of Callisthenes, in that living with Alexander he had plenty of all things; *nay*, saith he, *he is not happy, for he dines and suppes when Alexander pleases*.

When he wanted money, he said, he went to redemand, not borrow it of his friends.

Seeing a young man going along with some great persons to a Feast, he took him from them, and carried him to his own friends, bidding them to look to him better.

To one neatly dressed, who had asked him some question, *I cannot answer you*, saith he, *unlesse I knew whether you were a man or a woman*.

¹ Vit. Athenae.

Of a young man playing at *Cattabus* in a Bath, *by how much the better*, saith he, *so much the worse*.

At a Feast one threw a bone to him as to a dog, which he like a dog took up, and lifting his legge *μεγίστευον αὐτοῖς*.

Orators, and all such as sought glory by speaking, hee called *πεινῶνδράκους*, thrice men, instead of *τρεῖς ἀθλίους*, thrice wretched.

Hee called an unlearned rich man *a sheep with a golden fleece*.

Seeing written upon the Gates of a Prodigall's house, *TO BE SOLD*; *I knew*, saith he, *being so overcharg'd with wine, it would come up the owner*.

To a young man professing himself much displeased at the many

ny persons that courted him, *let him see*, saith he, *that you are displeased by casting off your effeminacy.*

Of a toul Bath, *where*, saith he, *shall they be washed that wash here?*

A big fellow that plaid on the harp, though by all others discommended for playing ill, he praised, being asked why, *because*, saith he, *being an able fellow, he chooseth rather to play on the harp then to steal*

A certain harper who plaid so ill, that the company alwaies went away and left him, he saluted thus, *Good morrow cock*, the other asking why, *because*, saith he, *your Musick maketh every one rise.*

Seeing a young man doing something, which though it were ordinary, he conceived to be unseemly, hee filled his bosome with beans, and in that manner walked through the people, to whom gazing upon him, *I wonder*, saith he, *you look at me and not at him.*

Hegesias desiring him to lend him some of his writings, *you are a fool*, saith he, *Hegesias, who eat figgs not painted but reall; yet neglect true exercitation, and seek after the written.*

Seeing one that had won the Victory at the Olympick Exercises feeding sheep; *you have made hast*, saith he, *good man, from the Olympick Exercises to the Nemaean*, the word alluding to feeding of sheep.

Being demanded how it cometh to passe that Wraftlers are for the most part stupid fellows, he answer'd, *because they are made chiefly of the skins of Oxen and swine.*

To a Tyrant, demanding of him what brasse was best, he answer'd *that whereof the Statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton were made.* This others ascribe to *Plato*.

Being asked how *Dionysius* useth his friends, *as vessels*, saith he, *emptying the full, and throwing away the empty.*

A young man newly married, having written upon his house, *the Son of Jupiter*, *Hercules*, *Callinicus dwelleth here* *let nothing ill enter*, hee added, *Assistance after a defeat*, implying it was too late, he being already married.

He said Coverousness is the Metropolis of all evil.

Seeing one, that had wasted all his means, eating Olives, *if you had used to dine so*, said he, *you would not have supp'd so.*

He said, *Good men are the Images of the Gods*, *love is the businesse of idle persons.*

Being asked what is the most miserable thing in life, he said, *an old man in want.*

Being demanded, the bitings of what beasts were most dangerous, *Of Wild Beasts*, saith hee, *a Detractor, of Tame, a Flatterer.*

Beholding a picture of two Centaures very ill painted, hee said,

said, *which of these is Chiron*; the least consisteth in the Greek word, which signifieth *worse*, and was also the name of a Centaur; tutor to *Achilles*.

He said, *the discourse of flatterers is a rope of honey*. He called the belly the *Charybdis* of life.

Hearing that *Didymo*, an Adulterer, was taken; he deserves, saith he; to be put out of his name (meaning emasculated)

k Stob. Ser. 55. ^k Being asked why gold lookes pale; *because*, saith he, *many lie in wait for it*.

Seeing a woman carried in a Litter; *that is not*, saith he, *a fit cage for such a Beast*.

Seeing a Servant that had run away from his Master, sitting upon the brink of a well: *Young man*, saith he, *take heed you do not fall in*; alluding to the punishment of fugitive servants.

Seeing one that used to steal garments in the bath, he said, *ἢ π' ἀλαμπιασθὼν ἢ τοῦ ἄλλοιού.οι*, *Do you come for unguents, or for another garment?*

Seeing some women hang'd upon an Olive-tree; *I would*, saith he, *all trees bore the same fruit*.

Seeing a thiefe that used to rob Tombes, he spoke to him in that verse of *Homer*,

— *What now of men the best,*
Com'st thou to plunder the deceas't?

Seeing a handsome youth all alone asleep, he awaked him, saying in the words of *Homer*, *Awake*,

Μὴ τίς σὺν ἑσθ' ἐμταρταρῶν ἐν δόρῳ πέσῃ.

To one that feasted sumptuously, he said that verse of *Homer*.

Son, thou hast but a little time to live.

Plato discoursing concerning *Ideas*, and naming *τραπέζιστος*, and *καύπητος*, as if he should say, *Tableity* and *Cuppeity*, he said, *I see Plato, the table and the cup, but not the tableity and cuppeity*. *Plato* answered, it is true indeed, you have eyes by which the *table* and *cup* are seen; but not an *Intellect*, by which *tableity* and *cuppeity* are seen.

Being demanded what he thought *Socrates*, he answered, *mad*. Being demanded at what time a man should marry; *a young man*, saith he, *not yet; an old man not at all*.

To one that asked, what he should give him to let him strike him, he answered, *a Helmet*.

1 Stob. Ser. 161 ¹ To a young man dressing himselfe neatly *if this*, saith he, *be for the sake of men, you are unhappy; if for women, you are unjust*.

Seeing a young man blush; *take courage*, saith he, *that is the colour of Vertue*.

Hearing

Hearing two men plead against one another, he condemn'd both, saying, *one had stolen, and the other had not lost.*

Being demanded what wine he thought most pleasant, he answer'd, *that which is drunk at anothers cost.*

To one that said, many deride thee; he answer'd, *but I am not derided*: as conceiving, saith ^m Plutarch, those only to be derided, who are troubled at such things. ^m Vit. Fab. Max.

To one who said, Life is an ill thing: *Life*, saith he, *is not an ill thing, but an ill life is an ill thing.*

As he was dining upon Olives, they caus'd Tart to be set before him; which he threw away, saying,

Stranger, when Kings approach, withdraw.

The words of Laius's Officers to Oedipus.

Being asked what kinde of dogge he was, he answer'd, *when he was hungry, a Spaniel, when his belly was full, a Mastiffe; one of those which many commend, but dare not take abroad with them a hunting.*

Being demanded whether wise men might eat dainties; *all things*, saith he, *as well as others.*

Being demanded why men gave to Beggars, and not to Philosophers; *because*, saith he, *they are afraid they may be lame or blinde, but are not afraid they may be Philosophers.* ^o Stob. Ser. 77.

To one that reproach'd him as having countefteit mony; *indeed*, saith he, *there was a time when I was such a one as you are; but the time will never come that you will be as I am.*

Coming to Mindus, and seeing the Gates very large, the City small; *Mindinians*, saith he, *shut your Gates, lest your City run out at them.*

Seeing a thiefe that was taken stealing purple, he apply'd that verse of Homer to him;

The purple death, and potent fate have seiz'd.

To Craterus, who invit'd him to come to him, he return'd answer, *I had rather lick salt at Athens, then enjoy the greatest delicacies with Craterus.*

Meeting Anaximenes the Oratour, who was very fat; *Give us*, saith he, *some of your flesh, it will ease you, and help us.*

The same Anaximenes being in the midst of a discourse, Diogenes shewing a piece of salt-fish, divert'd the attention of his Auditors; whereat Anaximenes growing angry, *See*, saith he, *a hard penny-worth of salt-fish hath broke off Anaximenes's discourse.*

Some ascribe this to him. Plato seeing him wash herbs, came and whisper'd thus to him, *If you had followed Dionysius, you would not have needed to wash herbs; to whom he return'd this answer in his ear, if you had washed herbs, you needed not to have followed Dionysius.*

DIOGENES.

To one that said to him, many laugh at you: *and Asses perhaps at them*, saith he; *but they care not for Asses, nor I for them.*

Seeing a young man studying Philosophy: Well done, saith he, you will teach those, who love your outward beauty, to admire your soul.

To one that admired the multitude of votive offerings in *Samo-thracia*, given by such as had escaped shipwrack: *There would have been far more*, saith he, *if those who perished had presented theirs.* Others ascribe this to *Diagoras* the Melian.

To a young man going to a feast, he said, You will come back *Chiron*: (alluding to the word which implyeth worse) the young man came to him the next day, saying, I went and returned not *Chiron*: No, saith he, not *Chiron*, but *Eurytion*.

Returning from *Lacedemon* to *Athens*, to one that asked him, from whence he came, and whither he went: *From men*, saith he, *to women.*

Returning from the Olympick Games, to one that asked if there were much people there; *Much people*, saith he, *but few men.*

He compared Prodigalls to fig-trees growing on a precipice, whose fruit men tast not, but crows and vultures devour.

Phryne the Curtezan, having set up a golden Statue of *Venus* at *Delphi*, he wrot on it, *From the intemperance of the Grecians.*

Alexander coming to him, and saying, I am *Alexander* the great King: *And I*, saith he, *am Diogenes the Dogg.*

Being asked why he was called *Dogg*: *I fawn on those that give*, saith he, *I bark at those that will not give, and I bite the wicked.*

As he was gathering figgs, the keeper of the Orchard spying him, told him, it is not long since a man was hang'd upon that Tree: *And for that reason*, saith he, *I will cleanse it.*

p. *Æl.* 12. 58. p Observing *Dioxippus* the Olympick victor, to cast many glances upon a Curtezan: *See*, saith he, *a common Woman leads the martiall Ramm by the neck.*

To two infamous persons stealing away from him: *Fear not*, saith he, *dogs eat not thistles.*

To one that asked him concerning a youth taken in adultery, whence he was; he answer'd, of *Tegea*, *Tegea* (a City of *Arcadia*) whereto he alluded, is a publick Brothell.

Seeing one, that in former times had been an ill Wrestler, professse Medicine; *What is the matter*, saith he, *have you a designe to cast those down that have thrown you?*

Seeing the Son of a common woman throw stones amongst a croud: *Take heed*, saith he, *you do not hit your Father.*

To a youth shewing him a sword, given him by one that loved him, he said, *ἡ αὐτὴ μάχεται καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ ἐν ἀλλοτρίῳ*.

To some that extolled one who had bestowed something on him: *But you do not praise me*, saith he, *who deserved to receive it.*

To

To one that redemanded an old Cloak of him, if you gave it me, saith he, *I must keep it, if you lent it me, I must make use of it.*

To a supposititious person that said to him, you have gold in your Cloak, Yes, saith he, and for that reason I lay it ^q under mee ^q when I go to sleep. The jeast consisteth in the allusion betwixt those two Greek words.

Being demanded what he had gained by Philosophy, if nothing else saith hee, at least this, to be prepared for all fortunes. ἡ ἀποδομιὰ τοῦ φιλοσοφίας.

Being demanded of what Country he was, he answered, *a Citizen of the world.* ἡ πατρις τοῦ κόσμου.

To one that sacrific'd, praying he might have a child, you pray for a child, saith he, but never trouble your self what kind of child it may prove.

At an ordinary, being demanded mony, he answered the Master in that verse of Homer,

Ask others, but from Hector hold thy hand.

He said the Mistresses of Kings were Queens; for the Kings, Et Stob. ser. did whatsoever they would have them.

The Athenians having decreed to stile Alexander Bacchus, and make me, saith he, *Serapis.*

To one reproaching him for living in filthy places, the Sun, saith he, *visits Kennells, yet is not defiled.*

Being at supper in the Temple, they brought him course bread, he threw it away, saying, *nothing but what is pure must come within a Temple.*

To one that said, why do you, who know nothing, profess Philosophy? he answer'd, *though I should but pretend to study Philosophy, yet that were a profession thereof.*

To one that recommended his Son to him, saying, hee was very ingenious, and exceeding well educated, he answered, *why then doth he need me?*

Those who speak good things, but do them not, differ nothing from a Lute; for that neither hears nor hath sense.

Hee went to the Theatre, as all the people were going out, being asked why he did so, *This*, saith he, *is that I study all my life time.*

Seeing an effeminate young man, are you not ashamed, saith hee, to use your self worse then Nature hath done? *She hath made you a man; but you will force your self to be a woman.*

Seeing an ignorant man tuning a Lute, are you not ashamed, (Stob. ser. 104.) saith he, to try to make a Lute sound harmoniously, and yet suffer your life to be so full of discord.

To one that said he was unfit for Philosophy, why do you live, saith he, if you care not for living honestly.

To one who despised his own Father, are you not ashamed, saith he; to despise him who is the cause you are so proud?

Hearing a handsome youth speak foolishly, are you not ashamed, saith he, to draw a leaden dagger out of an ivory sheath.

Being reproached for accepting a Cloak from *Antipater*, he answered in those words of *Homer*,

The gifts of Gods must not be thrown away.

One that hit him with a pole, and then bid him take heed, hee struck with his staffe, and said, *and take you heed.*

To one that sued to a Curtezian, *What mean you wretch* saith he, *to sue for that which is much better to misse.*

To one that smelled sweet of Unguents, *take heed*, saith he, *this perfume make not your life sink.*

He said, *Slaves serve their Masters, but wicked men their passions.*

Being demanded why slaves are called *Asses*, *Footmen*, because saith he, *they have feet like men, but such minds as you that ask the question.*

Seeing an unskilfull Archer going to shoot, he fate down at the mark, *left*, saith he, *he should hit me.*

He said lovers are unhappy in pleasure.

Being demanded whether death be ill, *how*, saith he, *can that be ill, whereof when it cometh we have no sense.*

Alexander coming to him, and saying, do you not fear me? what saith he, are you good or ill, he answered good: *who*, replies *Dio-genes*, *fears that which is good?*

He said, *Learning is a regulation to young men, a comfort to old men, wealth to poor men, and an Ornament to rich men.*

To *Didymo* an Adulterer curing a maids eye, *take heed*, saith he, *least in curing the eie, you hurt not the ball*, [the word *word*, signifying both the eye-ball and Virginitie.]

To one that said his friends lay in wait for him, *what then is to be done*, saith he, *if friends and enemies must be used alike.*

Being demanded what is best amongst men, he answered, *freedom of speech.*

Coming into a school, and seeing there many statues of the Muses, but few Auditors, *by the help of the Gods, Master*, saith he, *you have many Auditors.*

Stob. Eib. ser. 1. To one that asked him how he might order himself best, *by reprehending*, saith hee, *those things in your self which you blame in others.*

Ser. He gave good counsell to a person very dissolute, being demanded what he was doing, he answer'd, *washing an Ethiop.*

Ser. 32. He went backwards into the School of the Stoicks, whereat some laughing, are *you not ashamed*, saith he, *to do that in the whole course of your life, for which you deride me in walking.*

Ibid. Hee said, *men provide for their living, but not for their well living.*

Ser. 37, & 84. He said, it was a shame to see Wraстlers and Singing-Masters observe temperate dyet, and moderate their pleasures, one for exercise, the other for his voice, and yet no man would do so much for Vertue's sake.

He

He said, Pride, like a shepheard, driveth men whither it pleaseth. Ser. 45.

Seeing the high walls of *Megara*, he said, *Unhappy people, minde not the height of your walls, but the height of their courages who are to stand on the walls.* Ser. 48.

He compared covetous men to such as have the dropsey, those are full of mony, yet desire more; these of water, yet thirst after more: Passions grow more intense by enjoyment of what they desire. Ser. 53.

Seeing a man make love to old rich widowes: *This love, saith he, is not blinde, but toothlesse.* Ser. 53.

Being demanded what beasts were the worst: *in the field, saith he, Bears and Lyons, in the City, Usurers and Sycophants.* Ser. 54.

He compared flattery to an empty tombe, on which *Friendship* was inscribed. Ser. 64.

Blaming *Anisthenes* for being too remisse in discourse, in regard that when he spoke loudest he could hardly be heard, and calling himselfe the Trumpet of reproofe: *Anisthenes* reply'd, he was like a *Bee*, that makes no great noise, yet stings sharply. Ser. 66.

He said, reproof is the good of others.

Ibid.

A certain *Athenian* asking him why he lived not with the *redemonians*, whom he praised so much: *Physicians*, saith he, though they study health, converse with the sick. *Ibid.*

He said, other doggs bark at their enemies, I, my friends, that I may preserve them. *Ibid.*

He asked *Plato* if he were writing Lawes: *Plato* affirmed he was. Did you not write a Common-wealth before, said *Diogenes*? I did, answers *Plato*. And had not that Common-wealth Lawes, saith he? The other answering it had: *To what end*, reply'd *Diogenes*, *do you write new Lawes*? Ser. 68.

He said, *To give Physick to a dead body, or advise an old man, is the same thing*. Ser. 68.

To a bald man that reviled him, *I will not return your reproaches*, saith he, yet cannot but commend your hair, for leaving so bad a head. Ser. 71.

To an Informer that fell out with him *I am glad*, saith he, of the enmity betwixt us, for you hurt not your foes, but your friends. *Ibid.*

To one that reviled him; *No man*, saith he, will believe you when you speak ill of me, no more then they would me, if I should speak well of you. Ser. 72.

Alexander sent him a dish full of bones, with this message, *It was meat for doggs*; he answer'd, *Yea, but not fit for a King to send*. Ser. 77.

He said, it was the same fault to give to them that deserved nothing, as not to give to them that do. *Ibid.*

He said, *As houses, where there is plenty of meat, are full of mice, so the bodies of such as eat much are full of diseases.* Ser. 87.

At

- Ser. 88. At a Feast, one giving him a great cup full of wine, he threw it away; for which being blamed, *If I had drunk it, saith he, not only the wine would have been lost, but I also.*
- Ser. 105. Being demanded what was hardest, he answer'd, *To know our selves, for we construe most things according to our own partiality.*
- Ser. 117. He said, *Medea* was a wife woman, not a Witch, who by labour and exercise corroborated the bodies of effeminate persons, whence arose the fable, that she could renew age.
- Ser. 126. To one that profess'd himselfe a *Philosopher*, but argued litigiously, he said, *Why do you spoile the best part of Philosophy, yet would be thought a Philosopher?*
- Ser. 133. Questioning one of those young men that followed him, he was silent; whereupon *Diogenes*, *Do you not think, saith he, it belongs to the same man to know when to speak, and when to hold his peace?*
- Ser. 149. & 153. Being demanded how a man should live under the authority of superiours; as we do by fire, saith he, not too near, lest it burn, not too far off, lest we freeze.
- Ser. 183. Seeing some women talking privately together: *Behold, saith he, the Asp borrowes poyson from the Viper.*
- Ser. 210. Being demanded what was the heaviest burthen the earth bears, he answered, *an ignorant man.*
- Ser. 211. An Astrologer in the Forum discoursing to the people, and shewing them in a tablet the erratick Starrs: *No, saith Diogenes, it is not the Starres that erre, but these,* pointing to the people.
- Ser. 216. Being demanded what men are the most noble: *They, saith he, who contemn wealth, glory, and pleasure, and over-master the contraries to these, poverty, ignominy, pain, death.*
- Ser. 230. Seeing the servants of *Anaximenes* carrying many goods, he demanded to whom they belong'd; they answer'd, to *Anaximenes*. *Is he not ashamed,* reply'd *Diogenes*, *to have so much household stuffe, and yet not be master of himselfe.*
- Ser. 233. He said, Vertue dwelleth neither in a rich City, nor a private House.
- Ser. 235. He said, Poverty is a selfe-taught help to Philosophy, for what Philosophy endeavours to perswade by-words, poverty enforceth in practise.
- Ibid. To a wicked man reproaching him for his poverty; *I never knew, saith he, any man punished for poverty, but many for wickednesse.*
- Ibid. He called Poverty a selfe-instructing vertue.
- Ser. 237. To one that reproached him with poverty: *What mean you, saith he; poverty never made a Tyrant, riches many.*
- Ser. 248. *Alexander* seeing him asleep in his Tubb, said, *O Tubb full of wisdom: The Philosopher rising up, answer'd, Grea: King,*

*One drop of Fortune's better far
Then Tubbs repleat with wisdom are.*

To whom a stander by reply'd,

*One drop of Wisdom Fortune's Seas excells;
In unwise soules misfortune ever dwells.*

Seeing an old woman painted, *if this be for the living, you are de-* Ser. 270.
ceived, saith he, if for the dead, make hast to them.

To one bewailing his own misfortune, as that he should not die in Ser. 271.
his own Country, *be of comfort, saith he, the way to the next World*
is alike in every place.

Having a great pain in his shoulder which troubled him much, *ÆLuar. hist.*
one said to him in derision, why dost thou not die *Diogenes*, and 10, 11.
free thy self from this misery, he answer'd, *it is fit they should live*
who know how to order their life, for you who know not what to do or say,
it is a convenient time to die.

He used to say, *Aristotle* dineth when *Philip* pleaseth, but *Dioge-* *Plut. de consul.*
nes when it pleaseth *Diogenes*.

At *Corinth*, seeing *Dionysius* the younger, who was deposed from *Plut. quom.*
the Kingdom of *Sicily*, *This is a life*, saith he, *you deserve not, you* *ser. Resp.*
merit rather not to live here freely and without fear, but at home in per-
petuall imprisonment.

To some who commended *Plato*, he said, *what hath hee done wor-* *Pl. de virt.*
thy commendation, having professed Philosophy so long, yet never moved *Moral.*
any to grief.

To one demanding how he might take the greatest revenge upon *Pl. de aud. & vet.*
his Enemy, he answered, *by being good and vertuous your self.*

In commending his Master *Antisthenes*, he would say of him, of *Macrobi. Sat.*
rich he made me poor, and instead of a fair house, made me live in a 7. 3.
Tubb.

CHAP. VI.

His Writings.

OF the writings ascribed to him are these,
Dialogues.
Ichthyas
The Geay.
The Leopard.

The

DIOGENES.

*The Athenian people.**Policy.**Ethick art.**Of Riches.**Erotick.**Theodorus.**Hypſias.**Ariſtarchus**Of Death.**Epistles.**Tragedies 7.**Helena.**Thyeſtes.**Hercules.**Achilles.**Medea.**Chryſippus.**OEdipus.*

Sofocrates and Satyrus affirm that none of theſe were written by Diogenes; the Tragedies Satyrus aſcribes to Philſchus of Agina. Sotion affirmeth theſe only to have been written by Diogenes.

*Of Vertut.**Of Good.**Erotick.**The poor.**The Tolerant.**The Leopard,**Caffander.**Cephalio.**Philſcus.**Ariſtarchus**Sifiſphus.**Ganymede.**Chria's, &**Epistles.*

DIOGENES.

31

CHAP. VII.

His Death.

HE died, as *Demetrius* saith, at *Corinth* about 90. years old, the same day that *Alexander* died at *Babylon*, which according ^{Laert.} to *Ælian* was the seventh of *Thargelion* in the first year of 114th Olympiad.

The manner of his death is variously related. *Eubulus* saith; he lived to his end with *Xeniades*, and was buried by his Sons. As he lay sick, *Xeniades* asked him how he would be buried, he answer'd, with his face downwards; *Xeniades* demanding the reason, *because*, saith he, *all things will be turned upside-down*, alluding, saith *Laertius*, to the greatnesse of the *Macedonians*, who not long before were a poor inconsiderable people. Some report that being near death, he gave order that his body should be left unburied, that the wild Beasts might partake of him, or be thrown into a ditch, and a little dust be cast over it, or thrown upon a dung-hill, that he might benefit his Brethren.

Ælian saith, that being sick to death, he threw himself down ^{ar. hist. 8. 14.} from a bridge which was near the Gymnasium, and ordered the Keeper of the *Palæstra* to take his body and throw it into the River *Ilissus*.

Others affirm he died of a surfet of raw flesh, others that he stopp'd his own breath, others, that cutting a Cuttle-fish, in pieces to throw it to dogs, it bit asunder a Nerve in his foot, whereof he died.

Others affirm he died as he was going to the Olympick Games: being taken with a Feaver, he lay down by the way, and would not suffer his friends to carry him, but sitting under the shade of the next tree, spoke thus to them; *This night I shall be a Victor or vanquished, if I overcome the Feaver, I will come to the Games, if not, I must go to the other World, and drive it away by death.*

Antisthenes saith, his Friends were of opinion he stopp'd his own breath, for coming as they constantly used to visit him in the *Cranæum* where he lived, they found him covered; they did not imagine it was sleep, by reason of his great wakefulness; but immediately putting back his Cloak perceived he was dead. Hereupon there arose a contention amongst them who should bury him; they fell from words to blows, but the Magistrates and great ones of the City came themselves and buried him, by the gate which leads to *Isthmus*. Over the Sepulchre they placed a Column, and upon it a Dog cut out of *Parian* stone. Afterwards his own Countrymen honoured him with many brazen Statues, bearing this Inscription;

E e e e

Time

MONIMUS, &c.

*Time doth the strongest Brasse decay
Diogenes, thou ne're canst dy,
Who to content the ready way
To following Ages didst destroy.*

Laertius reckons five of this name, the first of Apollonia, a natural Philosopher.

The second a Sicionian.

The third this.

The fourth a Stoick of Seleducia.

The fifth of Tarsis.

MONIMUS.

^a *Laert.*

^a **M**onimus was a Syracusian, Disciple to *Diogenes*, he was first servant to a Money-changer, to whom *Xenades* who bought *Diogenes*, often coming, he was so taken with the worth and Vertue of the person, that he counterfeited himself mad, and threw all the mony from off the Table, whereupon his Master turning him away, he betook himself to *Diogenes*. He followed likewise *Crates* the Cynick, and others of that Sect, which confirm'd his Master in the opinion that he was mad. He was a person eloquent and learned, mention'd by *Menander* in his *Hippocomus*, of so great constancy, that he contemned all glory for vertues sake. He wrote some things, which at first appearance seem'd *Ludicrous*, but contained deep serious sense; as of *Appetites*, two Books, and a *Protreptick*.

ONESICRITUS.

^a *Laert.*

^a **O**nesicritus was of *Aegina*, or according to *Demetrius* an *Astyopalean*; he had two Sons. He sent the younger named *Androsthenes* to *Athens*, who hearing *Diogenes* would not depart thence.

CRATES.

33

thence. Hereupon he sent the elder, named *Philiscus*, who stayed there likewise for the same reason. Lastly, the Father himselfe went, and was so much taken with *Diogenes*, that he became a sedulous Auditor of him, as his two sons were.

He was esteemed amongst the most eminent Disciples of *Diogenes*: *Laertius* compares him with *Xenophon*; one fought under *Cyrus*, the other under *Alexander*: One wrote the institution of *Cyrus*; the other, the praise of *Alexander*: Their styles also were very like.

CRATES.

CRATES was a Theban, Son of *Ascandas*: He was likewise reckoned amongst the most eminent of *Diogenes's* Disciples; yet *Hippoborus* saith, he was not a Disciple of *Diogenes*, but of *Bryso* the Achaean. Lam.

He flourished about the 113th Olympiad. *Antisthenes*, in his successions, saith, that being at a Tragedy where *Telephus* was represented, carrying a Basket in a fordid condition, he betook himselfe to the Cynicall Philosophy, and selling all his estate, (for he was very rich, having gotten together above two hundred talents) he distributed it amongst the Citizens, and was so constant a Professor of this Philosophy, that *Philemon*, the Cornick Poet, takes notice thereof in these words,

*By him in Summer a thick Coat was worn,
In Winter-time (so temperate) a torn.*

Diocles saith, *Diogenes* perswaded him to part with his estate, and to throw all the mony he had left into the Sea: and that the house of *Crates* was from *Alexander*, that of *Hipparchia* his Wife, from *Philip*. Some of his neer friends that came to him to dissuade him from this course of life, he beat away, for he was of a resolute spirit.

Demetrius the Magnesian saith, he deposited some mony in the hands of a Banquier, with this condition, that if his sonnes betook themselves to any Civill employment, it should be repaid again; but, if to Philosophy, it should be distributed amongst the people, for as much as a Philosopher stands in need of nothing.

CRATES.

Eratosthenes relates, that having a son named *Pasicles*, by his Wife *Hipparchia*, as soon as he arrived at mans estate, he brought him to the house of a young maid that was his slave, saying, This is a hereditary matrimony to you: but those who commit adultery, are, according to the Tragedians punished with banishment or death; Those who keep Concubines were, according to the Comedians, by luxury and drunkenness, transported to madness.

Pasicles, the Disciple to *Euclid*, was his brother.

He said, 'tis not possible to finde a man without a fault, for, in every Pomgranat there is at least one grain corrupt.

Having displeased *Nicodromus* a Lutinist, he beat him black and blew; whereupon he pasted a piece of paper on his forehead, wherein was written, *Nicodromus did this*.

He was exceedingly invective against common women.

He reproved *Demetrius Phalerus* for sending bread and wine to him, saying, *I wish the fountains also produc'd bread*; intimating that he lived with water.

The Athenian Magistrates blamed him for wearing a long robe; *I will shew you Theophrastus*, saith he, *in the same attire*; which they not believing, he brought them to a Barbers shop, where he was fitting to be trimm'd.

At *Thebes*, being beaten by the Master of the *Gymnasium*; or, as others, at *Corinth* by *Euthicrates*, he laughed, saying,

*He by the foot him drew,
And o're the threshold threw.*

Zeno in his *Chrias* saith, he sowed a sheep-skin upon his cloak, to appear the more deformed. He was of a very unhandsome look, and whilst he discoursed, laughed.

He used to lift up his hands and say, *Be of good courage, Grecians, both for the eyes and all other parts, for you shall soon see these deriders surpris'd by sickness, and proclaiming you happy, blame their owne slothfulness*.

He said, we ought so long to study Philosophy, untill the leaders of the Army seem to be Horse-drivers.

He said, they who lived with flatterers were forsaken persons, living like sheep amidst wolves, not with those who wish'd them well.

Perceiving he drew nigh to death, he looked upon himselfe, saying,

*— And dost thou go, old friend,
To the next world, thou whom old age doth bend.*

For he was crooked through age.

To

To *Alexander*, asking whether he would that his Country should be restored or not: To what end, saith he, seeing there will come perhaps another *Alexander*, and depopulate it. He said, Contempt of glory and want were his Country; which were not subject to Fortune; and that he was Countryman to *Diogenes*, not tearing any-body.

Coming into the *Forum*, where he beheld some buying, others selling: These, saith he, think themselves happy in employments contrary to one another; but I think myselfe happy, in having nothing to do either way.

To a young man, followed by a great many Parasites: Young man, saith he, I am sorry to see you so much alone.

He said, we ought not to accept gifts from all men, for vertue ought not to be maintained by vice.

Seeing at *Delphi* a golden Image of *Phryne* the Curtezan; he cryed out, This is a Trophy of the Grecian intemperance.

Seeing a young man nicely fed and fat: Unhappy youth, saith he, do not fortifie your prison.

He said, He gained glory, not by his riches, but his poverty. Ser. 237.

To one, demanding what he should get by Philosophy: Thou wilt learn, saith he, to open your purse easily, and to give readily, not as you do now, turning away, delaying and trembling, as if you had the palsy.

He said, Men know not how much a Waller, a measure of Lupines, and security of minde is worth.

The Epistles of *Crates* are extant, wherein, saith *Laertius*, he writes excellent Philosophy, in style resembling *Plato*. He wrote Tragedies likewise, full of deep Philosophy.

He died old, and was buried in *Bæotia*.

METROCLEs.

METROCLEs was Disciple of *Crates*, Brother to *Hipparchia*. He first heard *Theophrastus* the Peripatetick, &c. afterwards apply'd himselfe to *Crates*, and became an eminent Philosopher. *Laert.*

He burnt, as *Hecaton* saith, his writings, saying,

These are the dreams of wilde phantastick youth.

He burnt likewise the dictates of his Master *Theophrastus*.

Vulcan come hither, Venus needs thy aid.

He

HIPPARCHIA.

He said, *Of things, some are purchased by money, as Houses; some by time and diligence, as Learning: Riches is hurtfull, if not rightly apply'd.*

He died old: he strangled himselfe.

Of his Disciples are remembered *Theombrotus* and *Cleomenes*. *Demetrius* of *Alexandria* was Auditor of *Theombrotus*: *Timarchus* of *Alexandria*, and *Echicles* of *Ephesus* were Disciples of *Cleomenes*. *Echicles* heard also *Theombrotus*, from whom came *Menedemus*, of whom hereafter. Amongst these was also *Menippus*, of *Sinopis*.

HIPPARCHIA.

Hipparchia was likewise taken with the Discourses of those *Cynicks*, she was Sister to *Metrocles*; they were both *Maronites*. She fell in love with *Crates*, as well for his discourse as manner of life, from which none of her Suitors by their Wealth, Nobility or Beauty, could divert her, but that she would bestow her self upon *Crates*, threatening her Parents, if they would not suffer her to marry him, she would kill her self. Hereupon her Parents went to *Crates*, desiring him to dissuade her from this resolution which he endeavoured, but not prevailing went away, and brought all the little furniture of his house and threw'd her, this saith he, *is your husband, that the furniture of your house, consider upon it, for you cannot be mine unlesse you follow the same course of life*. She immediately took him, and went up and down with him, and in publick, ~~every where~~, and went along with him to Feasts.

At a Feast of *Lyssimachus* she met *Theodorus* the *Atheist*, with whom she argued thus; If that, which if *Theodorus* do be not unjustly done, neither is it unjustly done if *Hipparchia* do the same; But *Theodorus* if he strike himself doth not unjustly; therefore *Hipparchia* doth not unjustly if she strike *Theodorus*; *Theodorus* answer'd nothing, onely pluck'd her by the Coat, which she wore not like a woman, but after the manner of the *Cynicks*, whereat *Hipparchia* was nothing moved, whereupon he said,

Her Webbe and Loom

She left at home.

I did saith she, *Theodorus*, and I think have not erred in choosing to bestow that time which I should have spent in weaving on Philosophy.

Much more saith *Laertius* is ascribed to her.

ME.

MENIPPVS.

M*enippus* was a *Cynick*, a *Phœnician* by birth, Servant by condition, as *Achaicus* affirms. *Diocles* saith, his Father was of *Pontus* called *Bato*, *Menippus* for acquisition of riches went to *Thebes* and was made free of that City. He wrote nothing serious, all his books being full of mirth, not unlike the writings of *Meleager*. *Hermippus* saith, he was named *Hemerodanista*, the dayly Usurer, for he put out mony to Merchants upon Interest, and took pawns, at last being cheated of all his goods, he hanged himself.

Some say the Bokes that are ascribed to him were writ by *Dionysius* and *Zopyrus*, *Colophonians*, which being ludicrous, they gave to him as a person disposed that way; they are reckoned, thirtē.

Nenia's.

Testaments.

Epistles, in the persons of the Gods.

Two natural Philosophers, *Mathematicians* & *Grammarians*:

Of Epicure.

Laertius reckons six of this name; the first wrote the *Lydian Story*, and epitomiz'd *Xanthus*.

The *second* this.

The *third* a Sophist, of *Caria*.

The *fourth* a Graver.

The *fifth* and *sixth* Painters, both mention'd by *Apollodorus*.

MENEDEMVS.

M*enedemus* was Disciple of *Colotes*, of *Lampsacum*; hee proceeded as *Hippobolus* relates, to so great extravagance that hee went up and down in the habit of the Furies, declaring he was come from the World below to take notice of such as offended, and that he was to return thither to give an account of them.

He went thus attir'd, a dark Gown to his heels, girt with a purple girdle, upon his head an *Arcadian* hat, on which were woven the twelve signes, tragick buskins, a long beard, in his hand an ashen staffe. Hitherto of the *Cynicks*.

FINIS.

THE
HISTORY
OF
PHILOSOPHY.

The Eighth Part,
Containing the *Stoick* Philosophers.



LONDON,
Printed for *Humphrey Moseley*, and *Tbo: Dring*.
An. Dom. 1656.

HISTORY

OF

HISTORICAL

THE

CONSTITUTION

AND

GOVERNMENT



ZENON.

Z E N O.

CHAP. I.

His Country, Parents, and first Studies.



THE Sect of *Stoicks* had its originall from the *Cynicks*, *Zeno* was the Author thereof, who having first been a Scholer of *Crates*, and afterwards a hearer of other Philosophers, at last instituted this new Sect. ^a Hee was born at *Cittium*, a Greek Sea-Town in the Isle of *Cyprus*, ^b with a lock'd Haven, inhabited by *Phoenicians*, ^c whence he somtimes was termed the *Phœnician*. His Father was called *Mnaseas*, by some *Demeas*, a Merchant, whence was objected to *Zeno*, the obscurity of his Birth and Country, as being ^d a stranger, and of mean Parentage, whereof he was so far from being ashamed, that ^e he refused to be made a Citizen of *Athens*, as conceiving it an undervaluing of his own Country; in so much as ^f when he contributed to a Bath in *Athens*, and his name was inscribed upon a Pillar with the Title of *Philosopher*, he desired they would adde a *Cittiean*.

^a Laert.

^b Strab. lib.

^c Suid.

^d Cic. de fin.

^e Plut. de rep.

^f Stoic.

^f Laert.

^g *Zeno* (as *Hecaton* and *Apollonius Tyrius* relate,) enquiring of the Oracle what course he should take to lead the best kind of life, was answer'd, that he should converse with the dead, whereupon he addicted himself to the reading of antient Authors.

^g Laert.

^h Herein he was not a little furthered by his Father, who, as *Demetrius* saith, trading frequently to *Athens*, brought him as yet but very young, many *Socraticall* Books, which excited in him a great affection to learning.

^h Laert.

ⁱ Being now 17. (or as *Perseus* 22) years old, hee took a voyage to *Athens*, carried thither as well by his particular inclination to Philosophy, as by his businesse, which was to sell some Purple that he had brought out of *Phœnicia*. He took along with him a hundred Talents; and having sold his Merchandise, applied himself to Philosophy, yet continued to lend his money out to Merchants upon interest, so to improve his stock.

ⁱ Laert.

Some affirm his Ship was cast away in the *Piræum*, which news being brought him to *Athens*, he seemed nothing at all moved,

^k *Plat. de util. cap. ex inimic.* but only said, *Thou dost well Fortune;* ^k *to drive me into a Gown, or, as Seneca, Fortune commands me to study Philosophy more earnestly.*

¹ *Laert.*

¹ Others say, that being troubled at the losse of his Ship, hee went up to the City of *Athens*, and sitting in a Booksellers shop, read a piece of *Xenophon's* Commentaries, wherewith being much pleas'd, he asked the Bookseller where such men lived, *Crates* by chance passing by, the Bookseller pointed to him, saying, *follow that man;* which he did, and from that time forward, became a Disciple of *Crates*.

CHAP. II.

Of his Masters.

^a *Laert.*

Zeno thus changing the course of his life, applyed himselfe to *Crates*,^a being apt to Philosophy, but more modest then suited with the Cynicall Sect. Which *Crates* to remedy, gave him a pot full of pottage to carry through the Ceramick, and perceiving him to hide it, as ashamed, with his Coat, he struck the pot with his stick and broke it. *Zeno* running away, all wet, what, said he, *are you running away little Phœnician, no body hurt you?* Hee made a litle hollow cover of a pot, in which he carried the money of his Master *Crates*, that it might be in readinesse when hee went to buy meat. Thus hee lived a while with *Crates*, during which time he writ his *Book of the Common-wealth*, whence some jeasting, said, it was written under the Dog's tail.

^b *Laert.*

At last deserting, *Crates* he apply'd himself to ^b *Stilpo* the Megarick Philosopher. *Apollonius Tyrinus* saith, that taking hold of his Cloak to pluck him away from *Stilpo*, he said, *O Crates, the handles by which the Philosophers are to be taken hold of, are their ears; Lead me by those your way, or else though you constrain my body to be with you, my mind will be with Stilpo.* With *Stilpo* he remained ten years.

From *Stilpo* he went to *Xenocrates*, being so well satisfied with the instruction of these two Masters, that he said, *he made a very good voyage when he was shipwrack'd;* though others apply it to his living with *Crates*.

^c *Laert.*

^d *Laert.*

^c He afterwards apply'd himself to *Diodorus Cronus*, as *Hippobotus* avers, under whom he studied Dialectick, to which Science he was so much addicted, that ^d when a certain Philosopher of that Sect had informed him of seven species of Dialectick, in that fallacy which is called *the Mower*, he asked him what he was to give him for his reward, the Philosopher demanded a hundred pieces of Silver, *Zeno* (so much was he affected to Learning) gave him two hundred.

^e *Laert.*

^f *Swid.*

^e Lastly, notwithstanding, that he had made a great progresse in

in Philosophy, he heard Polemon, whose Doctrine was against Pride; whereupon Polemon told him, Zeno, I am not ignorant, that you lie in ambush, and come slyly into my Garden (as the Phoenicians use) to steal away Learning.

CHAP. III.

His School and institution of a Sect.

HAVING been long a hearer of others, he at last thought fit to communicate the Learning which he had received and improved. To this end he made choice of the *peripatetic*, the painted walk, so named from the pictures of Polygnotus, otherwise called *Pisianadia*. Here he constantly walked and discoursed, resolving to settle there, and make the place as full of tranquillity as it had been before of trouble: For, in the time of the thirty Tyrants, near 1400 Citizens were there put to death.

Hither resorted a great many Disciples to him, who were at first called Zenonians, as Epicure affirmeth, from their Master; afterwards from the place where he taught, Stoicks, as Eratosthenes in his eight Book of antient Comedys adding, that not long before, some Poets that lived there were called Stoicks also, upon which occasion the name was very well known.

He was subtle in disquisition and dispute.

He disputed earnestly with Philo the Dialectick, and exercised himselfe together with him: so that Zeno the younger admired him no lesse, then his Master Diodorus.

He first seemeth (saith Laertius) to have set a bound to the loosenesse and extravagance of propositions: But, of this more, when we come to speak of his Philosophy, which by reason of its largenesse, we remit to the end of his life.

CHAP. IV.

What honours were conferr'd upon him.

ZENO by the Philosophy which he taught, and the practise of his life conformable to that doctrine, gained so high an estimation amongst the Athenians, that they deposited the keyes of the City in his hands, as the only person fit to be entrusted with their liberties. His name was likewise much honoured by his own Country-men, as well those at Cyprus, as those who lived at Sidon.

Amongst those who honoured and favoured Zeno, was Antigonus Gonotus King of Macedonia, a Prince no lesse eminent for his
Vertue

Vertue then his Greatnesse, much esteemed him, and, as often as he went to *Athens*, heard him. He sent many times to invite him to come to him, amongst the rest, one Letter to this effect, alledged by *Apollonius Tyrius*.

King Antigonus to Zeno the Philosopher, health.

I Think that I exceed you in Fortune and Glory; but, in Learning and Discipline, and that perfect felicity which you have attained, I am exceeded by you: Wherefore I thought it expedient to write to you, that you will come to me, assuring my selfe you will not deny it. Use all means therefore to come to us, and know, you are not to instruct me only, but all the *Macedonians*. For, he who teacheth the King of *Macedonia*, and guideth him to Vertue, it is evident, that he doth likewise instruct all his Subjects in Vertue. For such as is the Prince, such for the most part are those who live under his Government.

Zeno answered thus:

To King Antigonus Zeno, health.

I Much esteem your earnest desire of Learning, in that you aime at Philosophy, not popular, which perverteth manners, but that true discipline which conferreth profit, avoiding that generally commended pleasure which effeminates the soules of some young men. It is manifest, that you are enclined to Generosity, not only by nature, but by choice. A generous nature, with indifferent exercise, assisted by a Master, may easily attain to perfect Vertue. But, I am very infirm of body by reason of my age, for I am fourescore years old, and therefore not able to come to you. Yet, I will send you some of my con-Disciples, who, in those things that concern the Soul, are nothing inferiour to me; in those of the Body are much superiour to me, of whom, if you make use, you will want nothing conducing to perfect Beatitude.

Thus *Zeno* absolutely refused to go to *Antigonus*, but sent him his Disciple *Persæus* son of *Demetrius*, a Cittican (who flourish'd in the 130th Olympiad, *Zeno* being then very old) and *Philonides* a Theban, both mentioned by *Epicurus* in his Epistle to *Aristobulus*, as having been with *Antigonus*.

CHAP. V.

His Apophthegmes.

Of his Apophthegmes are remembered these: Of a man very finely drest, stepping lightly over a Kennell He doth not care
for

for the dirt, saith he, because he cannot see his face in it.

A certain Cynick came to him to borrow Oyle, saying, he had none left: Zeno deny'd him, and as he was going away; Now, saith he, consider, which of us two are the more impudent.

Laert.

Cremorides, whom he much affected, and Cleanthes sitting down beside him, he arose; whereat Cleanthes wondring, I have heard good Physicians say, saith he, that the best remedy for tumours is rest.

Laert.

Two sitting by him at a Feast, he that was next him hit the other with his foot: Zeno hit him that was next him with his knee, and turning him to him, What then think you, saith he, that you have done to him that sits below you.

To one that loved the company of boyes, Neither have those Masters, saith he, any wit, who converse alwaies with the boyes, nor the boyes themselves.

He said that elegant speeches were like Alexandrian silver, fair to the eye, and figur'd like mony, but not a whit of the more value. Speeches which are otherwise, he likened to Attick Tetradrachmes, which had a rough stamp, but, were of greater value.

Aristo his Disciple discoursing many things foolishly, some petulantly, others confidently, It cannot be, saith he, but your Father was drunk when you were begot: whereupon himselfe being very concise of speech, he called him the Talker.

To a great eater, who left nothing for those that eat with him, he caused a great fish to be set before him, and immediately to be taken away; the other looking upon him, What, said he, do you think your companions suffer every day, seeing that you cannot suffer my greedinesse once?

Laert. Athen. deipn.

A young man, who question'd something more curiously then suited with his age, he brought to a Glasse, and bad him look in it, and then asked him, whether he thought that question agreed with that face.

Laert.

To one that said, he disliked many things of Antisthenes writing, he brought his Chria of Sophocles, and asked him, if there were any thing therein excellent: The other answered, he knew not: Are you not ashamed then (replied Zeno) if Antisthenes have said any thing ill, you select and remember that: but if any thing excellent, you are so far from remembring, as not to minde it?

To one that said, the speeches of Philosophers were short: You say very true, saith he, so should their very syllables be, as much as is possible.

One saying of Polemon, that he propos'd some things, and said others: He frowning, said, What rate do you set upon things that are given?

He said, that a Disputant should have the voice and lungs of a Comedian, but not the loudnesse.

To

To those that speak well, he said, we should allow a place to hear, as to skilfull Artificers to see; on the other side, the hearer must so attend to what is spoken, that he take no time to censure.

To a young man that spoke much; your ears, saith he, are fallen into your tongue.

To a handsome youth who said, that he thought that in his opinion, a wise man ought not to love: Nothing, saith he, will be more unhappy to you than that are handsome.

He said, that most Philosophers are in many things fooles, in trivial and vulgar things ignorant.

He pronounced that of Capacia, who when one of his Disciples began to grow high, beating him, he said, Right is not placed in great, but great in right.

To a young man discoursing with much confidence; Young man, saith he, I should be loath to tell you my thoughts.

A youth of Rhodes handsome and rich, but refractory to him, not enduring, he bad him first sit in a dirty seat, that he might dirt his Gown, next placed him amongst the beggars, that he might converse with them and their raggs, untill at last the young man went away.

He said, that nothing is more unseemly then pride, especially in young men.

He said, that we must not only commit to memory speeches and words, as those who make ready some dish of meat, but apply it, and make use of it in our minds.

He said, that young men must use all modesty in their walking, in their behaviour, and in their garments; often repeating those verses of Euripides concerning Capaneus,

*He was not puffed up with his store,
Nor thought himself above the poor.*

He said, nothing was more alienate from the comprehension of Sciences then Poetry: and, that we need nothing more then Time.

Being asked who is a friend, he answered, My other selfe.

Having taken his servant in a theft, he beat him; the fellow said, it was his destiny to steal, and to be beaten, said he.

He said, that Beauty is the sweetnesse of the voice; or, according to some, he called it, the flower of Beauty.

Seeing the servant of one of his companions black and blew with stripes; I see, saith he, the fruits of your anger.

To one that smelt sweet of oyntments; who is it, saith he, that smells so effeminately.

To Dionysius surnamed *perdiduvos* the retraflor, who asked him, why he corrected all but himselfe; because, saith he, I do not believe you.

To a young man who spoke too freely, for this reason, saith he,
we

we have two ears and but one tongue, that we should hear much and speak little.

He was invited to a Feast with other Philosophers by the Ambassadors of *Antigonus* (according to *Laertius* of *Ptolemy*) and whilst of the rest every one amidst their cups made ostentation of their Learning, he alone sat silent, whereupon the Ambassadors asking him what they should say of him to *Antigonus* ; *That which you see, saith he, for of all things, it is hardest to contain speech.* *Laert. Stob. serm. 126.*

Being demanded how he behaved himself when reviled, hee said, *as an Ambassador dismiss'd without answer.*

He changed the Verses of *Hesiod*, thus ;

*Who good advice obeyes, of men is best,
Next, he who ponders all in his own brest.*

For that man (saith he) is better who can obey good advice, and make good use thereof, then he who finds out all things of himself; for the latter hath only understanding, but the other practise also.

Being demanded how it came to passe that being very austere, he notwithstanding was very cheertull, and merry at a Feast, he answer'd, *Lupines, though in themselves bitter, being steep'd, grow sweet.* *Laert. Athen. Deipn.*

He said it was better to slip with the foot then with the tongue.

He said, *that to do well is no small matter, to begin well depended on a small moment.*

This some ascribe to *Socrates*.

One of the young men in the Academy speaking of foolish studies, *If you do not dip your tongue in your mind, saith Zeno, you will speak many other foolish things.* *Stob. ser. 33.*

He accused many, saying, *when they might take pleasure in labour, they would rather go to the Cooks shop for it.* *Stob. ser. 38.*

He said, *that we should no affect delicacy of diet, not even in sickness.* *Stob. ser. 39. citing Mulo- nius.*

Being demanded by one of his friends, what course hee should take to do no wrong, *Imagine, reply'd he, that I am alwaies with you.* *Stob. ser. 51.*

Being demanded whether a man that doth wrong, may conceal it from God, *no*, saith he, *nor he who thinketh it.* *Stob. ser. 52.*

To some that excused their prodigality, saying, that they had plenty, out of which they did it; *will you excuse a Cook, saith he, that should oversalt his meat because he hath store of salt.* *Stob. ser. 7. 74.*

He said that of his Disciples, some were φιλόσοφοι, lovers of Knowledge, others, λόγοφιλοι, lovers of speaking. *Stob. ser. 133.*

He compared the Arts of *Dialectick* to just measures filled, not with wheat or any thing of value, but with chaffe and straw. *Stob. ser. 212.*

He said, we ought not to enquire, whether men belonged to great Cities, but whether they deserved a great City. *Stob. ser. 217.*

Seeing a friend of his too much taken up with the businesse of his Land, *unlesse you lose your Land, saith hee, it will lose you.* *Stob. ser. 222.*

Bbbbb

He

Stob. ser. 297. He said, a man must live not only to eat and drink, but to use this life for the obtaining of a happy life.

Alien. var. hist. 9. 26. Antigonus being full of wine, went to visit him, and kissing and embracing him as a drunken man, bad him demand, whatsoever he would, swearing that he would give it him; Zeno answered, *μὴ δὲ τίς, ἴσμεν*, at once reproving his vice, and taking care of his health.

Cic. Acad. quest. 4.

Stretching out the fingers of his right hand, he said, *such is phantastie*, then contracting them a little, *such is assent*; then closing them quite, and shutting his fist, *such is comprehension*; then putting to it his left hand and shutting it close and hard, *such* (saith he) *is science*, of which none is capable but a wise man.

CHAP. VI.

His Death.

a Laert.

b De longev. the numerall letter in Suidas is corrupt.

c Laert.

d Laert.

Zeno having continued according to ^a Apollonius Master of his School fifty eight years, and attained to the ninety eighth of his age, by the computation of *Laertius* and ^b *Lucian*. (for that he lived but seventy two years, as some affirm upon the testimony of ^c *Perseus*, seems to be a mistake, seeing that his Letter to *Antigonus* was written in his 80th year)^d in all which time he was never molested by any sickness, died upon this occasion. Going out of the School, he fell and broke his finger, whereupon striking the Ground with his hand, he said, as *Niole* in the Tragedy, *I come, why do you call me?* or as others, *why do you drive me?* and going out, ^e some say, he immediately strangled himself; ^f others, that by little and little he famish'd himself.

e Laert.

f Suid.

g Laert.

^g When the news of his death came to *Antigonus*; he broke forth into these words, *what a spectacle have I lost!* and being demanded why he so much admired him, because, said he; *though I bestowed many great things upon him, he was never therewith exalted nor dejected.* He sent immediately *Thraso* on Embassie to the Athenians, requesting, that they would build him a Tomb in the Ceramicke, which the Athenians performed, honouring him with this Decree.

A DECREE.

ARrhenides being Archon, the Tribe of Acamantis having the first place in the Phrytanæum, the tenth day of Maimacterion, the three and twentieth of the sitting of the Phrytanæum, the Congregation of Presidents decreed

decreed thus, Hippo Son of Cratistoteles a Xympeteian, and the rest of the Presidents, Thrafo Son of Thrafo, an Anacean; declared;

Whereas Zeno Son of Mnaseas a Cittiean, hath professed Philosophy many years in this City, and in all other things performed the office of a good man, encouraging those young men, who applied themselves to him, to Vertue and Temperance, leading himself a life suitable to the Doctrine which he professed, a Pattern to the best to imitate; The People have thought fit (good Fortune go along with it) to do honour to Zeno Son of Mnaseas the Cittiean, and to crown him with a Crown of Gold according to the Law, in reward of his Vertue and Temperance, and to build a Tomb for him publickly in the Ceramick. For the making of which Crown, and building of the Tomb, the People shall make choice of five men of the Athenians to take charge thereof. This Decree the Scribe of the People shall write upon two Pillars, one whereof shall be placed in the Academy, the other in the Lyceum. The charge of the Pillars, he who is Overseer of the Publick works shall undertake to defray, by way of rate, that all may know, the Athenian People honour good men both alive and dead. To take care of the building are appointed, Thrafo an Anacean, Philocles, a Pyrean, Phædrus, an Anaphistian, Medon, an Acarnean, Miccythus a Sympalletean.

The Athenians caused likewise his Statue in Brasse to be set up, as did also the Cittieans his Countrymen. Antipater the Sidonian bestow'd this Epitaph upon him.

*Here Zeno lies, who tall Olympus scal'd,
Not heaping Pelion on Ossa's head,
Nor by Herculean labours so prevail'd,
But found out Vertue's path which thither led.*

Another Epigram was written upon him by Xenodotus the Stoick, disciple of Diogenes.

*Zeno thy years to hoary age were spent,
Not with vain riches, but with self-content:*

Bbbbb z

A

*A stout and constant Set deriv'd from thee
The Mother of nought-dreading liberty:
Phoenicia, whence thou issuedst who can slight?
Thence Cadmus too, who first taught Greece to write.*

CHAP. VII.

His Person and Vertues.

^a Laert. ^b AS concerning his Person, ^a *Timotheus* saith, he was wry-neck'd: *Apollonius Tyrius*, that he was lean, tall, and of a swarthy complexion, whence stil'd by some (as *Chrysippus*) the *Egyptian sprigge*. ^b His look was sad, grave, severe and frowning; his constitution not strong, for which reason *Perseus* saith, he forbore to feast much. His ordinary diet consisted in raw food, especially Figs, both new and dried, bread and hony which he eate moderately, and a little sweet Wine.

Laert. His continence was such, that when *Perseus*, who cohabited with him, brought a she-Minstrell to him, he immediately sent her back.

Laert. Notwithstanding his severity, he was very complaisant, and often feasted with King *Antigonus*, and meeting him sometimes drunk, went along with him to *Aristocles* the Musician, to nightly banquets and plaies.

Laert. Popular ostentation he avoided by sitting in the lowest place, whereby he freed himselfe from the troublesome importunity of the other part.

Laert. He never walked with more than two or three at once: *Cleambes* saith, he many times gave mony to people that they would not trouble him, & throng about him. Being on a certain time encompassed by a great croud, he shewed them a wooden ball on the top of the cloyster, which formerly belonged to an Altar: This, saith he, was once placed in the middle; but, because it is troublesome, it is now laid aside: I desire you would in like manner withdraw your selves, that you may be lesse troublesome.

^c Laert. He was so free from being corrupted by gifts, that ^{*} *Democharis* son of *Laches*, desiring him to let him know what businesse he would have to *Antigonus*, promising to write about it, and assuring him, that *Antigonus* would furnish him with whatsoever he desired; he turned away from him, and would never after converse with him.

Laert. He was so humble, that he conversed with mean and ragged persons, whence *Timon*;

And

ZENO.

11

*And for companions gets of servants store,
Of all men the most empty and most poor.*

He was most patient and frugall in his household expences, something enclining to the fordidnesse of the Barbarians. *Laertius* mentions one servant that he had, *Seneca* averss he had none.

Whensoever he reprehended any, it was covertly and afar off, as may appear by many of his Apophthegms. *Laert.*

His habit was very mean, whence it was said of him,

Laert.

*Him nor the Winters rigid frost or rain,
The scorching Sun or sharp disease can pain:
Not like the common sort of people he;
But, day and night bent on Philosophy.*

The Comick Poets unwittingly, intending to discommend him, praise him, as *Philemon*, in his Comedy of Philosophers,

*He water drinks, then Broth and Herbs doth eat,
To live, his Schollers teaching, without meat.*

This some ascribe to *Possidippus*.

His vertues were so eminent, that they grew at last into a Proverb, *More continent then Zeno the Philosopher*, whence *Possidippus*;

— *He ere ten daies were spent,
Zeno in Continence out-went.*

Indeed he excelled all men in this kind of Vertue, and in Gravity, and, by *Jove* (addeth *Laertius*) in Felicity likewise.

CHAP. VIII.

His Writings.

HE wrote many Bookes, wherein (saith *Laertius*) he so discoursed, as no Stoick after him: their Titles are these:

Of Common-wealth, written whilst he was an auditor of *Crates*, *Laert.*
and (as **Plutarch* saith) much applauded, the scope whereof was this, *That we should not live in severall Cities and Townes by distinct* ** De vit. Alex*
Laxes; but, that we should own all men as our Country-men and fellow- *Orat. 1,*
Citizens: that there should be one manner of life and one order, as of one
flock which grazeth by equall right in one pasture.

Of Appetites or, Of human Nature.

Of Passions.

Of Office.

Of Law.

Of

Of the Discipline of the Grecians.

Of sight.

Of the Universe.

Of signes.

Pythagoricks.

Universalls.

Of words.

Homericall Problems 5.

Of hearing Poetry.

The Art.

Solutions.

Confutations.

Memorialls.

The Moralls of Crates.

* Laert.

* Some, amongst whom is *Cassius* a Sceptian, reprehended many things in the writings of *Zeno*: First, that in the beginning of his Common-wealth, he affirmeth the liberall Sciences to be of no use.

Again, that all wicked men are enemies among themselves, and slaves and strangers, as well Fathers to their Children, as Brethren to Brethren. Again, that only good men are Citizens, and Friends, and Kindred, and Children, as he affirmeth in his Book of the Common-wealth. So that according to the Stoicks, Parents should be enemies to their Children, because they are not wise.

That in his Common-wealth he would have women to be in common.

That no Temples, Courts of Judicature, nor publick Schooles, should be built in a Common-wealth.

That Money is not necessary, neither for exchange nor traffick.

That Women should go in the same habit as men.

CHAP. IX.

His Disciples.

ZENO (saith *Laertius*) had many Disciples; the most eminent these:

Laert.

PERSEÆUS Son of *Demetrius*, a Cittican; some affirm hee was *Zeno's* Scholer, others that he was one of the servants which were sent by *Antigonus* to *Zeno* to transcribe his writings; *whence *Bion* seeing this inscription on his Statue, *PERSEÆUS OF ZENO A CITTICAN* said, the Græver mistook, for instead of *citizēus*, he should have put *traxus*, a servant.

* Athen.

Afterwards he returned to *Antigonus* King of *Macedonia*; *Antigonus* to make a tryall of him caused a false report to be brought him, that his lands were spoiled by the Enemy; whereat appearing

pearing troubl'd, Do you not see, saith *Antigonus*, that riches are not to be reckon'd amongst indifferent things?

Antigonus so much favour'd him, that he preferr'd him to the government of *Acrocorinthus*; on which Fort depended not only *Corinth*, but all *Peloponnesus*; in this charge he was unfortunate; for the Castle was taken by the cunning of *Aratus* a *Sicyonian* (* *Athenæus* saith, whilst *Perseus* was feasting) who turned out * *Deipn.* *Perseus*, whereupon afterwards to one that maintained onely a wise man is a Governour: and I saith he, was once of the same mind, being so taught by *Zeno*, but now am of another opinion; the *Sicyonian* young man (meaning *Aratus*) hath taught me otherwise; Thus *Plutarch*; But *Pausanias* saith, that *Aratus* upon taking of the Fort, amongst others put *Perseus* the Governour to death.

He said, that those were esteemed Gods who had invented some things *Cic.* very usefull to humane life.

He wrote these Books; Of a Kingdom; The *Lacedamonian* Commonwealth; of marriages; of impiety; *Thyestes*; Of Love, *Protrepticks*, *Exercitiations*; *Chryas*, 4. *Commentaries*; against *Plato's Laws* 7. * *Symposiack Dialogues*.

* *Athen. Deipn.*

Laert.

ARISTO Son of *Miliades*, a *Chian*, surnamed the *Siren*; when *Zeno* fell into a long sickness, he left him, and went (as *Dicæus* saith) to *Polemo*: He was also a follower of *Perseus*, whom he flatter'd much, because of his favour with *Antigonus*; for hee was much given to pleasure even unto his end; Thus revolting from his Master *Zeno*, he asserted,

That the end consists in those mean things which are betwixt virtue and vice, that is, in indifference; not to be moved on either side, nor to imagine the least difference to be in these things, but that they are all alike; For a wise man is like a good Player, who whether he personate *Agamemnon* or *Thersides*, will act either part very well: Thus he took away the dignity which *Zeno* held to be in these mean things betwixt virtue and vices holding that there is no difference in them. *Cic. Acad. quest. 4.* *Cic. de finib. 4.*

He took away *Physick* and *Logick*, affirming that one is above us, the other appertaines nothing to us; *Ethick* onely appertaines to us; he compared *Dialectick* reason to cobwebs, which though they seem artificiall, yet are of no use.

He introduced not on any virtues as *Zeno*, nor one called by severall names as the *Megarick* Philosophers; but affirmed they have a quodammodotative relation to one another.

Professing these tenets, and disputing in *Cynosarges*, he came to be called Author of a Sect; whence *Miliades* and *Diphilus* were called *Aristonians*.

He was very perswasive, and wrought much upon the common people, whence *Timon in Sillis*,

One of *Aristo's* smooth perswasive race.

He defended eagerly this Paradox of the *Stoicks*, that a wise man

man doth not opinionate, but know, which *Perseus* opposing, caused of two like twins, first, one to give a depositum to him, then the other to come and redemand it, and by his doubting, if it were the same person, convinced him.

* Laert. vit.
Arcef.

He inveigh'd against *Arcefilaus*, [* calling him a corrupter of youth.] On a time, seeing a Monster like a Bull, but of both sexes, he said, *Alas! here is an argument for Arcefilaus against energy.* To an Academick who said, he comprehended nothing, *Do you not see (saith he) him who sitteth next you? which he denying, who struck you blinde, saith he, or took your light away?*

He wrote these Treatises, *Protrepticks* 2. of *Zeno's Doctrine*: *Scholastick Dialogues* 6. of *Wisdoms dissertations* 7. *Erotick dissertations*: *Commentaries upon vain-glory*: *Commentaries* 15. *Memorials* 3. *Chrias* 11. against *Oratours*: against *Alexinus* his oppositions: to the *Dialecticks* 3. to *Cleanthes Epistles* 4. But *Panætius* and *Socrates* affirm the *Epistles* only to be his, the rest to be *Aristo's* the *Periparetick*.

The Sun striking hot upon his head (which was bald) occasion'd his death. There was another of the same name, a *Juliite*, a *Periparetick*; another an *Athenian*, a *Musician*; a fourth a *Tragick Poet*; a fifth an *Alxan*, who writ the *Rhetoricall art*; a sixth of *Alexandria*, a *Periparetick*.

Laert.

ERILLUS (or as *Cicero*, *Herillus*) was a *Carthaginian*: when he was a boy, he was loved and courted by many, which *Zeno*, by causing him to be shaved, diverted.

He held, that the end is science, which is to live so, as to refer all things to Science, joyned with life: That Science is a habit susceptible of phantasies, falling under reason.

Yet, sometimes he said, there is no end; but, that the end it selfe is changed by the things, and those which are joyned to the things, as *Brasse*, of which the Statues of *Alexander* or *Socrates* is made.

That πᾶς the end, and ὑποβίαι differ; one is objected to unwise persons as well as wise, the other to wise only.

Those things which are betwixt vertue and vice are indifferents.

His Bookes are written in a short stile, consisting of few words, but very efficacious, wherein is contain'd what he held contrary to *Zeno*.

His writings these, of *Exercitation*, of *Passion*, of *Suspition*, the *Law-giver*, *Majeutick*, *Antiphéron*, the *Master*, the *Preparative*, the *Directive*, *Hermes*, *Medea*, *Dialogues*, *Librall Thefes*.

His Disciples were called *Herilians*, named by *Cicero* as a particular Sect amongst the *Socraticks*.

Laert.

DIONYSIUS, son of *Theophauntus*, an *Heracleot*, from the change of his opinion firnamed δῆμιος, the *retractor*. He was from

from the beginning studiously addicted to learning, and writ Poems of all kinds; then betook himselfe to *Aratus*, being much pleased with him. Of Philosophers he first heard, as *Diocles* affirms, *Heraclides* his country-man; then *Alexinus*, and *Menedemus*; after these *Zeno*.

Revolting from *Zeno*, he addicted himselfe to the Cyrenæans; he went to common houses, and addicted himselfe to other pleasures.

He asserted the end to be pleasure, and that by reason of his own purblindnesse; for being much grieved thereat, he durst not affirm griefe to be one of the indifferents.

He died eighty years old, starved.

His writings are thus intituled, *Of apathy* 2. *of riches and favour and punishment, of the use of men, of good fortune, of the Kings of the antients, of things that are praised, of the customes of the Barbarians.*

SPHÆRUS was of *Bosphorus*, he first heard *Zeno*, then *Cleanthes*, and having made a sufficient progresse in learning, went to *Alexandria* to *Ptolomy Philopater*, where there arising a dispute, whether a wise man doth opinionate, and *Sphærus* maintaining that he doth not, the King commanded some Quinces, *Athenæus* saith Birds, of wax to be set before him, wherewith *Sphærus* being cosen'd, the King cried out, that he assented to a false phantasy: *Sphærus* presently answered, that he assented not that they were quinces, but that it was probable they were quinces: but comprehensive phantasie differs from probable; *for that is never false, but is probable * *Athen.* matters sometimes a thing falleth out otherwise than we imagined. * *Mnesistratus* accusing him, that he denyed *Ptolomy* to be King, * *Laert.* he answered, that he thought *Ptolomy*, or such a one was King.

His writings are these: *Of the world, of the seed of Elements, of fortune, of leasys, against atomes and apparitions, of the organs of sense, upon Heraclitus five dissertations; of morall description, of office, of appetite, of passions* 2. *dissertations of a Kingdome; of the Lacedæmonian Common-wealth, of Lycurgus and Socrates* 3. *of Law, of Divination, Erotick Dialogues, of the Eretrick Philosophers, of things like, of definitions, of habit, of contraries* 3. *of reason, of riches, of glory, of death, of the art of Dialectick* 2. *of catagorems, of ambiguities, Epistles.*

CLEANTHES, whom *Zeno* compared to writing tables, that are so hard, they will not easily admit an impression; but having once received it, keep it long. He succeeded *Zeno*, of him therefore apart.

Philon, a Theban.

Callippus, a Corinthian.

Possidonius, an Alexandrian.

Athenodorus of *Soli*; there were two more of the same name, Stoicks.

Zeno, a Sidonian.

Last in the Catalogue of his Disciples must be remembered
C c c c c an

* *Ethic. Serm.*
198.

an Eretrian youth (mention'd by * *Stobæus*) who heard *Zeno* till he came to be a man; then returning to *Eretria*, his Father asked him what he had learn'd all that time, he answered, he would shortly let him see, and did so; for, not long after his Father in anger did beat him, which he took quietly, saying, *This I have learn'd, to bear with the anger of a Father, and not to oppose it.* x x x

In the life of *Zeno* (for as much as he is author of that Sect) it will be requisite to give account of the Doctrine of the Stoicks in generall; wherein, if the terms seem harshly rendred, it will easily be forgiven by those, who consider, the Stoicks were no lesse particular in their words, then in their doctrines.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE STOICKS.

The First PART.

CHAP. I.

Of PHILOSOPHY in generall, and particularly
of DIALECTICK.

a *Plut. de plac.*
Phil. 1. 1.

WISDOME is the Science of things divine and humane; *Philosophy* is the exercitation of convenient Art: *Convenient* is only and supream vertue. Of *Virtues* in the most generall fence there are three kinds, *Naturall*, *Morall*, *Rationall*; for which cause *Philosophy* likewise hath three parts, *Physick*, *Ethick*, *Logick*: *Physick*, when we enquire concerning the World, and the things in the world: *Ethick* is employ'd about humane life: *Logick* is that part which concerns reason, which is also called *Dialectick*. b Thus *Zeno* the Cittician first divided it in his book of *Speech*, and *Chrysippus* in his first book of *Speech*, and in his first of *Physicks*; and *Apollodorus Ephillus* in his first book of *Introductions into Doctrines*; and *Eudromus* in his *morall Institutions*; and *Diogenes* the Babylonian, and *Possidonius*. These parts *Apollodorus* calleth *Places*; *Chrysippus* and *Eudromus* *Species*, others *generus's*.

b *Laert.*

That *Logick* is a part of *Philosophy* distinct from the rest,
(where-

(wherein all the Stoicks agree) is proved by two arguments, the first this: ^c Every thing which useth another; if that which the thing using, useth, be neither part nor particle, nor part of part of any other, it must be part or particle of the thing using; as medicine useth the art of prescribing diet, which art being neither part nor particle of any other, is consequently a part or particle of Medicine; of part, as to the cure, of particle, as to the practise.

^d Philosophy is conversant about Logick; Logick therefore is either a part or particle of Philosophy; but, a particle it is not, for it is not a part either of the Contemplative or the Active. That which is a particle of any thing, ought to have the same matter and scope, with that whereof it is a part: Logick hath neither of these common with Active Philosophy, the matter whereof is humane things, and moderation of Appetite, the common scope, what in them is to be embraced or shunned: but, the matter of Logick is propositions, the scope, to demonstrate by a compofure of propositions, that which necessarily falls out upon the collection. Neither is Logick a part of the Contemplative, the matter whereof is things divine, the end, contemplation of them: now, if it be not a part, either of the Contemplative or the Active, it is not a particle of Philosophy, but equally separate from both these, and consequently it must be a part of it.

^e The second Argument is thus. No Art frameth its own Instruments, if therefore Philosophy make Logick, it is not its Instrument, but part thereof.

^f Philosophy, is by some compared to a field which produceth all manner of fruit; Physick to the soil and tall trees, Ethick to the mature pleasant fruit, Logick to the strong fence. Others liken it to an Egge; Ethick to the yolk, which some affirm to be the Chicken; Physick to the white, which is the nourishment of the Chicken; Logick to the outside or shell. *Possidonius*, (because the parts of Philosophy are inseparable from one another, but plants are distinct from the fruits, as walls from hedges) chuseth rather to compare Philosophy to a living creature, Physick to blood and flesh, Logick, to bones and nerves, Ethick to the soul. (Thus *Sexius Empiricus*, by whom, perhaps, *Laertius* is to be corrected, who saith, *They likened Ethick to the Flesh, Physick to the Soul*). Lastly, they compare Philosophy to a City, well fortified and govern'd according to Reason.

^g Some affirm, that none of these parts are distinct from the rest, but, all intermingled with one another, for which reason, they deliver them confusedly. The greater part place Logick first, Ethick next, Physick last; because the minde ought first to be fortified for the keeping of those things which are committed to it, so, as it be not easily expugnable. The Dialectick place is

a fortification for the minde. Secondly, to describe the contemplation of manners, that they may be reformed, which is safely undertaken, when the Logickall power is first laid down. Lastly, to induce the contemplation of Nature, for that is more divine, and requireth a more profound attention. This method ^h *Plac. Phil.* *Placitarch* affirms to have been observed by *Chrysippus*, adding that of *Physick*, the last part, is that which treateth of God; for which reason they call the precepts of Religion *ἡθικά*. It seemes therefore, that there is some mistake in *Laertius*, who of those who place Logick first, *Physick* next, and *Ethick* next, and *Ethick* last, citeth *Zeno* in his Book of *Speech*, and *Chrysippus*, and *Archedemus*, and *Endromus*. But *Diogenes* the *Ptolemaean* (continueth he) begins with *Ethick*: *Apollodorus* puts *Ethick* in the second place; *Panetius* and *Possidonius* begin with *Physick*, as *Phantias*, companion of *Possidonius* affirms, in his first of *Possidonius's* dissertations.

ⁱ *Laert.* ¹ Of Logick, *Cleanthes* assigneth six parts, *Dialectick*, *Rhetorick*, *Ethick*, *Politick*, *Physick*, *Theologic*: Some affirm, these are not parts of Logick, but of Philosophy it selfe: so *Zeno* of *Tarsis*. The Logickall part is by some divided into two Sciences, *Rhetorick* and *Dialectick*; some add the definitive part, some divide the definitive part into that which concernes invention of truth (by which the differences of Phantasies are directed) and that which concernes knowledge of truth; for things are comprehended by notions.

^k *Laert.* ² *Rhetorick* is the science of well speaking, by dilating upon the thing comprehended. *Dialectick* is the science of well speaking, (that is true and consentaneous) or well disputing by question and answer. It is defined by *Possidonius*, the science of true, false, and neuter.

^l *Laert.* ³ *Rhetorick* is of three kinds, deliberative, judicall, demonstrative: The parts of *Rhetorick* are *Invention*, *Stile*, *Disposition*, *Pronunciation*: *Rhetoricall Speech* is divided into *Proem*, *Narration*, *Confutation*, *Epilogue*.

^m *Laert.* ⁴ *Dialectick* is necessary, and a virtue within its species, containing other vertues: *ἡμετερολογία*, a Science whereby we are taught when to assent, and when not; *ἰσχυρισμός*, a firm reason, whereby we resist appearances, and are not led away by them: *ἀντιστάσις*, a fortitude of reason, which keeps us from being transported with the adverse opinion: *ἡγεμονία*, a habit directing phantasies to right reason.

ⁿ *Laert.* ⁵ *Dialectick* is a Science or certain comprehension, or a habit, not erring by reason in reception of phantasies; but, without *Dialectick*, a wise man cannot be infallible in reason; for by this, we discern the true, false, and probable, and distinguish the ambiguous.

CHAP. II.

Of the Instruments and rules of Judgment.

^a IN the first place, they put the discourse concerning phantasiaes and sence, as a Judicatory, whereby the truth of things is discerned.

^b The Senses (according to Zeno, who made many alterations in ^c Cic. Acad. 1. Dialectick, and asserted many things of the Sences that were wholly new) are joyned by a certain kinde of extrinsecall impulsion, termed Phantasy. To these phantasies received by the senses, is added an assention of the minde, which is placed in us voluntarily. The phantasie, when seen, is comprehensible, when received and approved, comprehension, and, if so comprehended, as that it cannot be plucked away by reason, Science.

^c Judgment is a perspection which discerneth a thing.

^d That which judgeth is taken two waies: 1. By which we say, somethings are, others are not, these are true, those are false. 2. Of Essence only; and this is understood three waies, commonly, properly, and most properly. *Commonly*, for every measure of comprehension, in which sence, even those things which judge naturally, have this appellation, as sight, hearing, tast. *Properly*, for every artificiall measure of comprehension; thus a cubit, a ballance, a ruler, a pair of compasses, are called things that judges but sight, and hearing, and the other common instruments of sence, are not. *Most properly*, for every measure of comprehension of a thing, uncertain, and not evident. In which sence, those things which belong to the actions of life, are not said to be things judging, but the logicall only, and those which dogmaticall Philosophers alledge for the invention of truth.

The Logicall is subdivided into that *from which*, that *by which*, and the *application* or habitude. From which, the man; by which, the sence: the third is the application of phantasie or sight. For as in the Staticks, there are three things which judge, the weigher, the ballance, and position of the ballance: The weigher is the judge from which, the ballance the judge by which, the position of the ballance, as it were a habitude. And again, as to discern right or oblique things is required, an Artificer, a Ruler, and the application thereof; in like manner in Philosophy are required those three things mentioned to the discernment of true and false: the man from whom the judgment is made, is like the weigher or artificer; to the ballance and ruler answer sence and cogitation, by which the judgment is made; to the habitude of the forenamed instruments, the application of phantasy, by which a man commeth to judge.

^e The Judge of truth, they affirm to be *comprehensive phantasy*, ^c Laert. that

that is, proceeding from that which is: so *Chrysippus* in the 12th of his *Phyſicks*, and *Antipater*, and *Apolodorus*. But *Boethus* holds many judicatories, the *minde*, and *sence*, and *appetite*, and *science*; from whom *Chrysippus* dissenting in his first Book of *Reason*, affirmeth the Judicatories to be *Sense* and *Anticipation*. *Anticipation* is a naturall notion of *Universalls*. Others of the more anti-ent *Stoicks* (as *Posidonius* saith in his Book of *Judgments*) assert *right reason* to be the Judicatory.

CHAP. III.

Of Sense.

^a *St. Aug. Civit. dei. 8. 7.*

Dialectick is derived from corporeall senses; for, from thence, the soul conceiveth *notions* (*εἰρησις*) of those things which are explained by definition, and from thence is propagated and connexed the whole reason of Learning and Teaching.

^b *Laert.*

^b *Sense* is a spirit, proceeding from the supream part of the Soul, and permeating to the Organs.

^c *Origen contra. Cels. lib. 7.*

^c Whatsoever things are comprehended, are manifestly comprehended by sense; all conceptions of the minde depend upon sense.

^d *Cic. Acad. quest. 1.*

^d Comprehension made by the senses is true and faithfull, (according to *Zeno*) for as much as nature hath given it as a rule for science, and principle of her selfe.

^e *Cic. Acad. quest. 4.*

^e Nothing is more clear then this *εὐαγγελία*, evidence; there cannot be any speech more perspicuous.

^f *Sext. Empir. pyrrh. hyp. 2. 8.*

^f Of Sensibles and Intelligibles, some are true, but, not directly sensible; but, by relation to those things which are next, as falling under Intelligence.

CHAP. IV.

Of Phantasy.

^a *Laert.*

In the first place (saith ^a *Diocles* the *Magnesian*) they put the reason concerning Phantasy and Sense, as a judgment, whereby the truth of things is discerned. It is phantasy as to its genus, and likewise in as much as the reason of assent, comprehension, and intelligence (which is more excellent then the rest) consists not without Phantasy; for phantasy goeth first, then the minde endued with elocution, declareth by words what it suffers from the phantasy.

^b *Plut. plac. Phil. 4. 12.*

^b *Phantasy* is so called from *φῶς*, light; for as light sheweth it selfe, and with it selfe all those things which are contained within

within it; so phantasy sheweth it selfe, and that which maketh it.

^c *Phantasy* is an impression in the Soul: *Cleanthes* addes, an impression by depression and eminence, as that impression, which is made in Wax by a Seal. *c Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hyp. lib. 2.*

Chrysippus conceives this to be absurd; for 1. saith he, When the soule first apprehends a triangle and a square, it will follow, that the same body, at the same time, must have in it selfe severall figures, which is absurd. Again, whereas many phantasies are together consistent in us, the Soul must have divers figures, which is worse then the former. He therefore conceived, that *Zeno* used the word Impression, for Alteration, meaning thus: Fantasy is an alteration of the Soul, whereby it is no longer absurd, that the same body (many severall phantasies being at the same time consistent in us) should receive severall alterations. For, as the aire receiving at once innumerable different percussions, hath presently many alterations; so the supream part of the soule, receiving various phantasies, doth something which hath proportion and conformity thereto.

Some object that this exposition is not right; because, though every phantasy is an impression and alteration in the Soul; yet, every impression or alteration of the Soul is not phantasy: as when the finger smarts or itches, and the hand is rubbed, there is then an impression and alteration in the soul; but it is not phantasy, because it is not in the supream part of the soul.

They answer, That in saying, an impression in the Soul, is implied as in the Soul as fully, as if we should say, phantasy is an impression in the Soul as in the Soul; as when we say, the white in the eye, we imply, as in the eye; that is, the white is in a certain part of the eye, which all men have so by nature. So when we say, Phantasy is an impression in the Soul, we imply the impression to be made in the supream part thereof.

Others more elegantly answer, that the word Soul is taken two waies, either for the whole, or for the principall part: when we say, man consists of soul and body; or, that death is a separation of the soul from the body, we mean properly the supream part, wherein properly consists the motion and goods of the Soul. When *Zeno* therefore calleth Phantasy an impression in the Soul, he is not to be understood of the whole Soul, but, of part thereof; as if he should say, Phantasy is an alteration of the supream part of the Soul.

To this interpretation, some object thus: Appetition, Assentation, and Comprehension are alterations in the supream part of the soul; but, these differ from phantasy, that being a certain kinde of perswasion and affection, whereas this is more operation then appetition, therefore the definition is not good, being competent to many other things.

They

They answer by recourse to *εὐχρηστικὰς* (*impliances*) that a definition is understood to be in all. As he who saith, Love is an application of the Soul towards procurement of Friendship, implieth amongst young people; so when we say, that phantasy is an alteration in the supream part of the soul, we imply by persuasions for, alteration is not made by operation.

d Laert.

^d Of Phantasies there are many kinds, some are *sensible*, others *not-sensible*. *Sensible* are those which are received through one or more of the senses: *Not-sensible* are those which are received through the minde, as of incorporealls, and other things comprehended by reason. The sensible formed from things that are, are made with concession and assent. There are also apparitions of phantasies, proceeding from things which are.

Again, some are *rationall*, others *irrationall*; *rationall*, those of reasonable creatures; *irrationall*, those of unreasonable. The *rationall* are intelligence, the *irrationall* have no name.

Again, some are *artificiall*, others *in-artificiall*; for, an Image is considered by an Artist one way, by him that is not an artist another way.

e Sext. Empir.
Pyrrh. hyp. lib.
2.

^e Again, some are *probable*, some *improbable*: The *probable* are those which make an easie motion in the soul; as, It is now day, I discourse, and the like. The *Improbable* are of a contrary nature, averting us from assent; as, it is day, the Sun is not above the earth; if it is dark, it is day. Both *probable and improbable* are those, which, by relation to other things, are sometimes such, as in doubtfull speeches, neither probable nor improbable are such, as these, The *staires* are even, the *staires* are odd.

Of probable and improbable Phantasies, some are *true*, some are *false*, some are *neither true nor false*. *True* are those, whose predication is true, as, It is day, 'tis light: *False*, whose predication is false; Both *true and false*, as happened to *Orestes* in his madness, meeting *Electra*; that he met something, it was true, for it was *Electra*; but, that it was a fury, was false. *Neither true nor false* are those which are taken from the Genus; for the Genus is not such as the Species in all respects: as; of men, some are Grecians, some are Barbarous; but, man in generall is not Grecian, for then all men must be Grecians, neither barbarous, for the same reason.

Of true Phantasies, some are *comprehensive*, others are *not-comprehensive*. *Not-comprehensive* are those which happen through sickness, or perturbation of minde; many being troubled with frenzie or melancholly, attract a true phantasy which is not comprehensive, even from that which extrinsically occurs casually, for which reason, they neither assert it often, nor assent unto it. *Comprehensive* phantasie is that which is impressed and signed by that which is, and conformable to that which is, so as it cannot be of that which is not.

To

To comprehensive phantasia three *conditions* are requisite:
 1. That it arise from that which is; for many phantasies arise from that which is not, as in mad men. 2. That it be conformable to that which is; for some phantasies are from that which is, but represents the similitude of that which is not: as *Orestes* derived a phantasia from that which was, viz. from *Electra*, but not according to that which was; for he thought her to be one of the furies. Comprehensive phantasia must be conformable to that which is, and so impressed and signed, as that it may imprint artificially all the properties of the thing phancied, as Gravers touch all the parts of those things which they imitate, and the impression made by a Seal on Wax exactly and perfectly beareth all its characters. Lastly, that it be without impediment; for sometimes comprehensive phantasia is not creditable, by reason of outward circumstances; as when *Hercules* brought *Alceſtis* taken out of the Earth, to *Admetus*, *Admetus* drew from *Alceſtis* a comprehensive phantasia, but did not credit it; for, he consider'd, that she was dead, and therefore could not rise again, but, that sometimes Spirits appear in the shape of the deceased.

^f *Phantasy*, *Phantaston*, *Phantasticon*, and *Phantasmé*, according to *Chrysippus*, differ thus: *Phantasy* is a passion made in the Soul, which sheweth it selfe, and that which made it; as, when with our eyes we see white, it is a passion engendred by sight in the Soul, and we may call this a passion; because the object thereof is a white thing which moveth us: the like of smelling and touching.

^t *Plur. plac. Phil. 4. 12.*

Phantaston is that which maketh phantasia; as the white and the cold, and whatsoever is able to move the Soul; that is phantaston.

Phantasticon is a frustaneous attraction, a passion in the Soul proceeding from nothing; as in those who fight with shadows; or extend their hands in vain: for, to phantasy is objected phantaston, but phantasticon hath no object.

Phantasmé is that, to which we are attracted by that frustaneous attraction, which happens in melancholy, or mad persons; as *Orestes* in the Tragedy, when he saith,

*Bring hither, Mother; I implore,
 These snakie bloodie Maids no more;
 Whose very lookes wound me all o're.*

This he saith in his madnesse, for he saw nothing: wherefore *Electra* answers him,

*Ab quiet in thy bed (unhappy) lie.
 Thou seest not what thou thinkest before thy eye.*

D d d d

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of True and Truth.

^a **T**RUE (according to Zeno) is that which is impressed in the minde from that whence it is, in such manner, as it cannot be from that which is not: or, as others, ^b True is that which is, and is opposed to something: False is that which is not; yet, is opposed to something also.

^a St. Aug. con-

tra Acad. lib. 2.

^b Sext. Empir.

Pyrrh. hyp. 2. 8.

Truth and true differ three waies, by *Essence*, by *Constitution*, by *Power*. By *Essence*, for truth is a body; but, true is incorporeall, for it is a dicible *ἄσῳν*, and therefore incorporeall. On the contrary, Truth is a body, as being the enunciative Science of all true things. All Science is in some measure the supream part of the Soul, which supream part is a body: therefore truth in generall is corporeall.

By *Constitution*; True is conceived to be something uniforme and simple by nature; as, It is day, I discourse. Truth, as being a Science, consisteth of many things; by a kinde of conservation. Wherefore as a People is one thing, a Citizen another; a People is a multitude consisting of many Citizens; but, a Citizen is no more then one. In the same manner differeth truth from true. Truth resemblenth a People, true a Cittizen; for, truth consisteth of many things collected, true is simple.

By *Power*; for true doth not absolutely adhere to truth: A fool, a child, a mad-man, may speak something true, but, cannot have the Science of that which is true. Truth considers things with Science; inso much that he who hath it is wise; for, he hath the Science of true things, and is never deceived, nor lyeth, although he speak false, because it proceedeth not from an ill, but, good affection.

CHAP. VI.

Of Comprehension.

^a Cic. Acad.

quest. 1.

^b Cic. Acad.

quest 4.

^a **C**omprehension (*ὑποληψις*) was first used in this sence by Zeno, by a metaphor taken from things apprehended by the hand; ^b which allusion he exprest by action. For, shewing his hand with the fingers stretched forth, he said, such was Phantasy; then bending them a little, said, such was Assent; then compressing them, and clutching his fist, such was Comprehension.

^c Galen. Hist. phil.

^c Comprehension is a firm and true knowledge, non-comprehension the contrary; for some things we only think that we see,

see, hear, or feel, as in dreams and frenzies; other things we not only think, but, truly do see, or hear, or feel. These latter, all (but the Academicks and Scepticks) conceive to fall under firm knowledge, the other, which we imagine in dreams or frenzy are false.

^d Whatsoever is understood, is comprehended by the minde, ^{d Sext. Empir. adv. Geom. cap. 19.} one of these two waies, either by *evident incursion* (which *Laertius* calls by sense) or by *transition from evidence* (*Laertius*, collection by demonstration) of which latter there are three kinds, by *Assimilation*, by *Composition*, by *Analogy*.

By *incurrent evidence* is understood white and black, sweet and soure.

By *Transition*, from evidents: by *Assimilation* is understood *Socrates* by his Picture: by *Composition*, as of a horse and a man is made a Centaure; for putting together the limbes proper to both species, we comprehend by phantasy that which was neither horse nor man, but a Centaur compounded of both.

By *Analogy*, things are understood two waies; either by *augmentation*; or, when from common ordinary men, we by augmentation phanfy a Cyclops, who not like

*Men that with Ceres gifts are fed:
But, some tall hill erects his head.*

Or by *Diminution*, as a Pigmeys. ^{e Laert.} Likewise the Center of the earth is understood by analogy from lesser Globes.

To these kinds add, ^{f Laert.} Comprehension by *transference*, as eyes in the breast; by *contrariety*, as death; by *transference*, as dicibles and place; by *privation*, as a man without hands; just and good are understood *naturally*.

CHAP. VII.

Of Assent.

^{a Cic. Acad. quest. 4.} **T**Hese things being enough known, which we have already explained, let us now speake a little of *Assent*, and approbation, termed *consensus*, not that is not a large place, but the grounds thereof have been already laid: For when we explained the power that was in the senses, we likewise declared, that many things were comprehended and perceived by the senses, which cannot be done without Assent. Moreover, seeing that betwixt an inanimate and an animate being, the greatest difference is, that the inanimate doth nothing, the animate doth something, we must either take away sense from it, or allow it assent, which is within our power. When we will not have a thing either to

perceive

perceive or assent, we in a manner take away the soule from it; for as it is necessary, that the scale of ballance which is laden should tend downwards; so is it that the soule should yeeld to things that are perspicuous.

^b Cic. lib. d. Pa-
10.

Although assent cannot bee made unlesse it bee moved by Phantasie, yet when that phantasy hath an immediate cause, it hath not (according to *Chrysippus*) this principall reason, not that it can be made without any extrinsecall excitation (for it is necessary that assent be moved by phantasie) but it returnes to its Cylinder and Cone, which move not by impulsion, then of their owne nature, the Cylinder seemes to rowle, and the Cone to turne round. As therefore he who thrust the Cylinder gave it the beginning of motion, but did not give it volubility; to the objected phantasy imprinteth, and as it were scaleth in the soule its species, yet the assent is in our power, and that (as we said in a Cylinder) extrinsecally impelled, the motion is continued by its own power and nature.

^c Agell. 19. 9.
and from him
St. August. Ci-
vit. dei. 9. 4.

Phantasies, wherewith the mind of man is presently affected, are not voluntary or in our own power, but inferre themselves by a kind of violence, approbations (*αγαθήματα*) by which these phantasies are knowne and judged, are voluntary, and made according to our arbitrement. So as upon any dreadfull noyse from heaven, or by the fall of any thing, or sudden newes of some danger or the like; it is necessary that the minde of a wise man bee a little moved, and contracted, and appalled, not through opinion perceived of any ill; but certaine rapid and inconsiderate motions, which praver the office of the mind and reason. But presently the same wise man appoveth not *ταῖς αἰσθητικαῖς παθήσας*, those dreadfull phantasies, that is, *ἡ συγκαταβολήν ἐν τῇ ἀπορρηξίῳ*, but rejects and refuses them, nor is there any thing in these which seemeth to him dreadfull. Thus differs the soules of wise and unwise men: The unwise, when phantasies appeare cruell and difficult at the first impulsion of the mind, thinke them to be truly such as they appeare, and receiving them as if they were justly to be feared, approve them by their assent, *ἡ ἀπορρηξίς*, (this word the Stoicks use vpon this occasion:) But a wise man suddenly changing colour and countenance, *ἡ συγκαταβολήν*, assents not, but retaineth the state and vigour of his judgment, which he alwaies had of these phantasies, as nothing dreadfull, but terrifying only with a false shew, and vain fear.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Notions.

^a From Sense, the rule of Science, Notions are imprinted in ^{a Cic. Acad. 1.} the Soul, by which, not only principles, but larger waies to reason are found out.

^b A man when he is born, hath the supream part of his Soul, like unto clean paper, upon which every notion is inscribed. ^{b Plur. de plac. Phil. 4. 11.} The first manner of inscription is by the Senses; as for example: They who perceive a thing that is white, after it is taken away, retain the memory thereof; but, when they have conceived many remembrances of one species, then they say, they have experience, for experience is a multitude of similitudes.

Of Notions, some are *naturall*, which are in such manner as we we have said, and without Art: Others *gained* by learning and industry: These are properly called *Notions*, the other *Anticipations*. The reason for which we are called *rationall*, is said to be perfected by anticipations in the first seven years.

Intelligence is the phantasme of the intellect of a rationall creature; for phantasm, when it lighteth upon a rationall Soul, is then called *intelligens*. Intelligence, a word taken from the Intellect. For, to other Creatures there happen not phantasmes, to the Gods only and to us these are incident. Those which belong to us, are Phantasmes, as to their genus, Notions, as to their species; as denaries and staters, when paid for transportation, are called *Naula*.

^c Common notions are planted in all men, (in which they all agree together) one is not repugnant to another; for, who holds not, that good is profitable, and ought to be chosen with utmost endeavours? Who holds not, that what is just, is fair and well-beseeming? Whence then proceed contentions and differences? to wit, from the application of first notions to singular things. ^{c Arrian. 1. 22.}

^d These Notions, and whatsoever is of this kinde, which right reason conformeth in us, being *long* examined, are true, and suitable to the natures of things. ^{d Simp. in EpiB.}

CHAP. IX.

Of Science and Opinion:

^a That which is comprehended by Sense, Zeno call'd *Sense*, ^{a Cic. Acad. 1.} and if so comprehended, as not to be plucked away by reason, *Science*, otherwise *Ignorance*; from which proceedeth *Opinion*, ^{quæst. 1.}

^b Sext. Emp.
adv. Logic. I.

Opinion, which is weak and common, to the false and unknown. These three are joyned together, Science, Opinion, and Comprehension, which borders upon the other two. Science is a firme, stable, immutable comprehension with reason: Opinion, an infirm, weak, assent: Comprehension, which commeth between both, is an assent to comprehensive phantasy. Comprehensive phantasy is true, in such manner, that it cannot be false. Therefore Science is in wise men only, Opinion in fooles, Comprehension is common to both, as being that by which truth is judged; ^c and is for this reason reckon'd by *Zeno*, neither among the right (*αρεσθόμενα*) nor amongst the bad (*ἀναρθόμενα*) but betwixt science and ignorance, affirming, that this only is to be credited.

^c Cicero. Acad.
quest. I.

CHAP. X.

Of Voice, Speech, and Words.

^a Sext. Emp.
adv. Log. cap.
de vero.

^a These three are joyned to one another; that which is signified, that which signifieth, and the contingent. *That which signifieth* is the voice, as *Dion*: *That which is signified*, is the thing it selfe declared by the voice; it is that which we apprehend, and is present in our cogitation. *The contingent* is the outward subject, as, *Dion* himselfe.

^b Laert.
^c Laert.

^b Dialectick being conversant about that which signifieth, and that which is signified, ^c is divided into two places: one, of *Significats*; the other of *Voice*. The place of significats is divided into *phantasies*, and *subsistents on phantasie*, *dicibles*, *axioms*, &c.

In the other place, concerning *Voice*, is declared *literall Voice*, the parts of speech, the nature of *Solacisms* and *Barbarisms*, *Poems*, *Ambiguities*, *Song*, *Musick*, and (according to some) *definitions and divisions*.

^d Laert.

^d The phantasies of the minde precede speech, (*Of these therefore we have already treated*) then the minde endued with the faculty of speaking, declareth by speech what it receiveth from the phantasie; For this reason, ^e the consideration of Dialectick, by the joynt consent of all, seemes as if it ought to be first taken from the place of voice.

^e Laert.

^f Laert.

^f *Voice* is aire percussed, the proper sensible object of hearing, (as *Diogenes* the Babylonian, in his *Art of Voyce*.) The voice of a living sensitive creature, is aire percussed with appetite; the voice of man is articulate, proceeding from the minde: at his fourteenth year it is perfected.

^g Laert.

Speech (as ^g *Diogenes* saith) is a literate voice; as, *It is day*. *Word* is a significative voice, proceeding from the minde. *Language* is a speech according to the variety of Nations, whereof each

each useth its peculiar dialect; as the Attick saith, *βαρής*, the Ionick *κίρην*. Voice and Speech differ, in that voice is a sound, but speech articulate only. Speech and Word differ; for word is alwaies significative; but, speech sometimes signifieth nothing, as Blitri, which is no word. To speak and to pronounce differ: voices are pronounced, but things only are spoken: ^h for, to speak ^h Sext. Emp. is to pronounce a significant voice of a thing that is said. ^{adv. Log. cap. de vero.}

ⁱ Hence *Corysippus* saith, that he who beginneth to speak and pronounce words, before he can put them in their right place, doth not speak, but thinketh that he speaks; as, the Image of a man is not a man: so in Crowes, Dawes, and Children, when they first begin to speak, the words which they say are not words. He only speaketh, who knoweth to put a word in the right place. ^{lat. lib. 5.}

They (particularly ^k *Zeno*) ^l took much pains in the invention ^k *Cicero*. and explication of words, ^m wherein they distinguished very ^l *Dionys. Halic.* subtilly. Hence *Cicero* calleth the Stoicks Architects of words. ^m *Hieronym.* *Ammonius*, the Grammarians, followers of the Stoicks.

ⁿ The *Elements* of speech are the 24 Letters. *Letter* is taken ⁿ *Laert.* three waies: First, for the character of figure which is formed. Secondly, for the element or power: Thirdly, for the name, as *A*. Of the Elements, seven are Vowels *a. e. i. o. u. i. o.* six Mutes, *b. g. d. x. p. t.*

^o Of speech there are five parts, as *Diogenes* saith in his Book ^o *Laert.* of Voice, and *Chrysippus* (^o at first they reckon'd but foure, separating the *Articles* from the *Conjunctions*, afterwards the latter Stoicks, dividing the *Appellatives* from the *Nounes*, made them five) *Noun*, *Appellation*, *Verb*, *Conjunction*, *Article*: (*Antipater* in his Book of Speech added the *medium*) *Appellation* (as *Diogenes* saith) is a part of speech signifying a common quality; as, *Man*; *Horse*. *Noun* a part of speech denoting a proper quality; as *Diogenes*, *Socrates*. *Verbe* (as *Diogenes* saith) a part of speech signifying a thing, which is predicated of one or more things, incompounded; or, as some say, an Element of speech without cases, whereby the parts of speech are connected; as, *I write*, *I speak*. *Conjunction* is a part of speech without cases, conjoyning the parts of speech. *Article* is an element of speech, having cases; distinguishing the kinds and numbers of Nounes; as, *ὁ, ἡ, τὸ, αὐ, αὐτή, ταῦτα* ^p *Dionys. Halic.*

^q Every word, by reason of that which it signifieth, calleth ^q *S. Augus. de Dialect. cap. 6.* foure necessary things into question, its *origine*, *power*, *declination*, *ordination*.

As concerning the first, which the Greeks call *ἔτυμολογία*, they conceived, that names were given by nature: the first pronounced voices, imitating the things themselves, from which the names were afterwards imposed, by which reason, they derive *Etymologies*, conceiving that there is not any word, for which there

there cannot be given a certain reason. They therefore studiously enquired whence words are deduced, much pains was taken, first, by *Zeno*, then by *Cleanthes*, afterwards by *Chrysippus*, to give a reason of commentitious fables, and to explain the causes of words, why they are called so and so.

This beginning is to be sought, untill we arrive so far, as that the thing agree in some similitude with the sound of the word, as when we say, tinkling of brasse, the *neighing* of horses, the *bleating* of sheep, the *gingling* of chains: These words by their sound, expresse the things which are signified by them.

But, for as much as there are things which sound not, in these the similitude of touching hath the same power: As, they touch the sense smoothly or harshly, the smoothnesse or harshnesse of letters in like manner touch the hearing, and thereby occasioneth their names. As when we say *smooth*, it sounds smoothly: so, who will not judge *harshnesse* to be harsh by the very word? It is smooth to the ear when we say *pleasure*; harsh, when we say *crux*, a *croffe*: the things themselves make good the sound of the words. *Honey*, as sweetly as the thing it selfe affects our tast, so sweetly doth the name touch our hearing: *Soure*, as harsh in both. *Wool* and *Bryars*, as the words are to the hearing, the things are to the touch. These are conceived to be the infancy, as it were, of words, when the sense of the thing concords with the sense of the sound.

From hence proceeded the licence of naming, according to the similitude of the things among themselves: as when, for example, *crux*, a *croffe*, is therefore so called, because the harshnesse of the word concords with the harshnesse of the pain which the croffe affecteth. But, *Crura*, thighes, are so called, not from harshnesse of pain; but, because in length and hardnesse, they are, in respect of the other limbs, like unto the wood of a croffe. Hence it comes to abuse, that the name usurped, not of a like thing, but, as it were neer: for what likenesse is there between the signification of little and minute, when as that may be little, which not only is nothing minute, but is somewhat grown; yet, by reason of a certain neernesse, we say minute for little. But, this abuse of the word is in the power of the speaker; for, he may use the word little, and not minute. This example belongs to that which we will shew, when we call that a *fish-pond* which hath no fish in it, nor any thing like a fish: It is denominated from fishes, by reason of the water, wherein fishes live. So the word is used by translation, not from similitude, but a certain kinde of vicinity. And if any one should say, that men in swimming resemble fishes, and that from thence a fish-pond is so named, it were foolish to refuse it, since that neither is repugnant to the nature of the thing, and both are occult. But, this is to the purpose, which we cannot dilucidate by one example,

ample, how much the origine of the word, which is taken from vicinity, differs from that which is derived from similitude.

From hence there is a progression to the contrary: *Lucus* is thought to be so named, *quod minime luceat*; and *bellum*, *quod res bella non sit*; and *ſœdus*, *quod res ſœda non ſit*. But, if we derive *perus*, as ſome do, à *ſœditate*, it returnes to that vicinity, when that which is made, is named from that by which it is made.

For this vicinity is very large, and divided into many parts, either by effieience, as this word *proeus* à *ſœditate*; from which likewise *ſœdus*: or by effect, as *puteus*, ſo named, becauſe the effect thereof is *potatio*: or by that it containeth, as *urbs ab orbe*, becauſe in a place which they liked, they firſt made a track about it with a plough, as *Virgil* ſaith of *Aeneas*,

— *Urlem designat Aratro.*

Or by that which is contained, as if *horreum* were derived from *hordeum*; or by abuſe, as *hordeum* for wheat, or the whole from a part, as *macro*, which is the point for the whole ſword; or a part from the whole, as *capillus quaſi capitis pilus*. What need we go any further? whatſoever elſe can be reckoned, we may ſee the origin of the word contained, either in the ſimilitude betwixt things and ſounds, or in the ſimilitude betwixt things themſelves, or in vicinity, or contrariety, which origine we cannot purſue beyond ſimilitude.

But this we cannot do alwaies, for there are innumerable words, the reaſons of which ly hid. To the infancy, or rather ſtock and ſeed of ſuch words, beyond which, no origine is to be ſought, neither if a man do enquire can he finde any, they proceed in this manner: The ſyllables, in which *v* hath the place of conſonant, as in theſe words, *center*, *vaſer*, *velum*, *vinum*, *vomis*, *vulnus*, have a thick, and as it were, a ſtrong ſound, which the very cuſtome of ſpeaking confirmeth, when from ſome words we take them away, leſt they ſhould burden the care; for which reaſon we ſay *amâſti*, rather then *amarîſti*, and *abiit*, not *âiit*, and innumerable of the ſame kinde. Therefore when we ſay *Vis*, the ſound of the word having, as we ſaid, a kinde of force, ſuiteth with the thing which it ſignifieth. Now from this vicinity, by that which they affect, that is, becauſe they are violent, *vincula* ſeem to be named, and *timen*, *quo aliquid vincitur*. Thence *vites*, becauſe they claſpe about thoſe things by which they grow. Hence alſo by ſimilitude, *Terence* calls a crooked old man *vietum*. Hence the Earth, worn into winding paths by the feet of paſſengers, is called *via*; but if *vi* be ſo named, *quaſi vi pedum trita*, the origine returnes to the vicinity: But let us ſuppoſe it derived from the ſimilitude it hath with *vitis*, or *vimen*, that is, from its winding, one asketh me why it is called *via*?

E e e e

I

I answer, from the windings and crookednesse thereof, which the antients called *vietum*; thence the rounds of a wheel *vietosi*. He demands, how *vietum* comes to signifie winding? I answer, from the similitude of *vitis*, a Vine: He requires whence *vitis* is so named? I say, because it doth *vintere* those things which it comprehends. He questions whence *vintere* is derived? We say, *à vi*: He asks, whence *vis*? We give this reason, because the word in its robust and forcible sound agreeth to the thing which it signifieth. He hath nothing more to demand.

τ Galen. de decret. Hipp. & Plat. lib. 2.

u Agell. 10. 5. In like manner, in this word *Ego*, as *Chrysippus* observes, in pronouncing the first syllable, we deprese the under-lip, as if it were to point to our selves, then by motion of the beard we point to our own breasts: of which *Nigidius* hath given more instances, in his Grammaticall Commentaries.

x Laert.

The second question concerning words, is of their power, *πῶς σημαίνοντες*, of significants; whence **Chrysippus* divided Dialectick into two parts, *πῶς σημαίνοντες ἢ σημαζόμενοι*, of significants and significans. Here they enquire, how many waies every thing may be said, and how many waies a thing said may signifie.

y Laert.

Here is examined the ambiguity of words: *γ* Ambiguity (or amphiboly) is a word signifying two or more things, naturally, and properly, according to the language of the Nation, in such manner, that many senses may be collected from the same words, as *πολλὰς πωλῶν*, which one way signifies, *the pot fell thrice*, another way, *the she-mistress fell*.

z Agell. 9. 12.
y D. August. de dialect.

z Every word (according to *Chrysippus*) is by nature ambiguous, for the same may be taken two or more waies: *γ* Neither is that any thing to the purpose which *Hortensius* calumniates in *Cicero*, thus, They affirm that they hear ambiguities acutely, explain them clearly. The same persons hold, that every word is ambiguous; how then can they explain the ambiguous by the ambiguous, that were to bring a candle not lighted into the dark. This is ingeniously and subtly said, but like that of *Scorolato Antonius*, you seem to the wise to speak acutely, to foolles truly: for what else doth *Hortensius* in that place, but by his ingenuity and facetiousnesse, as an intoxicating cup, bring darknesse upon the unlearned. For, when they say, every word is ambiguous, it is understood of single words. Ambiguities are explain'd by disputation; no man disputeth by single words, none therefore explaineth ambiguous words by ambiguous words. And yet seeing that every word is ambiguous, no man can explain the ambiguity of words, except by words, but those conjoynd and not ambiguous. As when we say, every Souldier hath two feet, it doth not follow, that a whole Regiment of Souldiers that have two feet, should have in all but two feet. So when I say, every word is ambiguous, I do not say, a sentence, nor a disputation, although they are woven of words. Every

veryambiguous word therefore may be explained by inambiguous disputation.

The third question is concerning *Declination*, *ἀναλογία* and *ἀνολογία*. ^a Some follow *Analogie*, others *Anomaly*: *Analogie* is a ^{a Agell. 2. 27.} like declination of like, in Latine *proportio*. *Anomaly* is an inequality, following the customes of declinations. ^a *Chrysippus* wrote six bookes *περὶ τῆς ἀναλογίας*, shewing, that like things are noted ^{a Varro. de ling. lat.} with unlike words, and unlike things with like words.

The last question is concerning *Ordination*, *οὐκ ἐκείνη*. ^b Upon this ^{b Dionys. Halicarn. de compos. verb.} subject *Chrysippus* wrote two bookes (*Laertius* reckons more) whose scope is not Rhetoricall, but Dialectick, as will easily appear to the Reader: *Of the Syntax of Axiomes: of true and false Axiomes: of possible and impossible: of contingent, and transient, and ambiguous*, and the like, which confer nothing to single speech, or pleasure, or grace to elocution.

There are five excellencies of speech, *Propriety*, *Perspicuity*, ^c *Succinnesse*, *Decorum*, *Elegance*. *Propriety* is a proper phrase, according to Art, not after the common expression.

Perspicuity is, when that which is intended is delivered clearly.

Succinnesse is, when that only is comprised which is necessary to the thing.

Decorum, is a conformity to the thing.

Elegance is an avoiding of vulgar phrase.

^d Amongst the faults of speech is *Barbarisme*, a phrase not in ^{d Laert.} use with the best persons; and *Solæcisme*, a speech incoherently framed.

CHAP. XI.

Of Definition and Division.

^a *Definition* (according to *Antipater* in his book of *Definitions*) ^{a Laert.} is speech by *Analysis* pronounced adæquately; or (as *Chrysippus* in his book of *Definitions*) an answer to this Question, what a thing is.

^b Those definitions are vicious which include any of those ^{b Sext. Empir. adv. Log.} things which are not in the things defined, or not in all, or not in some; so as if we should say, *A man is a rationally creature, or, a mortall grammaticall creature*; seeing that no man is immortall, and some men are not Grammarians, the definition is faulty.

^c We must therefore, when we take those things which are ^{c Cicer. Topic.} common to the things we would define, and others prosecute them so far, untill it becomes proper, so as not to be transferrible to any other things; as this. *An inheritance is riches, adde which by the death of some person falleth to another*; it is not yet a definition,

for riches may be held many other waies, as well as by Inheritance; adde one word, by right of Law; now the thing will seeme disjoyned from community; so that the definition is thus explained. *Inheritance is riches, which by the death of some person falleth to another by right of law*: It is not yet enough, therefore adde, *neither bequeathed by will, nor detained by possession*, and it is perfect.

d Cic. Topic.

^d Of definition there are two kinds; one of things *which are*; the other of things *which are understood*. Those things *which are*, we call such as may be seen or touched, as a field, house, a wall, and the like. On the other side, we say those things *are not*, which cannot bee touched or shewn, as possession, guardianship, nation, kindred, which have not any body, yet there is some conformity in the understanding which we call notionall, whereby in argumentation they may be explained by definition. This latter kind is rather called Description, a speech, which by the exterior figure of the things bringeth us to the things themselves, or a Definition simply expressing the power of a definition.

e Cic. Topic.

^e Again, of definitions, some are of *partitions*, others of *divisions*. Of *partitions*, when the thing proposed is torne (as it were) into pieces, as if we should say the Civill Law is that which consisteth in Lawes, Senators, things judged, the authority of Lawyers, Edicts of Magistrates, manners and Equity.

The definition of *divisions* comprehendeth all species which are under the genus defined, thus. Abalienation is of that thing which is in our power, or a deliverance of it into the power of another, or a concession by Law, amongst whom those things may be done by civill right.

f Laert.

g Sext. Empir.
adv. Math. 10. 2.

^f *Division* is a section of the genus into its immediate species; as, of *living creatures*, some are *rationall*, some *irrationall*. ^g This therefore is an ill division, of *men*, some are *Grecians*, some *Egyptians*, some *Persians*, some *Indians*; for the next species are not disparate, but opposite, we must therefore say thus; Of *men*, some are *Grecians*, some *Barbarians*, and again, by subdivision of *Barbarians*, some are *Egyptians*, some *Persians*, some *Indians*, which likewise is in the division of things that are. For those which are good and bad are different to us, those who are intermediate betwixt good and bad are indifferent to us. The division therefore ought not to be so, but rather thus: Of *things that are*, some are *indifferent*, others *different*, of the *different*, some are *good*, some are *ill*; For this division is like unto that which saith, of *men*, some are *Grecians*, others *Barbarians*; of *Barbarians*, some are *Egyptians*, some *Persians*, some *Indians*; the other is likewise; Of *men*, some *Grecians*, some *Egyptians*, some *Persians*, some *Indians*.

h Sext. Empir.
adv. Moral. 10.

Hence it followeth, that ^h perfect division hath an universall power; for he who divideth thus; Of *men*, some are *Grecians*, others *Barbarians*, saith as much as this, if there are any men, they are either *Grecians* or *Barbarians*, for if there be any man, who

who is neither Greek nor Barbarian, the division must necessarily be ill, the universall false. Wherefore when we say, of things that are, some are good, some ill, some intermediate, it is as much (according to *Chrysippus*) as this universall : if there be any things that are, they are either good, or ill, or indifferent. But this universall is false, if any thing false be subjected to it : For, if two things be subjected, one good, the other ill ; or, one good, the other indifferent, in this expression of those things which are, one kinde is good, that is true, but this, these are good, is false, for they are not good, for one is good, the other ill. And again, these are ill, is false, for they are not ill, but only one of them. The like in indifferents; for, it is false that these are indifferents, as that these are good or ill.

ⁱ There are three forms of division, *anti-division*, *sub-division*, ^{i. Laet.} *partition*. *Anti-division* is a distribution of the genus into species by the contrary ; as for example, by negation, as of things that are, some are good, others not good.

Sub-division is division upon a division: as, of things that are, some are good, others not good ; of the not-good, some are ill, others indifferent.

Partition, is a distribution of the genus into places (according to *Crinis*) as of goods, some belong to the Soule, others to the Body.

CHAP. XII.

Of Genus, Species, &c.

^a **G**ENUS is a comprehension of many Notions referred to ^{a Laet.} Gone, as, a living creature, for this includes all living creatures. Notion is a phantasie of the minde, not any thing existent or qualitative, but, as it were, something existent, and qualitative; as the notion of a horse, no horse being present.

Species is that which is contained under the Genus ; as, under living creature is contained man.

Most generall, is that which is a Genus, but hath no Genus : *Most speciall*, that which is a Species, but hath no Species.

To this place of Voice belong likewise, as we said, the consideration of *Poem* and *Poesy*. *Poem* (according to *Possidonius*, in his *introduction to Speech*) is a speech in meeter or rithme, not prose, as *γὰρ μῦθος*, and *διὰ λόγον*, *Poesy* is a significant Poem, with designe, containing the imitation of things divine and human.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Things.

NOtions, words, and things, as we have said, are conjoynd together. From notions we came to words, from words we come now to the things themselves: By Notions Things are perceived. ^a Those are said to be *Things* which are dicible. ^b The Stoicks by a new name call things *νυκταία*, *Contingents*, because we desire that things might befall us, and that we might obtain them. ^c *Contingents* therefore is the subject it selfe, beyond the notion or word, as *Dion*.

^a Laert.
^b Philop. in Anal. prior.

^c Sext. Empir. adv. Log.

^d Alexand. Aphrod. in Top. 4. vñ.
^e Senec. Epist. 19.

^d They comprehend all things under one common Genus, *νῦν*, *somewhat*; ^e placing this Genus above all, the reason this: In nature somethings are, somethings are not. For, those things which are not, but only incur in the minde, as Centaurs, Gyants, and whatsoever else is formed by false cogitation, hath some image, although it hath no substance. Even Negatives are in being. *Somewhat* therefore is more generall then *Ens*, which is understood only of Corporealls.

^f Simplic. in Categ.

^g Simplic. ibid.

^f Things are subdivided into foure Genus's, *Subjects*, and *qualitatives*, & *quodammodotatives in themselves*, and *quodammodotatives as to others*. ^g Thus the Stoicks treating more strictly and subrilly of these things, contract the Predicaments into a lesser number, taking some of those things which they diminished, but with some alteration.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Subjects.

^a Simplic. in Categ.

^b Simplic. ibid.

^a **T**Here is not any thing besides *νῦν*, *Subject*: The differences concerning this are nonsubsistent.

^b *Subject* is two-fold; one, which is called the *first* subject, such is matter, expert of all qualities, which *Aristotle* calleth a body potentially. The other, that which is *affected with quality*, as *Brasse*, and *Socrates*, with those things which are in them, or prædicated by them.

CHAP. XV.

Of Qualitatives.

^a Qualitatives have a subsistence, and are separate from their subjects. For qualities (as all other accidents) are bodies, ^{a Dexipp. in ca- teg. 2. 22.} seeing that according to Zeno, nothing can be effected by that which is incorporeall, nor can that which is incorporeall effect any thing; whatsoever effecteth is a body. Effective quality therefore is a body. Matter is expert of quality, but qualities are not expert of matter.

^b Quality is the habit of that which is qualitative. Qualitative ^{b Simplic. in ca- teg.} is taken three waies: First, for whatsoever hath difference, whether it be motion or habit, and whether hardly or easily separable. In this sence, not only he who is wise, but he who stretcheth out his hand are qualitative. The second signification includes not motions but habits only, which they define qualitative, that is, which hath a difference endued with habit, as a wise man, or an armed man. Of these, some are adæquate, to the measure of their pronounciation and consideration; others not adæquate. These they omit, those which are adæquate, equall, and permanent, they call qualitative; as, a Grammarian, and a wise man; neither of these exceeds, or falls short of his quality. Likewise a lover of meat, and a lover of wine, being in act such, as a glutton, and a drunkard, because they make use of those parts which serve to this end, are so called: so that if any man be a glutton, he is consequently a lover of meat; but, if he be a lover of meat, he is not therefore immediately a glutton; for, being destitute of those parts which he useth in eating, he wanteth the act, but not the habit. Quality is adæquated to qualitative in this last sence.

^c All qualities are either causes, and then they are called ^{c Burssus in dilect. Cicer. 4. 3.} formes; or effects, and then they are generally called *ἕξις*, *habitualls*, which word *Antipater* extends as large, as the common accident, both of things corporeall and incorporeall, *ἢ*, somewhat. Of *habitualls* there are foure kinds, *μετέσθ*, that is, *ἐννόματα*, when they reside in the minde; *πυκνὰ*, that is, *ἡρώσις*, when they fall from the minde into the voice; *καταγορήματα*, when by the motion of the minde, they are prædicated of any thing; *συμβεβηκότα*, or, *συμβαλήματα*, when they happen to subjects.

^d Habits are only things united, but those which are conjoynd ^{d Simplic. in Categ.} by contiguity, as a Ship; or by distance, as an Army; in these there can be no habit, nor one thing spirituall above all, nor one reason, whereby they may come to subsist within one habit.

It is common to quality of corporeall things to be the difference of their substance, not taken severally, but contracted into one notion and property of the minde, nor by time or strength

reduced to form, but by its own tality, according to which the generation of the qualitative subsists.

Ibid.

Power (a species of quality) is that which hath and giveth the faculty of exercising many accidents, as prudence giveth the faculty of walking prudently, and discoursing prudently: or, according to some, *Power* is that which giveth the faculty of exercising many accidents, and which ruleth and governeth the acts subjected unto it. What *Aristotle* called naturall *Power*, they name *Apistude*.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Habits are intended and remitted, dispositions cannot be intended or remitted. Thus the straightnesse of a wand, although it may easily be discomposed and bent, is a disposition, for straightnesse cannot be intended or remitted. Likewise the virtues are dispositions, not in respect of their firmnesse and constancy, but because they cannot admit of degrees of more and lesse: but, Arts must either have firmnesse, or not be dispositions. Thus *habitude* is taken in the latitude of the species, *disposition* in the chief perfection of the species, and in that which is the most it can be, whether it be easily alter'd (as the straightnesse of a wand) or not.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Quodammodotatives.

a Plotin. 1.30.

THE third kinde of things are τὰ μὴ ἴσχυεῖν, *Quodammodotatives*. They differ from *Qualitatives*, because matter is otherwise affected by habits, otherwise by *Quodammodotatives*, in this or that manner. Moreover *Qualitatives* are *Quodammodotatives* as to matter, and conversant therein; but properly, *quodammodotatives* are conversant in *qualitatives*.^b Again, as *habitualls* may be said to extend further then habits, so *quodammodotatives* are larger then *qualitatives*: for *quodammodotatives* extend even to those things which are *quodammodotatives* as to others, and include them; but *qualitatives* consist only in those which make a difference.

b Simplic. in Categ.

c Simplic. ibid.

^c This place *Boethius* conceives to have the power of habit. Habit chiefly and universally is taken three waies: First, to be to it selfe, and according to it selfe: Secondly, in respect to another: Thirdly, of another to it. That which is considered as to it selfe, pertaines to *quodammodotatives*; as, *armed*, for it is a habit of ones selfe to ones selfe. That which is to another, pertaines to relation; for, a Father, or a right hand, are said, according to a habit, not of themselves to themselves, but of them to another. But that which is of another to us, as of an armed man, being the habit of another to us, pertaines to habit.

To this head they reduce *quantitatives* and *quantity*, and their species,

species, place, time, and some species (according to Aristotle) of quality, figure and forms, as also action, passion, size, habit.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Quodammodotatives, as to others.

THe last genus of things is *πολλὰ καὶ ὁμοειδῆ*, quodammodotatives as to others. Of these there are two kinds, *Relatives*, and quodammodotative-*Relatives*. The *Relatives* are opposed and distinguished from those which are by themselves, and absolute. The quodammodotative-*relatives* are opposed to those which have a difference, as for example, Sweet and Sowre, and whatsoever is of the like kinde, are relatives; but quodammodotative-relatives, are as the right side, father, and the like; for, they have a difference, in that they are characteriz'd by differences, according to some species. As therefore there is one notion of those which are by themselves, and absolute; another of those which are considered with difference: so some things are relatives; others quodammodotative-relatives. The consequence of conjunctions in these is contrary; for, with those which are by themselves, coexist those which have a difference; for, those which are by themselves have some differences, as white and black. But, those which are by themselves, coexist not with those which have a difference. Sweet and bitter have differences, whereby they are characterized; yet, they are not absolute, but relatives. But, those which are quodammodotative-relatives, being contrary to those which have differences, are likewise relatives. For, the right side, and a Father, besides that they are quodammodotative, are likewise relatives: but, sweet and bitter being relatives, have a difference, whereby they are contrary, being quodammodotative relatives. Those which are quodammodotative relatives, it is impossible should be by themselves, and absolute, or by difference; for they depend solely upon relative habit. Relatives therefore are not by themselves, for they are not absolute; yet, are they according to difference, because they are distinguished by some character. To expresse this more clearly, Relatives are those, which by their proper character respect another; quodammodotative-relatives are those which use to happen to another, but not without mutation and alteration of those things which are about them; yet, with respect of something externall. If therefore any thing with difference respect another, it is only relative, as, habit, science, and fence: but, if it respect another, not out of inherent difference, but in pure habit, it is quodammodotative-relative. For, a Father, and right side, to their consistence, require some externall things, for as

Fffff

much

much as there being no mutation made in them, he is no longer a Father, his Son being dead, and the right side is no longer to, after he is risen, in respect of whom it was said to be such; but, sweet and bitter will not alter, unlesse their power be likewise changed. If therefore quodammodum ^{relative} are changed in habit to another, although they receive no passion in themselves, it is manifest they have ~~their being in the habit, altho they not in difference.~~

^a Laert. vit.

Ariston.

^b Simplic. in
Categ.

² This genus was first introduced by *Aristo*, ^b who defined quodammodum ^{relative} to be those, *whose being is the same with their quodammodum relative being to one another*: And so also *An-
dronicus* defines them,

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Dicibles.

TO the place concerning things and significats, belongeth that concerning *Dicibles*, ~~and rationes~~, to which true and false is common. ^a *Dicible* is that which consisteth according to rational phantasy. ^b *Rational phantasy* is that, by which what is comprehended by phantasy, may be expressed by speech. Every thing that may be said, ought to be said, for from thence is derived the denomination.

^a Laert.

^b Sext. Empir.
adv. log.

^c Ammon. in

prooem Arist.

met. seg.

^d Burz. in dial.

Cic. 5. 1.

² *Dicible* is a mean betwixt notion and thing. *Dicibles* are notions, that is, ~~notiones~~, but not meerly and simply notions, ^a which in as much as they are the principles of science, and are intelligences, are called ~~notiones~~, and ~~intelligences~~ but, in as much as they reside in the minde, are called ~~intelligences~~, and are genus's and species, in which manner, being ready for expression, they are called dicibles, and pertain to the enunciative faculty of the soule. For, whatsoever is said, if it be so considered as it is said of something, they are *Categorems*; if so, as it breaketh forth into voice, and with voice, they are words, if retained in the minde, ready to break forth, they are dicibles: *Dicible* therefore is a word, and yet signifies not a word, but that which is understood in the word, and is contained in the mind.

^e Laert.

³ Of *Dicibles* there are two kinds, the *defective*, and the *perfect*. The *defective* are those which an imperfect enunciation, not compleating the sentence, but requiring something to follow; as writeth, for we ask, who? To this kinde belongeth *Categorems*, which are praedicated of other things.

The *perfect* are such as have a perfect enunciation: Of these there are two kinds: The first peculiarly called *perfect*, which though they compleat the sentence, yet, signifie neither true nor false. Of these there are many kinds, as *Interrogation*, *percontati-*

on,

on, imperative, adjurative, optative, imprecative, or execrative, substitutive, hypotheticall, compellative, like to, or transcending an axiome, and dubitative.

Interrogation is that which is a perfect sentence, but requireth an answer, as, *Is it day?* for this is neither true nor false; so that *it is day*, is an axiom, *is it day?* an interrogation.

Percontation is a thing for which we cannot answer significantly, as in Interrogation, yes: but as thus, *he dwelleth in such a place.*

Imperative is a thing, in speaking whereof, wee command, as,

Go thou to the Inachian flood.

^f *Adjurative*, as, *witness thou Earth.*

Optative, which he we speak wishing, as,

^f *Ammom, in lib. me. 6. ep.*

*Great Jove who dost in Ida reign,
The Victory let Ajax gain.*

Imprecative, or execrative, as,

*As on the ground this wine I poure,
So may the Earth his blood devour.*

Substitutive, or expositive, as, *let this be a right line.*

Hypotheticall, as, *supposing the Earth to be the Centre of the Globe of the Sun.*

Compellative is a thing in speaking which we call another, as,

Laert.

Atrides, Agamemnon, King of men.

Like to, or transcending an axiom, is that which hath an axiomaticall manner of speaking; but because it superabounds in some particle or affection, it is not ranked amongst axioms, as,

*How beautilous is thy Virgin-Train!
How like to Priam's Son, that swaine!*

Dubitative is a thing different from an axiom, which, whosoever speaks, maketh a doubt, as,

Then are not life and grief of kin? all these are neither true nor false.

The other kind of perfect dicibles which compleat the Sentence, affirmeth or denyeth, and is either true or false. It is called *axiom*.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Categoremes.

a Laert.

^a **C**ategoreme is that which is prædicated of another, or a thing construed with one or more, or (as *Apollostrus*) a defective dicible, construed with the right case, to make an axiom.

b Ammon. in
Arist. *Fig.*

^b Whatsoever is prædicated of another, is prædicated of the name of the case; and both these are either *perfect*, as that which is prædicated, and together with the subject sufficient to make an Axiom. Or they are *defective*, and require some addition, to make thereof a perfect prædicate.

If that which is prædicated of a name, make an axiom, it is a Categorem, or *συμβάμα*, a congruity, as *walketh*, for example, *Socrates walketh*.

c Lib. 3.

But if it be prædicated of the case, (whereby transitions are made from one person to another, wherein it is necessary, that some oblique case, be likewise pronounced with the right, they are called *ὑποσάματα*, as an addition to the *συμβάμα*, (or as *Priscian* renders it, *lesse then congruities*) as, *Cicero saved his Country*.

Again, if that which is prædicated of some noun, require a case of some other noun to be added to make up the axiom, so as the construction bee made of two oblique cases, they are *ἡσυχάματα*, incongruities, or, according to *Ammonius*, *lesse then συμβάματα*, as, *it pleases me to come to thee*; whether the nouns onely or the words require it.

d Laert.

^d Again, of Categoremes, there are four kinds, *right*, *supine*, *neuter*, and *reciprocally active and passive*. *Right* are those which have a motion tending to another, and are construed with one of the oblique cases, for the making of a Categorem, as *heareth*, *seeth*, *discourseth*.

Supine are those which are consider'd from habit to an agent, and is construed with a passive particle, as, *I am heard*, *I am seen*.

Neuter, as those which are neither way, as, *to be wise*, *to walk*.

Reciprocally, active and passive are those, which seem supines but are not, for they are acts, as *κοιτᾶται*; for therein is included *καὶ ἀντιπᾶντος*.

The *right* (or *nominative case*), is so called by the Stoicks, whom the Grammarians follow, because it falleth directly from the notion which is in the mind. *Oblique cases* are the *Genitive*, *Dative* and *Accusative*.

CHAP. XX.

Of simple Axioms.

^a **A**xiom is that which is either true or false, or a thing perfect ^{a Laert.} by it selfe, negative, or affirmative, as far as it extends; or, (according to *Chrysippus*, in his dialectick definitions) Axiom is that which affirmeth or denyeth as far as it extends; as, *Dion walketh*. It is called Axiom ^{and in Greek ἀξίωμα}, because assent is either given to it or not: for he who saith, it is day, assenteth thereunto. If it be day, the axiom is true, if it be not, false.

^b Of Axioms, the first and most proper difference is of the ^{b Laert.} simple and not simple (thus divided by *Chrysippus*, and *Archidemus* and *Athenodorus*, and *Antipater*, and *Crinis*.)

^c Simple axioms are those which consist neither of one axiom ^{c Laert. Sext. Empir. adu. Log. cap. de vera.} twice taken, nor of different axioms, neither by one or more conjunctions; as, *It is day*, *'tis at night*, *Socrates disputes*. ^{d Laert.} Of simple axioms there are many kinds, *Apophatick*, or negative, *arnetic*, or universally negative; *stereick*, or privative; *categorick*, or predicative; *categoriack*, or indicative; *indefinit* and *mediate*.

^e Negative axioms are those, in which a negative particle is ^{e Laert. Apul. mel. app.} proposed; as, *If this is, that is not*. But if the negation be of the latter part of the Axiom, the other part not being negative, then the axiom is not negative, but *predicative*; as, *It happeneth to some pleasure not to be good*. This therefore declareth what happeneth to the thing, and therefore is predicative. ^{f Boet. in Cic. Top.} A species of negative axiom, is the *supernegative*, when, between the parts connected and copulated by two affirmations, a preposition with a negation is interposed, and that very negation denied; as, *If it is day, it is not light*. Of the same kinde are all those, wherein negation is proposed to negation; as, *It is not both day, and not light*.

^g Universally negative axioms are those, which consist of an u- ^{g Laert.} niversall negative particle, and a Categoriem; as, *no man walketh*.

^h Privative are those which consist of a privative particle, and ^{h Laert.} an axiom in power, as, *he is inhuman*.

ⁱ Predicative are those, which consist of a right case and a Ca- ^{i Laert.} tegorem; as, *Dion walketh*.

^k Indicative, or ¹ definitive is that which consists of a demon- ^{k Laert. I Sext. Empir.} strative right case, and a Categoriem; as, *this man walketh*.

^m Indefinit is that, which consists of one or more indefinit par- ^{m Laert. Sext. Empir.} ticles; as, *a certain man walketh, he is moved*.

ⁿ Intermediate are of this kinde, *a man sitteth, or a man walketh*; ^{n Sext. Empir.} *a certain man walketh* is indefinite, for it determines no single person; *that man sitteth* is definite, *Socrates sitteth* is intermediate; for it is not indefinite, because it determines the species, nor definite,

finite, because it is not pronounced with demonstration, but it is intermediate betwixt both.

- o Sext. Emp. ° An indefinite axiom, as, *some one sitteth*, is true, when the thing definite is true; as, *he sitteth*; but, if none of the singulars do sit, the indefinite axiom is not true, that *some one sitteth*.

CHAP. XXI.

Of not-simple Axioms.

a Laert. Sext.
Emp. adv. Log.
de verb.

^a **N**ot-simple axioms are those, which are in a manner double, consisting of one axiom diversified, or of axioms: of one axiom diversified; as, *if it be day, it is day*: of axioms; as, *if it be day, 'tis light*.

b Sext. Emp.
adv. Log. cap. de
verb.

^b In not-simple axioms, that which immediately followeth the conjunction *if*, or *whereas*, is called the *Antecedent*, the first, or the beginning; the rest is called the *ending*, or *Consequence*, or *second*. Notwithstanding that the axiom be pronounced by inversion; as, *It is light, if it be day*; for in this, the ending or consequence, is, *it is light*, although it be spoken first; the antecedent, *it is day*, although it be put in the second place; for it immediately followeth the conjunction *if*.

c Laert.

The Lawes and rules of Consequents are these: 1. ° From true followeth true; as, *if it be day, it followeth that it is light*. 2. From false followeth false; as, *if this be false that it is night, this is likewise false, it is dark*. 3. From false followeth true, as from this, the Earth flyeth, followeth, the Earth is. 4. From true doth not follow false; for from this, the Earth is, it followeth not, that the earth flies.

d Laert.

^d Of not-simple propositions there are many kinds, *Connex*, *Adnex*, *Conjunct*, *Causall*, *Declarative of the more*, and *Declarative of the lesse*.

e Laert.

^e *Connex* (according to *Chrysippus* in his *Dialectick*, and *Diogenes* in his *Dialectick Art*) is that which consists of the connective conjunction, *if*; which conjunction declareth, that the consequent is second to the first; as, *if it be day, it is light*. Of a diversified axiom, and the conjunction *if*, consisteth this *connex*, *If it be day, it is day*, these are properly right axioms. Of different axioms, and the conjunction *whereas*, this, *if it is day, 'tis light*.

f Philop. in A.
nal. prior.

^f *Connex* axioms are called also *tropicall*, because they turn from the antecedent to the consequent.

g Laert.

The rules of *connex* axioms are these: ° That is a *true connex*, wherein the contrary of the consequent is repugnant to the antecedent, as, *if it is day, 'tis light*; for, that *it is not light*, the contrary to the consequent, is repugnant to, *it is day*, the antecedent. A *false connex* is that wherein the contrary to the consequent

quent, is not repugnant to the Antecedent; as this, *if it is day, Dion walks*; for, that *Dion walketh not*, is not repugnant to, *it is day*. *Adnex* (which some reckon as a species of the *connex*) according to *Græc*, in his *Dialectick*, is an axiom connected by the conjunction *whereas*, beginning with an axiom, and ending with an axiom; as, *whereas it is day, it is light*, the conjunction sheweth, that the second is a consequent of the first, and that the first is subsistent.

LIXX. I A H

The rules of adnex axioms are these: ^h That is a true adnex, ^h Laert. which beginneth from true, and endeth in that which is consequent; as, *whereas it is day, the Sun is over the earth*. False is that, which beginneth from false, or endeth not; consequently, as, *whereas it is day, Dion walketh*, if this be said when it is not day.

A conjunct axiom is that, which is knit together by Conjunctions copulative; as, *it is both day, and it is light*. The rules thereof are these: That is a right conjunction wherein all things are true; as, *it is day, and it is light*. That is false, which hath something false. An axiom which hath neither conjunction nor disjunction, is to be taken in the sense of the speaker; for conjunction is sometimes taken for disjunction; as, *to me, and my heir*.

A disjunct axiom is that which is disjoyned, by a disjunctive conjunction; as, *either it is day, or it is night*. This conjunction sheweth, that one of the axioms is false.

All things that are disjoyned, are repugnant to one another; and their opposites likewise are repugnant. Of all things that are disjoyned, one must be true, the rest false, otherwise nothing at all is true, or all, or more then one are true; either those which are disjunct, will not be repugnant, or those which are opposite to them will not be contrary to one another; then the disjunct will be false, and is called *mendacium*, as this is, in which the opposites are not contrary; either thou runnest, or walkest, or standest, for they are repugnant to one another, but their opposites are not repugnant, because not to walk, and not to stand, and not to run, are not contrary in themselves; for, those things are said to be contrary, which cannot be true together. But you may at the same time neither walk, nor run, nor stand. Every disjunction therefore is not only true, but necessary; for if of contraries there could be a false conjunction, no disjunction could be true.

A Causall axiom is that which is connected by this conjunction, because, as because it is day, 'tis light; for the first is, as it were cause of the second. The rules thereof are these: A causall conjunction is true, when beginning from true, it endeth in the consequent, and cannot have the antecedent for its consequent; as because it is day, 'tis light: but this axiom, it is light, doth not follow from the other; it is day. A

A false causall is that which either beginneth from false, or endeth in that which is not consequent, or whose antecedent may be the consequent, as, because it is night, Dion walkes.

An Axiom declarative of the more, is that which is construed with this conjunction, more, as it is more day then night. Declarative of the less, is contrary to the former, as, it is less day then night.

CH A P. XXII.

Of contrary Axioms.

Lat.

Contrary Axioms are those which are repugnant to one another, according to truth and falsehood, whereof one affirmeth, the other denyeth, as, *it is day, it is not day*. Only Negatives are contrary, *impossibile*, and opposite, and repugnant, for onely in contraries one proposition is true, the other false. The other three kinds of contraries alledged by Aristotle, are pronounced without a conjunction. Whatsoever is pronounced without a conjunction, is neither true nor false, for true and false belongeth to axiom. Axiom is a speech which consisteth in the conjunction of some thing, whereas of Aristotle's other three kinds of contraries, none are conjunct but simple, as black and white, double and single, sight and blindness.

Adverse are (as likewise defined by Aristotle) those which in the same kind are most distant. Nothing that is pronounced by negation is adverse, (*adversus*) to another, for then the adverse to Vertue will be not Vertue, and to Vice not Vice, and under not Vertue will be included many other things beside vice, even, a stone, a horse, and whatsoever is beside Vertue; under not vice, will be found Vertue and all other things. Thus all things would be adverse to one, and the same the adverse to Vertue and Vice. Moreover if Vertue were not adverse to Vice, but to not-vice, the intermediate will be adverse both to good and bad, which is absurd.

* Simplic.

The rules of contraries are these. 1. * Contrariety is principally in acts, habits, and the like. 2. Caregorems and qualitatives are called as it were contrary. Prudently and imprudently in some manner lead to things contrary, but contraries absolutely are in things: and prudence is so immediately contrary to imprudence, not this to that:

Contraries are either *disjunctive* or *subdisjunctive*, *disjunctive* as when wee say, *it is either day or night*. *Subdisjunctive* are of two kinds, either *in whole*, betwixt universalls, as *every living creature either doth or suffereth, no living Creature either doth or suffereth*; or *in part*, betwixt particulars; as *he either sitteth or walketh; he neither sitteth nor walketh*.

The

The rules of contraries are these; of Disjunctives one being asserted, the other is necessarily taken away; one being taken away, the other is necessarily asserted.

Of subdisjunctives in whole, both cannot be true, both may be false; both cannot be affirmative, both cannot be negative.

Of subdisjunctives in part, both may be true, because they are taken in part.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of Possible and Impossible, Necessary and Unnecessary, Probable, Paradoxall and Reasonable axioms.

^a Moreover of axioms some are *possible*, others *impossible*; some ^{a Laert.} *necessary*, others not *unnecessary*. A *possible* Axiom is that which is susceptible of a true prædication, without obstruction from those things, which, though externall, are yet contingent with the thing it self; as *Diocles lives*. *Impossible* is that which can never be susceptible of truth, externalls oppugning it, as, *the Earth flies*. *Necessary* is that which is so true, as that it cannot any way receive a false prædication, or, may receive it, but those things which are extrinsecall, will not permit that it be true, as *Vertue profiteth*. *Not-necessary* is that which may be either true or false, exterior things not obstructing it, as *Dion walks*.

^b These future repugnants and their parts are according to the same manner, as the present and the past. For, if it be true that the thing either shall be or shall not be, it must be either true or false, because futures are determined according to these; as, if a Navy is built to morrow, it is true to say that it shall be built, but if it be not, it is false to say that it shall be built, because it will not be, therefore it will either be or not be, and consequently one of the two is false.

Concerning possibles and necessities, there is great difference betwixt *Diodorus* and *Chrysippus*. ^c *Diodorus* holds that only to be possible which either is, or will hereafter be. That which neither is, nor ever shall be is impossible. As *for me to be at Corinth* is possible, if I ever were there, or ever shall be there, but if I never was there, nor ever shall be there, it is impossible. That *a Boy shall be a Grammarian* is not possible, unless hereafter he come to be one.

^d On the contrary, *Chrysippus* held, that those things which neither are nor ever shall be, are yet possible to be, as, *to break a gemme*, though it never come to be broken. ^e Moreover that from possibles an impossible may follow, as in this Axiom, which is a true connexion: *If Dion be dead, He (pointing to Dion) is dead*: The

G g g g g

an-

^b Simplic. in
lib. Arist. de
opposit.

^c Johan. Gram-
mat. in Arist.
de opposit.

^d Cic. de fa.

^e Alexand. A-
phr. d in anal.
prior.

antecedent, if *Dion be dead* is possible, because it may at some time be true that he shall be dead; but this Axiom, *he is dead*, is impossible: for *Dion* being dead, the Axiom likewise is abolished, that *he is dead*, seeing he is no longer that man, capable of being demonstrated by the pronoun, *He*, for, *he*, is a demonstration of a living creature. If therefore *Dion* being not yet dead, this word, *He*, may be said of him, being dead, it cannot be said, *he is dead*. So that in this place, *he is dead*, is impossible. For it were not impossible, if, some time after the death of *Dion*, of whom it was before prædicated in the connexion whilst he lived, it might be again prædicated, *he is dead*; but because that cannot be, it is impossible, that, *he is dead*, should be prædicated of him.

d *Epist.* 11.
19.

To conclude, ^dsome held with *Diodorus*, that whatsoever is past, is true of necessity. That to impossible there followeth not a possible, and that what cannot be done, neither is nor shall be true. Others (as *Cleanthes* and *Antipater*) that something is possible that neither is nor shall be; that to possible followeth not impossible, and that which is past, is not true of necessity. Others, that something is possible which is not true; that whatsoever is past, is true of necessity, and that to possible followeth also impossible.

e *Laert.*

Furthermore of Axioms, some are ^eprobable, some paradoxall, some reasonable. A probable Axiom is that which perswadeth us by a specious shew to assent unto it; as, *whatsoever bringeth forth another is a mother*; which is false, for the hen is not the mother of the egge.

f *Laert.*

g *Cic. Parad.*
h *Epist.* 1.25

^fParadoxall Axioms are those which seem true onely to the wife, ^gcontrary to the opinion of all others. ^hThese are likewise in other Arts, besides Philosophy; for what is stranger then to prick the eyes for the recovery of sight? If we say this to one ignorant of Chirurgery, will he not laugh at it? It is not therefore strange, that such things as are true in Philosophy should seem paradoxes to the unlearned.

i *Laert.*

ⁱA reasonable Axiom, is that which hath many conditions requisite to the truth thereof, as, *I shall live to morrow*.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of Reciprocall Axioms.

Hitherto of the contrariety and repugnance of Axioms. Now of their consent and agreement, whereby one followeth and is correspondent to another, either according to truth or falsehood, by *reciprocation*.

Of Reciprocation there are three kinds: the first *α' αναποδο*,
perversion

perversion, a migration into false; the second *inversion*, *conversion*, a migration into true; the third *indrapia*, *equipollence*, into the same.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Signes.

TO the place of Axioms appertain likewise Signes. ^a *Signe* is ^a *Sext. Emp. hypot. 2. 1.* an axiom antecedent, in a true connexion, and having power to detect the consequent.

^b *Signe* is taken two waies: Commonly, for whatsoever falleth under any sence, and signifieth something that proceedeth from it: and Properly, for that which declareth a thing, which is not manifest. ^b *Sext. adv. log. cap. de signo.*

Things which are certain require no signe, for they are comprehended of themselves; neither those which are wholly uncertain, for they can no way be comprehended; but, those only, which are uncertain in time, or by nature, may be comprehended by signes, but not by the same. Things that are uncertain in time, are comprehended by commemorative signes; things uncertain by nature, are comprehended by demonstrative. ^{Sext. Empir. ibid. by Pyrrh. hyp. 2. 10. Galen. Hist. Philos.}

Of signes therefore, some are *demonstrative*, others *communicative*. A *communicative* signe is that which is so neer to the thing, that together with the signe the thing it selfe appeareth, into the knowledge whereof the signe bringeth us, as smoak, which when we see, we know it proceeds from fire. A *demonstrative* signe is that, which not being observed before with an evident signe, leads us by that to the knowledge of the thing; as when a female hath milk, we presently know that she hath brought forth.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Reasons or Arguments.

DIALLECTICK is the discipline of speech, concluded by reason. *Reason*, *λογος*, sometimes called also *Argument*, and *Interrogation*, is, according to ^a *Crimis*, that which consists of one or more suppositions, and an assumption, and an inference; as, ^a *Laert.*

If it be day, it is light. } *Supposition.*
 But it is day: } *Assumption.*
 Therefore it is light. } *Inference.*

b Alexand. Aphrod. in anal. prior.

The Reason of the Stoicks differs from the Syllogismes of Aristotle in three respects: First, a Syllogisme, according to Aristotle, cannot have lesse then two propositions, a reason may have but ones as, *Thou livest, therefore thou breathest*: which kinde Antipater calls *συναμματα*. Secondly, in Syllogismes, something besides that which is granted in the premises; but in Reasons, the conclusion may be the same with both, or either of the sumptions. The first are called *συνόψεις*, as,

If it is day, it is day.

But it is day:

Therefore it is day.

c Alex. Aphrod. in anal. prior.

The second are called *ἀναφορὰν ποσιν*, as,

It is either day, or not day.

But, it is not day,

Therefore it is not day.

d Alex. Aphrod. in anal. prior.

Lastly, in Syllogismes, the conclusion must necessarily follow, by reason of the premises, whereas there are three kinds of reasons which have not this property: The first, *συναμματα*, already mentioned: The second *ἀμεθόδου ποσιν*, not methodically conclusive reasons; as

The first is greater then the second.

The second is greater then the third:

Therefore the first is greater then the third.

This concludes necessarily, but not Syllogistically, unless this proposition be put in the first place: *What is greater then another, is greater also then that which is lesse then that other*. Of the same kinde is that Theorem in the first of Euclid's Elements; *This line is equall to that, therefore this line is likewise equall to that*, which is true indeed; but to conclude syllogistically, requires this universal proposition, *Those which are equall to a third, are equall to one another*.

The third kinde of reasons, from which Syllogism differeth by this property, are *περίσπλιοντες λόγοι*, redundant reasons, and those of two kinds: The first are such as have a superfluous sumptions as,

Every iust thing is honest,

Every honest thing is good,

Every good thing is expetible in it self;

Therefore every iust thing is good.

† The

The second are those in which the proper conclusion is not inferred, but something *consequent*, be *accident*, as that argument of Epicure:

Whatsoever is dissolved hath not sense,

Whatsoever hath not sense, is not to us.

Therefore death pertaineth not to us.

Whereas to conclude syllogistically, we should say, *Therefore whatsoever is dissolved, pertaineth to us.*

In a reason or argument, the *sumption* ^{hypothese} and the *assumption* ^{propositio} (termed by Aristotle *premissae*) are axioms received by consent of the adversary, for construction of that which is called Inference ^{consequens} (by Aristotle *conclusio*, conclusion) because it is inferred from the rest.

Of *sumption* and *assumption* according to Chrysippus, there are four differences: The first *Scientifick*: The second *Exercitatorie* (as Aristotle calls it) *Dialectick*: The third *Probable* and *Rhetoricall*: The fourth *Sophistick*.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of *conclusive* Reasons.

OF Reasons there are two kinds, *conclusive*, and *not-conclusive*. *Conclusive* reasons are those, in which the *Sumptions* being granted, from the concession thereof, the *Inference* seemeth to follow.

Conclusive reasons, in respect of their matter, are of two kinds, *true* and *false*. *True* are those, which from true *sumptions* collect a true inference, *Not-true* the contrary.

The Lawes and rules of true and false reasons, are these:

1. Truth is consequent to truth: as, If it is day, it is light.
2. False is consequent to false: as, If it be false that it is night, it is likewise false that it is dark. 3. False is consequent to true: as, Earth, if it flies is earth. 4. False is not consequent to true: for, because it is earth, it is not therefore consequent that it flies.

Again, of true reasons, some are *demonstrative*, others *not-demonstrative*. A *demonstrative* reason is that, which by things that are certain, or perspicuous, collecteth that which is uncertain and lesse perspicuous: as, If sweat issue through the skin, we may understand pores; but sweat issues through the skin, therefore we may understand pores.

Not-demonstrative are contrary: as, If it is day, it is light; but it is day, therefore it is light. Herein the inference, it is light, is certain.

Of Syllogistick Conclusive Reasons, or Syllogisms.

CONCLUSIVE reasons, as to their form likewise, are of two kinds; *Syllogistically conclusive*, and *not Syllogistically conclusive*.
^a *Syllogistically-conclusive* Reasons (or Syllogisms) are those which either cannot be more concluded, or whereof one or more of the sumptions are reduced to those which cannot be concluded again; as, if *Diop* walks, he is moved.

^a *Laert.*

Syllogismes (by which the Stoicks understand only the tropicall, or hypotheticall,) are of three kinds, *connex*, *disjunct*, *conjunct*.

^b *Simplific. in Epist.*

^b A *connex* Syllogism is, when two are so connected in themselves, that one is the antecedent, the other the consequent, in such manner, as, if the antecedent be asserted, the consequent followeth; and the consequent being taken away, the antecedent is likewise taken away, as, if it be day, it is not night, this antecedent is true, therefore it followeth, it is night. This kind of Syllogisme pertains to the first and second moods. In the first it is called from Position of the antecedent, to Position of the consequent; in the second, from negation of the antecedent, to negation of the consequent. The Lawes concerning the truth, or falshood of these Syllogismes are the same with those of *connex* axioms.

Of *connex* Syllogismes there are two kinds; *connex in themselves*, as, if it is light, it is light, but it is light, therefore it is light; and *connex by others*; as, if it is day, it is light, but it is day, therefore it is light.

^c *Cic. Topic. I.*

A *conjunct* Syllogisme, is, when we deny something conjunct, and to these adde another negation, and of these take the first, that what remains be taken away, as, it cannot be that a Legacy is money, and money not a Legacy; but a Legacy is money, therefore money is a Legacy.

^d *Cic. ibid.*

^e *Simplific.*

A *disjunct* Syllogism is that in which there cannot be more then one thing true, or, that in which if one be, the other is not, or, if one be not, the other is, as, It is either day or night, but it not night, therefore it is day; for one being asserted, the other is taken away, and so on the contrary.

^f *Sext. Hypotyp. Pyrrh. cap. 14.*

The evidence of this Syllogisme *Chrysippus* conceives to be so great, that even dogs have knowledge thereof. For coming to a place where there are three waies, if by the sent they find that the Beast hath not gone in two of them, they run directly to the third without senting, as if they argued thus, the Beast went either this way, or that way, or that way, but neither this way nor that way, therefore that way: The Lawes of disjunct Syllogismes are the same as those of disjunct Axioms.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of Moods.

^a SYLlogistick, conclusive Reasons are disposed into *Moods*. Of ^a *Laert.*
Moods there are two kinds, the first *simple*, properly called a
 Mood, *πρῶτον*, defined a kind of figure of the Reason, as thus,

*If the first is, the second is,
 But the first is,
 Therefore the second is.*

(It is observable by the way, that the *Stoicks* for letters used numbers.) The other *compounded*, called *συνθετον*, as being consistent of both reason and Mood, as,

*If Plato liveth, Plato breatheth,
 But the first,
 Therefore the second.*

This is used in a long Syntax, that it be not necessary to speak a long assumption, or a long inference, but they abbreviate them thus, but the first, therefore the second.

Of Moods or Tropes there are two kinds, one of *indemonstrables*, so termed, not that they cannot be demonstrated, but because they conclude so evidently, that they need not be reprov'd; the other of *demonstrables*.

Of Indemonstrable Moods, there are (according to *Chrysippus*) five, according to * others more or lesse.

The first, wherein every reason consists of a connex, and an antecedent from which beginneth the connex, and the consequent is inferred, as,

* *Cic Topic.
 Martian Capel.*

*If the first, then the second,
 But the first,
 Therefore the second.*

The second indemonstrable is, which, by the consequent of the connex, and the contrary of the consequent, hath a conclusion contrary to the antecedent, as,

*If it is day, 'tis light,
 But it is night,
 Therefore, it is not day.*

The

The third is, that which by a negative complication, and one of those which are in the complication, inferrs the contrary to that which remains, as,

*Plato is not both dead and alive,
But Plato is dead,
Therefore Plato is not alive.*

The fourth is that which by a disjunctive, and one of those which is in the disjunctive, concludeth the contrary to that which remains, as,

*Either it is the first or second,
But it is the first,
Therefore it is not the second.*

The fifth is that wherein the whole reason is connected by a disjunctive, and one of those which are in the disjunctive of the contrary, inferreth the rest, as,

*Either it is night, or it is day,
But it is not night.
Therefore it is day.*

CHAP. XXXI.

Of not-Syllogistick-conclusive Reasons.

^a **R**Easons *not-syllogistically-conclusive* (which are likewise especially called (as their genus) conclusive in opposition to Syllogismes) are those which conclude not by way of Syllogisme, as,

^a Laert.

*It is false, that it is both night and day,
But it is day,
Therefore it is not night.*

And this of Chrysippus.

*Whatsoever is good is laudable,
Whatsoever is laudable is honest,
Therefore whatsoever is good is honest.*

These *not-syllogistick*, or *categorick-conclusives*, are frequently used by the Stoicks (as by Zeno in Cicero) but immethodically,
not

not reduced to Mood and figure. Those they applied onely to tropicall reasons, as in which consisteth the sole way and order of inference. The Categorical are not Syllogismes, because in them something is ever omitted, and therefore they are ἀμειβόμενοι, immethodically conclusive; as in that argument of Chrysippus last mentioned, two assumptions, and an inference are omitted, for it ought to be thus,

*If it be good, it is laudable,
But it is good,
Therefore it is laudable.*

And again,

*If it be laudable, it is honest,
But it is laudable,
Therefore it is honest.*

Hence are derived those reasons which are called ἐπιβαλλόμενοι, and ἐπιβαλλόμενοι, *adjacent* and *adject*, consisting of propositions continually assumed without conclusions. *Adject* are those whose conclusion is omitted; *Adjacent*, those whose demonstrative proposition is omitted, as,

*The first of every second,
The second of every third,
The third of every fourth,
Therefore the first of every fourth.*

In this *adject*, the conclusion is omitted, which is, therefore the first of every third

CHAP. XXXI.

Of not-conclusive Reasons.

^a **N**ot-conclusive Reasons are those, whose opposite to the inference is repugnant to the connexion of the sumptions: ^a Laert. ^b They are of four kinds. 1. By incoherence. 2. By redundancy. ^b Sext. Empir. ^c 3. By being in an ill figure. 4. By defect. ^c adv. Logic.

By incoherence, when the propositions have no conjunction or communion with one another, nor with the inference, as,

*If it is day, it is light,
But corn is sold,
Therefore it is light.*

H h h h h

For

For neither, *it is day*, hath any communion with, *Corn is sold*, nor both of them together, with, *it is light*; but each dependeth upon something else.

By redundance, when something is assumed to the proposition extrinsecall and superfluous, as,

*If it is day, it is light,
But it is day, and Vertue profiteth,
Therefore it is light.*

For *Vertue profiteth* is superfluously assumed with the other proposition, the inference depending upon the other two.

By being in an ill figure, as, this is a right figure,

*If the first, the second,
But the first is,
Therefore the second.*

But this,

*If the first, the second,
But not the second, ----*

Is not conclusive, not that in this figure, there cannot be reason which may collect truth from truth, for that it may do as thus,

*If there are four, six are eight,
But three are not four,
Therefore six are not eight.*

But because there may be some ill reasons in it, as this,

*If it be day, 'tis light,
But it is not day,
Therefore it is not light.*

By defect, when there want one of the collective propositions, as,

*Riches are either ill or good,
But riches are not good;
Therefore they are ill.*

For in the disjunct there wanteth this, or indifferent, so that to be perfect the sumption should be thus, *Riches are ill, or good, or indifferent.*

CHAP. XXXII.

Of fallacious Reasons or Sophismes.

BY Dialectick are discerned true and false reasons: the latter are *Sophismes*, proper to *Sophists*, who dispute for vain-glory, or gain; as true reasons are to *Logicians*, whose end is only to finde out truth.

Of fallacious reasons there are many kinds; the *Quiescent* reason, or *Sorites*, the *Lying*, the *Inexplicable*, the *Sluggish*, the *Dominative*, the *Vailed*, *Electra*, the *Horned*, the *Crocodilite*, the *Reciprocall*, the *Nullity*, the *Defective*, the *Mower*, the *Bald*, the *Occult*, the *Negative*.

^a *Sorites*, named from *οἶκος*, a heap, is, ^b when from things evidently true, by short mutations, the dispute is brought to things evidently false: ^c as, *Are not two few? are not three so likewise? and four, and so on to ten? But, two are a few, therefore ten.* ^d It is called also *ἡσυχαστικός*, the quiescent reason, ^e because the way to withstand it is by stopping, and withholding the assent.

The lying reason, *ψευδιστικός λόγος*, is a captious argument, not to be dissolved. Of this, see the life of *Eubulides*.

The inexplicable reason, *ἀνερμήσιμος λόγος*, so called, from the intricate nature thereof, not to be dissolved, wherefore it seems to be the same with the lying, and perhaps the genus to most of those which follow.

The sluggish reason, *ἀργός λόγος*, is manifested by this example: ^f *If it be decreed that you shall recover of this sicknesse, you shall recover whether you take Physick or not. Again, if it be decreed you shall not recover, you shall not recover, whether you take Physick or not: Therefore it is to no purpose to take Physick.* This argument is justly termed sluggish, saith *Cicero*, because by the same reason, all action may be taken away from life.

The Dominative reason, *κυριαρχικός λόγος*; of this already in the life of *Diodorus*.

The vailed reason, *ἐκκεκρυμμένος λόγος*: Of this, and *Electra*, and the *Horned* reason, *κροκοειδής λόγος*, in the life of *Eubulides*.

The *Crocodilite*, so named from this *Ægyptian* fable: ^h A woman sitting by the side of *Nilus*, a *Crocodile* snatched away her child, promising to restore him, if she would answer truly to what he asked; which was, *Whether he meant to restore him or not.* She answered, *Not to restore him*, and challeng'd his promise, as having said the truth. He replied, that *if he should let her have him, she had not told true.*

The reciprocal reasons, *μεταπρὸς ἑαυτοὺς*, such was that of ⁱ *Protagoras* the Sophist, against *Euathlus*, a rich young man, his disciple, who promised him a great summe of mony for teaching him; H h h h h a where-

^a Said.
^b Ulpian. 48.
^c ad Sabin.
^d Laert. though the example be falsely applied, as Burhus and Calaubon have observed.
^e Laert. in Chrysip.
^f Cic. Acad. quest. 4.
^g Agel. 9. 13.

^g Cicero de Nat.

^h Dorotheus, in Aphe.

ⁱ Agell. 5. 10.

whereof halfe he paid in hand, the other halfe was to be paid the first that he should plead before the Judges, and carry the cause. Having learned long, and attained a great perfection in Rhetorick, he forbore to plead in publick, that he might defraud Protagoras. Protagoras sues him, and the cause comming to hearing, begins thus: Know, foolish young man, that which way soever the Cause goes, whether for thee or against thee, thou must pay what I demand. If against thee, it will be given me by judgment; if for thee, thou must pay it according to our agreement. Euatlas answers: I might have been intrapped by your subtilty, if I did not plead my selfe, but had employ'd some other to plead for me. Now I rejoyce doubly in the victory, that I shall be too hard for you, not only in cause, but in argument. Know therefore, my most wise Master, that which way soever the cause go, either with me, or against me, I will not pay what you demand. If it go with me, the judgment will acquit me; if against me, you are to have nothing by our agreement. The Judges not able to determine it, dismist them both.

b Olyf.

^k The nullity, *ἐμὴ*, used by Ulysses, who called himselfe *ἐμὴ*, no body, when he hurt Polypheme, whence it came to be so named.

The defective reason, *ἀσυνεπὴς λόγος*, mentioned by Laertius in Zenone: The mower, *θερίζων λόγος*, by Lucian: The bald, *γυμνὸς λόγος*, by Laertius in Eubulide: The occult, *ἀφανὴς λόγος*, by Laertius in Eubulide: The negative, *ἀπορρίπτον λόγος*, by Laertius in Chrysippo, and by Epictetus. But of these enough.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of Method.

a Cic. Offic. 2.

There are two kinds of disputation: ^a One, when the truth it selfe is sublely polished in the dispute: The other, when every expression is accommodated to the vulgar opinion; for, we must use popular and usuall words, when we speak of popular opinions, which Panetius in the like manner hath done.

b Cic. de fin. 3.

^b The first way was peculiar to the Stoicks, short, acute, and spinous, called likewise Logick, most worthy of Philosophy; for this useth definitions, divisions, and the lights which they afford, as likewise similitudes, dissimilitudes, and the nice acute distinction of them.

The vulgar way of dispute is likewise two-fold: One by continued oration: The other by question and answer; the first cal-

c Senec. Epist. 14. 90.

d Cic. de fin. 2.

e Senec. Ep. 14.

f Cic. de fin. 2.

g Cic. ibid.

led ^c Analytick, or ^d Rhetoricall; the other ^e Topick, or ^f Dialecticall. ^g Though the first be delightfull, yet the latter is more commo-
dious, when we insist on particulars, and understand what every man granteth, what every man denyeth, what we would have concluded from concessions, and brought to an end. For, when

when a speech is carried on like a Torrent, although it bears many things along with it; yet we can hold nothing, we cannot stop the rapid course of an oration. ^b The other, concluding as Zeno used, more shortly and narrowly, lyeth more open to reprehension. As a River in its course, cannot at all, or very hardly be corrupted, but water shut up, easily: So by a fluent oration, the faults of the opposer are carried quite away; in a narrow speech, they are not easily defended.

^h Cic. de nat. deor. 2.

But each of these methods hath a severall use, the first is proper for exposition of Arts and Sciences, the other for disputation.

THE SECOND PART.

CHAP. I.

ETHICK, and the parts thereof.

^a **T**HE Morall part of Philosophy is divided into these places; ^a Laert. Of appetite, Of good and ill, Of passions, Of Virtue, of the End; Of the first estimation, of Actions, Offices, exhortations and dehortations.

Thus distinguisheth Chrysippus, Archidemus, Zeno of Tarsis, Apollodorus, Diogenes (the Babylonians) Antipater and Possidonius. But Zeno the Cittiean, and Cleanthes, as being more antient, were lesse accurate in their manner of treating upon these things.

CHAP. II.

Of Appetite.

THE consideration of Ethick, beginneth properly from Appetite. ^a Appetite is moved by Phantasie of an Office, for it is the impulsion of the soul to something. ^a Stob. eclóg. Ethic.

Appetite in rationall and irrationall Creatures is different; ~~but~~ is not rationall appetite, but a species of rationall appetite. Rational appetite is defined an impulsion of the intellect to the doing of something. ~~Species~~ is a species of practick appetite, being an impulsion of the Intellect to something future. Hence appetite is taken four waies, for rationall and irrationall inclination, and for rationall and irrationall aversion. To these may be added the habit

habit of Appetition, which is likewise called appetite, the Origin of all appetitive acts.

Of practick appetite there are many species, of which are

1. *αἰσῶσις*, a Designation.
2. *ὑποβολή*, an appetite before appetite.
3. *προσβολή*, an action before action.
4. *ἐν τῷ νῦν*, an appetite to something now existent.
5. *αἰσῶσις*, a will by ratiocination,
6. *προαίρεσις*, a Will before Will.
7. *βέλουςις*, an appetite joined with reason.
8. *θέλωσις*, a spontaneous Will.

CHAP. III.

Of first naturall Appetite.

^a Laert.

^a The first appetite of a living creature is to preserve it self, this being from the beginning proper to it by nature, as *Chrysippus* in his first Book of Ends, who affirms that the care of our selves, and conscioufnesse thereof, is the first property of all living Creatures. For, Nature producing a living Creature, intended either to alienate it from it self, or to commend unto its own care; but the first is not likely; it followeth therefore, that Nature commendeth to every thing the preservation of it selfe, whereby it repulseth whatsoever is hurtfull, and pursueth what is convenient.

^b Cic. de fin. 3.

^b As soon therefore as a living Creature cometh into the World, it is conciliated to it self; commended to the conservation of it self and its own state, and to the election of such things as may preserve its state, but alienated from destruction, and from all such things as may destroy it. This is manifest in as much as before the accession of pleasure or grief, young creatures desire those things which conduce to their wellfare; and refuse the contrary, which would not be, if they did not love their own state, and fear destruction. Neither could they desire any thing without having some sense of themselves, whereby they love themselves, and what belongs to them. Hence it is manifest, that the principle of this love is derived from themselves.

^c Laert.

^d Cic. fin 3.

^c Whereas some must hold the first appetite of a living creature to be that of pleasure, that is false. ^d The greater part of Stoicks conceive that Pleasure is not to be placed amongst the naturall principles of love to our selves, for if nature had so ordered it, many dishonest things would have followed. ^e Pleasure is an after-accession, when as Nature enquiring by it self into it self, receiveth those things which are agreeable to its constitution, after

^e Laert.

ter

ter which manner living creatures are exhilarated, and plants sprout forth. Nature hath thus far made no difference betwixt plants and living creatures, that whereas plants are ordered without appetite or sense, there is in living creatures, something according to the nature of plants: But, there being over and above in living creatures, an innate appetite, whereby they go to those things that are proper for them, the naturall part in them is governed by the appetitive.

^f That we naturally love those things which are first proposed unto us by nature, may be argued from hence, in that there is no man, if both were put to his choice, but had rather have all his limbs able and sound, rather then uselesse and imperfect. These comprehensions we conceive fit to be acquired for their own sake, because they have in themselves something, as it were, complex, including Truth. This is discernable in young ones, whom we see delighted, though it nothing concernes them, if they themselves finde out any thing by reason. Even the Arts we conceive to be assumed for themselves, aswell because in these there is something worthy assumption, as because they consist of knowledge, and contain somethings constituted by reason and power.

CHAP. IV.

Of Appetites consequent to the first.

^a Thus according to the first innate principles of Nature, those things which are according to nature being expetible in themselves, their contraries avoidable in themselves, the first office is to conserve it selfe in the state of nature, the next, to obtain those things which are according to nature.

Here beginneth good to be first understood, for it is the first conciliation of man to things according to nature. This Good, as soon as man receiveth intelligence or notion thereof, and seeth the order and concord of Offices, he esteemeth far above those things which he formerly loved, and by rationall knowledge collecteth, that herein is placed the chief good of man, laudable and expetible in it selfe. To this chiefe good, which consisteth in homologic or convenience, all honest actions having reference, honesty it selfe, which is reckoned amongst the good, though it rise afterward, is notwithstanding alone expetible in its own power and dignity. But, of those which are the first objects of nature, none is expetible in it selfe.

Now whereas offices proceed from the first naturall objects, they must necessarily be referred to the same; so as all Offices tend to the fulfilling of the first naturall appetites; yet, not so,

as

as if therein consisted the ultimate good. Honest action is in the first conciliation of nature, for it is consequent, and ariseth as we said afterward; yet, it is according to nature, and much more allecive then all that go before it.

And seeing that all offices proceed from the first naturall appetites, even wisdom it selfe must be derived from thence likewise. But as it often happens, that he who is recommended to another, more esteemeth him to whom he is recommended; then the person which recommended him: so it is not strange, that we being recommended to wisdom by the first naturall appetite, afterwards more esteem that wisdom, then those things whereby we arrived at it. And as our limbs are given to us for a certain reason of living, so the appetite of the soul is given, not for every kinde of life, but for one certain form of living; so likewise reason and perfect reason. For, as action is proper to a Player, motion to a Dancer; yet, not any, but one certain kinde: so the life that is to be acted, is in one certain kinde, not in any, which kinde we call convenient and consentaneous. Wisdom is not like the art of a Pilot, or a Physician; but rather to that Action we mentioned, and to Dancing, that the extreame, that is, the effect of the Art be in the Art it selfe, and not extrinsecall. There is another similitude betwixt Wisdom and these Arts, for in them are those things which are done rightly; yet, are not all the parts whereof they consist contained therein. Things done rightly, or Rectitudes, contain all numbers of vertue; for, only wisdom is wholly converted into it selfe, which is not in other Arts. But, improperly is the Art of a Pilot and a Physician, compared with the ultimate of Wisdom: For, wisdom includeth Fortitude and Justice, and judgeth all things that happen to man to be below it, which happeneth not in other Arts: but, none can hold these vertues which we last mentioned, unlesse he affirm, there is nothing that is different, but honest and dishonest.

CHAP. V.

Of Good and Ill.

^a Stob.

Hitherto of Appetites, we come next to their Objects. ^a Things (according to Zeno) are whatsoever participate of Essence. Of things, some are *good*, some *ill*, some *indifferent*.

^b Cic. de fin. 3.

^c Sext. Empir.
^{Pyrrh.} 3. 20.

^b *Good* is severall waies defined by the Stoicks; but their definitions tend all to one end. ^c Good is profit, or that which differeth not from profit. Profit is vertue, and vertuous action, not different from profit is a vertuous man, and a friend. For vertue being a quodammodotative Hegemonick, and vertuous action

on being an operation according to vertue, is plainly profit. A vertuous man and a friend is not different from profit; for profit is a part of Vertuous, as being the Hegemoniack thereof. Now the wholes are neither the same with their parts, for a man is not a hand, nor different from their parts, for they subsist not without parts; wherefore the whole is not different from its parts, and consequently, a vertuous man being the whole, in respect of his Hegemoniack, which is profit, is not different from profit.

Good is by some defined that which is expetible in it selfe; by others, that which assisteth to felicity, or compleateth it: by *Diogenes*, that which is absolute by nature; [or, that which is perfect, according to the nature of a rationall creature.] The consequent thereof is a beneficent motion, or state absolute in nature. e Cic. de finib. 3.
f Laert.

Whereas things are known, either by use, or conjunction, or similitude, or collation, by this fourth kinde is the knowledge of good; for when from those things which are according to nature, the minde ascendeth by collation of reason, then it attaineth the notion of good.

^b Good is known and named, not by accession, increase, or comparison with other things, but by its proper power. For as Hony, though it be most sweet, yet, in its proper kinde of tast, not comparative to any other, we perceive it to be sweet: So this good of which we speak, is that which is most to be esteemed, but that estimation consisteth in the kinde, not the magnitude. For, estimation being neither amongst the good nor ill, whatsoever you apply it to, it will remain in its kinde. Different therefore is the proper estimation of vertue, which consisteth in the kinde, not in increase. h Cic. de finib. 3.

ⁱ To *Good* belongeth all vertue, as Prudence, Justice, Temperance, Fortitude, and whatsoever participates of those, as vertuous actions and persons. ^k Accessions hereto are joy, cheerfulness, and the like. i Laert. Stob.
k Laert.

^l *Ills* are the contrary vices, as Imprudence, Injustice, Intemperance, Pusillanimity, and whatsoever participates of vice, as vicious actions and persons. ^m The accessions hereunto are discontent, affliction, and the like. l Laert. Stob.
m Laert.

ⁿ Of *Goods*, some, as we have said, are *Vertues*, others *not-vertues*, as, Joy, Hope, and the like. In like manner of *Ills*, some are *Vices*, as those already mentioned; others *not-vices*, as Griefe and Fear. n Stob.

Again, ^o of *Goods*, some are *continuall* in all the vertuous, and at all times; such is all vertue, sounde sense, wise appetition, and the like. Others are *intermissive*, as joy, hope, and prudent counsell, which are not in all the wise, nor at all times. o Stob.

In like manner of *Ills*, some are *continuall* in all, and alwaies

in the imprudent, as all vice, and imprudent fence, and imprudent appetite: Others intermissive, as griefe, fear, and imprudent answer, which are not alwaies in the wicked, nor at all times.

p Laert. Stob. Again, of *Good* there are three kinds: The first *from which* profit commeth, as from its first cause, such is vertue: The second, *by which* profit commeth, as vertue, and vertuous action: The

third *that which may* profit, as vertue, and vertuous actions, and a vertuous man, and a friend, and the Gods, and good Demons.

q Sext. Empir. Thus the second signification includeth the first, and the third, both the first and second.

r Laert. Stob. In like manner of *Ills*, there are three kinds: First, that from which hurt originally proceedeth, as vices: Secondly, that by which hurt commeth, as vicious actions: Lastly, and most largely, whatsoever is able to hurt.

s Laert. Stob. Again, of *Goods*, some are *in the Soul*, as vertue, and vertuous actions: some *without the Soul*, as a true friend, a good Country, and the like: some *neither* within nor without the soul: as good and veritious men.

t Laert. Stob. In like manner of *Ills*, some are *within* the Soul, as vices, and vicious actions; some *without* the Soul, as, imprudent friends, enemies, and the like; some *neither* within nor without the Soul, as wicked men, and all that participate of vice.

u Laert. Stob. Of *goods within the Soul*, some are *habits*, some *affections*, some *neither* habits nor affections. The *vertues* themselves are affections, *their studies* habits, not affections, *their acts* neither habits nor affections.

x Laert. Stob. In like manner of *Ills*, some are *affections*, as vices; some *habits* only, as infirmities of minde, and the like; some *neither* habits nor affections, as vicious actions.

y Laert. Stob. Again, of *Goods*, some are *finall*, some *efficient*, some *both* finall and efficient. A friend, and the benefits arising from him, are *efficient* goods. Fortitude, magnanimity, liberty, delectation, joy, tranquillity, and all vertuous actions are *finall* goods. Both *efficient* and *finall* (as all vertues) as they perfect felicity, they are *efficient*, as they constitute it as parts thereof, *finall*.

z Laert. Stob. In like manner of *Ills*, some are *finall*; some *efficient*, some both. A friend, and the dammages incurred by him, are *efficient*. Fear, baseness, Nervitude, Cupidity, forwardnesse, griefe, and all vicious actions, are *finall*; participant of (are vices) as they procure misfortune: they are *efficient*, as they constitute it as parts thereof, *finall*.

a Stob. Again, of *goods*, some are *expetible in themselves*, not desired for the sake of any other: Others are *preparatory* to some other, called *effectively* expetible. The *expetible in themselves* are (according to *Dionysius*) of two kinds: 1. Ultimately expetible, as *Beatitude*. 2. *Ills* which have in them the cause of being expetible, as every good hath.

b Again,

Again, of goods some are *necessary* to *Beatitude*, as all Vertues and their Acts, others *not-necessary*, as Joy, delectation, and study. In like manner of Ills, some are necessary to *Infelicity*, as all the Vices and their Acts, others *not-necessary* thereunto, as, all passions and infirmities of the soul, and the like,

^c Again, of goods, some consist in motion, as Joy, delectation ^c Stob. and the like; some in affection, as quiet imperturbation; Of those which consist in affection, some are likewise in habit, as the Vertues; others in affection only as the former. Neither consist the Vertues only in habits, but other Acts likewise, changed by a Vertuous man, in a manner, into Vertue. Of these goods which are in habit, are those we call studies, as love of Learning, and the like. For these arts by their affinity with Vertue lead directly to our chief end.

Again, ^d of goods some are *absolute*, as Science, others *relative*, ^d Stob. as honour, benevolence, friendship, and the like.

^e Science is a certain infallible comprehension by reason. It is taken ^e Stob. ken three waies. First, for a System of Sciences conjoined together in a good man; Secondly, for a System of artificiaall Sciences, having a certainty. Lastly, for a demonstrative infallible habit of phantasies by reason.

^f Friendship, is a community of life and consent of studies. The ^f Stob. kinds thereof are six.

1. *γυναικιστία* a friendship amongst known persons.
2. *συνεία*, amongst Familiars.
3. *ἰσμεία*, amongst those of the same age.
4. *ξενία*, towards strangers.
5. *συγγενική*, amongst kinred.
6. *ἱερική*, from Love.

^g Again of goods, some are *simple*, as knowlege, others *mixt*, ^g Laert. Stob. as, *κοινωνία*, a good use of Children conformable to nature, *εὐχρησία*, a good use of old age conformable to nature, *εὐξενία*, a good use of life conformable to Nature.

Exemption from grief, *ἀλυσία*, and *conservation of order*, *ἐνταξία* are the same with, as the mind is with prudence, and communion with goodnesse; yet are otherwise referred, which is observable likewise in the other Vertues. Hence are the same distinctions applicable to ill.

^h Every good is *beneficiall*, *opportune*, *conducibile*, *usefull*, *commendable*, *fair*, *helpfull*, *eligible*, *just*. ^h Laert. Stob.

Beneficiall, *συμφέρον*, as conferring that whereby we receive benefit.

Opportune, *ἵκον*, as comprising that whereof we stand in need.

Conducibile, *ἀνταρπάζει*, as, resolving into it self the means, as the gaine acquired by traffick exceeds the charge.

Usefull, *χρήσιμος*, as conducing to our profit.

Commendable, *εὐχρηστον*, from the use.

Fair, ἡδὴ, as proportioned to the necessities of the receiver.

Helpfull, ὠφελὴς, as it relieves us.

Eligible, ἀγαθόν, as being in reason to be preferred.

Just, δίκαιον, as being conformable to Law.

i Stob.

On the contrary, every ill is unbeneficial, importune, inconducible, unusefull, uncommendable, foul, unhelpful, avoidable, and unjust.

k Laert.

^k Perfect good, is called *ἡδὴ*, *fair*, because it is absolute in all numbers required of Nature, and perfectly proportionate.

l Laert.

^l Of *fair*, (or *honest*) there are four species, *Just*, *valiant*, *temperate*, *knowing*; in these are honest actions consummated.

m Laert.

^m Likewise of *αἴθερ*, *foul* (or *dishonest*) are four species, *unjust*, *cowardly*, *dissolute*, *foolish*.

n Laert.

ⁿ *Honest*, is called *ἡδὴ*, *fair*, first, because it renders those who are endued therewith worthy of praise; Secondly, because it is most suitable to its proper work; Thirdly, because it is an ornament; we say, a wise man is only good and fair.

o Laert.

^o Only that which is good is fair or honest: so *Hecato* in his third Book of Good; and *Chrysippus* of Fair. This is Vertue, and what participates thereof, which is all one, as to say, that, whatsoever is good is honest likewise, and reciprocally whatsoever is honest is good.

p Cic. de fin. 3.

^p That what is honest only is good, is proved thus. Whatsoever is good is laudable, whatsoever is laudable is honest; therefore whatsoever is good is honest. Again, there is no good which is not expetible, nothing expetible which is not pleasant and amiable, therefore approveable, therefore laudable, therefore honest. Again, no man can glory in a life that is miserable or not happy, therefore to glory is proper to the happy, but to glory relateth only to that which is honest, therefore honest life is happy. And as he who is laudable, hath some eminent mark of renown & glory, for which he is justly stiled happy, the same may be said of the life of such a man, whence if a happy life consist in honesty, only that which is honest is to be esteemed good. Moreover, what man can be termed constant, firm, magnanimous, unlesse wee grant that paine is not an ill? For, hee who reckoneth death amongst the Ills cannot but fear it; so no man in any thing can neglect and contemn that which he accounteth ill. This being granted, the next assumption is this, he who is magnanimous and valiant, despiseth, as if they were nothing, all things that can arrive to man, whence it followeth, that nothing is ill which is not dishonest, and this sublime, excellent magnanimous person, accounting all humane things below him, considereth in himself and his own life past and future, knowing that no ill can happen to a wise man. Whereby wee see that what is honest only is good, which is to live happily and honestly.

On

On the other side, nothing is good, but what is honest; for, ^{q Cic. ibid.} who is, or ever was so fervently covetous, and of such disordinate affections, that the same things, for the attainment whereof he would perpetrate any wickedness, he had not much afraid unto (setting aside all punishment) without all that wicked means? What advantage or fruit do we aim at, in desiring to know those things which are hidden from us; how they are moved, and by what causes agitated in heaven? Who is so savage, so obdurate to naturall studies, that he abhorres things worthy knowledge, receives them without pleasure or some benefit, and values them at nothing? Who is there, that when he heareth of the actions, speeches, counsels of magnanimous persons, eminent in all vertue, is not affected with any pleasure? Who is there, that being instituted in an honest family, and ingenuously educated, is not offended at dishonesty, though it bring no hurt to him? Who is there, that looks without trouble upon such as live impurely and flagitiously? Who doth not hate sordid, vain, light, frivolous persons? If dishonesty were not in it selfe avoidable, why should men, when they are in the dark, or in a Wildernesse, abstain from any thing that is evil; but, that the very deformity and dishonesty thereof deterrs them? Nothing therefore is more clear, then that honest things are expetible in themselves, and dishonest things avoidable in themselves.

Hence it followeth, that what is honest, is more estimable then those mean things which accrue by it. And when we say, that folly, temerity, injustice, and intemperance are avoidable, in respect of those things which are consequent to them, it contradicts not the former assertion, that what is dishonest only is ill, because they relate not to the hurt of the body, but, to dishonest actions which proceed from vice.

All good is equall, and every good is highly expetible, and admits neither increase, nor decrease. ^{r Laert.} Here commeth in a ^{Cic. de fin. 3.} great controversy betwixt the Stoicks and the Peripateticks, which though *Carneades* affirm to be only verball, *Cicero* holdeth to be more in things then words.

The Peripateticks hold, that all goods are requisite to happy life; the Stoicks, that whatsoever is worthy estimation, comprehendeth happy life. Those holding pain to be an ill, it follows, that a wise man cannot be happy upon the rack. These, who account not pains among the ills, hold, that a wise man continueth happy in the midst of torments: For, if some bear those pains with greater courage for their Country, or some lighter cause, opinion, not nature increaseth or diminisheth the power of the pain. Again, the Peripateticks asserting three kinds of good, affirm a man to be so much the more happy, the fuller he is of externall corporeall goods; or, in the Stoicks expression, he

he who hath most corporeall estimables, is most happy, for as much as by them, Beatitude is compleated. On the contrary, the Stoicks hold, that those goods which they call of nature, make not by their frequency a life more happy, or are more expetible, or more estimable: For then wisdome being expetible, and health expetible, both together would be more expetible then wisdome alone; whereas either being worthy estimation, both are not more worthy of estimation then wisdome alone. For the Stoicks, who hold health to be estimable, but place it not amongst the goods, hold likewise, that no estimation is to be preferred before vertue. From this, the Peripateticks dissent, asserting, that an honest action without pain, is more expetible, then the same action with pain; the Stoicks otherwise. For, as a Taper is darkened by the light of the Sun, and as a drop of water is lost in the vastnesse of the *Ægean Sea*, and as in the riches of *Croesus* the accession of one farthing, and one step in the way between this and *India*; so in that end of all good which the Stoicks assert, all the estimation of corporeall things must necessarily be obscured, overwhelmed, and perish, by the splendour and magnitude of vertue. And as opportunity *καιρὸς*, is not made any thing greater by production of time, for whatsoever is opportune hath its measure; so right affection, *κατάθεσις*, and the good it selfe placed in it, that it be conformable to nature, admitteth no accession of encrease. For as that opportunity, to those of which we speak, are not made greater by production of time, for which reason the Stoicks conceive, that a happy life is not more to be desired, if it be long, then if it be short; and they use this simile: As it is the praise of a shoe to fit the foot, neither are many shoes preferred before two, nor the greater before the lesse: So in those things, whose good is confined to opportunity and convenience, neither are the more to be preferred before the fewer, nor the longer before the shorter. Nor do they argue acutely, who say, if long health be more to be esteemed then short, then likewise a long use of wisdome, more then a short; they understand not, that the estimation of health is judged by space, that of vertue by opportunity; as if they should say likewise, a good death, or a good labour to a woman in travell, is better long then short: So that they see not, that some things are more esteemed for their shortnesse, others for their length.

CHAP. VI.

Of Eupathies.

^a **A** Soon as any object is presented to us, which seemeth good, ^{a Cic. Tusc. quest. lib. 4.} Nature [as we said] drives us on to the acquisition thereof, which, being done constantly and prudently, is called Will; imprudently and excessively, Desire.

^b Moreover, while we are so moved, that we are in some good, that happeneth also two waies, when the Soul is moved quietly and constantly according to reason, this is called Joy; when vainly and excessively, Pleasure. ^{b Cic. ibid.}

^c In like manner, as we desire good things by nature, so by nature we decline the ill: This declination, if done according to reason, is called *Caution*, if without reason, *Fear*. ^{d Cic. ibid. Laert.} *Caution* is only in a wise man, of fear he is not capable.

Hence it appeareth, that there are three kinds of good affections of the minde, called ^e *Eupathies*, or ^f *Constancies*; Joy, ^{g Laert. f Cic.} *Caution*, Will.

1. ^h Joy is contrary to pleasure, as being a rationall elevation of the minde. ^{g Laert.}

2. *Caution* is contrary to fear, as being a rationall declination of ill.

3. *Will* is contrary to desire, as being a rationall appetite.

These are the primarie Eupathies; and as under the primary passions are comprehended many subordinate passions; so are there secundary Eupathies subordinate to those.

Under Joy are 1. *Delectation*: 2. *Cheerfulness*: 3. *Aquanimity*.

Under Caution, 1. *Respect*: 2. *Cleer nesse*.

Under Will are, 1. *Benevolence*: 2. *Salutation*: 3. *Charity*.

Notwithstanding that Eupathies and passions are contrary; ^{cic. Tusc. quest.} yet are there but three Eupathies, though there are foure ^{4.} passions; for, there is no Eupathie contrary to *Grief*.

CHAP. VII.

Of Passions.

^a **F** Rom falsities proceedeth a perversitie of Intellect, hence ^{a Laert.} spring up severall passions, and causes of disorder.

^b Zeno defineth passion, a præternaturall motion of the Soul, ^{b Laert.} (or as ^c Cicero renders it, a commotion of the Soul; ^{c Tusc. quest. 4.}averse from right reason, against Nature.) Others more briefly, a more vehement appetite. More vehement they call that, which recedeth from the constancy of Nature, ^d and is contrary to nature; wherefore all passion is an ^{d Laert.} excessive stupide desire. ^e The

suffers undeservedly, ^y for no man compassionates the punishment of a parricide or Traytor. ^{y Cic.}

^y Anguish, ^{ἄλγος}, anger, an oppressive grief. ^{y Laert. Cic.}

^z Mourning, ^{πένθος}, Luctus, grief for the death of a friend that was dear to us. ^{z Cic. Stob.}

^a Wailing, ^{Μένρον}, a grief accompany'd with Tears. ^{a Cic.}

^b Trouble, ^{ἰσχυρά}, arumna, a laborious piercing grief. ^{b Cic. Laert.}

^c Sorron, ^{Δόλον}, a vexatious grief, perhaps the same which in Sto- ^{c Cic.}
baeus is termed ^{ἀνίστημι}, a grief with conflict of Spirit.

^d Lamentation, ^{ἀνία}, a grief with thoughtfulness, ^e proceeding ^{d Cic.}
from and encreasing by consideration and discourse. ^{e Laert.}

^f Molestia, a permanent grief. ^{f Cic.}

^g Affliction, a grief with corporeall torment. ^{g Cic.}

^h Desperation, a grief without any hope of amendment. ^{h Cic.}

ⁱ ^{ἔκστασις}, an urgent grief attended by difficulty. ^{i Laert.}

^k ^{ἄφωνος}, a grief taking away the voice. ^{k Stob.}

^l ^{ἄλογος}, an irrational grief corroding, and hindring us from ^{l Laert.}
enjoying the present.

Under Pleasure are,

^m Malevolence, ^{ὀπταχαισμία}, a Pleasure at anothers Ill, without ^{m Cic. Laert.}
any good to our selves. This hath no reall subsistence; for no good ^{whence supply}
man was ever known to rejoyce at the harm of another. ^{Stobaeus}

ⁿ Delectation, ^{ἡδυσία}, a pleasure affecting and soothing the mind ^{n Cic. Laert.}
by the Ear, and in like manner by the eye, touch, smell or tast, ^{where (plea-}
which are all of one kind. ^{sure being omit-}
^{these are}
^{applied to a}
^{wrong head.}

^o Jactation, a boasting Pleasure, with insolent behaviour. ^{o Cic.}

^p ^{τίσις}, quasi ^{πρόσις}, an inclination of the mind to dissoluteness. ^{p Laert.}

^q ^{διαρρημία}, the dissolution of Vertue. ^{q Laert.}

^r ^{ἀεμίσις}, a pleasure from things not expected. ^{r Stob.}

^s ^{ροήσις}, a Pleasure caused by sight, without deceit. ^{s Stob.}

Under Fear, are

^t Dread, ^{δύμια}, a fear causing ^{t Laert. Stob.}

^u Sloth, ^{ὄνος} ^{πικρία}, a fear of future action, or] susception of ^{u Laert. Stob.}
labour.

^v Shame, ^{αἰσχύν}, a fear of ignominy. ^{v Laert. Stob.}

^y ^{ἑκστασις}, a fear of some unusuall phantasie. ^{y Laert.}

^z ^{θόρυβος}, a fear with losse, or trepidation of voice. ^{z Laert.}

^a ^{ἀγνία}, a fear of something uncertain, or a fear of offending or ^{a Laert.}
falling. ^{b Stob.}

^b ^{δαιμόνιος}, a fear of Gods or Demons. ^{c Stob.}

^c ^{αἰός}, a fear of some grievous thing. ^{d Cic.}

^d Terrour, a fear, which by striking the mind causeth rednesse, ^{e Cic.}
palenesse, trembling, or gnashing of the teeth.

^e Timor, a fear of approaching ill. ^{f Cic.}

^f Pavor, a fear thrusting the mind out of its place. ^{g Cic.}

^g ^{Examinatio}, a fear consequent, and as it were companion to ^{Contur-}
Pavor. ^{K k k k k}

c Cic. *ibid.*

c The kinds of passion arise from two opinionated goods, and two opinionated evils, so they are four. From the good, *desire* and *pleasure*; pleasure from present good, desire from future, from the ill, *fear*, and *grief*, fear, from the future, grief, from the present, for these things, whose coming we fear, when they do come, grieve us. Pleasure and desire arise from an opinion of good things, desire is fervently transported to that which seemeth good, pleasure rejoiceth when we have obtained what we desire. Thus *desire* and *fear* go formost, that to apparent good, this to apparent ill, *pleasure* and *grief* follows; pleasure, when we attain what we desire, *griefe, when we incurre what we fear.

f Stob.

* λυπῶν ὅτι
φρίττοιμεν,
Ec. so supply
the Text.
g Chr. ibid.

§ All passions arise from *Judgement* and *Opinion*, whence they are more strictly defined, (that it may appear not only how vicious they are, but also that they are in our power) thus ;

h Cic.

i Srob-

^b *Grief* is a fresh opinion of present ill, wherein it seemeth fit that the mind be contracted and dejected, or a contraction of the soul caused by opinion of present ill.

k Cic.

1 Laert.

^k *Pleasure* is a fresh opinion of present good, wherein it seemeth good 'that the mind be exalted, or 'an irrational elevation of mind to something that seemeth eligible.

m Cic.

^m *Fear* is an opinion of imminent ill, which seemeth to be intolerable; or a contraction of the soul disobedient to reason, caused by expectation of ill.

n Cic.

o Stob.

ⁿ *Desire* is an opinion of good to come, that if it were present, it were fit for our use, or ° an appetite disobedient to Reason, caused by the opinion of consequent good.

These four are, as *Hecato* saith, primary passions, under each of which there are subordinate passions, severall species belonging to their proper genus.

Under *Grief* are these kinds ,

p Laert. Cic.

9 Cicer.

* *Plut. Cont.*
Stoic.

^P Envy, ~~Phros~~, *invidentia*; a grief at the prosperity of others,
^q which doeth no hurt to him that envieth, * for some men desire
to see their neighbours suppress'd, that themselves might be ad-
vanced above them. For if a man grieve at the prosperity of ano-
ther whereby he is dammaged, hee is not properly said to envy,
as that of *Heſtor* to *Agamemnon*; but he who is nothing dam-
mag'd by the prosperity of another, yet grieveth thereat, truly
envieth.

1 Cic.

Emulation, ~~the~~ (not here taken for the imitation of Vertue, for that is laudable) a grief that another man enjoyeth that which we desire and want, or as *Laertius*, a grief for another's felicity, which we wish to our selves, and an æmulation thereof as greater then our own.

f Laert.

2 Cic.

u Lactid

¹ Jealousie, ζήλῳς, obtrudation, a grief lest another enjoy what we (love and) possess.

^u *Compassion, i.e. misericordia*, a grief for the misery another suffers

suffers undeservedly, y for no man compassionates the punish- y Cic.
ment of a parricide or Traytor.

^y Anguish, *ἄλγος*, anger, an oppressive grief.

y Laert. Cic.

^z Mourning, *πένθος*, Luctus, grief for the death of a friend that
was dear to us.

z Cic. Stob.

^a Wailing, *Μένειν*, a grief accompany'd with Tears.

a Cic.

^b Trouble, *ἰσχυρά, aerumna*, a laborious piercing grief.

b Cic. Laert.

^c Sorrow, *Δόλος*, a vexatious grief, perhaps the same which in Sto-
baeus is termed *ἄσος*, a grief with conflict of Spirit.

c Cic.

^d Lamentation, *ἄλγος*, a grief with thoughtfulness, e proceeding
from and encreasing by consideration and discourse.

d Cic.
e Laert.

^f Molestia, a permanent grief.

f Cic.

^g Affliction, a grief with corporeall torment.

g Cic.

^h Desperation, a grief without any hope of amendment.

h Cic.

ⁱ *Ἐπὶ ἄλγος*, an urgent grief attended by difficulty.

i Laert.

^k *Ἀχος*, a grief taking away the voice.

k Stob.

^l *Συγχοῖς*, an irrational grief corroding, and hindring us from
enjoying the present.

l Laert.

Under Pleasure are,

^m Malevolence, *ἐμχαιρέσις*, a Pleasure at anothers Ill, without
any good to our selves. This hath no reall subsistence; for no good
man was ever known to rejoyce at the harm of another.

m Cic. Laert.

ⁿ Delectation, *ἡδονή*, a pleasure affecting and soothing the mind
by the Ear, and in like manner by the eye, touch, smell or taste,
which are all of one kind.

where (plea-
sure being omit-
ted) these are
applied to a
wrong head.

n Cic. Laert.

^o Jactation, a boasting Pleasure, with insolent behaviour.

o Cic.

^p *Τίσις, quasi πρῆξις*, an inclination of the mind to dissoluteness.

p Laert.

^q *Διαφθορά*, the dissolution of Vertue.

q Laert.

^r *Ἀσμένειμα*, a pleasure from things not expected.

r Stob.

^s *Τόξος*, a Pleasure caused by fight, without deceit.

s Stob.

Under Fear, are

^t Dread, *δύμω*, a fear causing No.

t Laert. Stob.

^u Sloth, *ἔντρος Πιγνία*, a fear of future action, or] susception of
labour.

u Laert. Stob.

^x Shame, *αἰσχύνω*, a fear of ignominy.

x Laert. Stob.

^y *Ἐκπλαξίς*, a fear of some unusuall phantasie.

y Laert.

^z *Θόρυβος*, a fear with losse, or trepidation of voice.

z Laert.

^a *Ἀγωνία*, a fear of something uncertain, or a fear of offending or
falling.

a Laert.

^b *Δεισιδαιμονία*, a fear of Gods or Demons.

b Stob.

^c *Αἰός*, a fear of some grievous thing.

c Stob.

^d Terror, a fear, which by striking the mind causeth redness,
paleness, trembling, or gnashing of the teeth.

d Cic.

^e Timor, a fear of approaching ill.

e Cic.

^f Pavor, a fear thrusting the mind out of its place.

f Cic.

^g *Examinatio*, a fear consequent, and as it were companion to

g Cic.

Pavor.

K k k k k

Contur-

- h Cic. ^h *Conturbatio*, a fear, which disperfeth all our thoughts.
i Cic. ⁱ *Formido*, a permanent fear.
k Stob. ^k The Passions subordinate to desire, are generally two, *Anger* and *Love*.
l Laert. Cic. ^l *Anger* is a desire of taking revenge upon those by whom wee conceive our selves wronged.
m Stob. ^m The species thereof are,
n Laert. ⁿ *Onos*, or as *Cicero*, *Ignis exardescens*, anger beginning.
o Laert. ^o *Xelos*, anger encreasing.
p Cic. Stob. ^p *Misus*, *odium*, anger inveterate.
q Cic. Stob. ^q *Kiros*, *inimicitia*, anger watching the occasion of revenge.
r Stob. ^r *Perisla*, anger breaking forth into action.
s Laert. ^s *Misus*, a desire, whereby we wish ill to another, with continual progression.
t Cic. ^t *Malice*, *Discordia*, a bitter anger, with utmost hatred, conceived in the Heart.
u Laert. ^u *Phantasia*, a desire conversant in difference of opinions.
* Stob. ^{*} *Love* is an impulsion of good wil for apparent beauty, where-
y Laert. ^y by it is distinguished from the love of the vertuous, which is a voluntary subception of labour for true beauty. The species of Love are,
z Laert. Cic. ^z *Enavus*, *indigentia*, an (inexpleble) desire, of that which wee want, and being separated from it, in vain incline to it.
a Stob. ^a *Tisbos*, *desiderium*, a desire to see that which is not present. They
b Cic. ^b distinguish these two thus; Desire is of those things which are said, or praedicated of any thing which they call *Categoremes*, as to have riches, to take honours; Indigence is of the things themselves, as of honours, of money.
c Stob. ^c *Imis*, desire of conversation of that which is absent.
d Stob. ^d *Philandia*, desire of Pleasure.
e Stob. ^e *Philoplatia*, desire of Riches.
f Stob. ^f *Philodoxia*, desire of glory.
g Stob. ^g In all these passions there is opinion. ^h Opinion is a weak
h Laert. Cic. ^h assent. ⁱ Hence passions, (as *Chrysippus* in his Book of passions affirms) are Judgements; for Avarice is an opinion, or false judgement that money is good; drunkenness, and intemperance, are the like. ^k Opinion is likewise sudden from the contractive motion of an unreasonable elation of mind, unreasonable and praeternaturall, in as much as it is not obedient to reason. For every passion is violent, wherefore oftentimes, though we see in those that are transported by passion, the inconvenience thereof; yet notwithstanding the same persons that condemn it, are carried away by it, as by a head-strong horse, and therefore properly may use that saying:
Against my Judgement Nature forceth me, Meaning by judgement the knowledge of right things for man is carried beyond nature by passion, to transgresse naturall reason and right. All

¹ All those who are led by passion, are diverted from reason, ^{1 Stob.} but in another manner then those who are deceived. For the deceived, as for example, They who think Atomes to be the principles of all things, when they come to know that they are not, change their judgment: but, those that are in passion, although that they are taught not to grieve, or fear, or give way to any passion in the Soule; yet, they do not put them off, but are led on by their passions, untill they come to be subject to their tyrannicall sway.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Sicknesse and Infirmities.

^a **T**HE fountain of all passions is Intemperance, which is ^{a Cic. Tusc. quæst. 4.} a totall defection from the minde, and from right reason, so averse from the prescription of reason, that the appetites of the Soul can by no means be ruled, or contained. As therefore Temperance allayeth appetites, and causeth them to obey right reason, and preserveth the considerate judgments of the minde; so Intemperance, the enemy thereto, enflameth, troubleth, and enciteth the state of the Soul. Thus griefes, and fears, and the rest of the passions, all arise from this. For, as when the blood is corrupt, or flegme, or choler aboundeth, sicknesses and infirmities arise in the body: so the disorder of ill opinions, and their repugnance to one another, devesteth the Soule of health, and troubleth it with diseases.

^b By passions the minde becommeth indisposed, and as it were ^{b Laert. Stob. Cic.} sick. *Sicknesse* of minde, *νόσος*, is an opinion and desire of that which seemeth greatly expetible; but, is not such, as love of women, of wine, of mony. These *νόσηματα*, have likewise their contraries in the other extreame, as hatred of women, of wine, of men.

^c This sicknesse of minde happening with imbecillity, is called ^{c Laert. Stob. Cic.} *ἀσθένεια*, *infirmity*. For, as in the body there are infirmities, as Gouts, Convulsions, and the like; so are there infirmities in the minde, as love of glory, love of pleasure. And as in bodies, there is a propensity to some particular diseases; so in the minde, there is a proclivity *ἐνθυμία*, or, *ἐνθυμία*, to some particular passions, as *φθονία*, propensity to envy, *ἀνελπιστία*, propensity to unmercifulnesse, and the like.

^d In this place, much pains hath been taken by the Stoicks, ^{d Cic. Tusc. quæst. 4.} chiefly by *Chrysippus*, to compare the sicknesses of the minde with those of the body.

Passion (for as much as opinions are inconstantly and turbu-

lently tossed up and down) is alwaies in motion, and when this fervour and concitation of the minde is inveterate, and, as it were, settled in the veines and marrow, then ariseth sicknesse and infirmity, and those averſions which are contrary to thoſe infirmities and diſeaſes. Theſe differ only intentionally, but really are the ſame, ariſing from deſire and pleaſure; for, when money is deſired, and reaſon not immediately apply'd, as a Socratick medicine, to cure that deſire, the evil ſpreadeth through the veines, and cleaveth to the bowells, and becommeth ſickneſſe and infirmity, which when they grow inveterate, cannot be plucked away. The name of this ſickneſſe is avarice. In like manner ariſe other ſickneſſes, as, deſire of glory, deſire of women, φιλογυναια, and the reſt of ſickneſſes and infirmities. Their contraries ariſe from fear, as, hatred of women, μισογυναια, hatred of mankind, inhospitallity, all which are infirmities of the minde, ariſing from fear of thoſe things which they ſlie and ſhun.

Infirmity of minde is defined, a vehement opinion, inherent, and wholly implanted in us, of a thing not to be deſired, as if it were exceedingly to be deſired. That which ariſeth from averſion, is defined a vehement opinion, inherent, and throughly implanted in us, of a thing that ought not to be ſhunn'd, as if it ought to be ſhunned. This opinion is a judging our ſelves to know what we have not.

Under *Infirmity* are theſe ſpecies, *Love of money, of honour, of women, of curious meats*, and the like. Love of money, Avarice, is a vehement opinion, inherent, and throughly implanted in us, as if it were exceedingly to be deſired. In the like manner are all the reſt defined.

Averſions are defined thus, Inhospitallity is a vehement opinion, inherent, and throughly implanted in us, that gueſts ought to be ſhunned. In like manner is defined hatred of women-kinde, ſuch as was that of *Hippolitus*; and of man-kinde, as that of *Timon*.

As ſome are more prone to one ſickneſſe then to another; ſo are ſome more inclinable to fear, others, to other paſſions; in ſome is anxiety, whereby they are anxious; in others choler, which differeth from anger; for it is one thing to be cholerick, another to be angry, as anxiety differs from griefe; for all are not anxious who are ſometimes grieved, nor are all that are anxious grieved alwaies: as there is a difference betwixt ebriety and ebriofity, and it is one thing to be a lover, another to be amorous.

This propenſity of ſeverall perſons to ſeverall ſickneſſes, is called, from an analogy to the body, *Infirmity*, whereby is underſtood a propenſity to be ſick: but in good things, becauſe ſome are more apt to ſome goods then to others, it is ſtiled *Facility*, in ill things *Proclivity*, implying a lapſion; in neuters it hath the former name.

As

As there is sicknesse, infirmity, and defect in the body, so in the minde. Sicknesse is the corruption of the whole body. Infirmitie is sicknesse with some weaknesse. Defect is, when the parts of the body disagree with one another, whence ariseth pravity, distortion, deformity of the limbs; so that those two, sicknesse and infirmity, arise from the confusion and trouble of the health of the whole body; defect is seen in perfect health. But, in the minde, sicknesse is not distinguish'd from infirmity, but by cogitation only.

Vitiosity is a habit or affection, inconstant in it selfe, and oft differing in the whole course of life; so that in one by corruption of opinions, is bred sicknesse and infirmity; in the other, inconstancy and repugnance. For, every vice hath not disagreeing parts, as of them who are not far from wisdom, that affection is different from it selfe, as being unwise, but not distorted nor depraved.

Sicknesses and infirmities are parts of vitiosity; but, whether passions are parts thereof also, it is a question. For vices are permanent affections, passions are moving affections, so that they cannot be parts of permanent affections.

And as in all things the Soul resembleth the Body, so in good likewise. In the body, the chiefeest are beauty, strength, health, soundnesse, agility; so likewise in the minde. And as the good temper of the body is, when those things whereof we consist agree well among themselves: so the health of the Soule is, when the judgments and opinions thereof agree. This is the vertue of the Soul, which some affirm to be Temperance; others, a Soule obedient to the precepts of Temperance, and obsequious thereunto; not having any speciousnesse of her own. But, whether one or other, it is only in a wiseman; yet, there is one kinde of health of the soul, which is common also to the unwise, when by the care of Physicians, the distemper of the minde is removed.

And as there is in the body an apt figure of the limbs, together with a sweetnesse of colour, which is called Beauty; so in the soule, equality, and constancy of opinions, and judgments following vertue, with a certain firmnesse and stability; or, including the very power of vertue, is called Beauty.

Likewise, correspondent to the powers, nerves, and efficacy of the body, in the same termes are named the powers of the Soul. Agility of body is called quicknesse, the same commendation is ascribed to wit, in respect, that the Soul overrunneth many things in a short time.

Only there is this difference betwixt Soules and bodies: Strong soules cannot be assaulted by diseases, strong bodies may: but, the offensions of bodies may happen without any fault, those of the Soule cannot, all whose sicknesses and passions proceed from contempt of reason, and therefore are in men only; for,

for, though beasts do somethings like this, yet, they fall not into passions.

Betwixt acute and obtuse persons, there is this difference, the ingenious, as Corinthian Brasse rusteth, slowly falling into sickness, and more quickly got out of it: the dull do not so, neither doth the soul of an ingenious person fall into every sickness and passion; for, there are not many things extreamly savage and cruell, and some also have a shew of humanity, as compassion, griefe, fear.

But, the infirmities and sicknesses of the minde are lesse easily rooted out, then those great vices which are contrary to the vertues; for, the sicknesses remaining, the vices may be taken away, because the sicknesses are no sooner healed, then the vices are removed.

CHAP. IX.

Of Vertue and Vice.

a Laert.

^a **V**ertue is a convenient affection of the Soul, throughout all life.

c Stob.

Of vertues there are three kinds: The first *generall*, taken for any perfection of a thing, as of a Statue: The second are *Sciences*, or *contemplative*, which, according to *Hecaton*, consist in speculation, as *Prudence* and *Justice*. ^d The third *not-sciences*, or *not-contemplative*, which are considered as consequent to the speculative; as, *health*, *strength*, *hope*, *joy*, and the like. Health is consequent to Temperance, a theoretick vertue, as strength to the building of an Arch. They are called *not-contemplative*, because they require no assent, but are by after-accession, and common even to the wicked, as health and strength.

e Laert. Stob.

Vice is the contrary to vertue, for ^e the rationall creature is perverted sometimes by the perswasion of exteriour things, sometimes by the counsell of those with whom he converseth, contrary to nature, who gives us inclinations unperverted.

f Laert.

Of vices therefore there are two kinds: The first *ignorance* of those things whereof vertues are the knowledge; as, *imprudence*, *intemperance*, *injustice*: The second *not-ignorances*; as, *pussillanimity*, *imbecillity*.

g Laert.

^g *Panaetius* asserteth two vertues, *Theoretick* and *Practick*: others three, *Rationall*, *Naturall*, *Morall*. *Possidonius* foure; *Cleanthes*, *Chrysippus*, and *Antipater* more; *Apollodorus* one only, *Prudence*.

h Laert.

^h Of vertues, some are *primary*, others *subordinate*. The *primary* are foure, *Prudence*, *Temperance*, *Fortitude*, *Justice*; the first conversant in offices, the second in appetite, the third in tolerance, the fourth in distribution.

ⁱ *Pru-*

ⁱ *Prudence* is the Science of things that are to be done, and not to be done, and neuter; or the knowledge of good, bad and neuter in civil life. ^k The Vertues subordinate to Prudence are five.

ⁱ Laert.

^k Stob.

Ευβουλία, ⁱ The Science of things that are to be done, how they may be done beneficially. ⁱ Laert. ^{Stob.}

Ευνοησία, The Science of comprehending things to be effected. ^{Stob.}

Αγχιγνω, The Science of finding out our office. ^{Stob.}

Νοησις, The Science of attaining the scope in every thing. ^{Stob.}

Ευρηστική, The Science of finding out the issues of things. ^{Stob.}

^m *Temperance*, is the Science of things expetible, avoidable and neuter. Under Temperance are these species. ^m *Stob.* by whom correct

Χρονία, ⁿ the Science of time and order for the weldoing of things. ^{Laetius, who applies this definition to Temperance.}

Κοσμιότης, ^o the Science of honest and dishonest motions. ⁿ *Stob.*

Αιδομεσότης, ^p the Science of avoiding just blame. ^o *Stob.*

^q *Fortitude*, is the Science of things grievous, not grievous and neuter, the species under it these. ^p *Stob.*

Εγκρίσις, ^r a Science tenacious of right reason. ^r *Stob.*

Κατησία, ^s a Science persisting in right judgement. ^s *Stob.*

Θαλασσίη, ^t a Science whereby we trust that no ill shall happen to us. ^t *Stob.*

Μεγαλοψυχία, ^u the Science of overcoming those things which happen to the good and bad. ^u *Stob.* ^{Laert.}

Διψυχία, ^{*} a Science of the Soule which renders her invincible. ^{*} *Stob.*

Φιλοσοφία, ^v the Science of going through to the attainment of that which we propose to our selves. ^v *Stob.*

^z *Justice* is the Science of distributing to every one according to his desert; under Justice are four subordinate vertues. ^z *Stob.*

Ευσέβεια, ^a The Science of worshiping the gods. ^a *Stob.*

Χρησιότης, the Science of well-doing.

Εὐκταμοσύνη, the Science of equality in community.

Εὐνομία, the Science of contracting honestly with others.

^b In like manner of Vices, some are primary, others subordinate to the primary. The primary vices are, *Imprudence*, *Intemperance*, ^b *Laert.* *Pusillanimity*, *Injustice*.

^c *Imprudence* is the ignorance of things good, ill and neuter; and the ignorance of things to be done, not to be done, and neuter.

^c *Stob.* ἀφροσύνη

Intemperance is the ignorance of things expetible, avoidable and neuter.

τὴν ἀνέγκαιον

ἀναδόντες

καὶ τὴν

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

ἀνέγκαιον

d Stob. The subordinate vices to these are correspondent to the secondary virtues, as, *inquietia, Belligerentia, transmutatio*, which are defined answerably to their opposite virtues.

e Stob. These virtues are perfect, and consist in contemplation; but, there are other virtues; which are not arts, but faculties; consisting in exercise, as, health of the Soul, integrity and strength thereof, and pulchritude. For, as the health of the body is a good temperature of hot, cold, dry, and moist; so the health of the soul is a good temperature of the doctrines in the soul. And as the strength of the body consisteth in a tension of the nerves; so the strength of the soul in a proper extension thereof to judgment and action. And as the beauty of the body is a symmetry of all the parts to one another, and to the whole: so the beauty of the soule is the symmetry of the reason and parts thereof; to the whole, and to one another.

f Stob. All those virtues which are Sciences and Arts; have common theorems, and the same end, wherefore they are (as *Zeno* saith) inseparable, connexed to one another, as *Chrysippus*, *Apolodorus* and *Hecaton* affirm. He who hath one, hath all (saith *Chrysippus*) and he who doth according to one, doth according to all. He who hath virtue, is not only contemplative; but also practick of those things which are to be done. Things which are to be done are either experible, tolerable, distributable, or retainable; so that whosoever doth one thing wisely, doth another justly, another constantly, another temperately; and so is both wise, magnanimous, just, and temperate.

i Stob. Notwithstanding, these virtues differ from one another by their heads: For, the heads of prudence are, to contemplate and do well, that which is to be done in the first place, and in the second, to contemplate what things are to be avoided, as obstructive to that which is to be done. The proper head of temperance is to compose our own appetites in the first place, and to consider them; in the second, those under the subordinate virtues, as being obstructive and divertive of appetites. The heads of Fortitude are in the first place, to consider all that we are to undergo; in the second, other subordinate virtues. The heads of justice are in the first place, to consider what every one deserves, in the second, the rest. For all virtues consider the things that belong to all, and the subordinate to one another. Whence *Panetius* saith, it is in virtue as in many Archers, who shoot at one mark distinguished by divers colours: every one aims at the mark, but one proposes to himseffe the white line, another the black, and so of the rest. For, as these place their ultimat end in hitting the mark, but every one proposes to himseffe a severall manner of hitting: so all virtues have Beatitude, which is placed conformably to nature for their end, but severall persons pursue it severall waies.

^k As vertues are inseparable, so are they the same substanti- ^{k Stob.}
ally with the supream part of the soul, in which respect all
vertue is said to be a body, for the Intellect and Soul are a body,
for the soul is a warm spirit innate in us. Therefore our soul is
a living creature, for it hath life and sence, especially the su-
pream part thereof, called the Intellect. Wherefore all vertue
is a living creature, because it is essentially the Intellect. And
therefore *ἡ ἀρετή ὁ νοῦς*, for that expression is consequent to this
assertion.

^l Between vertue and vice there is no medium (contrary to ^{l Stob.}
the Peripateticks, who assert a mean progression betwixt vertue
and vice) for all men have a naturall appetite to good: and as a
stick is either straight or crooked, so man must be either just or
unjust; but cannot be either more or lesse just or unjust.

^m That vertue may be learned, is asserted by *Chrysippus*, in his ^{m Laert.}
first book of the End, and by *Cleanthes*, and *Possidonius* in his Ex-
hortations, and *Hecaton*, because men of bad are made good

ⁿ That it may be lost is likewise affirmed by *Chrysippus*, deny'd ^{n Stob.}
by *Cleanthes*. The first saith, it may be lost by drunkennesse or
madnesse: the other, that it cannot be lost, by reason of the firm
comprehensions of the soul.

^o Vertue is in it selfe vertue, and not for hope or fear of any ^{o Laert.}
externall thing. It is experible in it selfe, for which reason, when
we do any thing amisse, we are ashamed, as knowing that only
to be good, which is honest.

^q In vertue consisteth Felicity, for the end of vertue is to live ^{q Laert.}
convenient to nature. Every vertue is able to make a man live
convenient to nature: for, man hath naturall inclinations for
the finding out of Offices, for the compolure of Appetites, for
tolerance and distribution. Vertue therefore is selfe-sufficient
to Beatitude, as *Zeno*, *Chrysippus*, and *Hecaton* assert. For if, saith
he, magnanimity, as conceiving all things to be below it selfe, is
selfe-sufficient, and that be a part of vertue, vertue it selfe,
which despiseth all things that obstruct her, must also be selfe-
sufficient to Beatitude. But *Panætius* and *Possidonius* deny, that
vertue is selfe-sufficient, affirming, that it requireth the assi-
stance of health, strength, and necessities; yet, they hold, that
vertue is alwaies used, as *Cleanthes* affirms, for it cannot be lost,
and is alwaies practised by a perfect minde which is good.

^r Justice is not by nature, but by prescription, as law and right ^{r Laert.}
reason: Thus *Chrysippus* in his book of honest.

^s Vertue hath many attributes, it is called ^{s Stob.}

1. *ἀγαθόν*, a good, because it leaderth us to right life.
2. *ἀντιστά*, because it is approved without any controversy, as
being most excellent.
3. *κατασκευαστόν*, because it is worthy of much study.
4. *ἐπαινετόν*, because it may justly be praised.

5. *καλῶς*, because it inviteth those who desire it.
6. *αὐτοῦ*, because it conduceth to goodnesse of life.
7. *χρήσιμον*, because it is usefull.
8. *κατὰ φύσιν*, because it is rightly expetible,
9. *ἐν αὐτῷ*, because being present it profiteth, being absent, it doth not.
10. *ὑπερβαίνει*, because it hath an use that exceeds the labour.
11. *ἀνεπὶ τούτου*, because it is alone sufficient to him that hath it.
12. *ἀναισθητόν*, because it takes away all want.
13. *κοινόν*, because it is common in use, and extendeth to all the uses of life.

CHAP. X.

Of the End.

a Stob.

^a The end is that, for whose sake all offices are done, but it self is not done for the sake of any : or that to which all things done conveniently in life are referred, it selfe is referred to nothing.

b Stob.

^b The end is taken three waies : First, for the finall good, which consisteth in rationall conversation : Secondly, for the scope, which is convenient life, in relation thereto : Lastly, for the ultimate of expetibles, unto which all the rest are referred.

c Stob.

^c Scope and end differ ; for scope is the proposed body, which they who pursue Beatitude aim at. Felicity is proposed as the scope, but the end is the attainment of that felicity. If a man throw a spear or an arrow at any thing, he must do all things that he may take his aim aright, and yet so, as to do all things whereby he may hit. So when we say, it is the ultimate end of man to obtain the principles of nature, we imply in like manner, he must do all things necessary to taking aim, and all things likewise to the hitting of the mark ; but, this is the last, the chiefe good in life, that as to be selected, not desired.

e Stob.

Reason being given to rationall creatures, for the most perfect direction, to live according to reason, is in them to live according to nature, that being the Artificer of Appetite. Hence ^e Zeno first (in his discourse of human nature) affirms, that the end is, to live conformably, that is, to live according to one reason concordantly, as on the contrary, savage Beasts that are always at difference, live miserably.

f Stob.

The followers of Zeno, conceiving his expression not full enough, enlarged it. First, Cleanthes his successor, added, *to nature*, making it up thus, *The End is to live conformably to Nature, which is to live according to vertue* : for nature leads us to vertue.

Thus

Thus *Cleanthes* in his book of *Pleasure*, and *Possidonius*, and *Hecaton* in his book of *Ends*.

^g *Chrysippus*, to make the expression of *Cleanthes* more clear, ^g *Sub.* expounds it thus, *To live according to expert knowledge of things which happen naturally*: For our natures are parts of the Universe, our end therefore is to live conformably to nature, which *Chrysippus*, in his first book of *Ends*, expounds, both our own proper human nature, and likewise the common nature of the Universe. But *Cleanthes* allowes only common nature to be followed, and not the particular. To live according to this knowledge, is all one, as to live according to vertue, not doing any thing forbidden by our common Law. Right Reason, which is current amongst all, being the very same that is in God, the Governour of all. The vertue therefore, and beatitude of a happy man, is, when all things are ordered according to the correspondence of a mans Genius, with the will of him who governs the Universe.

^h *Diogenes* defineth the end, *A good use of reason, in the election* ^h *Sub.* *and refusall of naturall things, choosing those that are according to nature, and refusing those that are repugnant to nature.* So likewise *Antipater*.

Archidemus defineth it, *To live, performing compleatly all offices, choosing of those things which are according to nature, the greatest and most principall, and not to be able to transgresse them.*

Panetius, to live according to the appetites given us by nature.

Possidonius, to live contemplating the truth and order of the Universe.

ⁱ Thus by living according to nature, the Stoicks understand ⁱ *Cic. de fin. 4.* three things: First, to live according to the knowledge of those things which happen by nature. This is *Zeno's* end, to live convenient to nature. Secondly, to live, preserving all, or the greater part of mean offices. This exposition differeth from the former; for that is a Rectitude, proper only to a wise man, this is the office of a progressive, not perfect person, which may likewise be to the foolish. The third is, to live in enjoyment of all, or the greater part of those things which are according to nature. This is not constituted in our action, for it consisteth of that kinde of life which enjoyeth vertue, and of those things which are according to nature, and are not in our power.

^k The chiefe good therefore, is to live suitably to the know- ^k *Cic. de fin. 2.* ledge of those things which arrive by nature, elective of those which are according to nature, and rejective of those which are contrary to nature. ^l This is to live conveniently and conforma- ^l *Philo. Jud. mel. arist.* bly to nature, when the soul entring into the path of vertue, walketh by the steps and guidance of right reason, and followeth God. That which in other arts is artificiall, is here epigematick and consequent.

m Stob.

^m This end is Beatitude. *Beatitude*, by *Zeno*, is defined a good course of life, which definition is used likewise by *Cleantes* and *Chrysippus*, and all their followers, who affirm Beatitude to be nothing but happy life.

n Stob.

o Cic.

Fair and *good*, and *Virtue*, and that which *participates of Virtue* are equivalent termes, whence it followes that ⁿ Beatitude is all one with living according to *Virtue*. ^o And as *Good*, and *Virtue* admit no degrees of increase or diminution, neither doth the ultimate end of all good and *Virtue* increase or diminish. For, as they who are drowned, are no more able to breathe, though they are nearer the top of the water then they who are in the bottom; nor a little whelp, the time of whose sight approacheth, see any more then one that is newly litter'd; so he, who hath made some little progresse in *Virtue*, is no lesse in misery then he who hath made none.

CHAP. XI.

Of Indifferents.

a Cic. de finib. 3

^a OF things as we have said, some are good, some ill, some indifferent. ^a To deny this difference of things, would be to confound all life, as *Aristo* doth, neither could there be any function or act of wisdom, since that, if amongst those things which appertain to life there were no difference; no election were requisite.

b Laert.

Good and *ill*, as we said, are these things which are honest or dishonest. Of these hitherto. Betwixt both these, there are some things which conferre nothing to happy or unhappy life, called *Indifferents*. ^b To profit is a motion or state proceeding from *Virtue*; To hurt is a motion or state proceeding from *Vice*; but *Indifferents* neither profit nor hurt, such are life; health, pleasure, Beauty, Strength, riches, honour, Nobility, and their contraries; death, sickness, grief, deformity, imbecillity, poverty, dishonour, meanness and the like. Thus *Hecaton* in his seventh Book of *Ends*, and *Apollodorus* in his *Ethicks*, and *Chrysippus*. These therefore are not goods, but *indifferents*. For, as the property of Heat is to warm, not to cool, so is it of good to profit, not to hurt. But health and wealth doe not hurt more then they profit, therefore health and wealth are not goods. Again, that which we may use ill as well as well, is not good; but health and wealth may be used ill as well as well, therefore health and wealth are not goods. Yet *Pessidonus* reckons these amongst goods. But *Hecaton* in his 19th of *Good*, and *Chrysippus* of *Pleasure*, will not allow *Pleasure* a good: For pleasures are dishonest, but nothing dishonest is good.

c Morco-

Moreover, Riches, as *Diogenes* conceiveth, have not only this power that they guide to Pleasure and good health, but that they comprise them. They do not the same in Vertue nor in other arts, whereto many may be a guide, but it cannot contain them. Thus if Pleasure or health were good, riches likewise should be numbred amongst the good, but if wisdom be good, it followeth not that riches likewise be good, nor that any thing which is not reckoned amongst the good, nor that which is good can be contained by any thing which is not amongst the good. And also for this reason, because Sciences and comprehensions of things, by which Arts are produced, move appetite; but riches are not reckoned among the good, it followeth that no Art can be contained in Riches, and much lesse any Vertue, for Vertue requireth far more study and exercise then Art, and compriseth the firmnesse, stability, and constancy of all life, which Art doth not.

Things are said to be indifferent in three respects; First, if they move neither appetite nor aversion, as, if the starres be of even number, or to have even or uneven hairs on our head, to stretch out the finger this way or that way, to take up straw and the like. Secondly, things are said to be indifferent which move appetite and aversion equally, not one more then the other; as in two pieces of Silver of equall value, no way different, which to him who comes to make choice of either, are indifferent. There is an appetite to the election of one, but not more of this then of that. The third kind of indifferents are those which are neither good nor ill, expetible nor avoidable, conducing neither to happinesse nor unhappinesse. In this sense all things are called indifferent, which are betwixt Vertue and Vice, as health, wealth, strength, glory, and the like; for we may be happy without these, though their use hath some relation to happinesse, their abuse to unhappinesse. In this sense whatsoever we may sometimes use well, other times ill, is indifferent, which kind appertaineth chiefly to Ethick.

Again, of Indifferents some are *Naturall*; and move appetite, as health, strength, soundnesse of sense and the like; some *Præternaturall* which move aversion, as sicknesse; infirmity, and the like; some *Neuter*, which move neither appetite nor aversion, as the constitution of the soul and body, one capable of receiving Phantasies, the other wounds.

Of naturall and præternaturall indifferents, some are *primary*, others by *participation*. *Primary* naturall Indifferents are motions or affections convenient with reason, as health and strength. *Participant* are those by which that motion or affection is communicated, as a healthfull body, sound sense. *Præternaturall* Indifferents are the contrary to these.

CHAP. XII.

Of Estimation.

a Laert.
b Stob.

^a *Estimation αἵμα*, is a certain concurrence with convenient life, which concerns all good. ^b Estimation is two-fold; one, a mediate power or use concurring with life according to nature; such we call health or wealth, as far as they conduce to life, according to nature. The other is the valuation of the Estimator, imposed by him who is skilfull in such things.

c Stob.

^c Again, *Estimation* is taken three waies: First, for absolute donation: Secondly, for return of approbation: Thirdly, as *Antipater* calls it, *Elective*, by which, when some things are proposed, we rather choose these then those; as health before sicknesse, life before death, and riches before poverty. In like manner, disestimation is taken three waies, the termes only changed to the contrary. *Donation* according to *Diogenes*, is a judgment, that a thing is according to nature, or conferreth use thereto. *Approbation* is in in man, not in things. *Election* only in the good, not the indifferent.

d Laert. Stob.
Sext. Empir.
Pyrrh. hyp. 3.
24.

^d Hence followeth another distinction of indifferents, whereof some are preferred, some rejected, some neither preferred nor rejected. Preferred are those, which though they are indifferents, have neverthelesse a sufficient reason why they are to be had in estimation, as health, soundnesse of sense, exemption from griefe, glory, and the like. Rejected are those, which are not worthy any estimation, as poverty, sicknesse, and the like. Neuter are those, which are neither preferred nor rejected, as to extend or contract the finger.

These termes preferred, *προηγμενα*, and rejected, *απορριπταμενα*, were invented by *Zeno*, upon this ground: ^e As when we speak of the Court, no man saith, the King himselfe is preferred to dignity, but those who are in some honour, next and second to him in rank: so when we speak of life, we call not those things which are in the first place, the preferred or promoted, but those which are in the second: and so likewise in the rejected. Now forasmuch as good hath the first place, it followes, that what is preferred, is neither good nor ill. [No good is reckoned amongst the preferred, because that hath the greatest estimation; but the preferred having the second estimation, approacheth somewhat to the nature of good. It is called preferred, not that it conduceth to Beatitude, but in respect of the rejected.] We define it thus: *an Indifferent with mean estimation*; for it could not be, that nothing should be left in mean things, that is according to, or contrary to nature, neither being left, that nothing should be placed in them, which is sufficiently estimable, this being granted,

ted that there is not something preferred. Rightly therefore this distinction is made, and may more fully be explained by this simile. As if we should suppose our ultimate end, to be so to cast the dy that it may chance right, the dy that shall be so cast as to fall right, must have some thing preposed and preferred towards its end; and on the other side the contrary, yet the preposition of the dy, nothing conduceth to that end; to those which are preferred, relate indeed to the end, but nothing pertain to the power and nature thereof.

^f Of the preferred some are *in the Soul*, as ingenuity, art, progression and the like; some *in the body*, as life, health, strength, ability, soundness, beauty; some *externall*, as riches, honour, nobility and the like. f Laert. Stoic.

^g In like manner of the rejected, some are *in the Soul*, as hebetude, ignorance; some *in the body*, as death, sickness, infirmity, maim, deformity. Some *externall*, as poverty, dishonour and meanness. g Laert. Stoic.

Likewise of the *Neuter*, some are *in the Soul*, as imagination, assent; some *in the body*, as whiteness, blackness, some *externall*, which having no estimation or use, are of little value.

Those which are preferred in the Soul, conduce more to living according to Nature, and are of more worth then those of the body, or the externall, as to have a good disposition of mind, is better then to have a good disposition of body.

^h Again, of the preferred, some are preferred for themselves, as ingenuity, countenance, state, notion, and the like; some for others, because they effect something, as Riches, and Nobility; some both for themselves and others, as health, strength, soundness, ability: for themselves, as being according to Nature; for others as affording no small benefit. h Stoic.

ⁱ As concerning Reputation, *indocia*, Chrysippus and Diogenes affirm, that being separated from utility, we should not so much as stretch out our finger for it. But those who followed them, not able to withstand Carneades, affirmed Reputation to be preferred for it selfe, and that it was proper for an ingenuous man freely educated, to desire to be well spoken of by his Parents, kindred, and good men, and that for the thing it self, not for the use thereof, adding, that as we provide for Children, though to be born after our death; so we must provide for future reputation after death, even for its own sake separated from all use. i Cic. de finib. 3.

^k In like manner of the rejected, some are rejected for themselves, some for others, some both for themselves and others, which appears by the rule of Contraries. k Stoic.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Actions and Offices.

OF those *Actions* which proceed from appetite, some are *offices*, some *præter-offices*, some *neuter*.
 b Laert. Cic. de finib. 3.

^b Office is that which is preferred, and hath a good reason for the doing thereof, as being convenient to life; or, as others, Office is whatsoever reason requireth to be done, as, to honour our Brethren, Parents, Country, to relieve our friends. Zeno first gave it this name, *τὸ καθήκον*, Office, *ἀνθρώπων πρὸς ἀλλήλους*. It is an action conformable to the dictates of nature, and extends even to plants, and irrationall living creatures, for offices may even be observed in those.

Præter-office is an action, which reason requireth that we do not, as, to neglect our Parents, to contemn our Brethren, to disagree with our Friends, to despise our Country, and the like.

Neuter are those actions which reason neither requireth nor forbiddeth, as the taking up of a straw.

b Stob.

^b Of Offices, some are *perfect*, called *κατὰ φύσιν*, *Rectitudes*, actions done according to vertue; as, to do wisely, to do justly: Others *not-rectitudes*, actions which have not a perfect office, but a mediate; as, to marry, to go an Embassy, to discourse, and the like.

Of *rectitudes*, some are *in things requisite*, others *not*: Of the first kinde are, to be wise, temperate, and the like: of the second, those which are not requisite to the being such. In like manner are *præter-offices* divided.

Again, of Offices some are *ordinary*, as, to have a care of our selves, of our limbs, and the like: Some *extraordinary*, as, to main our selves, throw away our goods. Accordingly is it of *præter-offices*.

Again, of Offices, some are *continuall*, as, to live vertuously: some *intermissible*, as, to question, answer, walk, and the like. Accordingly it is of *præter-offices*.

c Cic de fin. 3.

^c Office is a mean thing, placed neither amongst the good, nor their contraries; for, there is something in this approvable, so as a right reason may be given for it, as done approbably. That which is so done is office. And forasmuch as in those things which are neither vertues nor vices, there is something which may be of use, it is not to be taken away. Again, it is manifest, that a wise man doth something in these mean things; he therefore, when he doth it, judgeth that it is his office so to do; but, a wise-man is never deceived in judgment, therefore there is an office in mean things. Again, we see there is something which we call a thing rightly done, or a Rectitude, but that is a perfect office; there-

therefore there is an inchoat office; as, if it be a Rectitude *justly* to restore a depositum, to restore a depositum *must* be a simple office. The addition of *justly* makes it a rectitude; the simple restitution without the additionall terme, is an office.

And since it is not to be doubted, but that in mean things, some are to be performed, others rejected, whatsoever is done in that manner, is comprehended in common office; whence it is manifest, that all men by nature loving themselves; as well the foolish as the wise, will take those things which are according to nature, and reject the contrary. This is therefore one common office of the wise and unwise, conversant in mean things.

All offices proceeding from these, it is justly said, that to these are referred all our thoughts, even the forsaking of life, or continuing in it. In whom most things are according to nature, the office of that person is to remain in life, in whom there are, or are foreseen to be more things contrary to nature, his office is to forsake life, although he be happy, and of a fool to continue in life, although he be miserable; for that good, and that ill, as we have often said, are things that follow afterwards. The first principles of naturall appetite, fall under the judgement and election of a wise man, and is as it were the matter subjected to wisdom. Thus the reason of continuing in life, or forsaking it, is to be measured by all those things we mentioned. For, neither are they who enjoy vertue, obliged to continue in life, nor they who live without vertue to die, and it is often the office of a wise man, to part with his life, even when he is most happy, if it may be done opportunely, which is to live conveniently to nature. This they hold, that to live happily, depends on opportunity; for wisdom commandeth, that a wise man, if it be required, should part with his life. Wherefore vice not having power to bring a cause of voluntary death, it is manifest, that the office even of fooles, who are likewise wretched, is to continue in life, if they are in the greater part of those things, which we hold to be according to nature. And forasmuch as going out of life and continuing in it be alike miserable, neither doth continuance make his life more to be avoided. We say not therefore without cause, that they who enjoy most naturalls, should continue in life.

Hitherto it appertaines to know, that the love of Parents towards their Children is the effect of nature, from which beginning, we may track all mankind, as proceeding from thence. First, by the figure and parts of the body, which declare, that nature carefully provided for procreation. Neither can these two agree, that nature orders procreation, and takes no care that those which are procreated should be loved: For even in beasts the power of nature may be seen, whose care when we behold in bringing up of their young, me thinks we hear the

M m m m m

very

very voice of nature her selfe. Wherefore as it is manifest, that we abhor pain by nature; so it is likewise apparent, that we are drawn by nature to love those we have begotten.

Hence ariseth a common naturall commendation of men among men, that it behooveth a man not to seeme alienate from man, for this very reason, because he is man. For, as among the parts of the body, some are made only for themselves, as the eyes and ears; others assist towards the use of the other parts, as the thighs and hands: so though some huge beasts are born only for themselves; yet, that shell fish which is called *patula prima*, and the *pinniteres*, so named from keeping its shell, which shutteth it selfe up so close, as if it thought others to look to themselves: as also Ants, Bees, Storks, do something for the sake of others. Much neerer is the conjunction of mankind, so that we are inclined by nature to Conventions, Counsells, Cities.

c Cic. offic. 1. 10. Whatsoever is produced upon the earth, is created for the use of man; but, men are generated for men, that they may profit one another. In this we ought to follow nature our leader, and to bring forth common benefit to the publick; by mutuall offices, by giving, by receiving, by arts, by endeavours, and by faculties, to unite the society of man with man.

f Cic. de fin. 3. b. The world is governed by the power of God; it is as it were, a common City of men and Gods, and each of us is a part of the world; whence it followeth by nature, that we should prefer the common benefit before our own. For as Lawes prefer the safety of the generall before that of any particular; so a good and wise man conformable to Law, not ignorant of civill office, taketh more care for the benefit of the generall, then of any particular, or of his own. Nor is he who betraies his Country more to be condemned, then he who deserteth the common benefit or safety. Whence it followeth, that he is to be commended who undergoeth death for the Common wealth, and teacheth us, that our Country is dearer to us, then our selves. And because that speech is esteemed inhuman and wicked of those who affirm, they care not when they are dead if all the earth were set on fire; it is certainly true, that we are likewise to provide for those who shall hereafter be, even for their own sake. From this affection of the soul, whence proceed Wills and commendations of dying persons, as also, forasmuch as no man will live solitary in a desert, even with the greatest abundance or plenty, it is easily understood, that we are born for conjunction, congregation, or naturall community, we are impelled by nature to benefit others the most that we can. All these are offices, chiefly by teaching and communicating the reasons of prudence, so that it is not easie to finde one, who wil not communicate to some other what he knoweth himselfe.

selfe. Thus we are not only inclined to learn, but also to teach. And as it is given to Bulls by Nature, to fight even with Lyons, for their heifers with great force & impetuosity; so they who abound in wealth, and are able to do it (as is related of *Hercules* and *Bacchus*) are incited by nature to preserve mankind. Likewise, when *Jupiter* is stil'd *Optimus* and *Maximus*, *Salutaris*, *hospitalis*, *Stator*, we hereby expresse that the safety of mankind is under his tuition. But we cannot expect, if we our selves are vile, abject, and neglected amongst our selves, that we should be dear to the immortall Gods, and loved of them. As therefore wee make use of our limbs, before that we have learnt for what cause of utility we have them, so are we conjoined and consociated amongst our selves by Nature to civill community, which if it were otherwise, neither would there be any room for Justice or goodness.

Yet though there are mutuall Chains betwixt man and man, man hath no common right with beasts, [*by reason of our dissimilitude, as both Chrysippus and Possidonius affirm*] for all other things saith *Chrysippus*, were made for men and the Gods, but they for community and society one with another, so that men may make use of Beasts for their benefit without doing any wrong.

Moreover, since the nature of man is such, that there is a certain civill right betwixt him and all mankind, he who preserveth that right, is just, who transgresseth it, unjust. But as in a Theater, though it be common, that room which a man possesseth, is justly said to be his place; so this civill right in a City and the World doth not repugne to the propriety of particular persons.

In order to the conservation of all society, conjunction, and dearness betwixt man and man, emoluments and detriments *οφελήματα* and *βλάμματα*, which benefit or hurt must be common amongst them, and not only common but equall. Convenients and Inconvenients, *ευχρησάματα* and *δυσχρησάματα*, must be common, but not equall. Those which benefit or hurt, are either good or ill, and therefore must necessarily be equall; convenient and inconvenient are ranked amongst the preferred and rejected, and therefore cannot be equall: Emoluments and detriments are common, but rectitudes and sins not common.

Herein Friendship is requisite, as being one of those things which benefit. Some affirm, that a good man ought to be as much concern'd for his friend as for himself; others, that every man ought to be most concern'd for himself. Yet these latter confesse, that it is contrary to Justice, whereunto we are born, to take away any thing from another, and assume it to our selves.

Neither can friendship be contracted, nor Justice performed

M m m m 2

for

for private respects and advantages, for then these advantages might overthrow and pervert them. But neither could Justice or friendship be at all, unless they were expetible in themselves. Justice is by Nature; it is contrary to a wise man, not only to do an injury, but even to hurt. Neither can it be right to injure those who are our friends, or have deserved well of us; Equity cannot be separated from Utility; whatsoever is equall and just, is likewise honest, and reciprocally; whatsoever is honest, is equal and just.

^h Cic. offe. lib. 1, and again, lib. 3.

^h *Panaetius*, who discoursed most accurately of Offices, proposeth three kinds wherein men use to deliberate or consult of Offices. First, when they doubt, whether that of which the question is, be honest or dishonest. Secondly, whether it be profitable or unprofitable. Thirdly, if that which hath the shew of honesty be repugnant to that which seems profitable.

ⁱ Laert.

^k Sext. Empir. Pyrrh. hypot. 3. 25.

Next the Gods, we are to reverence our Parents and Brethren. As concerning the buriall of Parents, *Chrysippus* saith, it ought to be done in the most simple manner. For the body, as the Nails, teeth, or hair, thereof nothing pertaineth to us; and therefore ought not to be used with any curiosity or respect. Flesh, if it bee usefull, ought to be converted into aliment (though it were a part of our own body, as the foot) as is proper to it; if uselesse, put under ground, or thrown into some remote place, without more respect then wee have of our nailes or haire when cut off.

^l Cic. de offic. lib. 3.

^l Concerning the Office of the Buyer, and the Seller, *Diogenes* the Babylonian, and *Antipater* his Disciple differ. *Antipater* holds that all must be laid open, that the Buyer be not ignorant of any thing that the Seller knoweth; *Diogenes* that the Seller as far as is appointed by civill Law, ought only to tell the faults, and to conceal the rest, for as much as he in selling desireth to sell to his best advantage.

Hecaton in his sixth Book of Offices, is full of these questions, as whether a good man in a dearth may give over house-keeping. He disputes it on both sides, but concludes that the office is directed rather by profit then humanity.

He questions, whether if at Sea, a Ship be to be disburthen'd by the casting out of something, we should rather cast over-board a horse of great price, or a slave worth little. In this case, private interest leads one way, humanity another.

If a fool in a shipwrack catch hold of a plank, may a wise man wrest it from him if he can? He saith, hee may not, for it is injurious. What may the Master of the Shippe? May not he take his own? No; no more then he may throw a Passenger out of the Ship, because it is his own, into the Sea. For untill they come to the place to which they are bound, the Ship is not the Masters, but the Passengers.

what

What if two Shipwreck'd persons light upon one plank, and both pluck at it, should one give it over to the other? yes; but to him, who, it is more expedient, should live, either for his own sake or the Common-wealth. But what if these be alike in both? There will be no contention, but either as it were by lot, or mication with the fingers (*giuoco della mora*) one will give place to the other.

What if a Father rob Temples, undermine the publick treasury, should the Son reveal it to the Magistrates? It were a great wickednesse. On the contrary, he ought to defend his Father, if he be called into-question. But is not our Country before all Offices? yes, but it is for the good of our Country to have Citizens pious to their Parents.

What if a Father should aim at possession of the Tyranny, or endeavour to betray his Country, shall the Son keep his Counsell? He shall beseech him not to do it. If that prevail not, he shall accuse him, yea, threaten; and lastly, if the matter shall tend to the destruction of the Country, he shall preferre the safety of the Country before that of his Father.

If a wise man receive Counterfeit money for good, if afterwards hee know it to be counterfeit money, may he pay it where he owes anything for good? Diogenes saith he may, Antipater, that he may not.

If a man sell wine that will not last, and know it to be such, ought hee to declare it or no? Diogenes thinks he is not obliged, Antipater conceives a good man must. These are as it were cases of Controversie amongst the Stoicks.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Præteroffices.

^a As every perfect Office in a rational Creature is a Rectitude, ^{a Stoic.} and alwaies compleat in all numbers; so every Præter-office in a rationall creature is a sin. A sin is that which is done contrary to right reason, or in which something of Office is omitted by a rationall Creature. ^b A good deed is the command of the Law. Sin the prohibition of the Law. Hence it is that the Law forbiddeth fools and mad men many things, but prescribeth them nothing, because they are not capable of doing any thing well. ^{b Plur. de re- pugn. Stoic.}

^c All sinns are impiety, as being a resisting of the will of the Gods. The Gods love Vertue and its works; they hate vice and its works. Every sin therefore displeaseth them, and consequently is impiety. ^{c Stoic.}

^d All sins are equall (so Chrysippus in the first of his morall questions, and Persæus, and Zeno) though not alike, for they flow from one fountain, as it were of vice, and the judgment is the same ^{d Plur. de re- pugn. Stoic.}

same in all, but by the externall object by which that judgment is made, they are rendred unlike. That they are equall is evident from this: If there be not one truth more truth then another, nor one falshood more falshood then another, neither is one deceit more deceit then another, nor one sin more sin then another. He who is distant from *Canobus* a hundred furlongs, and he who is distant but one furlong, are both alike not at *Canobus*: so he who sins more, and he who lesse, are both alike not in the right way.

Yet, though sins are equall, there are some differences in them, forasmuch as some proceed from an obdurat incurable affection, others from an affection not obdurat nor incurable. And though every lie is equally a lie, yet all men do not lie equally; but, every sin is equally sin, for every sin consisteth in lying. Thus *Chrysippus*, *Persæus*, and *Zeno*: But *Heraclides* of *Tarsis*, friend to *Antipater*, and *Athenodorus* hold, that sins are unequal.

CHAP. XV.

Of wise or vertuous Persons.

Paradoxes.

There are (according to *Zeno*) two kinds of men, the wise or vertuous, and the vicious. The wise make use of vertue through the whole course of their life, the vicious of vice.

^a *Seneca*

^b *Cic. in Laert.*
^c *Quintil. lib.*
^{12.}

^a Of the wise there are two sorts, one in perfection consummate; the other in progression, procedent. Of the first are these following paradoxes to be understood; ^b not that the Stoicks positively affirm there ever was such a one in nature (for ^c *Zeno*, *Cleantes*, and *Chrysippus* were great and venerable persons, yet, did not attain the height of human nature) but, that such a one might possibly be.

^d *Laert.*

^a A wise man is void of passion, for he cannot fall. There is another kinde of person void of passion likewise, a wicked man that is obdurate and inflexible.

^e *Laert.*

^c A wise man is void of pride, honour and dishonour are alike to him. There is another kinde of person void of pride, a wicked man, equally inclinable to dishonour as to honour.

^f *Laert. Stob.*

^e A wise man is austere, for he neither speaketh for complaisance, nor admitteth any thing spoken in that kinde. There is another sort of austere persons, which resemble soure wine, not fit for drinking, but for medicines only.

^g *Laert.*

^g A wise man is sincere, for he taketh care, that he be not thought better then he is, by reason of some specious show, and withall to expresse whatsoever good he hath, without any Rhetoricall glosse.

A wise man is not pragmaticall; for he declines the doing of any thing that is beyond his office. h Laert. Plut. de repugn.

A wise man is never drunk, although he drink wine; for he never sinneth, but doth all things according to Vertue. Stoic. citing Chrysippus.

A wise man is never mad, yet sometimes strange phantasies may occur to him through melancholy or delirations, not according i Laert. Stob.

to the reason of eligibles, but prater naturall. k Laert.

A wise man is never grieved; for grief, according to Apollodorus, is an irrational contraction of the Soul. l Laert.

A wise man is chaste; for he hath God with himself; but a wicked man is an Atheist. An Adversary is taken two waies, for him m Laert.

who is an Enemy to the Gods, and for him who believeth there are no Gods: which all wicked men do not. An Adversary is n Stob.

impious, because he doth all things according to Vice, as the good according to Vertue; and he who hath one vice hath all. He is an

Enemy to the Gods, for enmity is the discord of life; as amity is the concord. The wicked differs from the Gods in his course of

life; and therefore is an Enemy to them, for they account all their Enemies who are contrary to them. The wicked are contrary

to the good; God is good; therefore the wicked are Enemies to God.

A wise man is religious; for he is skilfull in all divine rites. Religion is the Science of divine worship. He sacrificeth to the o Laert.

Gods; and is pure, detesting all sin, holy and just in Divine things.

A wise man only is a Priest, skilfull in Sacrifices, businesse of the Temple, expiations, and other things proper to the p Laert.

Gods.

A wise man only is a Prophet, endued with the Science of those signs which are communicated by Gods or Demons which belong q Stob.

to humane life. In him therefore are all kinds of vaticination, as well by dreams, birds, and other things.

A wise man reverenteth and loveth his Parents and Brethren, next the Gods. He hath likewise an innate love of his Children, which r Laert.

the vicious hath not.

A wise man ought to apply himself to some office in the Commonwealth s Laert.

(according to Chrysippus) unlesse otherwise diverted; For he will encourage Vertue, and suppress Vice, especially in those Com- t Stob.

monwealths which are far from perfection. He ought to make Laws, instruct men, prescribe rules. To which is opposit, study

of popularity, specious deceit, prescription of things unprofitable, which are not competible to a wise man.

A wise man ought to marry (as Zeno in his Common-wealth) that he may have Children: u Laert. Cic. de finib. 3.

A wise man doth not opinione or think; but believe or know, for he never assents to any falsity. Ignorance is an infirm assent; he thinks all firmly. There are two kinds of opinion, one an x Laert. y S. to d.

assent

assent, to things not comprehended, the other a weak believe. Neither of these are in a wise man, for he never assented without comprehension, and then alwaies firmly, for nothing is hid- den from him, otherwise he might have a false opinion. There- fore he is never diffident. Faith is proper to a wise man, for it is a firm exstimation. A Science is a firm habit, therefore a wicked man doth neither know nor believe.

2 Laert. Cic. de
finib. lib. 3.
a Stob.

A wise man must imitate the Cynicks: for Cynicisme is the nea- rest way for vertue, as Apollodorus in his Ethick: Others say, a wise man ought to continue in that Sect, if he have been thereof; but if he have not, not to enter into it.

b Laert.

A wise man may upon occasion eat mans flesh. Of this already a- mongst the Offices.

c Laert. Cicero
Paradox.

A wise man only is free, the wicked are slaves: for liberty is the power of doing according to our own judgment. Servitude is a privation of the power of doing according to our own judg- ment. There is another kinde of servitude which consisteth in subjection, a third in being possess'd and subjected, to which is opposed vicious domination.

d Laert.

A wise man only is a King: For Monarchy is a principality sub- ordinate to none, which only consists in the wise, as Chrysippus in his treatise, That Zeno used words properly. For (saith he) a Prince must know both good and bad, which none of the wicked knoweth. Dominion and the kinds thereof, Monarchy, Magistracy, Generalship, Admiralty, and the like, are only pro- per to a wise man; therefore the wise only command, though not actually, yet potentially.

f Laert.

A wise man only is proper to be a Magistrate, Judge, and Orator; but not any of the wicked.

g Laert.
h Laert.

A wise man is void of sin, for he cannot fall into error.

i Stob.

A wise man is innocent, and uninjurious, for he cannot hurt ei- ther himselfe or others, nor receive, nor do any injury: For, injury is a hurtfull injustice, which is not competible to a wise man, although he may be unjustly assaulted: for he having with- in himselfe all good and vertue, is not capable of vice or harme.

k Laert. Stob.

A wise man is not mercifull, nor pardons any, remitting no- thing of the punishments inflicted by Law, as knowing them to be proportioned to, not exceeding the offence, and that who- soever sinneth, sinneth out of his own wickednesse. A wise man therefore is not benign, for he who is benign, mitigates the ri- gour of Justice, and conceives the punishments inflicted by Law to be greater then they ought: But, a wise man knoweth the Law to be good, or a right reason, commanding what is to be done, and what not.

l Laert.

A wise man nothing wonders at those things which seem Parado- xical, as Charop's Cave, the ebbing and flowing of the Sea, and hot springs, and ebullitions of fire.

^m *A wise man will not live in a desert*, for he is communicative ^m Laert. by nature, and practick, and will undertake exercise to strengthen his body.

ⁿ *A wise man will pray*, requesting good things of the Gods, ⁿ Laert. *Possidonius* affirms, in his first of Offices, and *Hecaton* in his thirteenth of Paradoxes.

^o *A wise man only is a friend*: Friendship is only amongst the ^o Laert. ^{Sub.} wise, for in them only is an unanimity as to things that concern life and community, so as our friends may make use of them as freely, as we our selves. Unanimity is the Science of common good. A friend is exorable in himselfe. Plenty of friends is a good: but, amongst the wicked, there is no friendship, for friendship being reall and not fained, it is impossible it should consist without faith and constancy. But, in the wicked, there is infidelity, and inconstancy, and hostility, and therefore not friendship, but some externall connexions, whereby necessity or opinion ties them together.

^p *A wise man doth all things well*, as we say, all Pipes play the ^p Laert. ^q *He doth all things wisely, temperately,* ^q *prudently, modestly, and according to the other vertues,* ^q *throughout the whole course of his life.* A wicked man doth all amisse, sinning in the whole course of his life, inconstant by nature, often grieved by his own ill actions, wretched and troubled, for as much as he is vexed at the thing done, so much is he angry at himselfe for being the Author of it.

^r *A wise man loveth* (^r *vertuously*) *those, whose beauty expresse their* ^r Laert. ^{Cic.} *inward vertue.* Thus *Zeno*, *Chrysippus*, and *Apollodorus* affirm. ^{Tusc. quest. 4:} ^{Cic. de fin. 3:} For love is an impulsion of benevolence, raised from beauty, which love is not of conjunction, but of friendship. For this reason, *Zeno*, though he were in love with *Thrasomides*, a young woman that was in his power, yet, suppress'd his affection because she was averse from him. This *Chrysippus* calls the love of friendship, it is no way discommendable, for beauty is the flower of vertue.

^t *A wise man upon occasion will die voluntarily* for his Country ^t Laert. and friends; or, in case he be seized by some excessive pain, losse of his senses, or incurable diseases.

^u *A wise man is wise*, for he compasseth that which is proposed; ^u *and*, for he is every way augmented; ^u *and*, for he hath attained the just height of wisdom; ^u *and*, for he is invincible, and insuperable. The wicked are the contrary.

^x *A wise man profiteth the wise*, and is mutually profited by all the ^x *wise*, though not friends or acquaintance, for betwixt them there is a concord and community of goods, and he who benefiteth another, benefiteth likewise himselfe. A wicked man neither conferreth nor receiveth benefits; for one is to move towards vertue, the other is to be moved towards vertue.

96
y Stob. *A wise man is a good Oeconomist*; skillfull to acquire wealth. Oeconomist is a habit active, and contemplative in the businesse of a family, Oeconomy is the ordering of expences, works, and possessions; the Science of acquisition is a reason whereby wealth is attained; which some account in indifferents, others in good. But no wicked man is a good Oeconomist, since only a wise man knoweth from whence, how, and how far gain may be acquired.

z Stob. *A wise man only is perfect*, for he wanteth no vertue; a wicked man is imperfect, for he hath no vertue. Therefore the wise are alwaies happy, the wicked miserable; which happiness, according to *Chrysippus*, differs nothing from that of God, nor is lesse expetible. The wicked partake of no good, because vertue and that which partakes thereof is good, and those things which are convenient and requisite are proper only to the wise, as the contraries to the wicked.

a Stob. *A wise man is only rich*; for good is true riches, and ill true poverty: a wicked man is poor, not having the means to become rich.

b Stob. *A wise man is only obedient*; the wicked can neither obey nor command.

c Stob. *A wise man only is honourable*; for honour is the reward of vertue, the wicked wanting this, are justly dishonourable.

d Stob. *A wise man only is ingenuous and noble*, according to some of the Stoicks; but, others deny it, referring these not to nature, but institution only, according to the proverb, Custom is a second Nature. So that ingenuity is an habit of nature or institution apt to vertue; Nobility is a habit of descent or institution, apt to vertue.

e Stob. *A wise man is pleasing, persuasive, opportune, and sincere*; for he is expert in every thing, affable in conversation, and helpfull to the publick: The wicked are the contrary.

f Stob. *A wise man is the best Physician*, for he hath considered his constitution, and those things which are requisite for his health.

g Stob. *A wise man may lawfully part with his life*, the wicked cannot, because in their life they never acquire vertue, nor eschew vice. But life and death are limited by offices, and their contraries.

h Stob. *A wise man will accept of Empire, and cohabit with Princes*; but not unlesse he perceive it may be done without danger, and to much advantage.

i Stob. *A wise man never lyeth*, for he who speaketh a falsehood is not properly said to lie, unlesse it be with intent to deceive. A lie may be used many waies without assent, as in War against enemies, or in the like necessity.

k Stob. *A wise man neither deceiveth, nor is deceived*, for he never sinneth, he useth not his sight, hearing, or any other sense ill: He is not suspicious, nor repenteth, for both these are proper to fallaci-

fallacious assent. He can no way be chang'd or erre; or opinio-
nate.

¹ *A wise man only (though not all wise men) is happy in Children, 1 Sub.*
in old age, in death.

^m *A wise man doth nothing contrary to his appetite, for all such m Sub.*
things are done with a privation, and nothing adverse unfore-
seen happeneth to him. ⁿ But in the primitive time, there was ^{n Sub.}
some wise man that did not desire or will any thing, because that
those things which were then present, were not sufficient to be
required by him.

^o *A wise man is meek, for meeknesse is a habit whereby things ^{o Sub.}*
are done meekly, not breaking forth into Anger.

^p *A wise man is peacefull and modest. Modesty is the Science of de- ^{p Sub.}*
cent motion; tranquillity the order of natural motions. The con-
trary to these are seen in the wicked.

^q *A wise man is free from all Calumny; he calumniates none, and ^{q Sub.}*
is not calumniated by any; for Calumny is a lying imputation of
fained friends, to which the wise are not liable, for they are
true friends; the wicked are, for they are feigned.

^r *A wise man delayeth nothing, for delay is an omission of Office ^{r Sub.}*
through slothfulness, of which Hesiod,

*Nothing deferre a year, a month, a day,
He fights aginst himself that doth delay.*

^s *A wise man can only incite, and be incited to Vertue, a fool can- ^{s Sub.}*
not, for he neglecteth præcepts, and goeth no further then the
words, not proceeding to Action. A wicked man is not desirous
to hear or learn, as not being capable by reason of his imprudence
of what is rightly said; whence it followeth, that he can neither
be incited nor incite to Vertue. He that is capable to be incited,
or to incite, must be prepared by Philosophy, which is not com-
petible to a wicked man, for he who diligently heareth Philoso-
phers, is not prepared to Philosophy, but he who expresth their
doctrine in their life and actions. This no wicked man can do, for
he is prepossess'd by Vice. If he should be incited, Vice would
pull him back; but none that is vicious incited to Vertue, as none
sick to health.

^t *Every wicked man is an exile, wanting Law and Country, for both ^{t Sub.}*
these are good. That a City or Country is good, Cleanthes proveth
thus. If there be a habitation, where those, who fly for succour,
find justice, it is good, but a City is such a habitation, therefore
a City is good. A City is taken three waies, for a habitation, for
a convention of men, and for both. In the two latter significati-
ons it is called good.

^u *Every wicked man is rustick, for rusticity is ignorance of Laws ^{u Sub.}*
and civill manners. A wicked man refuseth to live according to
Law, and is hurtfull as a savage Beast.

x Stob.

* *A wicked man is tyrannical, cruell, violent, and injurious, whensoever he gets an occasion.*

y Stob.

† *A wicked man is ungratefull, not obliging nor requiting; for he doth nothing by Friendship.*

z Stob.

‡ *A wicked man is not perseverant, for perseverance is the Science of obtaining our purpose, not being deterred by labour.*

a Stob.

§ *A wicked man is not capable of the right of donation. Donation is the good bestowing of estimation, but nothing that is good is competent to the wicked.*

b Stob.

¶ *Every wicked man is delighted with his wickednesse, which wee may perceive not so much by his discourse, as actions, which shewes that he is carried on to wickednesse.*

THE THIRD PART.

CHAP. I.

PHYSICK, and the parts thereof.

a Lect.

* **PHYSICK** is divided into these places; *Of Bodies, Of Principles, Of Elements, Of Gods, of Place, Of Vacuum*: thus especially; but generally into three places; *Of the World, Of Elements, Axiologick of Causes.*

That concerning the *World* is divided into two parts; whereof one, Contemplation, is common also to the Mathematicks, concerning fixed stars and Planets; as whether the Sun be of the same magnitude as he appears to be, and whether the Moon be so likewise; of their periods and the like; The other contemplation proper only to Physick, to enquire into the essence of these; whether the Sun and Stars consist of matter and form; whether generate or ingenerate, whether animate or inanimate, whether corruptible or incorruptible, whether govern'd by Providence or the like.

The place concerning *Causes* is likewise twofold; whereof one, Contemplation, is common also to medicinall disquisitions; whereby they enquire concerning the principall part of the soul, and those things which are produced in the soul & seed, and the like. The other is likewise usurped by the Mathematicks, as, in what manner we see, what is the cause of the visuell phantasie;
How

How are made Clouds, Thunder, Rainbows, Halo's, Comets and the like.

CHAP. II.

Of Bodies.

^a **N**atural Philosophy brancheth into two parts, of Corpore- ^{a Senec. Epist. 89.}
alls and Incorporealls.

A body is that which doeth or sufficeth; ^b It is the sense with ^{b Laert.}
essence or substance, and finite: ^c whatsoever is, is a body, for ^{c Plut. cont. 1}
whatsoever is, either doeth or suffereth. ^{Stoic.}

^d Principles are Bodies void of form. ^{d Laert.}

Elements are bodies endued with form.

^e Causes are corporeall, because they are spirits. ^{e Plut. plac.}

^f Qualities are Corporeall, for they are spirits, and aerial in- ^{phil. 1. 11.}
tentions, which affect the parts of all things, generated with ^{f Plut. cont. 1}
form and figure. ^{Stoic.}

^g Vertues, Vices, Arts, Memory, Phantasies, Affections, Ap- ^{g Plut. cont. 1}
petitions, Assents, are bodies, existing in the Supream part of the ^{Stoic. Tertul. de anima cap. 6.}
Soul.

^h The Soul is a Body, because it maketh us to be living Crea- ^{h Sen. Ep. 113.}
tures.

ⁱ Night and day are bodies. ^{i Plut.}

^k Voice is a body, for it maketh that which is heard; in a ^{k Laert.}
word, whatsoever is, is a body and a subject, (^l for the Stoicks ^{l Orig.}
take away intellectuall substances, affirming all things that are,
to be comprehended by sense) onely differences are not sub-
sistent.

^m A solid body (according to *Apollodorus*) is dividible three ^{m Laert.}
waies, into length, breadth, and depth.

A superficies is the terme of a body, or that which hath onely
length and breadth, but no depth; thus *Possidonius*.

A line is the terme of a Superficies, or a length without breadth,
that which hath length onely.

A point is the terme of a line, or the least mark.

ⁿ A body is dividible into infinite, yet it consisteth not of infi- ^{n Stob. Phys. 17}
nite bodies.

CHAP. III.

Of Principles.

^a **T**he place concerning bodies is divided into two degrees, ^{a Senec. Ep 79.}
into those which produce, and those which are produced,
the first Principles, the second Elements. Prin-

b Laert.

^b Principles and Elements differ: Principles are ingenerate, incorruptible: Elements shall perish by conflagration. Moreover, Principles are bodies, and void of form; Elements have forme.

c Laert.

^c There are two principles of all things, the Agent, and the Patient: The Patient is a substance void of quality, called Matter: the Agent is the reason which is in the Matter, God.

d Sen. Ep. 65.

^d Matter is sluggish, a thing ready for all things, but will cease if none move it. The Cause, that is, the Reason, formeth matter, and moldeth it which way he pleaseth, out of which he produceth various works. There must therefore be something out of which a thing is made, and also by which it is made: This is the Cause, that Matter. ^e The Cause or active Reason is God.

e Ibid.

f Cic.

^f In the Agent there is power, in the Patient a certain matter [or capacity,] and in both, both; for matter it selfe could not cohere, if it were not kept together by a power, nor that power without some matter; for there is nothing, which is not compelled to be somewhere.

g Laert. 7. 3.

^g Both these, God and the World, the Artist and his work, they comprehend within this terme, *Nature*, as if nature were God mixed through the World. ^h Sometimes they call that nature which containeth the World, sometimes that which generateth and produceth things upon the earth.

h Laert.

i Stob. Phys. 1. 16.

ⁱ The Agent is, as we said, called the Cause. ⁱ A Cause, according to *Zeno*, is that, by which there is an effect, which is not a Cause; or, as *Chrysippus*, the reason of the effect; or, as *Possidonius*, the first Author of a thing. A Cause is a body, a not-Cause a Categorem. It is impossible that the cause being assigned, the effect should not be present, which is to be understood thus: The Soule is the Cause through which we live, Prudence the Cause by which we are wise. It is impossible, that he who hath a Soule should not live, or he who hath Prudence should not be wise.

CHAP. IV.

Of Matter.

a Laert.

b Stob. Phys. 14.

c Laert.

^a **T**he substance of all [^b qualitative] beings is first Matter, according to *Zeno* and *Chrysippus*, in his first of *Physicks*.

^c Matter is that of which every thing is made, it hath two names, *ὑποκείμενον* Substance, and *ὑλη* Matter. Substance is of all things in generall, Matter of particulars.

d Laert.

e Stob. Phys. 14.

^d Universall matter is [^e according to *Zeno*, wholly eternall,] not admitting, as *Chrysippus* saith, encrease or decrease.

^f Particu-

^f Particular matter admitteth augmentation, and diminution, ^{F Laert.}
^s for it remaineth not alwaies the same, but is separated and ^{Stob. Phys. 14.}
mixed, so that, according to *Chrysippus*, its parts perish by sepa-
ration, and exist by mutuall mistion. But those who call fire,
air, water, and earth, Matter, assert not a thing void of forme,
but of a body.

^h Matter is a body, [and finite.] *Possidonius* saith, that the ^{Stob. Phys. 14.}
substance and matter of the Universe is void of quality and ^{Laert.}
form, in as much as it hath not a certain figure and quality in it
selfe, but it is alwaies seen in some figure and quality. But, the
substantiall nature of the Universe, differs from matter inteni-
onally only.

^k Matter is passible, for if it were immutable, things could not ^{k Laert.}
be generated of it. Hence it followeth, that it is divisible into
infinite; yet, it selfe, as *Chrysippus* saith, it not infinite, for no-
thing that is divisible is infinite, but matter is continuous.

^l Through this matter, *Zeno* affirmeth, that the reason of the ^{Stob. Phys. 14.}
World, which some call Fate, is diffused as seed.

CHAP. V.

Of the World.

OF this matter was made the World. The World hath seve-
rall appellations, *κόσμος*, the World, *πάντα*, the All; *κόσμος*, the
whole. ^{a Laert.} World, is taken three waies: First, for God him-
selfe, who is properly qualified with all Essence, incorruptible,
and ingenerate, who framed the Universe after a certain period
of time, who resolved all nature into himselfe, and again gene-
rated it out of himselfe. Secondly for the starry Ornament: and
thirdly that which consists of both.

^b The All, *πάντα*, is one way taken, as *Apollodorus* saith, for the ^{b Laert.}
World, and another way for the System of the World, and the
vacuity beyond it. The World is finite, the vacuity infinite.

^c Thus likewise they distinguish betwixt *κόσμος*, and *κόσμος*; ^{c Stob. Phys. cap. 24.}
κόσμος, includeth also an infinite vacuity, in which the world is:
κόσμος, signifies the world without that vacuity, which neither
is increased nor diminished; but its parts are sometimes ex-
tended, sometimes contracted. It began from the earth as its
center, for the center is the beginning of a Circle.

^d The world is that which is properly qualited with the es- ^{d Laert.}
sence of all things; or, as ^e *Chrysippus* and ^f *Possidonius* define it, ^{e Stob. c. 24.}
a System of Heaven and Earth, and of the natures therein con- ^{f Laert.}
tained; or a System of God and Men, and of all things that were
made for them.

^g The world was made by God, for if (saith *Chrysippus*) there <sup>g Laert. de i-
be ra dei. cap. 10.</sup>

be any thing which produceth such things, as Man, though indued with reason, cannot produce, that (doubtlesse) is greater and stronger, and wiser then man. But a Man cannot make the Celestiall things, therefore that which made them, transcendeth man, in Art, Counsell, Prudence, and Power, and what can that be but God?

^h *Cic. de nat. d.* ^h The World was made for those animate essences which have the use of Reason, these are the Gods and men, then whom nothing is better. All things of which it consisteth, and which it produceth within it selfe, are accommodated to the use of Man.

^k *Laert.* The World was made in this manner; ^k God in the beginning being alone by himself, converted all substance (which according to *Zeno* was fire) first into air, then into Water. And as in the Plant the seed is contained; so God, who is the prolifick reason of the World, left such a seed in the humidity, as might afford easie and apt matter for the generation of those things that were to be produced.

^l *Laert. Stob. Phys. cap. 20.* ^l *Zeno* addeth, that one part tending downward, was condensed into Earth, another part remained partly water, and partly, being exhal'd, air, of a particle of which air flashed out fire.

^m *Stob. Phys. cap. 20.* ^m *Cleanthes* describeth it in this manner. The Universe being set on fire, the middle part thereof first settled downwards, then the next parts by little and little were quenched. Thus the Universe being wet, the extreame fire, (the middle part opposing it) sprang upward, and began the constitution of the World, and the revolution of this constitution shall never end. For as the parts of every thing are at certain times produced of Seed; so the parts of the Universe (amongst which are living Creatures and Plants) are produced in their seasons; and as some reasons of the parts are mixed together in the seed, which being composed, are again dissolved; so of one are all things made; and again, of one is all compounded by an equall and perpetuall revolution.

ⁿ *Laert.* ⁿ The World is *One*, of the same corporeall substance, and of a Sphaerickall figure, for this is of all figures most apt for motion. Thus *Zeno*, *Chrysippus*, *Pessidonium*, and others.

^o *Laert.* ^o The World is seated in an infinite incorporeall vacuity, which is beyond it, circumsufed about it, ^p into which the world shall be dissolved by conflagration. The World is finite, the vacuity infinite; yet ^q *Pessidonium* saith, it is no more then will suffice for the resolution of the World, when it shall perish. ^r By this argument they confute the motion of Atomes downward; introduced by *Epicure*, for in that which is infinite, there are no locall differences of high or low.

The world is not heavy, because the whole fabrick thereof consisteth of heavy and light Elements, and, being placed in the midst, whither such bodies tend, it keepeth its place. ^s In

^p *Plu. Pl. i. lib. 2. 9.*
^q *Int. Pl. Phil. 2. 9.*
^r *Plut. contra. Stoi.*

¹In the World there is no vacuity, but it is compleatly one, ¹Laert. for that necessitates a conspiracy and harmony, betwixt Celestials and Terrestrials.

The World only is ² self-sufficient, because it alone hath all ¹Plut. contra. in it self, whereof it standeth in no need. Of it self it is nourished and augmented, whereas the parts are transmuted and converted into one another. ²Stoic.

The World is a ³ perfect body, the parts of the World are ¹Plut. contra. not perfect; because they are respective to the whole, and not of themselves. The Universe is by Nature apt to move it self in all parts, to contain, preserve, and not break, dissolve and burn it self, the Universe sending and moving the same point, and the parts thereof having the same motion from the Nature of the body. Like it is that this first motion is naturally proper to all Bodies, namely, to encline towards the midst of the World, considering the World moveth so in regard of it self; and the parts likewise, in that they are parts of the whole. ²Stoic.

⁴The World is a living Creature, rationally, animate and intellectual (so *Chrysippus*, *Apollodorus* and *Possidonius*) and hath an animate sensible essence. For a living Creature is more excellent then that which is not a living Creature; but nothing is more excellent then the World, therefore the World is a living Creature. That it is animate is manifest from our Soul, which is a picce thereof taken out of it. (but *Boethius* denies that the world is a living Creature) ⁵The mind, or Providence passeth through every part thereof, as the Soul doth in us, but in some parts more, in others lesse; through some permeating, as a habit, as in the bones and Nerves, through some as a mind, as through the principall (*Hegemonick*) part. In like manner the whole World is an animate rationally Creature, the Hegemonickall part thereof is the *Æther*, as *Antipater* the Tyrian in his eighth Book of the World. But *Chrysippus* in his first of *Providence*, and *Possidonius*, of the Gods, affirm, that Heaven is the Hegemonick of the World; *Cleanthes*, the Sunne. But *Chrysippus* in the same Book (differing from what he said before) affirmeth it to be the purest part of the *Æther*, which they call the first God, sensibly, because it passeth through all in the air, and through all living Creatures and Plants, but through the Earth as a habit. ⁶Laert.

⁷The World, according to the greater part of Stoicks, is corruptible, for it is generated in the same manner as things comprehensible by sense. Again, if the parts thereof be corruptible, the whole is also corruptible; but the parts of the World are corruptible, for they are dayly changed into one another, therefore the whole it selfe is corruptible. And again, if any thing admit any change into the worse, it is corruptible; but the World doth, for it admitteth exsiccation, and inundation; therefore, &c.

O o o o o

⁸The

a Philo. Ind. de
immortal. mun-
di.

b Phil. com. mot.

c Numen. apud
Enseb.

d Phil. com. mot.

e Phil. Ind.
f Cic. Stob.

* The World shall perish by fire, caused by the power of fire which is in all things, which, after a long time, consuming all the moisture, shall resolve all things into it self. The Moon, Stars, and Sun; saith *Cleanthes*, shall perish, but God shall assimilate all things to himself, and resolve all into himself. * This opinion of the generall conflagration of the World, was held by the first and most antient of this Sect, *Zeno*, *Cleanthes* and *Chrysippus*.

^d This fire is the Seed of the World; after the conflagration it diffuseth it self even into the Vacuity that was beyond the World. Afterwards, by order of the same reason which made the World; it shall withdraw and contract it self towards the generation of a new World, yet not be quite extinguished, but so as that some portion thereof remain; for as much as it is the cause of motion.

But *Boethius*, *Possidonius*, and *Panetius* deny this conflagration; of the World, conceiving rather that the World is eternall, to whom likewise *Diogenes* the Babylonian assents.

CHAP. VI.

Of Elements.

a Laert.

^a GOD having converted, as we said; all matter into moisture, and prepared it for the generation of future things; in the next place, produced the four Elements; Fire, Water, Air, and Earth. Of these discourseth *Zeno* in his Book of the Universe, and *Chrysippus* in his first of Physicks, and *Archdemus* of Elements.

b Laert.

^b Element is that, of which generated things are first made, and into which they are resolved. The four Elements are matter or substance endued with quality. Fire is hot, water moist, Air cold, Earth dry; yet not so, but that in Air, there is part of the same quality, for in the highest it is fire, which is called *Ether*, in which is generated the first sphere of Planets, next Air, then Water, the basis of all, Earth, being placed in the midst of all.

^c Of the four Elements, two are light, Fire and Air, the other two, Earth and water, heavy, which properly tend to the centre, but the centre it self is no way heavy.

CHAP. VII.

Of Fire.

^a THE first Element is that of *Fire*, which, as all bodies tend ^{a Stob.} to the middle, enclineth, as much as the lightnesse of its Nature permits, to the centre of the world, by a circular motion round about it.

^b There are (according to *Zeno*) two kinds of fire, one artificiall, requisite to the use of life, which converteth nutriment into it self; the other inartificiall (so ^c *Cicero* renders *ἀναχρηστικόν*) by ^c *De Nat. deor.* which all things grow, and are preserved; ^d for whatsoever is nourished and groweth, compriseth within it self the power of heat. This fire is diffused through all the parts of the World, and they are all sustained by it. That it is in the Earth appeareth by Seeds and Roots, which spring up and grow by the temperament of this heat. That it is in Water appeareth, forasmuch as Water is susceptible of greater cold, as by freezing. It is consequently in air also; that being a vapour extracted from Water, and supply'd by motion of the heat which is in the Water. But primarily, and originally, it is in the Element of fire, a Nature absolutely hot, which dispenseth salutary vitall heat to all other things. ^e This is Nature, saith *Zeno*, and the Soul: Of fire consist ^{e Stob. Phys. p. 47.} the Sun, Moon, and Starrs.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Starres.

^a IN the *æther* are generated the Starrs, of the noblest and purest ^{a Cic. Nat. deor. 2.} part thereof, without admixtion of any other Nature wholly hot and pellucid, animate creatures indued with sense and Intellect.

^b *Possidonius* defineth a Star, a divine body, consisting of *æthericall* fire, splendid and fiery, never resting, but alwaies moving circularly. ^{b Stob. Phys.}

^c That the Starrs are wholly fiery, *Cleantes* proveth by the testimony of two senses, touch and sight. For the Lustre of the Sun is brighter then of any fire, seeing that it shines so far and wide, to so vast a world; and such is its touch, that it not onely warmeth, but oftentimes burneth, neither of which it would do if it were not fiery. ^{c Cic. nat. deor. 2.}

Now (saith he) the Sun being fiery, is either like that fire which is requisite to the use of life, or unto that which is contain-

ned in the bodies of living creatures; but this our fire, which the use of life requireth, is a consumer of all things, disturbeth and dispatcheth all things. On the contrary, the other is corporeall, vitall, and salutary, it conserveth all things, it nourisheth, encreaseth, sustaineth, and affecteth with sense; therefore, saith he, there's no question to which of these fires the Sun is like, for he causeth all things to flourish and sprout up, according to their severall kinds: Wherefore the fire of the Sun being like those fires which are in the bodies of living creatures, the Sun must be a living creature also, and so must be likewise the rest of the Starrs in the celestiall fire, which is called *Æther* or Heaven.

* Cic. nat. deor.
2.

* For seeing that of living creatures, one kinde is generated in the earth, other kinds in the water, others in the aire, it were absurd to think, that in that part which is most apt for generation of living creatures, no living creature is generated. The Starrs possesse the *Æther*, which being most rare, and in perpetuall agitation and vigour, it is necessary the living creature that is generated in it be endued with most acute sense, quickest mobility. The starrs therefore have sense and intelligence, whence it followeth, that they are to be reputed Gods. For we say, that they who live in the purest aire are much more acute and understanding, then those who live in a thick climate: The diet likewise is thought to conduce not a little to the sharpening of the understanding. Whence it is probable, the starrs are endued with most excellent understanding, forasmuch as they dwell in the ætheriall part of the world, and are nourished with exhalations from the Sea and Earth, extenuated by a long distance.

The sense and intellect of the Starrs is chiefly manifest from their order and constancy, for nothing can be moved by proportion and number without providence, in which nothing is temerarious, nothing various, nothing casuall. But the order of Starrs, and constancy throughout all eternity, cometh neither from Nature, for that is void of Reason, nor from Fortune, which affecteth variety, and disalloweth constancy.

Again, all things are moved either naturally, or violently, or voluntarily. Those which move naturally, are carried either by their weight downward, or by their lightnesse upwards, neither of which is proper to the Starrs, for their motion is circular. Neither can it be said, that they are moved violently against their own nature; for what power can be greater? it remaineth therefore, that their motion be voluntary.

d Cic.
e Laert.

^d No fire can subsist without some aliment, ^e the starres therefore are nourished by the vapours of the earth.

f Stob.

^f Of Starrs (according to *Corysippus*) there are two sorts, both which are by nature divine, animate, and providentiall, the fixed

fixed and the Erratick. The multitude of the fixed is incomprehensible; the Erratick are lower then the fixed. The fixed are all ranked in one superficies, as is manifest to the sight; the erratick in severall. The sphear of fixed starrs includeth that of the erratick. The highest of the erratick, and next to the fixed starrs, is the sphear of *Saturn*, next, that of *Jupiter*, after which, that of *Mars*, then that of *Mercury*, then that of *Venus*, then that of the *Sun*, and lastly that of the *Moon*, which being neerest the air, seemeth therefore aeriall, and hath greatest influence upon terrestriall bodies.

^a *Saturn*, *φάων*, finisheth his course in almost thirty years; ^c *Cic. de Nat. deor. 2.*
Jupiter, *φαιδων*, in twelve; *Mars*, *πυρρον*, in twenty foure Months wanting six daies; *Mercury*, *σινδων*, in a year; *Venus*, *φωσφορος*, (lowest of the five Planets) in a year.

^b The *Sun* and the *Moon* are properly called *ἀστρα*, Starrs; but ^h *Stob.*
ἀστρον and *ἀστρον* differ; for every *ἀστρον* is *ἀστρον*, but not the contrary.

ⁱ The rising of a star, *Chrysippus* defineth, its advancement above the earth; and the setting thereof its occultation under the earth. The same starrs at the same time, rise to some, and set to others. The apparition of a star, *ἐμφανη*, is its rising together with the Sun; and the setting thereof, is its setting with the Sun: for setting is taken two waies, in opposition to rising, and in opposition to apparition. As the apparition of the Dog-star is its rising together with the Sun, and its setting is its occultation under the earth together with the Sun. The same is said of the Pleiades.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Sun.

NEXT *Venus* (the lowest Planet) is the *Sun*, the ^b chiefe of all ^a *Cic. nat. deor.*
that consist of this ætheriall fire. The Sun is defined by ^{2.}
Cleanthes and *Chrysippus*, an intellectuall Taper, gather'd and ^b *Stob. p. 56, 57.*
kindled from the vapours of the Sea. ^c *Possidonius* defineth the ^c *Laert.*
Sun a most pure fire, greater then the earth, of a sphericall figure (as ^d *Cleanthes* also affirms) answerable to that of the ^d *Stob. p. 57.*
world.

^e That the Sun is fiery, is manifest in that it hath all the operations of fire; ^f and forasmuch as he is fire, it followeth that hee ^f *Cic.*
must be nourished. ^g The Sun is nourished by exhalations from ^g *Stob. p. 56.*
the great Ocean. ^h *Laert.*

^h According to the expansion of this subjected aliment, saith ^h *Stob.*
Cleanthes, in his motion from Tropick to Tropick. He moveth in a spirall line, from the Æquinoctiall towards the North, and towards the South. ⁱ *Zeno* saith, he hath two motions, one with ⁱ *Stob. p. 57.*
the

the World from *East* to *West*, the other contrary, through the Signes.

k Laert.

^k That the Sun is greater then the Earth, appeareth in that it enlightneth, not only all the Earth, but Heaven also. Again, the shadow of the Earth being conicall, argues the Sun to be greater then the Earth. Again, it is visible every where by reason of its magnitude.

l Laert.

^l The Sun is Eclipsed by interposition of the Moon betwixt us and that part of the Sun which is toward us (as *Zeno* in his book of the Universe.) For meeting the Sun, and coming under him, she seemeth to darken his light, and afterwards to disclose it again, as will appear in a basin of water.

CHAP. X.

Of the Moon.

^a *Stob. Phys. p. 59.* **I**N the lowest part of the æther is the *Moon*: The Moon (according to *Zeno*) is an intellectuall, wise, igneous, Star consisting of artificiall fire. *Cleanthes* saith, she is of a fiery substance,

b *Physiol. Stoic.*

2 13.

c Laert.

d *Plur. plac. 2.*

25. *Stob. p. 59.*

e *Pl. plac. Phil.*

2. 30.

f *St. p. 60.*

g *Pl. Ph. 2.*

26.

and of a dirty figure. ^b *Lipsius* for *καλον*, dirty, substitutes *καλον*, as if of the same figure, as a hat or cap. But perhaps there needs no alteration, for they ^c affirmed, as she is nearer to the Earth then the Sun, so is she of a more terrene Nature. ^d *Possidonius* and most of the Stoicks affirm, she is mixt of fire and air, ^e by reason of which diversity of substance she is not subject to corruption. ^f To this mixtion of air in her composition, they impute likewise those spots which are seen in her face. ^g She is greater then the Earth, as well as the Sun is, and Sphæricall as the Sun, yet appeareth in various figures, the full-Moon, first quarter, New-Moon, last quarter.

h *Stob. p. 59.*

^h *Chrysippus* saith, she is a fire collected after the Sun, from the exhalation of fresh Waters, for which cause she is likewise nourished by them, as ⁱ *Possidonius* also asserteth.

i Laert.

k Laert.

l *Stob. p. 57.*

m *Stob. p. 59.*

Laert.

^k Her motion is spirall; *Zeno* saith, she hath two motions, as the one with the World from *East* to *West*, the other contrary through the signes. ^m The period of her course is called a *Monti*; ⁿ *μυθε*, is likewise that part of the Moon which appeareth to us, for one halfe of her is alwaies turned towards us.

ⁱ The Moon is Eclipsed when she falleth into the shadow of the earth. For although every month she is opposite to the Sun, yet she is then only eclipsed when she is fullest, by reason of the obliquity of her course, whereby her latitude is varied towards the north and south. When therefore she happens to be neer the Ecliptick, and opposite to the Sun, she is eclipsed; which happens (as *Possidonius* saith) in *Libra* and *Scorpio*, and in *Aries* and

Taurus.

Janus. Thus *Lucretius*, but *Possidonius* seems to have been ignorant of, or not to have considered the motion of the Nodes of the Moon (commonly called *Caput & Cauda draconis*) whereby the restitution or period of Eclipses is made in nineteen yeeres, (*ἡλικία τοῦ διαγράμματος*) which was the ground of *Aetion's* period, and of the Cycle of the Moon, in the Julian Calender.

CHAP. XI.

Of Aire.

NEXT the sphere of the Moon (saith *Chrysippus*) is the element ^{a Stob.} of *Aires* interposed betwixt the Sea and Heaven (^{b Cic.} spherical in figure) ^{c Laert.} consecrated by the name of ^{d Cic.} *Juno*, Sister and Wife of *Jupiter*, who is the *Æther*; betwixt these there is a neer conjunction.

^{e Stob. Phys.} The Aire is divided into three regions, the highest, the middle, and the lowest. The highest region is the hottest and dryest, and rarest, by reason of the vicinity of the eternall fires. The lowest and neerest to the earth is thick and caliginous; because it receiveth terrene exhalations. The middle region is more temperate than the higher and lower, as to ficcidity and rarity, but colder than both. This, wherein the clouds and winds are generated, is, according to *Possidonius*, forty furlongs above the earth. Next to it is the pure and liquid aire of untroubled light. From the turbulent part to the Moon is twenty hundred thousand furlongs.

^{f Laert.} To the aire is attributed the primitive cold.

^{g Laert.} As concerning things in the Aire: *Winter* is the rigour of the aire, next above the earth, occasion'd by the remoteness of the Sun, and is the coldest of the seasons of the year. *Spring* is the season succeeding *Winter*, preceding *Summer*, and is a good temperature of the air, occasion'd by approach of the Sun. *Summer* is that season of the year, when the aire above the earth is warmed, by the Sun's access towards the north. *Autumn* is that season of the year which followeth *Summer*, and precedeth *Winter*, is made by the return of the Sun from us.

^{h Laert.} *Winter* commeth, when the aire is predominant in thicknesse, and is forced upward: *Summer*, when the fire is predominant, and driven downward.

^{i Phil. 2. 2. d.} ^{j Laert.} Winde is a fluxion of the aire, having severall names, from the variety of places; as for example: That which bloweth from the darknesse of the night, and Sun-setting, is called *Zephyrus*; from the East and Sun-rising, *Apeliotes*; from the North, *Boreas*; from the South *Lybs*. ^{k Laert.} It is occasion'd by the Sun's ex-
 nuation of the vapours.

^{l The}

l Laert.

¹ The *Rainbow* is a reflection of the Sun's beams from a humid cloude; or, as *Possidonius*, an apparition of part of the Sun or Moon in a cloud, dewy, concave, and continuous to the phantasy, as in a looking-glasse, the representation of a Circle.

m Laert.

^m *Comets* are fires subsisting of thick air, carried up to the ætheriall place.

n Laert.

ⁿ *Ætas* is an accension of suddain fire, swiftly carried through the air, appearing length-waies.

o Laert.

^o *Rain* is a conversion of clouds into water, when either from the Earth, or from the Sea, by the power of the Sun, the humour is drawn upwards ineffectually.

p Laert.

^p *Frost* is congealed rain.

q Laert.

^q *Hail* is a concrete cloud, disperfed by the winde.

r Laert.

^r *Snow* is humidity, from a concrete cloud, according to *Possidonius*.

f Laert.

^f *Lightning* is an accension of clouds, which are driven by the winds upon one another, and broken, according to *Zeno*.

e Laert. Phil.

plac. p. hil. 3. 3.

Stob. p. 65.

u Laert.

^e *Thunder* is a noise occasion'd by the collision of clouds.

^u *Thunderbolt* is a strong inflammation, rushing upon the earth with great violence, when the clouds by impulsion of the winds are broken against one another. Some define it a conversion of fiery inflamed aire, violently rushing down.

z Laert.

^z *Typho* is a violent Thunder, thrust down with a great force of winde, or a smoaking winde, which rusheth down upon the breaking of the cloud.

Preflex is a cloud inclosed with fire by winde in the concavities of the earth: There are many kinds thereof, *Earthquakes*, *Chasma's*, and the like.

CHAP. XII.

Of Water and Earth.

Stob.

¹ That part of the world (saith ^a *Chrysippus*) which is the most solid support of nature, as bones are in a living creature, is called the earth: About this the water is evenly diffused. The earth hath some uneven parts arising out of the water, called Islands, or, if of large extent, Continents, from the ignorance of man, who knowes not, that even those are Islands, in respect of the great Ocean.

b Phil. plac.

Phil. 3. 9. Laert.

c Phil. plac.

p. hil. 9. 10.

The earth is in the midst, being in the nature of a Center, one and finite, sphericall in figure. The water is likewise sphericall, having the same center with the earth.

The earth hath five *Zones*, one northern, beyond the Artick Circle, uninhabitable through extremity of cold: another temperate; a third not habitable by reason of extream heat, whence it

it is called Torrid; a fourth temperate, a fifth southern, not habitable by reason of cold. * But *Possidonius* conceiveth the Climate under the Equinoctiall to be temperate; for, saith he, under the Tropicks where the Sun dwells longest, the places are habitable, and why not then under the Equator? Again, the night being equall to the day, affordeth leisure enough for refrigeration, which is assisted likewise by showers and winds.

* The generation of the world began from the earth, as from the Center; for the Center is the beginning of a sphere. * *Stob.*

* Plants have not any soul at all, but spring up of themselves; as it were by chance. * *Plut. Plat. Phil. 5. 26.*

CHAP. XIII.

Of Mixture and Temperament.

Chrisippus asserteth a Spirit moving it selfe to it selfe, and from it selfe, or a spirit moving it selfe backwards and forwards. He calleth it spirit, as being moved aire, answering in some proportion to the Æther, so that it both meets in one; and this motion is only according to those who think; that all nature receiveth mutation, solution, composition, and the like. Composition, mixtion, temperament, and confusion are different; Composition is a contract of bodies, whose superficies are contiguous to one another, as in heaps of grain or sand. Mixtion is of two or more bodies, whose qualities are diffused through the whole, as we see in fire, and red hot iron, and in our own soules; for every where there is a diffusion through entire bodies, so as one body doth passe through another. Temperament is of two or more humid bodies, whose qualities are diffused through the whole. Mixtion is also common to drie bodies, as to fire and iron, to the soul and the body, temperament only to the humid. For qualities appear from the temperament of severall humid things, as of wine, honey, water, vinegar, and the like; that in such temperament, the qualities of the things tempered remain, is evident from this, that oftentimes they are by some art separated from one another. For, if we put a sponge dipped in oyle into wine mixt with water, the water, separating it selfe from the wine, will gather to the sponge. Lastly, confusion is the transmutation of two or more qualities into another of a different nature, as in composition of Unguents and Medicines.

CHAP. XIV.

*Of Generation and Corruption.**a Stob. Phys.*

Possidonius asserteth foure species of generation and corruption, of things that are into things that are (for that of things that are not, and of things that are not he rejected, conceiving there is none such.) Of transmutations into things that are, one is by division, another by alteration, a third by confusion, a fourth of the whole by resolution. Of these, alteration concerneth the substance, the other three are of the qualities which inhere in the substance. According to these are generations made. But the substance it selfe is neither augmented nor diminished by apposition or detraction, but is only altered as happeneth to numbers and measures. But in things properly qualited, as *Dion* and *Theon*, there is augmentation and diminution, wherefore the quality of each remaineth from the generation untill the corruption thereof, in plants and living creatures which are capable of corruption. In things properly qualited, he asserted two susceptible parts; one, according to the substance, another according to the quality. This, as we have often said, admitteth augmentation and diminution. Neither is the thing properly qualited, and the substance out of which it is, all one, nor divers, but only, not all one, because the substance is a part, and occupatech the same place; but things that are divers have distinct places, and are not consider'd in part. That as to the thing properly qualited, and as to the substance, it is not the same, *Mnesarchus* affirmeth to be evident, because it is necessary, that to the same happen the same things. For if, for example, a man having formed a horse, should break it, and make a dog, we would presently, beholding it, say, this was not before, but it is now: So are the qualited and the substance divers. Neither is it likely that we should all be the same as to substance; for it often happens, that the substance is preexistent to the generation, as the substance of *Socrates* was, before *Socrates* was; and after the corruption and death of *Socrates*, the substance remaineth, though *Socrates* himselfe be not.

CHAP. XV.

*Of Motion.**a Stob.*

Motion (according to *Chrysippus*) is a mutation of parts, either in whole or in parts, or an excession out of place, either in whole or in part, or a change according to place, or figure.

figure. *Jaculation* is a vehement motion from on high. *Rest* is partly a privation of motion in a body, partly the same habit of a body before and after. There are two first motions, *right* and *oblique*; from the mixtion of these ariseth great variety of motions.

^b *Zeno* affirms the parts of all things consulting by themselves ^b *Sub.* are moved towards the middle of the whole, and likewise of the World it self; wherefore it is rightly said; that all parts of the World tend to the middle thereof, and principally the heavy, and that there is the same cause of the *rest* of the World in the infinite vacuity, and of the *rest* of the Earth, in the World, in the midst of which it is constituted as a point. All bodies have not gravity, as air, and fire; yet these in some manner tend to the midst of the World.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Living Creatures.

OF animate Creatures there are two kinds (for Plants as we ^a *Plus. Pl. Ph.* said have no souls) some are appetitive and concupiscible, others ratiocination. The *Soul*, according to *Zeno*, *Antipater* and *Pissidonius*, is a hot spirit, for hereby we breath and move. *Cleanthis* saith, we live so long as that heat holdeth.

Every soul hath sense and is a spirit innate in us, wherefore it is a body, and shall not continue after death; yet is it by Nature corruptible, notwithstanding, that it is a part of the Soul of the Universe which is incorruptible: Yet some hold, that the lesse firm Souls, such as are those of the unlearned, perish at the dissolution of the body; the stronger, as those of the wise and virtuous, shall last even untill the generall conflagration.

The Soul hath eight parts, whereof five are the Senses, the ^b *Lact. Plac. phil. 4. 4.* sixth generative, the seventh Vocall, the eighth Hegemonick.

The Supream or Hegemonick part of the Soul, is that which ^c *Plus. plac. phil. 4. 4.* maketh Phantasies, assent, sense, appetite. This Supreme part is called Ratiocination; ^d *Plus. plac. phil. 4. 4.* it is seated in the Heart; Some say in the Head, as in its spear.

From the Hegemonick issue and are extended to the body ^e *Plus. plac. phil. 4. 21.* the seven other parts, which it guideth by their proper Organs as a fish its claws.

Sense is an apprehension by the Sensitive Organ, or a comprehension. Sense is taken many waies; For the faculty, habit, act, phantasie, whereby the sensible object is comprehended, and the Hegemonick parts of the Soul are called Sense. Again, the Senses are intelligent spirits, diffused from the Hegemonick to the ^f *Plus. plac. phil. 4. 21.* Organs. ^g *Plus. plac. phil. 4. 21.* The senses are Sight, Hearing, Smell, Taste, Touch.

^h *Sight* is a spirit extended from the Hegemonick part to the ⁱ *Eies.*

Else, Sight is made by contraction of that light which is between the eye and the object into a Cone, according to *Chrysippus*. *Apolodorus* saith, that part of the Air which is Conicall is next the sight, the Base next the Object; so as that which is seen is pointed out to by the Air as by a stick.

Colour is the first figuration or habit of matter.

Darknesse is visible, for from the sight there issaeth a splendor which passeth round about that darknesse. Neither is the sight deceived, for it truly sees that it is dark. *Chrysippus* saith, that we see according to the intention of the mediate air, which is struck by the visuall spirit, which passeth from the Hegemonick to the apple of the eye; and, after that blow, falleth upon the ear next, extending it self in a Conicall figure. Again, from the eye are emitted fiery raies, not black or dusky, and therefore darknesse is visible.

i *Plut. Pl. Ph.*
4. 21.

Hearing is a spirit extended from the Hegemonick part to the Ears. Hearing is made when the Air betwixt the speaker and hearer is verberated in a circulation; and at last by agitation, passeth in at the Ears, as the circles that are made in a pond, by casting in a stone.

k *Plac. Phil.*
4. 21.

Smelling, is a spirit extended from the Hegemonick to the nostrils.

l *Plut. ibid.*

Tasting is a spirit extended from the Hegemonick to the Tongue.

m *Plut. ibid.*

Toucing is a spirit, extended from the Hegemonick part to the superficies, so that it perceiveth that which is obliged to it.

n *Plut. ibid.*

The sixth part of the Soul is the Generative, which is a spirit from the Hegemonick to the *Parastate*; of this part, see *Laertius* from *Athena N. Nymphis* &c. to *de deis* &c. and *Plutarch de Philosoph. Plac. lib. 5. cap. 4, 5, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 23.*

o *Plut. ibid.*

The seventh and last part of the Soul, is that which *Zeno* calls vocall, commonly called the Voice. It is a spirit proceeding from the Hegemonick part to the throat, tongue, and other proper Instruments of speech. Voice is Air, not composed of little pieces, but whole and continuous, having no vacuity in it. This Air being struck by the wind, spreadeth into circles infinitely, untill the Air round about it be filled like the Water in a pond by throwing in of a stone, only the Water moves spherically, the Air circularly. Voice is a body, for it acteth, it striketh upon, and leaveth an impression in our Ear, as a seal in Wax. Again, whatsoever moveth and disturbeth some affection is a body; Harmony moveth with delight, discord disturbeth. Again, whatsoever is moved is a body, but Voice is moved and reverberated from smooth places, as a ball against a Wall. So in the Egyptian Pyramids, one Voice is redoubled four or five times.

p *Plut. Pl.*
Ph. 4. 19.

CHAP. XVII.

Of God.

Hitherto of the Material principle, and that which is produced of it; we come now to the other principle, the Agent, God.

This question they divide into four parts; first, that there are Gods; secondly, what they are; thirdly, that they order the world; fourthly, that they take care of humane affairs. a Cic. nat. deor. lib. 2.

Clement saith, that the notions of God are imprinted in the minds of men from four causes. First, from Divination, for the Gods afford us signes of future things, wherein if there be any mistake, it is not from their part, but from the error of humane conjecture. The second is from the multitude of good things we receive by the temperature of Heaven, the fertility of the Earth, and abundance of other benefits. The third from the Terror of Thunder, Tempest Rain, Snow, Hail, Devastation, Pestilence, Earthquakes, and sometimes groanings, showers of stones and blood, Portents, Prodigies, Comets and the like; with which men are affrighted into a belief, that there is a heavenly divine power. The fourth and greatest cause is the equability of the motion and revolution of Heaven, the Sun, Moon and starres, their distinctions, variety, beauty, order, the very sight whereof declares that they were not made by chance. Cic. ibid.

That there are Gods *Chrysippus* proveth thus: ^b If there is something in Nature, which the mind, reason, power, and faculties of man could not make, that which did make it is better then Man; but Celestiall things, and all those, whose order is sempiternal, could not be made by Man; there is therefore something which made them, which is better then Man, and what is that but God? For if there are no Gods, what can there be in Nature better then Man, for in him only is reason, then which nothing is more excellent? But for a man to think that there is nothing in the World better then himself, is a foolish arrogance. Therefore there is something better, and consequently there is a God. b Cic. ibid.

Zeno more concisely thus; That which is rationall is better then that which is irrationall, but nothing is better then the World, therefore the World is rationall. In like manner may be proved that the World is wise, that it is happy, that it is eternal, for all these are better then the want of these; But there is nothing better then the World; whence it followeth that the World is God. c Cic. ibid.

Again, he argues thus. No part of an insensible thing hath sense; but the parts of the World have sense, therefore the World hath sense.

He

He proceedeth to urge this more strictly : Nothing, saith he, that is void of minde and reason, can of it selfe generate that which is animate and rationall ; but the world generates animate and rationall creatures, therefore the world is animate and rationall.

Likewise, according to his custome ; he concludeth his argument with a similitude: If out of an Olive-tree should come harmonious Pipes, that made Musick, you would not doubt, but that the science of Musick were in the Olive-tree. What if a Plain-tree should bear Musicall instruments, you would think there were musick in those Plain-trees : Why then should we not judge the world to be animate and wise, that produceth out of it selfe animate and wise creatures.

There is nothing besides the world which wanteth nothing, and which is perfect and compleat in all its numbers and parts : for as the cover, saith *Chrysippus*, was made for the shield's sake, and the scabberd for the swords ; so besides the world, all other things were made for the sake of something else. Fruites of the earth were made for living creatures, living irrational creatures for the use of man, horses for carriage, oxen for tillage, dogs for hunting and defence ; but, man himselfe was made to contemplate and imitate the world. Not that he is at all perfect, but only a part of that which is perfect. But the world it selfe, forasmuch as it comprehendeth all things, neither is there any thing which is not in it, is every way perfect. What therefore can be wanting to that which is best ? But, there is nothing better then the minde and reason, therefore these cannot be wanting to the world.

Chrysippus addeth this comparison: As all things are best in the most perfect and mature creatures, as in a Horse better then in a Colt, in a Dog better then in a Whelp, in a Man better then in a Child : So that which is best in all the world, must be in that which is perfect and absolute ; but, then the world, nothing is more perfect, nothing better then vertue ; therefore the world hath proper vertue. The nature of man is not perfect ; yet, in man there is vertue, how much more then in the world ? The world therefore hath vertue, therefore it is wise, and consequently God.

d Plut. Pl. Ph.
1.6.

Thus the notion and apprehension men have of God, is, first, by conceiving the beauty of those things which are objected to their eyes, for no beautifull thing hath been made by chance and adventure, but composed and framed by some ingenious and operative art. Now that the heaven is beautifull, appeareth by the form, colour, and bignesse thereof, by the variety also of starres disposed therein. Moreover, the world is round in manner of a ball, which figure of all others, is principall and most perfect, for it alone resembleth all the parts ; for
being

being round it selfe, it hath the parts also round.

As to the second part of the question, ^c God is an immortall ^c *Laert.* being, rationally, perfect, or intellectuall in Beatitude, voide of all evill, provident over the world, and things in the world, not of human form, maker of all, and as it were father of all.

^f They define God a spirit full of intelligence, of a fiery nature, having no proper form, but transforming himselfe into whatsoever he pleaseth, and resembling all things. ^f *Plut. Pl. PF.* ⁱ 6.

We understand by God, saith *Antipater*, a living nature or substance, happy, incorruptible, doing good to mankind. All men acknowledge the Gods immortall. They who deprive the Gods of beneficence, have an imperfect notion of them, as they likewise, who think they are subject to generation and corruption.

^s Yet, are there some Gods, saith *Chrysippus*, generative and mortall, as well as there are others ingenerate: [^h The world, ^h *Stoic.* ^h *Stob.* ^g *Pl. contrad.* starres, and earth are Gods, but the supream God is the ætheriall minde, *Jupiter*.] The sun, moon; and other such like Gods were begotten; but *Jupiter* is eternall. Other Gods use a certain nourishment, whereby they are maintained equally; but *Jupiter* and the world after another sort then the generated, which shall be consumed by fire. *Jupiter* groweth continually; untill such time as all things be consumed in him, death being the separation of the soul and body; for seeing that the soul of the world never departeth at all, but augmenteth continually, untill it have consumed all the matter within it selfe, we cannot say that the world dieth.

ⁱ The substance of God, *Zeno* affirmes to be the whole World and Heaven, so also *Chrysippus* in his 1st of the Gods, and *Possidonius* in his first of the Gods. But *Antipater* in his 7th of the World, affirmes his substance to be aeriall. *Boethius* in his book of nature, saith, the substance of God is the sphere of fixed stars. Sometimes they call him a nature containing the world, sometimes a nature producing all upon earth.

As concerning the third part of the question, they affirm, that ^k God is an operative artificiall fire, methodically ordering and effecting the generation of the world, comprehending in himselfe all prolifick reason, by which every thing is produced according to Fate. God is a Spirit, diffused through the whole world, having severall denominations, according to the severall parts of the matter through which he spreadeth, and the ^l severall effects of his power shewn therein. They call him *Δία*, as *Διὸς παῖς*, by whom all things are: *Ζεύς*, as the author of life. *Μινέρυα*, as diffused through the æther; *Ιουνο*, as through the aire; *Βουλκαν*, as through the artificiall fire; *Νεπτυν*, as through the water; *Κερες*, as through the earth. In like manner the rest of his names were imposed, with respect to some property. ^m Perhaps it should be *αἰθήρ*, *αἰθήρ*, though *Ελχλυς* ascribe this to *Βουλκαν*, *αἰθήρ*. ⁿ *αἰθήρ* *αἰθήρ*.

n Cic.

ty. ⁿ This place was first discoursed upon by *Zeno*, after whom, *Cleanthes* and *Chrysippus* dilated more largely upon it.

o Cic.

^o By this Providence, the World, and all parts of the World, were in the beginning constituted, and are in all time ordered. This disputation they divided into three parts: The first, from the same reason that teacheth us there are Gods, inferreth, that the World is ordered by them, seeing that there is nothing higher or more excellent, then this administration. The second, from that reason which teacheth us, that all things are subjected to an understanding nature, and exquisitely ordered by it, inferreth, that it is generated of animate principles. The third place is derived from admiration of celestiall and terrestriall things. Upon these, *Cicero* discourseth at large, according to the opinion of the Stoicks.

As to the fourth part of the question in generall concerning the Gods, that they have a particular providentiall care of man-kinde, it is manifest, in that whatsoever is in this world was made for the use of man, and is conducible thereunto; and if for the whole species, they must consequently have the same care of particulars, which they expresse by many portents, and all those signes whereupon the art of *Divination* depends. There was never any great person without some divine inspiration. But we must not argue from hence, that if the corn or vineyard of any man be hurt by a Tempest, or Fortune deprive him of any of the conveniencies of life, that he to whom this hath happened, may be judged to be hated or neglected of God. The Gods take care of great things, the little they neglect; but to great persons all things have alwaies a happy issue.

p Agel. lib. 6.
cap. 1.

^p *Chrysippus* in his fourth Book of *Providence* saith, there is nothing more ignorant, nothing more sordid then those persons, who think, good might have been without ill. For, Good and Ill being contraries, it is necessary, that both consist together mutually, sustaining one another, as it were by opposition. For, how could we understand *Justice*, unlesse there were *Injuries*? What is *Justice*, but a privation of *Injustice*? How can *Fortitude* be understood, but by opposition to *Fear*? How *Continence*, but from *Intemperance*? How *Prudence*, if there were not *Imprudence*? Why do not these fooles desire that *Truth* might be without *Falshood*? Such are good and ill, *happinesse* and *miserie*, *griefe* and *pleasure*; one is ty'd to the other, as *Plato* sayes, by their contrary ends.

q Agel. ibid. v.

^q Here followeth the question, whether that Providence which framed the world and mankinde, did make likewise those corporeall infirmities and sicknesses which men suffer. *Chrysippus* affirmeth it was not the intent of Nature to make men obnoxious to sickness: For this agreeth not with the Author of Nature, and Parent of all good things; but he having genera-
ted

red many great things, most apt and usefull, other things also, incommodious to those which he made, were aggenerated together with them, coherent to them, made, not by Nature, but certain necessary consequence, *κατὰ παρακολούθησιν* As, saith he, when Nature framed the bodies of Men, more subtile reason & the benefit of the World, would have required that the head should have been made of the smallest and thin bones; but this utility would have been followed by another extrinsecall inconvenience of greater consequence, that the head would be too weakly defended, and broken with the least blow. Sickneses therefore and diseases are engendred whilst health is engendred. In like manner saith he, whilst *Vertue* is begotten in Man, by the counsell of Nature, vices likewise are begotten by contrary affinity.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Nature.

^a **N**EXT *Jupiter*, *Possidonius* placeth Nature. By Nature they sometimes understand that which containeth the World, sometimes, that which produceth things upon Earth; both which, as we said, is to be understood of God. For that Nature which containeth and preserveth the World, hath perfect sense and reason, which power is the Soul of the World, the mind and divine Wisdom. ^b Thus under the terme of Nature, they comprehend both God and the World, affirming that the one cannot be without the other, as if Nature were God permeating through the World, God the mind of the World, the World the body of God. ^c This *Chrysippus* calleth *Common-Nature* in distinction from particular Nature. ^d *Laert.*

^a Nature is defined by *Zeno* an artificial fire, proceeding in the way of generation, which is the fiery spirit, the Artist of formes; by others, a habit receiving motion from it self, according to prolifick reason, and effecting and containing those things which subsist by it, in certain definite times, producing all things, from which it self is distinct by Nature, proposing to it self these two ends, Utility and Pleasure, as is manifest from the production of man. ^b *Laert. lib. 7. cap. 3.* ^c *Plur.*

n Cic.

ty. ⁿ This place was first discoursed upon by *Zeno*, after whom, *Cleanthes* and *Chrysippus* dilated more largely upon it.

o Cic.

^o By this Providence, the World, and all parts of the World, were in the beginning constituted, and are in all time ordered. This disputation they divided into three parts: The first, from the same reason that teacheth us there are Gods, inferreth, that the World is ordered by them, seeing that there is nothing higher or more excellent, then this administration. The second, from that reason which teacheth us, that all things are subjected to an understanding nature, and exquisitely ordered by it, inferreth, that it is generated of animate principles. The third place is derived from admiration of celestiall and terrestriall things. Upon these, *Cicero* discourseth at large, according to the opinion of the Stoicks.

As to the fourth part of the question in generall concerning the Gods, that they have a particular providentiall care of man-kinde, it is manifest, in that whatsoever is in this world was made for the use of man, and is conducible thereunto; and if for the whole species, they must consequently have the same care of particulars, which they expresse by many portents, and all those signes whereupon the art of *Divination* depends. There was never any great person without some divine inspiration. But we must not argue from hence, that if the corn or vineyard of any man be hurt by a Tempest, or Fortune deprive him of any of the conveniencies of life, that he to whom this hath happened, may be judged to be hated or neglected of God. The Gods take care of great things, the little they neglect; but to great persons all things have alwaies a happy issue.

p Agel. lib. 6.
cap. 1.

^p *Chrysippus* in his fourth Book of *Providence* saith, there is nothing more ignorant, nothing more sordid then those persons, who think, good might have been without ill. For, Good and Ill being contraries, it is necessary, that both consist together mutually, sustaining one another, as it were by opposition. For, how could we understand *Justice*, unless there were *Injuries*? What is *Justice*, but a privation of *Injustice*? How can *Fortitude* be understood, but by opposition to *Fear*? How *Continence*, but from *Intemperance*? How *Prudence*, if there were not *Imprudence*? Why do not these fooles desire that *Truth* might be without *Falshood*? Such are good and ill, happinesse and misery, grieve and pleasure; one is ty'd to the other, as *Plato* sayes, by their contrary ends.

q Agel. ibid.

^q Here followeth the question, whether that Providence which framed the world and mankinde, did make likewise those corporeall infirmities and sicknesses which men suffer. *Chrysippus* affirmeth it was not the intent of Nature to make men obnoxious to sickness: For this agreeth not with the Author of Nature, and Parent of all good things; but he having genera-
ted

ted many great things, most apt and usefull, other things also, incommodious to those which he made, were aggenerated together with them, coherent to them, made, not by Nature, but certain necessary consequence, *κατὰ παρακαλήθειαν* As, saith he, when Nature framed the bodies of Men, more subtile reason & the benefit of the World, would have required that the head should have been made of the smallest and thin bones; but this utility would have been followed by another extrinsecall inconvenience of greater consequence, that the head would be too weakly defended, and broken with the least blow. Sickneses therefore and diseases are engendred whilst health is engendred. In like manner saith he, whilst *Vertue* is begotten in Man, by the counsell of Nature, vices likewise are begotten by contrary affinity.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Nature.

^a **N**Ext *Jupiter*, *Possidonius* placeth Nature. By Nature they sometimes understand that which containeth the World, sometimes, that which produceth things upon Earth; both which, as we said, is to be understood of God. For that Nature which containeth and preserveth the World, hath perfect sense and reason, which power is the Soul of the World, the mind and divine Wisdom. ^b Thus under the terme of Nature, they comprehend both God and the World; affirming that the one cannot be without the other, as if Nature were God permeating through the World, God the mind of the World, the World the body of God. ^c This *Chrysippus* calleth *Common-Nature* in distinction from particular Nature. ^{a Plur. Plac. 1. 28. Laert.}

^d Nature is defined by *Zeno* an artificial fire, proceeding in the way of generation, which is the fiery spirit, the Artist of formes; by others, a habit receiving motion from it self, according to prolifick reason, and effecting and containing those things which subsist by it, in certain definite times, producing all things, from which it self is distinct by Nature, proposing to it self these two ends, Utility and Pleasure, as is manifest from the porduction of man. ^{b Laert. lib. 7. cap. 3. c Plur.}

CHAP. XIX.

Of Fate.

a Stob. 1. 9.
Plur.

^a The third from *Jupiter* (according to *Possidonius*) is *Fate*, for *Jupiter* is first, next *Nature*, then *Fate*.

b Plut. Pl. Ph.
1. 28.

^b They call *Fate* a concatenation of *Causes*, that is, an order and connexion which cannot be transgressed.

Fate is a cause depending on *Laws*, and ordering by *Laws*, or a reason; by which the *World* is ordered.

c Laert.

^c *Fate* is, according to *Zeno*, the motive power of matter, disposing so and so, not much differing from *Nature* and *Providence*.

d Stob.

^d *Panaetius* affirmeth *Fate* to be *God*.

e Stob.
f Agel.

^e *Chrysippus* defineth *Fate* a spirituall power, governing the *World* orderly; or, ^f a sempiternall and indeclinable series and chain of things, it self, rolling and implicating it self by eternall orders of consequence, of which it is adapted and connected; or, as *Chrysippus* again in his *Book of Definitions* hath it, ^g The reason of the *World*, or *Law* of all things in the *World*, governed by *Providence*; or the reason why things past have been, the present are, the future shall be. For *Reason*, he useth *Truth*, *Cause*, *Nature*, *Necessity*, and other termes, as attributed to the same thing in different respects. *Fate* from the severall distributions thereof, is called *Clotho*, *Lachesis* and *Atropos*. *Lachesis*, as it dispenseth to every one, as it were by lot; *Atropos*, as it is an immutable dispensation, from all eternity; *Clotho*, in allusion to the resemblance it hath with spinning and twisting of *Threads*.

h Pl. Pl. Ph. 1.
27.
i Pl. Ph. 1. 29.

^h *Necessity* is a cause invincible, most violent, and inforcing all things. ⁱ *Fortune* is a Cause unknown and hidden to humane reason. For some things come by *Necessity*, others by *Fate*, some by deliberate Counsel, others by *Fortune*, some by *Casualty*.

k Pl. Ph. 1. 27.

^k But *Fate*, being a connexion of *Causes* interlaced and linked orderly, compriseth also that cause proceedeth from us.

l Laert.

^l That all things are done by *Fate*, is asserted by *Zeno* in his *Book of Fate*, and *Possidonius* in his second *Book of Fate*, and *Boethius* in his 11th of *Fate*. Which ^m *Chrysippus* proves thus. If there is any motion without a cause, then every axiom is not either true or false; for that which hath not efficient causes, will be neither true nor false; but every axiom is either true or false, therefore there is no motion without a cause. And if so, then all things that are done, are done by precedent causes, and if so, all things are done by *Fate*. That all axioms are either true or false, *Cicero* saith, he labour'd much to prove, whereby he takes away,

m Cic. de Fato.

Possibles

possibles, indeterminates, and other distinctions of the *Academicks*, of which see *Alcinous*, Chap. 26.

^a In answer to the *suggestive reason*, if it be your fate to die of ^{a cic. de sen.} this sicknesse, you shall die whether you have a Physician or no; and if it be your fate to recover, you shall recover whether you have a Physician or not. *Chrysippus* saith, that in things some are *simple*, some *conjunct*. Simple is thus, *Socrates* shall die on such a day; for whether he do any thing or not, it is appointed he should die on such a day. But if it be destin'd thus, *Laius* shall have a son *Oedipus*, it cannot be said, whether he accompany with a woman or not, for it is a *conjunct* thing, and *confatal*, as he termes it, because it is destin'd that *Laius* shall lie with his wife, and that he shall get *Oedipus* of her. As if we should say, *Milo* shall wrastle at the Olympick Games, and another should infer, then he shall wrastle whether he have an adversary or no, he were mistaken; for that he shall wrastle is a *conjunct* thing, because there is no wrastling without an adversary. Thus are refuted all sophismes of this kinde (you shall recover whether you have a Physician or not) for it is no lesse determined by fate that you shall have a Physician, than that you shall recover. They are *confatal*.

Thus there being two opinions of the old Philosophers; one, that all things are so done by Fate, that Fate inferreth a power of Necessitie, as *Democritus*, *Heraclitus*, *Empedocles*, and *Aristotle* held; the other, that the motions of our souls were voluntary without any Fate: *Chrysippus*, as an honourable Arbitratour, took the middle way betwixt these, but inclining most to those who conceived the motions of our souls free from necessitie. The Antients, who held all things to be done by Fate, said, it was by a violence and necessitie; those who were of the contrary opinion, denied, that Fate had any thing to do with our assent, and that there was no necessitie imposed upon assents. They argued thus: If all things are done by Fate, all things are done by an antecedent cause, and if appetite, then likewise those things which follow appetite, therefore assents also. But, if the cause of appetite is not in us, neither is the appetite it selfe in our power, and if so, neither those things which are effected by appetite are in our power, and consequently neither assents nor actions are in our power; whence it followeth, that neither praise can be just, nor dispraise, nor honour, nor punishment; but this is false, therefore all things are not done by Fate.

But *Chrysippus* not allowing this necessity, yet maintaining that nothing happened without precedent causes, distinguisheth thus. Of Causes, saith he, some are perfect and principall, others assistant and immediate. When we say, all things are done by Fate, from antecedent causes, we understand not the perfect

and principall causes, but the assistent and immediate. He therefore answers the former objection thus: If all things are done by Fate, it followeth, that all things be done by antecedent causes, but not by the principall and perfect, but by the assistent and immediate, which though they be not in our power, it followeth not, that the appetite likewise is in our power. This Argument therefore concludes well against those who joyne necessity with Fate, but nothing against those who assert antecedent causes not perfect nor principall. What assent is, and how it commeth to be in our power, we have already shewn in the *Logicke*.

o Agell. 6. 2.

Hence it followeth, that notwithstanding that all things are necessarily coacted and connected by Fate, with a certain principall reason; yet (saith *Chrysippus*) our mindes are so obnoxious to Fate, as their property and quality is. For, if at the first by nature they were formed soundly and profitably, all that power which commeth upon them extrinsically from Fate, they transmit easily and inoffensively; but, if they are harsh, ignorant, and rude, not supported by any helps of good art, although they are pressed by little or no conflict of fatall incommodity, yet by their own unluckinesse, and voluntary impulsion, they rush into continuall sins and errors, which thing maketh that this naturall and necessary consequence of things, which is called Fate, be by this reason. For it is, as it were, fatall, and consequent in its kinde, that wicked minds should not be without sins and errors, an instance whereof he bringeth not unapposite. As, saith he, a rolling stone, if you turn it down a steep place, you first give it the cause and beginning of its precipitation, but afterwards it rolleth headlong of it selfe; not that you make it do so any longer, but because its figure, and the volubility of its form is such. In like manner, order, and reason, and necessitie, moveth the beginnings of causes; but the impetuousnesse of our thoughts and mindes, and our own actions, are guided by every mans private will and minde. Thence continueth he, the Pythagoreans say,

Men of their own accord their ills procure.

As conceiving that all ills proceed from themselves, and according to their own appetites when they sin and offend, and according to their own minde and signe.

For this reason he denyeth, that we ought to suffer and hear such wicked, or idle, or noxious, or impudent persons, who being taken in some fault and wickednesse, have recourse to the necessity of Fate, as to a Sanctuary, affirming that they have done wickedly, is not to be attributed to their temerity, but to Fate.

CHAP. XX.

Of Not-Bodies, or Incorporealls; and first of Dicibles.

Hitherto of Bodies, we come next to the second place of Physics, concerning Not-Bodies, or Incorporealls. Incorporeall is that which may be, but is not contained in bodies. ^{a Sext. Empir.} Of those there are four kinds, Dicibles, Vacuum, Place, and Time.

Dicible is that which consisteth according to rationall phantasy, a mean betwixt notion and thing. Of this already in the Logick.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Vacuum and Place.

The second incorporeall is *Vacuum*, which is the solitude or vacuity of a body. In the world there is no vacuum, neither in the whole nor in any part: Beyond it there is an infinite vacuity, into which the world shall be resolved. Of this already in the Chapter concerning the world.

Next is Place: Place is that which is fully occupied by the body; or, as *Chrysippus* defines it, that which is or may be occupied by one or more things. Thus it differs from vacuity, which hath no body, and from space, which is occupied but in part, as a vessell halfe full of wine.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Time.

Last of the Incorporealls is *Time*. Time is, according to many of the Stoicks, the motion of it selfe, not of heaven, and had no beginning of generation. *Chrysippus* saith, that Time is the measure of slownesse or swiftnesse. *Zeno* defined it the intervall of motion, and measure of slownesse and swiftnesse, according to which, all things were and are.

Possidonius saith, that some are wholly infinite, as all Time; some only in part, as the past and future; for they are joyned together by the present. He defined Time the intervall of motion, or the measure of swiftnesse and slownesse, one part of it being present, the other future, the present connected to the future by something like a point. It is called *νῦν*, attributed to the least part of Time that falleth under sense, subsisting according to the difference of past and future.

Chry-

Chrysippus saith, that Time is the intervall of motion, the measure of swiftnesse and slownesse, a consequent intervall to the worlds motion, according to which all things are, and are moved, unless rather there be a two-fold Time, as the Earth and Sea, and Vacuity and Universe, have the same names with their parts. And as vacuity is every way infinite, so Time is both waies infinite, for the present and future have no end. He likewise asserts, that no entire present is Time, for continuous things being divided into infinite, Time likewise admitteth of the same division; so that no Time is properly present, but so called, after a lesse accurate manner. The present only is subsistent, unless it be understood as of Catecores; as, walking is attributed to him that walketh, but not to him that sitteth or lyeth. Thus much for the *STOICALL PHILOSOPHY*.

CLEAN.

CLEANTHES

C A P. I.

His Life.



Cleanthes was of *Assus* an *Aolian* City (fortified, as *Strabo* describes it, both by Nature and Art) sonne of *Phanias*. He was first according to *Antisthenes* a wraistler, and coming to *Athens*, having no more then four Drachms, he apply'd himself first to *Crates*, then to *Zeno*, whom he heard constantly, and persevered in his Philosophy and Opinions.

He was much commended for his laboriousnesse, in as much as being poor, he went by night to the Gardens to draw water, and in the day time studied Philosophy. Hence he was called *ὁ τῷ κήρῳ*.
The drawer of water.

Being cited to the Court to give an account how he lived, being so healthfull and lusty, hee produced the Gardener, under whom he drew water, and a woman for whom he ground meal, to witnesse how he subsisted. The *Areopagites* wondring hereat, allotted him 10. *mina*, which *Zeno* would not suffer him to accept. *Antigonus* gave him 3000. *mina*. On a time leading some young men to a spectacle, the wind blew back his Cloak, and discovered that he had no Coat; whereupon the Athenians much applauded him, and, as *Demetrius* the *Magnesian* saith, bestowed a Coat upon him.

Antigonus, who was his Auditor, asked him why he drew water, he answer'd, *Do I only draw water? Do I not also dig and water the ground, and all for the sake of Philosophy?* For *Zeno* brought him up to this, and bad him bring him an *obolus* gained by his labour. Upon a time he brought in his gains before all his Disciples, saying, *Cleanthes, If he would, could maintain another Cleanthes; but they who have wherewithall to maintain themselves, would be supply'd by others; yet study Philosophy nothing the more diligently.* Hence *Cleanthes* was called a *second Hercules*. He was very laborious, but dull and slow.

He

He used to write the dictates of *Zeno* in shells, and the shoulder-blades of *Oxen*, for want of money to buy paper. He was his auditor 19. years.

For these reasons, though *Zeno* had many other eminent Disciples, yet he succeeded him in the *School*.

CHAP. II.

His Apophthegmes.

a Laert.

^a **H**IS Fellow-Disciples derided him, he took it patiently, and being called *Asse*, answered, he onely could bear *Zeno's* burthen.

Another time being reproached as timerous, *therefore*, saith he, *I sin little*.

Preferring his own Poverty before the plenty of the rich, *while they*, saith he, *Play at Ball, I manure a hard barren soil*.

He often chid himself, being all alone, which *Aristo* overhearing; whom, saith he, do you chide, he smiling, answered, *a grey headed old fellow without wit*.

To one that said *Arcefilaus* abrogated the offices of life; peace, saith he, dispraise him not; for though he take away offices in discourse, he commends them in his actions; To whom *Arcefilaus* saying, I cannot endure flattery; *I do indeed flatter*, replies *Cleanthes*, *when I say, you speak one thing and do another*.

To one that asked what he should teach his Son, he answer'd in the words of *Electra*;

Peace, peace, a little sleep.

A Lacedemonian saying, that labour was good, hee laughed, answering,

My Son, thou of a gen'rous race art come.

Disputing with a young man, he asked him whether hee did feel; the other answers he did, he replied, *why then do I not feel that you feel?*

Sofybius the Poet saying in the publick Theatre when *Cleanthes* was present;

Those whom Cleanthes madnesse leads away; hee sate still, not changing his countenance; whereupon the Auditors applauding him, turned out *Sofybius*, who afterwards coming to *Cleanthes*, told him he was sorry that he had reproached him; *Cleanthes* answer'd, *it were unfit I should behold unconcerned Bacchus and Hercules derided by the Poets, and be angry at a little word against my self.*
He

He compared the *Peripateticks* to *Lutes*, that make good Music, but hear it not themselves.

Holding according to *Zeno* that the mind may be discerned in the countenance, some merry young men brought an effeminate youth to him rustically cloathed, desiring his opinion of that mans disposition; He bad him depart, which the other going to do, sneezed; *Cleanthes* presently cryed out, *I have found out the man, he is effeminate.*

To one that was all alone talking to himself, *you discourse* saith he, *with a man that is not ill.*

To one that reproach'd him with his age, *I would be gone*, saith he, *but when I consider that I am in health, fit to write and study, I rather choose to stay.*

^b *Cleanthes* bad those who came to hear him, to fancy pleasure painted in a Tablet, richly habited and adorned, sitting upon a Throne, the Vertues standing about her, as her handmaids, doing nothing else but wait on her commands, and whispering in her ear (if it can be phancied of a picture.) to bid her take heed of doing any thing imprudently, that may offend the minds of men, or any thing that may occasion grief.

^c He said; whosoever sweareth, at the same time sweareth truly, or forswearth himself: if he intend to do that which hee sweareth, though he do it not, he sweareth truly; if he intend it not, he is forsworn. ^{c Sub. Ser. 116.}

^d One observing him silent, said to him; why do you hold your peace, it is pleasant to talk to friends; *It is indeed*, answer'd *Cleanthes*, *but the more pleasant it is, the more we ought to allow them the freedom of it.* ^{d Ser. 126.}

^e Hee said that unlearned men differed from Beasts in their figure. ^{e Ser. 210.}

^f Being demanded why amongst the Antients, when there were fewest Philosophers, there were more eminent then at this time; he answer'd, *because then they minded the thing it self, now only in words.* ^{f Ser. 212.}

To one that asked him, how a man might be rich, he answered, by being poor in desire. ^{g Ser. 229.}

CHAP. III.

His Writings.

HEE left behind him (saith *Laertius*) these excellent Books.

Of time.

Of Zeno's Philosophy.

Explications of Heraclitus, 3.

Rrrrr

of

CLEANTHES.

Of sense 4.
Of Art.
To Democritus.
To Aristarchus.
To Erillus.
Of Appetite 2.
Archæology.
Of God.
Of Giants.
Of Hymenealls:
Of a Poet.
Of Office 3.
Of right consultation.
Of Gratitude.
Of Protrepick.
Of Vertues.
Of Ingenuity.
Of Gorgippus.
Of Envy.
Of Love.
Of Liberty.
The Art of Love
Of Honour.
Of Glory.
The Politick:
Of Counsell.
Of Laws.
Of Judging.
Of the reason of living.
Of speech 3.
Of the End.
Of honest things.
Of Actions.
Of Science.
Of a Kingdom.
Of Friendship.
Of a Symposium.
That the vertue of man and woman is the sam
That a wise man may use Sophismes.
Of Chria's.
Dissertations 2.
Of Pleasure.
Of Properties.
Of Inexplicables.
Of Dialectick.
Of Tropes.
Of Categoriemes.

Besides,

Besides these, are mention'd

^a Of Atoms.

Of Brasse.

^b Of Sumptions.

Fabulous Traditions.

^c The Art of Rhetorick.

^a Laert vit.
Zen.

^b Athen. deipn.

^c Cic. de fin. l. 4.

CHAP. IV.

His Death.

HE lived according to *Laertius* 80. years; according to *Lucian*, 99. The occasion of his death this, being troubled with a forenesse of his gumms (*Stobaeus* saith, an Ulcer under his Tongue) he was enjoyned by the Physitians to fast two daies, which he did, and was wel; then they told him he might eat again, but he would not, saying, he was now gone a great way on his journey; ^a would you have me, saith he, having past over the greatest part of my life, return back again, and begin it anew? ^b Having fasted two daies more hee died.

^c *Simplicius* saith, he saw an exquisite statue of *Cleanthes* in *Affus*, ^c in *Epist.* an example of the magnificence of the Rōmane Senate, dedicated to his honour.

Rrrrr 2

CHRY!

CHRYSIPPVS.

CHAP. I.

His Life.

Laert.



Chrysippus was of *Soli*, (a City of *Cilicia*, afterwards called *Pompeopolis*.) his Father was of *Tarsis*, named *Apollonius*, or, as *Suidas*, *Apollo-nides*, who came and lived at *Soli*, which perhaps gave *Laertius*, and from him *Suidas*, occasion to doubt whether *Chrysippus* himself were not of *Tarsis*.

He first exercised in the *Hippodrome*. *Hecaton* saith, that having wasted his Patrimony in the Kings service, hee applyed himself to Philosophy. Coming to *Athens*, he heard, as some affirm *Zeno*, or rather (as *Diocles* and others) *Cleanthes*, from whom whilst he was yet alive he dissented. He was an eminent Philosopher, ingenious and acute in every thing; so that in most opinions he differ'd from *Zeno* and *Cleanthes*, to whom he would only say, *tell me the Doctrines and let me alone for proofes*. If at any time he crossed *Cleanthes* in dispute, he was afterwards sorry for it, often saying,

*Of happinesse in all I am possesse'd,
But in Cleanthes; there alone unblest'd.*

He was so famous for *Dialectick*, that it was a common speech, *If the Gods themselves woul duse Dialectick, they would make use only of the Chrysippean*. But he was more plentifull in matter then free in expression.

He was infinitely studious and industrious, as appeareth from the multitude of his Books. An old woman that waited on him said, *that he wrote every day 500. Paragraphs*.

When any question'd him in private, he answer'd meekly and freely; but as soon as any company came, he grew eager and litigious, saying,

*Brother, there hangs a cloud before your eyes,
Cast quite away this madnesse, and be wise.*

When

When he drunk at Feasts he lay very still, only shaked his legs; whereupon his woman said, *Chrysippus's legs only are drunk.*

He had so good an opinion of himselfe, that to one who asked him to whom he should commend his son, he answered, *To me; for if I knew any better, I would hear Philosophy of him my selfe:* Whence it was said of him,

*He is inspir'd by Jove,
The rest like shadows move.*

As also that,
*Had not Chrysippus been,
No Stoa we had seen.*

Arcefilaus and *Lacydes* (as *Sotion* saith) coming into the *Academy*, he studyed Philosophy with them, whence he disputed against Custom, and for Custom, and of Magnitude and Multitude, using the arguments of the *Academicks*.

^b He was a great despiser of honours, for of all his writings, he dedicates none to any King. ^c He was content with little, for ^d he lived without any other attendants then one old woman; and when *Ptolomy* wrote to *Cleanthes*, desiring he would come to him, or send some one of his Disciples, *Sphaerus* went, but *Chrysippus* refused.

Having sent for *Aristocreon* and *Philocrates*, his sisters sons, he first taught in the *Lyceum* in the open air, as *Demetrius* writes.

CHAP. II.

His Apophthegmes.

^a **T**O one that blamed him for not hearing *Aristo* as many did; ^a *Laert.*
If I should follow many, saith he, I should not study Philosophy.

To a Dialectick assaulting *Cleanthes* with sophismes: *Leave,* saith he, *diverting an aged person from serious things; propound those to us that are young.*

^b He said, meditation is the fountain of discourse.

^c He said, drunkenness is a lesser madness.

^d He said, a wife man grieveth, but is not troubled, for his minde yields not to it.

^e To one that said to him, your friend revileth you behinde your back: *Blame him not,* saith he, *for he might do it before my face.* ^e *Ser. 71.*

^f To a wicked man that cast many aspersions upon him: *You have done well,* saith he, *not to omit any thing that is in your selfe.* ^f *Ibid.*

^g Being told that some spoke ill of him; *It is no matter,* saith he, *I will live so, that they shall not be believed.* ^g *Ibid.*
He

h Ser. 116.

^h He said, there is a difference between swearing true, and swearing truly, and betwixt swearing false and forswearing. That which is sworn, at the time that it is sworn must necessarily be either true or false, seeing that the form of swearing is an *Axiom*: But he that sweareth, at the same time that he sweareth is not necessarily perjur'd, or sweareth true, because the time is not yet arriv'd that must determine his oath. For as a man is said to have covenanted truly or falsely, not when the covenant is made, but when the time whereby it is limited is come: so a man is said to swear truly or falsely, when the time comes wherein he promised to make good his oath.

i Ser. 151.

ⁱ Being demanded why he did not undertake the government of the Commonwealth; *Because*, saith he, *If I govern ill, I shall displease the Gods; if well, the people.*

k Ser. 249.

^k He said, he who hath arriv'd at perfection dischargeth all offices, omitting none, yet his life is not happy, for Beatitude is a post-accession thereto, when as the mean actions acquire a constancy, habit, and peculiar confirmation.

CHAP. III.

His Writings.

BEcause, saith *Laertius*, his writings were very celebrated, we shall give an account of them digested according to their subjects: They were these.

Of the Logickall place, Theses.

Logick.

Philosophick Commentaries.

Dialectick definitions, to Metrodorus, 6.

Of Dialectick names, to Zeno 1.

Dialectick art, to Aristagoras 1.

Of connex Probables, to Dioscorides 4.

The first order of the *Logickall* place of things.

Of Axioms 1.

Of not-simple Axioms 1.

Of Connex, to Athenades 2.

Of Negatives, to Aristagoras 3.

Of Catareuticks, to Athenodorus 1.

Of things spoken by privation, to Thearus 1.

Of best Axioms, to Dion 3.

Of Indefinites 4.

Of things spoken according to Time 2.

Of perfect Axioms 2.

The

The second order.

- Of true disjunct, to Gorgippides 1.*
- Of true connex, to Gorgippides 4.*
- Division, to Gorgippides 1.*
- Of Consequents 1.*
- Of that which is for three, to Gorgippides 1.*
- Of Possibles, to Clitus 4.*
- Of Significations, against Philo 1.*
- What are false 1.*

The third order.

- Of Precepts 2.*
- Of Interrogations 2.*
- Of Percontation 4.*
- Epitome of Interrogation and Percontation 1.*
- Epitome of Answers 1.*
- Of Question 2.*
- Of Answer 4.*

The fourth order.

- Of Categorems, to Metrodorus 10.*
- Of right and supine, to Philarchus 1.*
- Of Conjunctions, to Apollonides 1.*
- To Pasylus, of Categorems 4.*

The fifth order.

- Of the five cases 1.*
- Of expressions defined according to the subject 1.*
- Of Assimilation, to Stesagoras 2.*
- Of Appellatives 2.*

Of the Logickall place concerning words, and their reasons, the first order.

- Of singular and plurall expressions 6.*
- Of words, to Soligenes and Alexander 5.*
- Of the anomaly of words, to Dion 4.*
- Of Sorites pertaining to voice 3.*
- Of Solæcismes, to Dionysius 1.*
- Of unusuall speech 1.*
- Words, to Dionysius 1.*

The second order.

- Of the elements of speech 5.*
- Of the syntax of things said 4.*
- Of the syntax and elements of speech, to Philip 3.*

CHRTSIPPVS.

Of the elements of speech, to Nicias 1.

Of relative speech 1.

The third order.

Of not-dividends 2.

Of Amphibolies, to Apollas 4.

Of Tropicall Amphibolies 1.

Of connex Tropicall Amphibolies 2.

Upon Panthœdus, of Amphibolies 2.

Introduction to Amphiboly 5.

Epitome of Amphibolies, to Epicrates 1.

Connex to the Introduction of Amphibolies 2.

Of Logicall place concerning Reasons and Moods,
the first order.

The Art of Reasons and Moods, to Dioscorides 5.

Of Reasons 3.

Of the composition of Moods, to Stefagoras 2.

Comparison of tropicall Axioms 1.

Of reciprocall Reasons and connex 1.

To Agatho, or of sequent problems 1.

Of Inferences, to Aristagoras 1.

Of placing the same reason in diverse Moods 1.

*Against those who oppose that the same reason may be placed
in syllogistick and not syllogistick Moods 2.*

Against those who oppose the reduction of Syllogismes 3.

Against Philo's book of Moods, to Timostratus 1.

Logicall conjuncts, to Timocrates and Philomathes.

Upon Reasons and Moods 1.

The second order.

Of conclusive Reasons, to Zeno 1.

Of first indemonstrable Syllogismes, to Zeno 1.

Of Reduction of Syllogismes 1.

Of redundant Syllogismes, to Pasylus 2.

Theorems of Solœcismes 1.

Syllogistick Introductions, to Zeno 1.

Introductions to Moods, to Zeno 3.

Of Syllogismes false in figure 5.

Syllogistick reasons by reduction in indemonstrables 1.

*Tropicall Questions to Zeno and Philomathes (suspected to
be spurious) 1.*

The third order.

Of coincident reasons, to Athenades 1. spurious.

Coincident reasons as to the medium 3. spurious.

Of Aminius's disjunctions 1.

The

The fourth Order.

- Of Hypotheses to Meleager 3.*
- Hypothetick reasons in Law to Meleager 1.*
- Hypothetick Reasons for introduction 2.*
- Hypothetick reasons of Theorems 2.*
- Solution of Hedyllus's Hypotheticks 2.*
- Solution of Alexander's Hypotheticks 3. Spurious.*
- Of expositions, to Leodamas 1.*

The fifth order.

- Of introduction to the lying reason to Aristocreon 1.*
- Lying reasons to the Introduction 1.*
- Of the lying reason, to Aristocreon 6.*

The sixth order.

- Against those who think true and false are one, 1.*
- Against those who dissolve the lying Reason by distinction 2:*
- Demonstration, that infinites are not to be divided 1.*
- Upon what hath been said against the division of infinites, to Pasylus 3.*
- Solutions according to the Antients, to Dioscorides 1.*
- Of the solution of the lying reason to Aristocreon 3.*
- Solution of Hedyllus's Hypotheticks, to Aristocreon and Apollas.*

The seventh Order.

- Against those who say the lying reason hath false suppositions 1.*
- Of the negative, to Aristocreon 1.*
- Negative Reasons, to Gymnasias 1.*
- Of the diminutive reason, to Stesagoras 2.*
- Of opinionative and quiescent reasons, to Onetor 2.*
- Of the veiled reason, to Aristobulus 2.*
- Of the occult reason, to Athenades 1.*

The eighth Order.

- Of the Nullity, to Menecrates 8.*
- Of reasons consisting of indefinite and definite, to Pasylus 2.*
- Of the Nullity to Epicrates 1.*

The ninth Order.

- Of Sophismes to Heraclides and Pollis 2.*
- Of insoluble dialectick reasons to Dioscorides 5.*
- Against Arcefilaus's method, to Sphaerus 1.*

The tenth order.

- Against Custom, to Metrodorus. 6.*

CHRTSIPPVS.

Of the elements of speech, to Nicias 1.

Of relative speech 1.

The third order.

Of not-dividends 2.

Of Amphibolies, to Apollas 4.

Of Tropicall Amphibolies 1.

Of connex Tropicall Amphibolies 2.

Upon Panthœdus, of Amphibolies 2.

Introduction to Amphiboly 5.

Epitome of Amphibolies, to Epicrates 1.

Connex to the Introduction of Amphibolies 2.

Of Logicall place concerning Reasons and Moods,
the first order.

The Art of Reasons and Moods, to Dioscorides 5.

Of Reasons 3.

Of the composition of Moods, to Stefagoras 2.

Comparison of tropicall Axioms 1.

Of reciprocall Reasons and connex 1.

To Agatho, or of sequent problems 1.

Of Inferences, to Aristagoras 1.

Of placing the same reason in diverse Moods 1.

*Against those who oppose that the same reason may be placed
in syllogistick and not syllogistick Moods 2.*

Against those who oppose the reduction of Syllogismes 3.

Against Philo's book of Moods, to Timostratus 1.

Logicall conjuncts, to Timocrates and Philomathes.

Upon Reasons and Moods 1.

The second order.

Of conclusive Reasons, to Zeno 1.

Of first indemonstrable Syllogismes, to Zeno 1.

Of Reduction of Syllogismes 1.

Of redundant Syllogismes, to Pasylus 2.

Theorems of Solæcismes 1.

Syllogistick Introductions, to Zeno 1.

Introductions to Moods, to Zeno 3.

Of Syllogismes false in figure 5.

Syllogistick reasons by reduction in indemonstrables 1.

*Tropicall Questions to Zeno and Philomathes (suspected to
be spurious) 1.*

The third order.

Of coincident reasons, to Athenades 1. spurious.

Coincident reasons as to the medium 3. spurious.

Of Aminius's disjunctions 1.

The

The fourth Order.

Of Hypotheses to Meleager 3.
Hypothetick reasons in Law, to Meleager 1.
Hypothetick Reasons for introduction 2.
Hypothetick reasons of Theorems 2.
Solution of Hedyllus's Hypotheticks 2.
Solution of Alexander's Hypotheticks 3. Spurious.
Of expositions, to Leodamas 1.

The fifth order.

Of introduction to the lying reason, to Aristocreon 1.
Lying reasons to the Introduction 1.
Of the lying reason, to Aristocreon 6.

The sixth order.

Against those who think true and false are one, 1.
Against those who dissolve the lying Reason by distinction 2:
Demonstration, that infinites are not to be divided 1.
Upon that which hath been said against the division of infinites, to Pasylus 3.
Solutions according to the Antients, to Dioscorides 1.
Of the solution of the lying reason to Aristocreon 3.
Solution of Hedyllus's Hypotheticks, to Aristocreon and Apollas.

The seventh Order.

Against those who say the lying reason hath false sumptions 1.
Of the negative, to Aristocreon 2.
Negative Reasons, to Gymnasia 1.
Of the diminutive reason, to Stesagoras 2.
Of opinionative and quiescent reasons, to Onetor 2.
Of the veiled reason, to Aristobulus 2.
Of the occult reason, to Athenades 1.

The eighth Order.

Of the Nullity, to Menecrates 8.
Of reasons consisting of indefinite and definite, to Pasylus 2.
Of the Nullity to Epicrates 1.

The ninth Order.

Of Sophismes to Heraclides and Pollis 2.
Of insoluble dialectick reasons to Dioscorides 5.
Against Arcefilaus's method, to Sphaerus 1.

The tenth order.

Against Custom, to Metrodorus 6.

CHRYSIPPUS.

Of the Logickall place, besides these four differences,
there are dispersed, not containing in the body of
Logical Questions, 39.

Of the Ethick Place, for direction of morall notions, the
First Order.

Description of speech, to Theoporus 1.

Morall Theses 1.

Probable summptions for Doctrines, to Philomathes 3.

Definitions of civill person, to Metrodorus 2.

Definitions of wicked persons, to Metrodorus 2.

Definitions of mean persons, to Metrodorus 2.

Generall Definitions, to Metrodorus 7.

Definitions of other arts, to Metrodorus 2.

The second Order.

Of things like, to Aristocles 3.

Of Definitions, to Metrodorus 7.

The third Order.

Of things not rightly objected against Definitions, to Laodamas 7.

Probables for Definitions, to Dioscorides.

Of Species and Genus, to Gorgippides 2.

Of Divisions 1.

Of Contraries, to Dionysius 2.

Probables for Divisions, genus's and species.

Of Contraries 1.

The fourth Order.

Of Etymologicks, to Diocles 6.

Etymologicks, to Diocles 4.

The fifth Order.

Of Proverbs, to Zenodotus 2.

Of Poems, to Philomathes 1.

How Poems must be heard 2.

Against Criticks, to Diodorus 1.

Of the morall place of common speeches, according to Arts and Vertue: The first Order.

Against Rescriptions, to Timonax 1.

How we think and speak singulars 1.

Of notions, to Laodamas 2.

Of Suspicion, to Pythonax 2.

Demonstration 5

Demonstrations that a wise man doth not opionate 1.
Of Comprehension and Science, and ignorance 4.
Of Speech 2.
Of the use of Speech, to Leptines.

The second Order.

That the Antients approved Dialectick with Demonstration, to
Zeno 2.
Of Dialectick; to Aristocreon 4.
Upon the objections against Dialectick 3.
Of Rhetorick, to Diolcorides 4.

The third Order.

Of habitude, to Cleon 3.
Of art and sloth, to Aristocreon 4.
Of the difference of Vertues, to Diodorus.
What Vertues are 1.
Of vertues, to Pollis.

Of the morall place concerning Good and Ill; the
 first Order.

Of Honesty and pleasure, to Aristocreon 10.
Demonstration, that Pleasure is not the chief end 4.
Demonstration, that pleasure is not good 4.
*Of those which are said ******

Thus concludes the seventh Book of *Laertius*, and who seeth
 not that the last of these titles is defective, and moreover that the
 rest of the *Orders*, concerning this place of *Good and Ill*, (whereof
 this is but the first) are wanting. Doubtlesse the end of this book
 is imperfect, and wanteth, if not the lives of any Stoicall Philo-
 sopher, who succeeded *Chrysippus* (whereof he mentions *Zeno* and
 others else where) yet at least a considerable part of his Cata-
 logue; containing the rest of his *Ethick* writings and all his Phy-
 sick, many of which are elsewhere cited even by *Laertius* himself,
 which as the learned *Cassaubon* had observed, he would not have
 ascribed to *Laertius*'s neglect that *Chrysippus*'s book of *Laws* is
 not mentioned. Of his *Ethick* writings, besides those here named,
 were these;

- ^a Of *Laws*.
- ^b Introduction to the consideration of things good or ill.
- ^c Of *Honesty*.
- ^d Of *Consent*.
- ^e Of things expetible in themselves.
- ^f Of things not expetible in themselves.
- ^g Of *Politick*.
- ^h Of ends.

- ^a Ael. 14. 4.
- ^b Athen. deipn. 4. & 11.
- ^c Deipn. 4. & 8.
- ^d Deipn. 6.
- ^e Athen. Deipn. 7.
- ^f Ath. Deipn. 4.
- ^g Laert. vit. Zen. Pl. Rep. Snic.
- ^h Laert. Zen. Pl. Rep.

i Laert. vit. Zen.

k Laert.

l Plut. rep.

Laert.

m Laert.

n Plut. repug.

Laert.

o Laert.

p Plut. rep.

q Plut. repugn.

r Plut. repugn.

s Plut. repug. &

de com. not.

t Plut. repug.

u Plut. repug.

x Plut. repug.

y Plut. repug.

z Laert.

a Laert.

b Laert.

c Plut. repug.

Laert.

d Plut. rep.

Laert.

e Laert.

f Laert.

g Plut. rep.

h Plut. rep. &

com. not.

i Plut. repug.

k Plut. rep.

l Plut. rep.

m Plut. rep.

n Plut. com. not.

o Plut. com. not.

& Laert.

p Laert.

i Of Passions.

k Of Ethick questions.

l Of lives, whereof Plutarch cites the 4th book.

m That Zeno used names properly.

n Of Justice, the first book cited by Laertius.

o Of Life and Transaction.

p Of Offices.

q Demonstration of Justice.

r Protrepticks.

s Of the End.

t Of a Common-wealth.

u Of the office of a Judge.

x Of Good.

y Of Habits.

To Physick belong these.

z Physicks

a Of the Soul, the 12th book cited by Laertius.

b Of Providence, the first book cited.

c Of the Gods.

d Of Fate.

e Of Divination.

f Of the Philosophy of the Antients.

g In calumination of the Senses.

h Of Jupiter.

i Of Nature.

k Physicall Theses.

l Of Substance.

m Of Motion.

n Physicall questions, the third book cited.

o Of Vacuity.

p Epistles.

The number of all his writings, according to *Laertius*, was 705. He wrote so much, that he had often occasion to treat upon the same subject, and setting down whatsoever came into his minde, he often corrected and enlarged it by the testimonies of others; whence having in one book inserted all *Euripides's Medea*, one having the book in his hand, answer'd another that asked him what book it was, It is *Chrysippus's Medea*. And *Apolodorus* the Athenian, in his collection of *Doctrines*, asserting, that *Epicurus* had written many books upon his own strength, without using the testimonies of others, and that he therein far exceeded *Chrysippus*, adds these words; *For if a man should take out of Chrysippus's writings all that belongs to other men, he would leave the paper blank.*

q De Benef. 1.

3.

Seneca gives this censure of him: ^a He is most subtle and acute, penetrating into the depth of truth. He speaks to the thing that is

to

to be done, and useth no more words then are necessary to the understanding thereof; but addes, that his ^racutenesse being too ^r *Sen de Benef.* fine, is many times blunted, and retorted upon it selfe; even ^r 4 when he seemes to have done something, he only pricks, not pierceth.

Some there are who inveigh against him, as one that wrote ^r *Laert.* many obscene things, not fit to be spoken, as in his *Commentary of the antient Physiologists*, what he writes concerning *Jupiter* and *Juno* is obscenely feigned, delivering that in 600 Paragraphs, which the most impudent person would not have committed to writing; for, say they, he hath related the story most unhand-somly, and though he prais'd it as naturall, yet it becommeth Curtezans rather then Gods.

Moreover what he saith of those that writ of *Tables* is false, not to be found neither in *Polemo*, nor *Hippocrates*, nor *Antigonus*, but forged by himselfe.

In his book of *a Commonwealth*, he allowes marriage with a mother and a daughter, and repeats the same in the beginning of his book, *Concerning things expetible in themselves*.

In his third book of *Justice*, extending to a thousand Paragraphs, he advis'd to feed upon the very dead.

In his second book of *Life and Transaction*, he affirmeth, a wise man ought to take care to provide himselfe food; but to what end must he provide himselfe food? for Livelyhood? Life is an indifferent. For Pleasure? Pleasure also is indifferent. For Vertue? that is selfe-sufficient for *Beatitude*. Such kinds of acquisition of wealth are very ridiculous. If they proceed from a King, there is a necessitie of complying with him; if from a friend, that friendship is veniall; if from wisdom, that wisdom is mercenary. For these things, saith *Laertius*, some have inveigh'd against him.

CHAP. IV.

His death.

HE died, according to *Apollodorus*, in the 143^d Olympiad, (so supply *Laertius*, in whom the centenary number is wanting by *Suidas*) having lived 73 years.

The manner of his death is differently related; *Hermippus* affirms, that being in the *Odeum* (a kinde of publick Theatre at *Athens*) his Disciples called him away to Sacrifice, and thereupon taking a draught of wine, he was immediately seiz'd by a Vertigo, of which at the end of five daies he died. Others report, he died of excessive laughter: Seeing an Asse eat figs, he bad his woman offer it some wine, and thereat fell into such extremity of laughter, that it killed him. As

As to his person, he was very little, saith *Laertius*, as appeareth by his Statue in the *Ceramick*, which is almost hid by the horse that stands next it, whence *Carneades* called him *μικρὸν ὑπὸ ἵππῳ*, hid by a horse. The posture of this Statue, *Cicero* saith, was sitting, and stretching forth his hand. *Pausanias* saith, it was set up in the *Gymnasium*, called *Ptolomean* from the Founder, not far from the *Forum*.

Laertius reckons foure more of this name.

The first, a Physician, to whom *Erasistratus* acknowledgeth himselfe beholding for many things.

The second, his sonne, Physician to *Ptolomy*, who, upon the calumnies of some that maligned him, was publickly punished and beaten with rods.

The third, Disciple to *Erasistratus*.

The fourth, a writer of *Georgicks*.

ZENO!

ZENO.

^a **ZENO** was of *Tarsis*, or, according to others, of *Sidon*, his ^a *Snidas*.
 Father named *Dioscorides*. He was Disciple to *Chrysippus*,
 and his successor in the School. ^b He wrote few bookes, but left ^b *Laert. vii.*
 behinde him many Disciples. *Zen.*

DIOGENES.

DIOGENES was born at *Seleucia*, he was surnamed the *Baby-* ^a *Laert. vii.*
Ionian, from the vicinity of that place. He was Disciple of *Diog.*
Chrysippus, and is styled by *Cicero* an eminent and serious Stoick.
^b *Seneca* relates, that discoursing earnestly concerning anger, ^b *De ira. 3.38.*
 foolish young man standing by, spat in his face, which he took
 meekly and discreetly, saying, *I am not angry, but am in doubt*
whether I ought to be so or not. He was one of the three that was
 sent from *Athens* on Embassy to *Rome*; of which already in the
 life of *Carneades*, who learn'd *Dialectick* of him. *Cicero* saith, he
 lived to a great age. Amongst other things, he wrote a treatise
 of *Divination*.

ANTIPATER.

^a **ANTIPATER** was of *Sidon*, Disciple to ^b *Diogenes* the *Baby-* ^a *Laert.*
Ionian. *Cicero* calls him a most acute person; *Seneca*, one of ^b *De Offic. 3.*
 the great authors of the Stoicall Sect. ^c He declined to dispute ^c *Plut. de Cor-*
 with *Carneades*; but filled his bookes with confutations of him, *rut.*
 whence he was called *καταμύθεος*, the clamorous penman. ^d He dispu- ^d *Cic. Ac. quest.*
 ted much against those who asserted nothing. Besides other things, ^e
 he writ two books of *Divination*. ^e *Cicero*, at the latter end of his ^e *Cic. de divin.*
 second book of *Offices*, saith, he then was lately dead at *Athens*. ^f *l. 1.*

PANÆTIUS.

^a **PANÆTIUS** was of *Rhodes*, his Ancestours eminent for Mar- ^a *Strab. l. 14.*
 triall affairs and exercises. He was ^b Disciple to *Antipater*, ^b *Cic. de Divin.*
 intimate friend to ^c *P. Scipio Africanus*, whom he accompanied ^c *lib. 1.*
 in his journey to *Alexandria*. *Cicero* calls him, ^d almost Prince of ^d *Plut. Apoph.*
 the Stoicks, a person extreamly ingenious and grave, worthy the fami- ^e *Acad. 2.4.*
 larity of *Scipio* and *Laelius*.
 He

CHRTSIPPUS.

As to his person, he was very little, saith *Laertius*, as appeareth by his Statue in the *Ceramick*, which is almost hid by the horse that stands next it, whence *Carneades* called him *ὑποπῆλον*, hid by a horse. The posture of this Statue, *Cicero* saith, was sitting, and stretching forth his hand. *Pausanias* saith, it was set up in the *Gymnasium*, called *Ptolomean* from the Founder, not far from the *Forum*.

Laertius reckons foure more of this name.

The first, a Physician, to whom *Erasistratus* acknowledgeth himselfe beholding for many things.

The second, his sonne, Physician to *Ptolomy*, who, upon the calumnies of some that maligned him, was publickly punished and beaten with rods.

The third, Disciple to *Erasistratus*.

The fourth, a writer of *Georgicks*.

ZENO!

ZENO.

^a **ZENO** was of *Tarsis*, or, according to others, of *Sidon*, his ^a *Snidas*.
 Father named *Dioscorides*. He was Disciple to *Chrysippus*,
 and his successor in the School. ^b He wrote few bookes, but left ^b *Laert. vit. Zen.*
 behinde him many Disciples.

DIOGENES.

DIOGENES was born at *Seleucia*, he was surnamed the *Baby-* ^a *Laert. vit.*
lonian, from the vicinity of that place. He was Disciple of *Diog.*
Chrysippus, and is stiled by *Cicero* an eminent and serious Stoick.
^b *Seneca* relates, that discoursing earnestly concerning anger, ^a *De ira. 3.38.*
 foolish young man standing by, spat in his face, which he took
 meekly and discreetly, saying, *I am not angry, but am in doubt*
whether I ought to be so or not. He was one of the three that was
 sent from *Athens* on Embassy to *Rome*; of which already in the
 life of *Carneades*, who learn'd Dialectick of him. *Cicero* saith, he
 lived to a great age. Amongst other things, he wrote a treatise
 of *Divination*.

ANTIPATER.

^a **ANTIPATER** was of *Sidon*, Disciple to ^b *Diogenes* the *Baby-* ^a *Laert.*
lonian. *Cicero* calls him a most acute person; *Seneca*, one of ^b *De Offic. 3.*
 the great authors of the Stoicall Sect. ^c He declined to dispute ^c *Plut. de Gar-*
 with *Carneades*, but filled his bookes with confutations of him, ^c *cul.*
 whence he was called *καλαμβλας*, the clamorous penman. ^d He dispu- ^d *Cic. Ac. quest.*
 ted much against those who asserted nothing. Besides other things, ^{4.}
 he writ two bookes of *Divination*. ^e *Cicero*, at the latter end of his ^e *Cic. de divin.*
 second book of *Offices*, saith, he then was lately dead at *Athens*. ^f *l. 1.*

PANÆTIUS.

^a **PANÆTIUS** was of *Rhodes*, his Ancestours eminent for Mar- ^a *Strab. l. 14.*
 tiall affairs and exercises. He was ^b Disciple to *Antipater*, ^b *Cic. de Divin.*
 intimate friend to ^c *P. Scipio Africanus*, whom he accompanied ^c *lib. 1.*
 in his journey to *Alexandria*. *Cicero* calls him, ^d almost Prince of ^d *Plut. Apoph.*
 the Stoicks, a person extremely ingenious and grave, worthy the famili- ^d *Acad. 24.*
 arity of *Scipio* and *Lælius*.
 He

Cic. Tusc.
quæst. lib. 1.

He was a great admirer of *Plato*; whom every where he calleth, *divine, most wise, most holy, the Homer of Philosophers*. But his opinion of the immortality of the Soul he approved not, arguing thus; Whatsoever is generated dieth; but soules are generated, as is manifest from the likenesse of those that are begotten to their Parents, not only in body, but disposition. His other argument was; There is nothing that is grieved or pained but is subject to be sick; whatsoever is subject to sicknesse is likewise subject to death; soules are subject to griefe, therefore they are subject to death.

Cic. de divin.
lib. 2.
De divin. 11.

He alone rejected *Astrologically* predictions, and receded from the *Stoicks*, as to *Divination*; yet, would not positively affirm there was no such art, but only that he doubted it.

He wrote three books of *Offices*, much commended by *Cicero*. *Lipsius* conjectures he died old, because *Cicero* affirmeth out of *Posidonius*, that he lived thirty years after he had written his Bookes of offices.

POSIDONIUS.

Strab. lib. 14.

Cic. Tusc. quæst. lib. 1.

POSIDONIUS was born at *Apamea* in *Syria*. He lived at *Rhodes*, and there managed civill affairs, and taught Philosophy. *Pompey* in his return from *Syria*, went to *Rhodes* purposely to hear him, and coming to his dore, forbade the Lictor to knock as was the custome, but he (saith *Pliny*) to whom the East and West had submitted, himselfe submitted his *Fasces* at this Gate. But understanding that he was very sick of a great pain in his, joynts he resolved only to give him a visit. At his first coming and salutation, he told him with much respect, that he was extreemly sorry he could not hear him. *Posidonius* answered, *You may; for no corporeall pain shall make me frustrate the coming of so great a person.* And thereupon he discoursed seriously and copiously upon this subject, as he lay in his bed, *That nothing is good, but what is honest.* And as often as his pain took him, he would say, *Pain it is to no purpose; though thou art troublesome, I will never acknowledge thou art ill.*

Cic. de nat.
Deor. lib. 2.

He made a *Sphear*, wherein were all the conversions of the Sun, Moon, and Planets exactly as they moved in the Heavens every day and night.

De divinat.

Of his writings are cited by *Cicero*, five Bookes of *Divination*; as also five bookes of the nature of the Gods.

Thus far we have a continued succession of the *stoick* Philosophers, the last *School*, according to *Laertius's* disposition, of those that were descended from *Thales*.

FINIS.

THE TABLE.

The fourth Part.

Containing the *Cyrenaick, Megarick, Eleack*
and *Eretriack* Sects.

A RISTIPPIUS. Chap. I. <i>His Country and Parents</i>	1
II. <i>How he went to Athens and heard Socrates</i>	2
III. <i>How he went to Ægina</i>	ibid
IV. <i>His institution of a Sect</i>	3
Sect. 1. <i>Of Judgment and Judicatories</i>	4
Sect. 2. <i>Of the End or chief Good</i>	4
Sect. 3. <i>Of Vertue</i>	5
V. <i>How he went to Dionysius's Court</i>	ibid
VI. <i>His Emulators</i>	6
VII. <i>His Apophthegms</i>	8
VIII. <i>His Writings</i>	11
IX. <i>His Death</i>	12
X. <i>His Disciples & successors</i>	14
HEGESIAS. Chap. I. <i>His Life</i>	15
II. <i>His Philosophy</i>	ibid
ANNICERIS. Chap. I. <i>His Life</i>	17
II. <i>His Philosophy</i>	ibid
THEODORUS. Chap. I. <i>His Life</i>	19
II. <i>His Philosophy</i>	20
III. <i>His Death, Writings, &c.</i>	21
BION. Chap. I. <i>His Life</i>	22
II. <i>His Apophthegms</i>	23
III. <i>His Death</i>	24
EUCLID. Chap. I. <i>His Country and Masters</i>	27
II. <i>His institution of a Sect</i>	ibid
III. <i>His Apophthegms, Writings</i>	28
EUBULIDES	29
ALEXINUS	31
EUPHANTUS	32
APOLLONIUS CRONUS	ibid
DIODORUS. Chap. I. <i>His Life</i>	ibid
II. <i>His Philosophy</i>	33
ICHTHIAS	34
CLINOMACHUS	ibid
STILPO. Chap. I. <i>His Life</i>	35
III. <i>His Philosophy</i>	36
III. <i>His Disciples</i>	37
IV. <i>His death, writings</i>	38
PHÆDO	39
PISTHENES	40
	ME-

The Table.

Chap.	Pag.
MENEDMUS, Chap. I. <i>His Country, Parents, Teachers</i>	ibid
II. <i>His School and Philosophy</i>	41
III. <i>His manner of living</i>	ibid
IV. <i>His Civill Employment</i>	43
V. <i>His Vertues and Apophthegmes</i>	44
VI. <i>His Departure from Eretria, and Death</i>	46

The Fifth Part.

Containing the *Academick Philosophers.*

P L A T O, Chap. I. <i>His Country, Parents and time</i>	p 1
II. <i>His first Education, Exercises, and studies</i>	4
III. <i>His Masters in Philosophy, and his Travels so that end</i>	7
IV. <i>What Authors he follow'd</i>	10
V. <i>His School</i>	12
VI. <i>How he instituted a Sect</i>	14
Sect. 1. <i>Ethick</i>	15
Sect. 2. <i>Physick</i>	ibid
Sect. 3. <i>Dialectick</i>	16
VII <i>His Inventions</i>	17
VIII. <i>His Distinctions</i>	19
IX. <i>His three voyages to Sicily</i>	23
X. <i>His Authority in Civill Affairs</i>	34
XI. <i>His Vertues and Morall Sentences</i>	37
XII. <i>His Will and Death</i>	49
XIII. <i>His Disciples and Friends</i>	42
XIV. <i>His Amulators and Detractors</i>	43
XV <i>His Writings</i>	45

The Doctrine of Plato delivered by *ALCINOUS.*

Chap. I. <i>Of Philosophy, and how a Philosopher must be qualify'd</i>	pag 56
II. <i>That contemplation is to be preferred before Action</i>	57
III. <i>The three parts of Philosophy</i>	ibid

D I A L E C T I C K.

IV. <i>Of the Judiciary part</i>	58
V. <i>The Elements and office of Dialectick</i>	69
VI. <i>Of Propositions and argumentations</i>	68
VII. <i>Of THEORETICK Philosophy</i>	64
VIII. <i>Of first matter</i>	66
IX. <i>Of Ideas</i>	67
X. <i>Of God</i>	68
XI. <i>Of Qualities</i>	70
XII. <i>Of the Causes, generation, Elements, and order of the World</i>	ibid
XIII. <i>Of the convenience of Figures, with the Elements and World</i>	72
XIV. <i>Of the Soul of the World, the sphears and Starres</i>	73

The Table.

Chap.	Pag.
XV. Of Demons and Elements	75
XVI. Of the younger Gods, makers of men	ibid
XVII. Of the body and parts of man, and powers of the Soul	76
XVIII. Of Sight	77
XIX. Of the rest of the Senses	ibid
XX. Of Heavy and Light	79
XXI. Of Respiration	ibid
XXII. Of the Causes of Diseases	ibid
XXIII. Of three principall powers of the Soul	80
XXIV. Of the distinction of the parts of the Soul	ibid
XXV. Of the immortality of the Soul	81
XXVI. Of Fate and Free-will	83
XXVII. Of the chief Good, and of Vertues	84
XXVIII. The Definition and kinds of Vertue	86
XXIX. Of Vertues, Vices and their differences	87
XXX. That Vertue is Voluntary, Vice involuntary	88
XXXI. Of love and Friendship	89
XXXII. Of Passions	90
XXXIII. Of the Forms of Common-wealths	92
XXXIV. Of a Sophist	93

A PLATONICK DISCOURSE.

*Written in Italian by JOHN PICUS Earl of Mirandula, in explication to
a Sonnet by Hieronimo Benniuieni: The first part*

The second Part	pag. 94
The Sonnet	99
The third Part	109
	113

SPEUSIPPUS. Chap. I. His Life	119
II. His Profession of Philosophy	120
III. His Writings	121
IV. His Death	122

XENOCRATES. Chap. I. His Country, Parents, living with Plato	123
II. His Profession of Philosophy	124
III. His Vertues and Apophthegms	125
IV. His Writings	127
His death	129

POLEMO	ibid
--------	------

CRATES.	131
---------	-----

CRANTOR	132
---------	-----

ARCESILAUS. Chap. I. His Country, Parents and Teachers	133
II. Upon what occasion he constituted the middle Academy	135
III. His Vertues and Apophthegms	139
IV. His death	142
LACYDES	143

CRANEADES. I. His Country, Parents, Time, Masters	145
Tert 2	II. How

The Table.

Chap.	Pag.
II. <i>How he constituted the New Academy</i>	146
III. <i>Upon what occasion he was sent on an Embassy to Rome</i>	151
IV. <i>His Vertues and Apophthegms</i>	152
V. <i>His Death and Writings</i>	144
CLITOMACHUS	155
PHILO	157
ANTIOCHUS	158

The Sixth Part.

Containing the *Peripatetick* Philosophers.

A RISTOTLE Chap. I. <i>His Conuntry, Parents, and time of his Birth</i>	p. 1
II. <i>His first Education and Studies</i>	3
III. <i>How he heard Plato</i>	ibid
IV. <i>How he lived with Hermias</i>	6
V. <i>How he lived with Philip and Alexander</i>	8
VI. <i>His School and manner of Teaching</i>	10
VII. <i>His Philosophy</i>	11
VIII. <i>His Correspondence with Alexander</i>	13
IX. <i>Upon what occasion he left Athens and went to Chalcis</i>	16
X. <i>His Apophthegms</i>	18
XI. <i>His Will and Death</i>	20
XII. <i>His Person and Vertues</i>	23
XIII. <i>His Wives and Children</i>	24
XIV. <i>His Disciples and Friends</i>	25
XV. <i>His Detractors</i>	27
XVI. <i>His Writings</i>	29
XVII. <i>His Commentators</i>	36
ARISTOTLE'S <i>Epistles</i>	39

THE DOCTRINE of ARISTOTLE.

The First Part.

I. O F Philosophy in generall, and particularly of DIALECTICK	42
II. <i>Of Termes</i>	43
III. <i>Of Proposition</i>	44
IV. <i>Of Syllogisme</i>	35
V. <i>Of Apodeictick (or Demonstrative) Syllogisme</i>	46
VI. <i>Of Dialectick Syllogisme</i>	48
VII. <i>Of Sophistick Syllogisme</i>	49

The Second Part.

Chap. I.	
O F PHYSICK	51
II. <i>Of the Principles of naturall Bodies</i>	ibid
III. <i>Of Nature and the Causes of natural Bodies,</i>	52
IV. <i>Of the Affections of naturall Bodies, motion, time, place</i>	53
V. <i>Of</i>	V. Of

The Table.

Chap.	Page.
V. Of the kinds and properties of motion	53
V. Of the first mover.	54
VI. Of Heaven	56
VII. Of Elements	59
VIII. Of Generation, Corruption, Alteration, Augmentation and Diminution	61
IX. Of Action and Passion	Ibid
X. Of Mixtion and Temperament	63
XI. Of imperfect mixt Bodies	66
XII. Of Perfect mixt Bodies	68
XIII. Of Plants and Animals	Ibid
XIV. Of the Soul	70
XV. Of the Nutritive Faculty	70
XVI. Of the Sensitive Faculty	72
XVII. Of Common Sense	73
XVIII. Of Phantasy and Cogitation	74
XIX. Of Memory and Reminiscence	Ibid
XX. Of Sleep and Waking	75
XXI. Of Dreams	76
XXII. Of the Intellective Faculty	77
XXIII. Of the Motive Faculty	78
XXIV. Of Life and Death.	

The Third Part.

I.	ETHICK	80
	II. OECONOMICK	90
III.	Politick	91

The Fourth Part.

I.	OF METAPHYSICK	93
	II. Of the first Principle	Ibid
III.	Of Substance and Accident	94
IV.	Of Power and Act	95
V.	Of True and False	96
VI.	Of one, the same, and divers	97
VII.	Of immortall, eternall, and immovable Substances	Ibid
VIII.	Of Gods	98
IX.	Of Intelligences	99
THEOPHRASTUS, Chap. I. His Country, Parents, Masters		
	II. His profession of Philosophy, and Disciples	100
	III. His Vertues and Apophthegmes	Ibid
	IV. His Will and Death	101
	V. His Writings	103
STRATO, Chap. I. His Life		
	II. His Will and Death	105
	III. His Writings	111
		Ibid
		131

LYCO

The Table

Chap.	Page.
LYCO, Chap. I. <i>His Life</i>	115
II. <i>His Will and Death.</i>	116
ARISTO	119
CRITOLAUS	120
DIODORUS	ibid

The Seventh Part.

Containing the Cynick Philosophers.

I. ANTISTHENES, <i>his Life</i>	1
II. <i>His Institution of a Sect.</i>	2
III. <i>His Apophthegmes</i>	4
IV. <i>His Writings</i>	6
V. <i>His Death.</i>	9
DIOGENES, Chap. I. <i>His Country, Parents, Time, Banishment</i>	10
II. <i>How he lived at Athens</i>	11
III. <i>How he lived at Corinth</i>	13
IV. <i>His Philosophy</i>	14
V. <i>His Apophthegmes</i>	15
VI. <i>His Writings</i>	29
VII. <i>His Death</i>	31
MONIMUS	32
ONESICRITUS	ibid
CRATES	33
METROCLES	35
HIPPARCHIA	36
MENIPPUS	37
MENEDEMUS	38

The Eighth Part.

Containing the Stoick Philosophers.

I. ZENO, <i>his Country, Parents, and first Studies</i>	1
II. <i>Of his Masters</i>	2
III. <i>His School, and Institution of a Sect.</i>	3
IV. <i>What honours were conferred upon him</i>	ibid
V. <i>His Apophthegmes</i>	4
VI. <i>His Death</i>	8
VII. <i>His Person and Vertues</i>	10
VIII. <i>His Writings</i>	11
IX. <i>His Disciples</i>	12

The DOCTRINE of the STOICKS.

The First Part.

I. OF Philosophy in generall, and particularly of DIALECTIC	16
II. <i>Of the Instruments and Rules of judgment</i>	19
III. <i>Of</i>	ibid

The Table.

Chap.	Page
III. Of Sense	20
IV. Of Phantasy	1b
V. Of True and Truth	24
VI. Of Comprehension	1b
VII. Of Assent	35
VIII. Of Notions	27
IX. Of Science and Opinion	1b
X. Of Voice, Speech, and Words	28
XI. Of Definition and Division	33
XII. Of Genus, Species, &c.	31
XIII. Of Things	36
XIV. Of Subjects	1b
XV. Of Qualitatives	37
XVI. Of Quodammodotatives	38
XVII. Of Quodammodotatives as to others	39
XVIII. Of Dicibles	40
XIX. Of Categorems	42
XX. Of Simple Axioms	43
XXI. Of Not-simple Axioms	44
XXII. Of Contrary Axioms	46
XXIII. Of Possible and Impossible, Necessary and Unnecessary, Probable, Paradoxall, and Reasonable Axioms	47
XXIV. Of Reciprocall Axioms	48
XXV. Of Signes	49
XXVI. Of Reasons or Arguments	1b
XXVII. Of Conclusive Reasons	51
XXVIII. Of Syllogistick conclusive Reasons or Syllogismes	52
XXIX. Of Moods	53
XXX. Of Not-Syllogistick conclusive Reasons	54
XXXI. Of Not-conclusive Reasons	55
XXXII. Of Fallacious Reasons or Sophisms	57
XXXIII. Of Method	58

The Second Part.

I. ETHICK, and the parts thereof	59
II. Of Appetite	1b
III. Of first Naturall Appetite	60
IV. Of Appetites consequent to the first	61
V. Of Good and Ill	62
VI. Of Emphathies	69
VII. Of Passions	1b
VIII. Of Sicknesse and Infirmities	73
IX. Of Vertue and Vice	76
X. Of the End	80
XI. Of Indifferents	82
XII. Of Estimation	84
XIII. Of Actions and Offices	86
XIV. Of Præter-Offices	91
XV. Of Wise or Vertuous Persons, PARADOXES	92

The

The Table

The Third Part.

Chap.

I. **P**HYRICK, and the parts thereof

II. Of Bodies

III. Of Principles

IV. Of Matter

V. Of the World

VI. Of Elements.

VII. Of Fire

VIII. Of the Starrs

IX. Of the Sun.

X. Of the Moon

XI. Of Air

XII. Of Water and Earth

XIII. Of Mixture and Temperament

XIV. Of Generation and Corruption

XV. Of Motion

XVI. Of living Creatures

XVII. Of God

XVIII. Of Nature

XIX. Of Fate

XX. Of Not-Bodies, or Incorporealls, and first of Dicibles

XXI. Of Vacuum and Place

XXII. Of Time

CLEANTHES, Chap. I. his Life

II. His Apophthegms

III. His Writings

IV. His Death

CHRYSIPPUS, Chap. I. his life

II. His Apophthegms

III. His Writings

IV. His death

ZENO

DIOGENES

ANTIPATER

PANÆTIUS

POSIDONIUS

FINIS.

Page.

98

99

ibid

100

101

104

105

ibid

107

108

109

110

111

112

ibid

113

115

119

120

123

ibid

ibid

125

126

127

129

130

131

132

139

141

ibid

ibid

ibid

142

10
11
12

age

98

99

ibid

100

101

104

105

ibid

107

108

109

110

111

112

ibid

113

115

119

120

123

ibid

ibid

124

126

127

129

130

131

132

139

141

ibid

ibid

ibid

142